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Foreword
Attempts to build interstate cooperation on migration within a global 
framework are not new. In 1927, the League of Nations explored at some 
length the possible adoption of an international convention to “facilitate and 
regulate” international exchange of labor. But no definitive decision was taken, 
and there was little follow-up. In the wake of World War II, when Europe was 
economically devastated and suffered from serious labor shortages, several 
international and regional organizations, including the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), the European Economic Community (now the European 
Union), and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (now the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]), were 
calling for freer movement of workers to help economic reconstruction and 
development. But by the mid-1970s, as oil prices soared and most industrial 
countries faced massive unemployment and looming stagflation, these calls 
were abandoned and new slogans of “trade in place of migration” and “taking 
work to workers” gained ground.  
Years later, in 1980, the Willy Brandt Commission lamented the absence 
of a shared understanding of the principles that should guide international mi-
gration and urged nations to “build, on the basis of the interests of the countries 
concerned, a framework that would be more just and equitable than the present 
one” (Brandt 1980). Yet, again, nothing much happened.
In the past few years, however, things have been slowly, but perceptibly, 
changing. The enormous economic, political, and human costs of the growing 
mismatch between rising emigration pressure and dwindling opportunities for 
legal entry (especially for low-skilled labor migrants) have led a number of 
academics and policy analysts to call for a concerted global approach to inter-
national migration. Some have also emphasized the efficiency gains that the 
world economy would derive from more multilateral openness in international 
migration. Some have also linked these gains to future labor market, social 
security, and demographic trends in developed and developing regions. But 
while these calls from individual academics and policy analysts have become 
increasingly vocal, they have made relatively little institutional or policy-level 
impact.
A first major institutional approach to the issue was then made in 1993, 
when the Commission on Global Governance (cochaired by Ingvar Carlsson, 
the then Prime Minister of Sweden) considered a paper outlining a proposal 
for the establishment of a new global regime to better manage migration. As 
a direct follow-up, a global project (New International Regime for Orderly 
Movement of People [NIROMP]) was launched in 1997, with the support of 
xv
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the United Nations (UN) and several European governments, to build a glo-
bal consensus for such a regime. The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) served as the main executing agency. A first intergovernmental meet-
ing held in Geneva (September 1997) under its auspices generally endorsed 
the concept and objectives of the global regime. In December 1999 a second 
intergovernmental meeting, also held in Geneva, helped develop a common 
framework for return and reintegration of migrants as a component of the new 
regime. In the following year it found a regional echo in a West African min-
isterial conference on migration, which was held in Dakar. During 2001 the 
project concept and findings were widely debated in a series of meetings held 
in a number of capitals and university centers in Europe and the United States. 
A momentum was created for moving forward. However, soon thereafter, with 
a shift in the organization’s program priorities alongside changes at the top of 
its secretariat, IOM lost interest in the initiative. 
A next major step was the Berne initiative, a state-owned process launched 
by the Swiss government in 2001. In line with the NIROMP approach, it aimed 
to develop a broad policy framework to facilitate cooperation between states in 
planning and managing migration, based on interests and concerns common to 
all. Following its first conference (Berne I) in July 2003, it held four regional 
consultations in 2004 to enable regions to become associated with the initia-
tive. A second international conference (Berne II) was held in the same year to 
take into account the regional inputs. But by that time the original thrust of the 
initiative had been considerably diluted, with a shift away from its collective 
and regulatory multilateral approach. The consequence was the adoption of a 
nonbinding agenda for pursuing well-meaning goals for migration manage-
ment. With political changes in the country and transfers of key officials in the 
government, further activities soon tapered off. 
Meanwhile, the need for a more coherent and concerted global approach 
to migration management was underscored by several independent interna-
tional commissions. These included the Commission on Human Security 
(2001–2003), set up at the initiative of the Government of Japan, and the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, sponsored by the ILO. 
They repeated the call already made under NIROMP and the original Berne 
Initiative for the development of an international framework for better govern-
ance of migration. In 2004 the ILO then formally adopted a plan of action, one 
component of which concerned the development of a nonbinding multilateral 
framework for a rights-based approach to labor migration. There was, howev-
er, no mention of freer movement of labor under a multilateral arrangement.
Then came the Global Commission on International Migration, estab-
lished by Switzerland, Sweden, and several other like-minded governments, 
with the active encouragement of the then UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. 
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However, the commission shied away from the idea of a harmonized multi-
lateral framework on grounds that “the governments were not ready for it,” 
making its deliberations more of a fact-finding, rather than a forward-looking, 
exercise. No action was taken on the report, except that it was used as one 
of the inputs for the “High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development” 
(HLD), which the UN organized in September 2006. But the hopes, if any, for 
a reinvigorated multilaterally harmonized approach to migration were dashed 
as the member states were unable to agree on any new initiative by the UN in 
this area. It just encouraged the establishment, outside the UN’s organizational 
framework, of a Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) to be 
run by willing and like-minded governments. The GFMD held its first session 
in Brussels in 2007 and the second in Manila (GFMD II) in October 2008. It 
has no formal mandate, however, and the agenda for its annual meeting is fixed
mostly by the host government in consultation with others. The GFMD can 
thus discuss any of the issues bearing on migration and development, but it is 
not specifically geared to developing an internationally harmonized migration 
regime; however, nothing prevents it from addressing the issue.
The above narrative of events highlights the fact that, despite eloquent 
pronouncements and a plethora of consultations, governments and intergov-
ernmental organizations have so far remained sluggish in giving a concrete 
shape to the proposed international framework. Meanwhile, however, several 
nongovernmental organizations and academic groups have been pushing ahead 
with the proposal, building on the work already undertaken. For instance, at 
its sixth annual conference in Rotterdam, the Canada-based International 
Metropolitan Project focused on the issue under the session’s keynote theme, 
“Managing Migration in the 21st Century.” At its ninth annual conference, held 
in Geneva in 2004, it revisited the theme and organized a panel discussion on 
the subject under the title “The Emerging Migration Management Paradigm: 
Cooperation and Partnership.” In the Netherlands, the 21-Point Action Pro-
gramme—adopted in 2002 by the Hague Process on Refugees and Migration 
(THP)—includes a commitment to gathering support for developing a con-
certed global approach to migration management. 
Professor Joel Trachtman’s excellent study appears at this juncture, 
which makes it particularly timely. It examines openness in migration from 
economic, political, and ethical perspectives, and relates the discussion to the 
existing international law of migration. It also puts forward proposals for a set 
of detailed international legal rules on liberalization of economic migration, 
based on reciprocity of state’s interests—a distinctive contribution that carries 
forward earlier work done in this area. In doing all this, Trachtman, a widely 
respected legal scholar, shows a high degree of professional rigor and scholar-
xvii
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ship combined with an objective, balanced, and forward-looking approach to 
the complex issues involved. 
The excellence of the book notwithstanding, it would be naïve to assume 
that everyone will fully agree with all that it suggests. Admittedly, there are 
also new or additional issues relevant to the subject of the book that remain to 
be further explored.
In appraising the ground for a global compact on economic migration 
based on reciprocity of interests, Trachtman delves into such issues as skilled 
migration, remittances, and temporary migration, drawing with considerable 
dexterity on the mainstream economic migration literature on these questions. 
The problem, however, is that the mainstream debate has yet to catch up fully 
with the changing nature of some of these issues and the most recent research 
findings on them. For example, following the mainstream view, the study of-
ten assumes that emigration of skilled workers is necessarily harmful for a 
developing country. A number of recent theoretical and empirical studies sug-
gest however that it is not always or invariably so and that at least in some 
cases it may, on balance, even benefit a country. Under these “optimal skilled 
migration models” much depends on the country-specific situation, especially 
as concerns the proportion of a country’s skilled migrants abroad to the total 
number of its skilled workers and the quality and structure of its education sys-
tem. To the extent that these findings are valid, some developing countries may 
be willing to send specified numbers of selected skilled migrants in exchange 
for the admission of a number of unskilled workers by developed countries. 
Although not mentioned in the study, this opens up a new window of reciproc-
ity in the bargaining between developed and developing countries.
On the other hand, for many developing countries the net value of remit-
tances as a compensation for their loss of skills is often much more limited 
than what much of the mainstream migration literature (reversing the views in 
the past) seems to suggest. It tends to underrate several of the potential pitfalls 
involved, such as excessive dependence on remittance income, postponement 
of essential economic reform, and volatility as well as pro-cyclicality of invest-
ment-oriented remittances. The book rightly takes a cautious view of the role 
of remittances in the context of any bargaining on openness in migration. In a 
similar vein, it shows prudence in addressing the issue of temporary migration. 
Although temporary immigration may be more attractive for receiving coun-
tries because (arguably) it entails lower political cost, it does raise, as a recent 
OECD study shows, the adjustment and training costs due to recurrent changes 
in workforce. Sending countries, too, may suffer due to the possible temporary 
unemployment of the returning migrants and the cost of their reintegration into 
the job markets. 
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The somewhat random comments I have just made do not detract from 
Trachtman’s basic paradigm or the conceptual approach that underpins his 
proposal. They only point to the promising scope for further exploration of 
several potential areas of reciprocity or trade-offs between migrant sending 
and receiving countries to facilitate liberalization commitments envisioned in 
the book. Of some special interest in this context are the areas of reciprocity 
being opened up by the emerging role of transnational diasporas that link mi-
grant receiving (developed) and migrant-sending (developing) countries. They 
include, in addition to remittances to sending countries, diasporas’ financial
and entrepreneurial engagement in business, promotion of trade and tourism, 
transfer of technology and skill circulation, and establishment of knowledge 
and information-based networks. In a globalized world economy, these links 
often yield benefits to both groups of countries. In several ways they add new 
dimensions to the conventional debate on such issues as skilled migration, re-
mittances, and temporary movements. 
Not surprisingly, a number of countries have therefore adopted dual 
nationality legislation or analogous arrangements to facilitate transborder 
movement, especially of those diasporas who are now host country citizens. It 
seems logical to think that countries that are not inclined to do so may find it 
useful to explore an alternative reciprocal arrangement—developing countries 
could trade their supportive measures, including access to special, multi-entry 
visas, to facilitate diaspora participation in productive business and other ven-
tures in their countries against developed countries’ commitments to liberalize 
labor immigration under the agreement. This avenue of action makes it easier 
for developing countries to tap the development potential of their noncitizen 
diasporas than through the taxation arrangements discussed in the book. There 
may also be some promising areas of cross-sectoral reciprocity. For example, 
as the recent Doha Round of trade negotiations showed, there is a glimmer of 
real possibility for nations, developed and developing, to exchange trade con-
cessions in certain farm products or manufactures against admission of certain 
groups of labor migrants. 
An attractive feature of the agreement proposed in the book relates to the 
flexibility and gradualness of its approach to openness. This makes Tracht-
man’s approach, which is very much in line with the principle of “regulated 
openness” as envisioned under NIROMP, politically more realistic. This prob-
ably also explains why he has opted for a “positive list” approach (under this 
each state specifies sectors in which it would liberalize) to commitments for 
openness. Admittedly, one potential weakness of the positive list approach 
is that, unless counterbalanced by other agreed measures, it tends to give a 
differential edge to the more economically powerful or hegemonic states. In 
the present case, the rising pressure for emigration (or excessive demand for 
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admission) in labor-abundant countries is likely to put them in a weaker bar-
gaining position. Fearful of excessive inflows, rich destination countries may 
be inclined to withhold commitments on openness. A way out of this situation 
may lie in a collateral commitment by both sending and receiving countries to 
reduce excessive labor emigration pressure, with appropriate assistance from 
the rich destination countries. 
The book focuses on economic or labor migration, which is the most im-
portant component of contemporary international migration. But is it possible 
to ensure the sustainability of an international agreement that, however fle -
ible otherwise, is confined to labor migration in isolation? Experience shows 
that different channels of migration are closely interconnected, and that when 
the pressure or demand for emigration by a particular channel far exceeds the 
opportunities for legal entry, the flows are diverted to an alternative legal (or 
irregular) channel, encouraging “category jumping.” The fact that much of the 
contemporary international migration is driven by mixed motivation exacer-
bates the potential risk of category jumping. This could clog the channel for the 
admission of bona fide labor migrants under the proposed agreement, unless 
the excessive pressures from other sources can at the same time be reduced.  
The “reverse safeguard” included in the agreement does provide for in-
creased liberalization commitments under exceptional circumstances. But 
do these emergency measures, however useful, go far enough? In many poor 
countries, causes for potential surges—such as environmental degradation, 
drought, floods and loss of crops, endemic poverty, widespread violence, and 
gross violation of human rights—are so structurally embedded that they need 
to be reckoned as “chronic emergencies.” If the labor migration channel is to 
be kept free from congestion, it seems important to address these other sources 
of emigration pressure through complementary measures within a comprehen-
sive and coherent framework of interstate cooperation. As an autonomous but 
interconnected instrument, the proposed agreement on economic migration 
can then be expected to function more smoothly. 
The book’s discussion makes a sharp distinction between sending (ori-
gin) and receiving (destination) countries, and sometimes assumes that all in 
the first group are developing countries while those in the second group are 
rich, developed countries. Recent ILO surveys show, however, that at least 
one-fourth of all countries are major senders and major receivers of migrants 
at the same time. For these countries, migration in large part is bidirectional. 
Most recent statistics also reveal that much of international migration takes 
place within the developing world itself. The World Bank recently suggested 
that some 40 percent of the world’s migrant stock was in developing countries 
and that roughly half of the migrants from developing countries were migrat-
ing to other developing countries. Clearly, both these trends have important 
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implications for a possible multilateral agreement on economic migration. For 
example, the involvement of a significant number of countries in both sending 
and receiving migrants is likely to widen the areas of reciprocity and scope for 
bargaining between countries. On the other hand, the divergence of interests 
within the developing world makes the process of group bargaining more com-
plex. Further exploration of these issues would facilitate interstate trade-offs 
and cooperation envisaged in the book. 
I believe that in the coming years, stung by the gathering malaise of a 
mismatch between rising emigration pressures and dwindling opportunities for 
legal entry, nations will be impelled to cooperate more closely to bring these 
contradictory trends into a dynamic harmony and improve the governance of 
human mobility. It is difficult to foresee what form(s) such cooperation would 
take; it would probably lead to the development of a set of autonomous but 
interconnected normative instruments—both hard and soft, as appropriate—
complementing those that already exist. Hopefully, these specific subregimes 
would be formulated within a common, multilaterally harmonized framework 
ensuring overall policy coherence. It is conceivable that by 2025 the global 
migration system would become more stable and these normative arrange-
ments will work under much less tension. This stability would come from two 
sources: 1) improved political and economic situation, including high rates 
of economic growth in some (though not all) of the major sending countries 
and declining income and wage differentials between these and rich receiving 
countries; and 2) technological progress and rich countries’ increased ability 
and willingness to make adjustments in their labor market, social security, and 
demographic policies as well as in aspects of their lifestyle. 
This book, while standing out for its excellence as a scholarly text, gains 
additional salience from the perspective of policy development as conjectured 
above for several reasons. First, it strengthens the arguments for a cooperative 
global approach to international migration, and bolsters the ongoing efforts to 
build support for it. Second, it delineates a specific legal model for structuring 
such interstate cooperation on economic migration that could fit into a wider 
global framework of common norms and principles. Third, it lays the basis for 
further research and exploration of areas of reciprocity to enhance the pros-
pects of cooperation on economic migration. 
Scholars, academics, and policymakers, as well as anyone interested in 
better governance of human mobility, will find it rewarding to go through this 
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1
1  
Introduction: Toward  
the Fourth Freedom
It was permissible from the beginning of the world, when 
everything was in common, for anyone to set forth and travel 
wheresoever he would.
 —Francisco de Vitoria 
(quoted in Plender [1988], p. 2)
International migration is the missing link between global-
ization and development.
—Rubens Ricupero 
(quoted in International Organization for Migration [2001])
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall, 
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it, 
And spills the upper boulders in the sun, 
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
—Robert Frost (1914)
This book explores the economic and political ramifications of 
liberalization of national rules of migration through international le-
gal agreements, examines the existing international law of economic 
migration, and develops detailed conjectural proposals for new interna-
tional legal rules in this field  1 
As I reviewed the prior literature on the law of economic migra-
tion, and as I interviewed policymakers and scholars active in this field,
it was continually impressed upon me that “people are not commod-
ities.”2 When I began my research, I tended to set aside this caveat, 
thinking that this truism was simply a way to avoid grappling with the 
hard issues of whether to have, and how to structure, international legal 
commitments on labor migration. However, as I learned, and thought, 
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2   Trachtman
more, I understood that the point is that people are complex, with com-
plex needs and relationships. 
Goods are often single purchase events and do not broadly entail a 
continuing relationship between buyer and seller. Services, while often 
entailing more complex and durable relationships than a purchase of 
goods, are relatively unidimensional. Individuals, on the other hand, 
are multidimensional, and their movement as workers involves long-
term relationships of great complexity with governments and with 
employers. 
Throughout my research for this book I was also periodically re-
minded of the aphorism attributed to the Swiss author Max Frisch: 
“We imported workers and got men instead.” Men and women come 
with cultures and skills and grow up in dense familial and social net-
works. They have spouses and children. They need education, health 
care, political engagement, and all the other fruits of society. They bear 
responsibilities to society as well, including taxes and perhaps military 
service. So, as we discuss migration, we must recognize that it requires 
breaking and restructuring many relationships: a costly endeavor in the 
deepest sense. 
Despite this complexity, and despite these costs, individuals some-
times determine that migration is their best option. However, there are 
substantial barriers in place today, which prevent people from achieving 
their desires to move to seek a better life. These barriers often demean 
human welfare. So it seems worthwhile to grapple with the complex-
ity in order to evaluate whether and how to unlock substantial welfare 
gains. But it is important to say that at stake is welfare in the broadest 
sense: the right and power to move should be seen as an essential lib-
erty, which is today highly constrained. 
Individuals will only decide to undertake migration if they perceive 
that it is worthwhile to them. Throughout history, some have decided 
to do so while many others have not. But we must also recognize that 
there are costs and benefits that are external to the individual migrant. 
The migrant may be permitted to decide whether to accept these costs 
and benefits for his or her own family, but what about costs and benefits
of the migrant’s decision that are felt by the migrant’s former compa-
triots, or by the migrant’s new hosts? The external effects of migration 
legitimate the desire to regulate migration to some extent. 
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Introduction   3
MIgra TIon, The S Ta Te, and In Terna TIonal  l aw
For millennia, human migration was unconstrained, and people 
and even peoples often moved to seek a better life (Diamond 1999). 
While migration was a mechanism of social and biological evolution, 
by which stronger societies overcame weaker ones, and human society 
expanded its geographic scope and adaptive capacity (Chua 2007), it 
was also a mechanism of integration, forming multicultural societies 
which then became new cultures. 
One of the main roles, and powers, of the modern state involves 
citizenship, and the capacity to exclude outsiders. This role of the state 
stands in opposition to the natural movement of individuals, limiting 
human freedom. On the other hand, one might argue that the freedom 
to associate within a state, even exclusively of others, is an important 
innovation in human freedom and enhances the ability of individuals 
to develop unique and enhanced cultures. Perhaps freedom is on both 
sides of the argument. But to the extent that these freedoms are incon-
sistent with one another—which merits further analysis—what is the 
best trade-off? 
The role of international law in this as in other contexts is to allow 
states to constrain themselves where their unregulated action would be 
less desirable than action constrained by international law. International 
law has not broadly responded to state restraints on immigration. There 
are a number of reasons why there is little international law addressing 
state restraints on immigration. One reason is that these restraints are 
fairly recent. 
The United States, which was once a nation of immigrants, only 
began to restrict immigration at the federal level in 1875, and then re-
strictions were limited to those who were destitute, engaged in immoral 
activities, or physically handicapped.3 These restrictions seem to be in-
tended to protect the public fisc, as opposed to jobs. However, the U.S. 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 responded to concerns about competi-
tion from cheap immigrant labor, as well as racism. In fact, throughout 
the history of immigration restrictions, we see the influence of both 
protectionism and racism. However, the late nineteenth century was 
still a period of effectively liberal policies toward migration. “Roughly 
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60 million Europeans emigrated to the New World between 1820 and 
1914” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 2). This liberalism ended in the imposition of 
country of origin quotas during the early twentieth century (O’Rourke 
2004). 
During the early twentieth century, many popular destination states 
began to establish restrictions on immigration. During the past sixty 
years, global society has made important strides toward free movement 
of goods, money, and even some types of services. Yet human migration 
for economic and noneconomic reasons remains broadly constrained. 
This book explores the law and policy of international economic 
migration. It analyzes the economics and politics of migration in order 
to assess the fit between the legal rules and institutions that presently 
exist to govern international economic migration, and the goal of 
maximizing welfare. In fact, there are practically no multilateral inter-
national legal rules regulating migration for economic purposes. This 
work shows that, in order to establish the domestic and international 
political conditions for welfare-enhancing liberalization of migration, it 
may be necessary to establish complex and binding international legal 
agreements regarding liberalization. 
Four Freedo MS
In connection with trade in goods and services, and also in connec-
tion with movement of workers, the European Union (EU) is a paradigm 
of advanced integration. Within the EU, the drive toward free trade and 
economic integration has been defined in terms of four freedoms: free 
movement of 1) goods, 2) services, 3) money, and 4) labor. The EU 
has made important progress in achieving all four freedoms, including 
the fourth freedom: legally authorized free movement of labor. In the 
global setting, we have done little to establish, or reestablish, the fourth 
freedom. 
In the United States during the Second World War, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt declared four other freedoms for each citizen of the globe: 
1) freedom of expression, 2) freedom of conscience, 3) freedom from 
fear, and 4) freedom from want. This fourth freedom—freedom from 
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want—is directly linked to free movement of labor: free movement of 
labor enhances the capacity of individuals to be free from want. While 
throughout history migrants have moved to avoid oppression of all 
kinds, today many would like to move to obtain better livelihoods. The 
European fourth freedom is closely related to Roosevelt’s fourth free-
dom: freedom from want can be enhanced by freedom of movement of 
labor. 
This fourth freedom seems to have intrinsic value, but it also has 
enormous instrumental value. The dual pressures of globalization and 
demographic imbalance suggest the utility of greater legal structure to 
facilitate and regulate economic migration. 
d emography and d estiny
One important set of determinants of the quantity of migration is 
supply of and demand for work abroad. 
On the demand side, the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
(2006, p. 28) explains why demographic trends—principally the rela-
tive youth of developing country populations—suggest that the number 
of people who wish to migrate from developing to high-income coun-
tries will rise in the period through 2026. While the global workforce is 
expected to increase substantially in the decade ending in 2010, the vast 
majority of the increase will take place in developing countries. As de-
veloping countries have relatively young populations, and as the returns 
to migration are greater the earlier in one’s life that one migrates, it 
is appropriate to anticipate increased numbers of people in developing 
countries interested in emigration (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2006, p. 28). 
Demography also operates on the “supply” side in this model: the 
supply of immigration opportunities would be expected to increase 
as developed country populations age. The workforces in developed 
countries are about to begin a decline. The high-income countries will 
experience a general decline in working-age population during the pe-
riod 2010–2025 (OECD 2007; World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2006, p. 29). 
Wealthier states such as Germany, Japan, and the United States are 
anticipating labor shortages that will have substantial adverse conse-
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quences for their prosperity, for their ability to provide services to aging 
populations, and for their ability to fund social welfare programs (Mc-
Donald and Kippen 2001). The stock of immigrants to high-income 
countries increased at about 3 percent per year from 1980 to 2000, up 
from a 2.4 percent pace in the 1970s (World Bank Independent Evalua-
tion Group 2006, p. 27). About 70 percent of this increase is accounted 
for by the United States and Germany, which only account for 40 percent 
of the population of high-income countries. The Pew Research Center 
has recently stated that, based on current trends, “The population of the 
United States will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, 
and 82 percent of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from 
2005 to 2050 and their U.S.-born descendants . . .” (Passel and Cohn 
2008). 
In some advanced states, these shortages arise from fertility rates 
that are below replacement levels. It is estimated that between 2010 
and 2030, the number of employed people in Europe will fall by ap-
proximately 20 million, while the number of older people will rise from 
71 million to 110 million (Commission of the European Communities 
2003a,b). 
Thus, there are prospective increases on both the demand and sup-
ply side of international migration. Therefore, both wealthy and poor 
states will find themselves responsible to manage and regularize, even 
encourage, flows of migrant labor—flows of migrants. While this need 
will be reflected in part in unilateral policy measures, it will become 
important, for a variety of reasons addressed in this work, for states to 
cooperate in managing global migration. In some cases, it will be ben-
eficial to enter into international agreements simply to manage flows
of immigrant labor. There are a number of historical examples of in-
ternational agreements used to regulate economically inevitable flows
of workers, and there exist today hundreds of bilateral labor mobility 
agreements that do so. In other cases, it will be useful for states to make 
commitments to liberalize their restrictions on immigration. 
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Force S beh Ind The l aw  o F MIgra TIon
There are great gains in welfare to be made in freeing up interna-
tional economic migration, just as there have been and continue to be 
great gains to be made in freeing up international trade in goods, ser-
vices, and money. The global and sectoral welfare effects of migration 
will be examined in detail in Chapter 2. 
It is estimated that a modest increase in industrial countries’ quotas 
on incoming temporary workers, equal to an aggregate of 3 percent of 
their current workforces, would result in increased world welfare of 
more than US$356 billion a year by 2025 (World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group 2006). Scaled to the same reference year, 2001, the 
gains from a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants is $175 billion, 
while the gains from total trade liberalization are $155 billion (World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 41). “If international pol-
icy makers were really interested in maximizing worldwide efficienc , 
they would spend little of their energies on a new trade round or on the 
international financial architecture. They would all be busy at work lib-
eralizing immigration restrictions” (Rodrik 2001). 
These gains would be shared by developed and developing coun-
tries, although the greatest portion of gains would accrue to the migrants 
themselves. But perhaps even more important, migration, if it is man-
aged carefully, can help to raise the living standards in poor countries. 
In order to achieve these gains, it is necessary to overcome obstacles to 
bargaining, and to assist political processes in realizing the magnitude 
of the potential gains. With so much welfare improvement to be gained, 
states will endeavor to overcome these obstacles to bargaining. Chapter 
3 addresses the possibilities for doing so through international legal 
commitments. 
So, poverty reduction may be an important goal of liberalization of 
migration. However, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2003) argue that
compared with the late 19th century . . . early 21st century policies 
make it far more difficult for developing countries to use migra-
tion as a means of convergence on the rich. One hundred years ago 
mass emigration raised living standards significantly in countries 
such as Ireland, Italy and Sweden, enabling them to converge on 
the core countries of the day, Britain and the U.S. Indeed, mass 
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migration can account for as much as 70 percent of the conver-
gence in living standards worldwide which occurred during the 
late 19th century . . . Today’s rich country immigration policies not 
only prevent developing economies from raising their average liv-
ing standards via emigration; by admitting skilled workers rather 
than unskilled workers, these policies may actually hurt develop-
ing economies via the brain drain effect, and also make them less 
equal (by raising the relative wages of skilled workers). 
There are important barriers to realizing increased welfare and in-
creased economic equality. But the critical point is that these are policy 
barriers rather than natural barriers. The goal of this work is to explore 
these barriers, and to suggest international legal responses. 
In economic terms, migration is a result of demand and supply. To 
think of this relationship in economic terms from the standpoint of the 
potential migrant deciding whether to migrate, we might understand 
the present value of life opportunities at home, plus the cost of migra-
tion, as the total cost to the potential migrant, while the present value of 
life opportunities in the destination state is the benefit to the potential 
migrant. Whenever the benefit exceeds the cost, the potential migrant 
will wish to migrate. Of course, each individual will have different op-
portunities at home and in the destination state, and different ways of 
valuing various components of their opportunities. 
Of critical importance, now and in the future, will be demographic 
supply and demand, as discussed above. Pressure to emigrate from poor 
countries is increasing (Ghosh 2000, pp. 6, 10). Differences in wages, 
largely due to differences in productivity, drive the demand. “For exam-
ple, in 1975 per capita GDPs in the high-income countries were on 
average 41 times higher than those in low-income countries, and 8 
times higher than in middle-income countries. By 2000, high-income 
countries had per capita GDPs that were 66 times those in low-income 
countries and 14 times those in middle-income countries” (Martin 2004, 
p. 4). “Despite the public announcements by policy-makers in numer-
ous regional and international fora for a concerted use of aid, trade, and 
foreign investment to reduce emigration pressure in labour-abundant 
countries, there is little evidence that the strategy is being consistently 
applied or that it is making a real impact at the global level” (Ghosh 
2000, p. 17). 
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Source countries are sometimes ambivalent, and would at least be 
expected to vary in their policy responses to emigration. First, emigra-
tion can reduce pressure on domestic employment markets, and can 
produce remittances, which can be an important source of foreign ex-
change. So, important countries such as the Philippines and India have 
sought to promote emigration. However, the risk of brain drain might 
raise concerns in particular circumstances. 
Demand to migrate is not exclusively dependent on demography 
and economic circumstances. Reduction of transportation costs due to 
new transportation technologies has reduced the costs of migration to 
a point within reach of the very poor. This change has increased the 
number of potential migrants (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 1). Costs 
imposed by the destination country’s immigration system also affect the 
decision to migrate. For poor people, these costs have been a significant
barrier. 
Demand to migrate is also affected by conditions in departure coun-
tries, compared to conditions in destination countries. So, in addition 
to the critical factors of wages and productivity, human rights abuses, 
insecurity, disease, and other negative factors in the departure countries, 
combined with their opposites in the destination countries, would be 
expected to affect demand for migration. Famines, revolutions, govern-
ment crises, and ethnic cleansing and other action have contributed to 
the timing and source of migration (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 
213). There are important links between economic migration and forced 
migration, and the border between these phenomena is not always clear. 
In fact, any regime for management of either voluntary or forced mi-
gration must deal with the problem of definition and enforcement of 
categories. 
The cost of migration is also dependent on the costs of travel and 
information, and on the ease of obtaining legal permission for migra-
tion to the destination country, or on the ease of evading enforcement of 
legal restrictions. It is important to note that migration is facilitated by 
reduced costs of transportation and communication. Perhaps less obvi-
ous as a causal factor is greater information and education, increasing 
awareness of better conditions abroad. Migration can also build upon 
itself, as emigrants supply information and support to future emigrants. 
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Earlier migration has resulted in “diasporas” in developed countries 
that can promote and facilitate future migration. 
Restrictions on immigration reduce the supply of immigration op-
portunities. They can also be understood as increases to the price of 
migration, as the restrictions themselves would have effects on the cost 
of migration. Supply and demand will adjust toward equilibrium. Oc-
casionally, shocks will occur, changing some of these parameters and 
thereby changing the relevant prices. 
As these demand and supply factors change, there is no particular 
reason for the relevant law to remain static. “With respect to migration, 
national regulatory regimes and municipal law in general simply must 
accommodate the development of international markets for skilled and 
unskilled workers” (Hollifie d 2000, pp. 75, 87; Sassen 1996). The 
same perspective applies to the applicable international law. In fact, all 
law is to some extent dynamic, as it responds to changed conditions and 
aspirations. In addition to being molded to fit social conditions, law can 
also play a leading role, driving social change. 
Migration, g lobalization, and l aw
Migration is a parameter of globalization, and it also has complex 
relationships of substitutability and complementarity with other pa-
rameters of globalization: movement of goods, services, information, 
money, and investment. Rubens Ricupero states that “migration is the 
missing link between globalization and development” (International 
Organization for Migration 2001).
Freeman (2006) examines the degree of international economic 
integration in labor, evaluating both quantities of movement of labor 
compared to movement of other factors, and price differentials in labor 
compared to price differentials in other factors. He finds that the labor 
market “is the least developed part of globalization.” 
Harris (2002, p. 93) describes a globalization sequence between 
freeing trade (1950–1980 and beyond), freeing capital (1980 onward), 
and freeing movement of people. If Harris is correct regarding this 
sequencing, it might help us to understand why trade has been liber-
alized while migration has not. Harris sees xenophobic resistance to 
liberalization of immigration as nothing short of a survival of “the old 
Job Name: -- /309724t
Introduction   11
order of states and the reality of warfare between them” (Harris 2002, 
p. 94). Indeed, xenophobia, as well as a tendency to value the welfare 
of compatriots over that of foreign persons, is an important reason for 
antipathy to globalization. For Harris, the resistance to liberalization of 
migration is ideational, rather than necessarily economic. Law can play 
a leading role in changing ideas. 
It seems true that free migration would challenge the nation-state-
based world order, insofar as under a regime of free migration the 
composition of states would no longer be formally based on “nations,” 
and would be fluid. The ruler-subject relationship would be broken, and 
citizens would have greater freedom to “vote with their feet.” Further-
more, as some degree of a global society is formed through globalization, 
it seems increasingly reasonable to see the freedom to move within this 
global society—global movement—as a basic liberty comparable to the 
fundamental freedom to move within a national state. 
International l aw of e conomic Migration
States have found it useful to exchange authority with others in 
particular contexts: this is the role of international law.4 What are the 
changing social elements that would lead states to agree to reduce their 
authority further in the field of migration? First, demographic change 
will result in increasing demand for certain types of labor in the devel-
oped world.5 Second, individuals in poor countries will continue to seek 
better standards of living in wealthier countries. Finally, there are large 
economic surpluses to be captured from mobility. These surpluses arise 
from rather large wage differentials between developing and developed 
countries; labor mobility will allow individual workers, their employ-
ers, and eventually consumers to share these surpluses. 
This study assesses the existing international law of economic mi-
gration, both descriptively and analytically. While the world has found 
it useful to establish rules regarding the entry of foreign goods, ser-
vices, and investment, there is a remarkable scarcity of international 
law establishing commitments of states to admit foreigners to work in 
their markets (Aleinikoff 2003, p. 2). In 1992, Sohn and Buergenthal 
(1992) wrote, “The preoccupation of many governments with interna-
tional trade in goods and services across national borders has resulted 
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in an elaborate set of international rules on that commercially important 
subject. Less attention has been paid to the development of the rules 
governing the movement of human beings across national borders.”
On the other hand, there are significant rights accorded to migrants 
upon their arrival. Authorized migrants are entitled to a full panoply of 
human rights—but while it is clear that migrants have rights, few peo-
ple outside of a few regional arrangements generally have the right to 
be a migrant—to immigrate.6 The fourth freedom still seems neglected. 
This work seeks to explain the dog that did not bark: the failure, 
thus far, to establish international law regarding labor market access 
(Hollifield 2000, pp. 75, 87). This work is intended to contribute to a 
small but growing literature on this topic, commenced in the late 1990s 
with Bimal Ghosh’s project (2000) for a “new international regime for 
the orderly movements of people” and continuing recently with Lant 
Pritchett’s Let Their People Come (2006).
It is worthwhile here to observe that, as we will see in Chapters 
6 and 7, the states of virtually all of Europe, most of Latin America, 
the Caribbean, much of Africa, and Australia and New Zealand are 
party to fairly comprehensive regional labor movement liberalization 
agreements. These agreements demonstrate that, at least outside of Asia 
and North America, states have been willing at some level to engage 
in liberalization of labor migration. There are additional initiatives in 
Asia, including an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
effort to liberalize movement of highly skilled and professional work-
ers, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides 
for a very modest degree of liberalization of North American migration. 
However, most of the liberalization commitments that have been un-
dertaken in Africa and Latin America have not been fully implemented. 
Furthermore, while many states have engaged in some liberalization 
with some states, few have engaged in liberalization with many other 
states. 
Thus, one question that arises in connection with liberalization of 
migration is the conflict (or competition or synergy) between regional 
or plurilateral liberalization on the one hand and multilateral liberaliza-
tion on the other. Are regional or plurilateral efforts in this area building 
blocks or stumbling blocks toward multilateral liberalization? A differ-
ent but related question is whether they increase or reduce welfare. Any 
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multilateral agreement in this area will have to address whether most-
favored nation (MFN) type prohibitions of discrimination will apply to 
prevent states from treating specified other states better than others, and 
whether regional or other plurilateral arrangements will benefit from an 
exception to an MFN rule. 
l egalizing Migration
The focus of this work will be on international legal commitments 
regarding legal immigration. Legal immigration has a complex rela-
tionship with illegal immigration. First, legal immigration serves as a 
substitute for illegal immigration, and thus can suppress illegal immi-
gration. Second, legal immigration (like illegal immigration) produces 
remittances which increase wealth in sending states, also possibly sup-
pressing illegal immigration. Third, legal immigration, to the extent that 
it is limited, may induce increased illegal immigration through infor-
mation or other support provided by legal migrants to potential illegal 
migrants. 
There is an ongoing competition between illegal immigration 
(Ghosh 2000, p. 12) and legal immigration, both in the decision mak-
ing of individual migrants and in the policy of the receiving countries. 
A substantial percentage of global migrants are illegal immigrants.7 An 
important research question asks to what extent the demand to migrate 
is elastic in relation to increased costs based on legal restrictions, or 
based on increased enforcement of legal restrictions. 
In any event, poverty-induced migration, like the poor, will always 
be with us. Since half the world’s workers live on less than US$2 per 
day, there will be strong incentives for them to migrate, and for those 
seeking inexpensive labor to employ them. Experience along the United 
States–Mexico border shows that it is difficult for immigration law 
and enforcement to stop behavior required by the “laws” of econom-
ics (Pritchett 2006). However, illegal migration can have a number of 
adverse consequences, for the migrants themselves, for citizens of the 
host country, and for the political fortunes of liberalization of market 
access. 
Of course, no system of border controls will be impermeable. Each 
destination state must make a policy choice regarding its investment in 
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controls, both in terms of financial cost and social cost. In addition, at 
some level, immigration controls become too expensive financiall , or 
are inconsistent with an open society and open economy (Harris 2002). 
If there are otherwise gains to the destination state from excluding il-
legal aliens, these gains may be overcome by the costs of exclusion. 
Making immigration illegal increases the costs, including the dangers, 
experienced by migrants. 
In examining national policy, it is important to examine not just the 
law on the books but also the law in practice. Many destination states 
purport to limit legal immigration, but their lax enforcement policy with 
respect to illegal immigration can be understood instead as evidence of 
a liberal policy. 
For example, the United States has an ambivalent relationship with 
illegal immigration: it declines to legalize certain unskilled flows, but 
declines also to devote sufficient resources to enforce the exclusion. 
The then commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Lionel Castillo, said in 1989 testimony to the U.S. Congress 
that “The actual policy of the U.S. government is quite different from 
its stated policy . . . the de facto policy is to keep the door half open” 
(Harris 2002, p. 80). While interior enforcement can be more effective 
than border control, especially if it focuses on imposing penalties on 
employers who hire illegal immigrants, some destination states, such 
as the United States, have declined to implement it. This ambivalence 
may represent an attempt to placate two opposing political forces: 1) 
employers who seek immigrant labor, and 2) general public opinion 
which is opposed to increased immigration. 
To the extent that a state implicitly permits illegal immigration, 
with the presumed result (see Chapter 2) that labor prices are artificially
suppressed compared to legal immigration, it may have the effect of 
subsidizing the domestic production of goods or services. Even in the 
1940s, during the formation of the original General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT), states were concerned about the trade effects of 
prison labor, with some of the same trade-distorting characteristics. 
At any rate, the main point is that controls on immigration—illegal-
ity—seek to stem a natural phenomenon, one that is likely to enhance 
global welfare and is unlikely to diminish local welfare in the destina-
tion state. Where wage or welfare differentials are sufficiently large, 
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individuals will find a way to overcome barriers: they will make great 
expenditures and incur fearsome risks in order to migrate. The barri-
ers are simply part of the price. Yet this expenditure and risk may be a 
source of deadweight loss: it may be a cost incurred in order to frustrate 
efficient transactions. The efficiency of any particular act of migration 
is not assured, as there will be external costs that the migrant will not 
take into account, but the data presented in Chapter 2 showing the wel-
fare gains from liberalized migration suggests that it is safe to assume 
that much migration is efficient.
r ecent Initiatives
There have been a number of recent initiatives that have sought 
to stimulate interest and action relating to international migration. Of 
course, there were earlier initiatives. For example, the League of Na-
tions explored in the 1920s an international convention to “facilitate and 
regulate international exchange of labour.” In 1939, the ILO adopted 
a Migration for Employment Convention, which was never ratified by 
any state. 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the current initiatives, 
with a focus on their perspectives and goals.8 But the main point is 
that these are talking initiatives and have not yet resulted in significant
changes in law. The formation of new international legal commitments, 
or protections for migrants, does not appear to be on today’s formal radar 
screen. However, this book examines the possibility that new interna-
tional legal commitments might be worthy of greater consideration. 
g lobal  c o MMISSIon on In Terna TIonal  MIgra TIon 
r epor T: MIgra TIon In an In Terconnec Ted w orld
The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was 
established in 2003 by a self-appointed core group of states, with the 
encouragement of then UN secretary-general KofiAnnan.9 The mandate 
of the GCIM was to formulate a coherent global response to interna-
tional migration. The commission was established as an independent 
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body consisting of 19 experts, including Mike Moore, former director 
general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Mary Robinson, 
former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights. 
The GCIM issued an important report in October 2005. This report 
states that migration has risen to the top of the global policy agenda, 
and that “In every part of the world, there is now an understanding that 
the economic, social and cultural benefits of international migration 
must be more effectively realized, and that the negative consequences 
of cross-border movement could be better addressed” (GCIM 2005). 
The report establishes six principles that it recommends be followed 
in formulating global migration policy (GCIM 2005). First, individuals 
should migrate out of choice, not necessity. It is worth pointing out here 
that choice and necessity may be difficult to separate, especially when 
the choice arises from poverty. Second, migration should be part of 
development policy. Third, states should cooperate to regulate illegal 
immigration. Fourth, efforts should be made to integrate immigrants 
into host country society. Fifth, the rights of immigrants should be re-
spected and strengthened. Sixth, governance of international migration 
should be improved, with greater attention to coherence. 
Importantly, while these principles otherwise provide a reasonable 
starting point, they do not explicitly include liberalization of market 
access for migrants. 
The report wisely recommends that policymakers pay attention to 
the relationship between supply and demand for workers (GCIM 2005). 
So long as developed country demand is subject to political constraint, 
it is useful to seek to reduce developing country supply through contin-
ued focus on poverty alleviation at home. 
The report concludes that “a well regulated liberalization of the 
global labour market would also be preferable to the current situation, 
in which labour market gaps are filled in part by means of irregular mi-
gration and unauthorized employment” (GCIM 2005). 
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berne In ITIa TIve 
In recognition that there is no comprehensive and harmonized sys-
tem regulating international migration through which the movement of 
people can be managed in an orderly and cooperative way, the Swiss 
Federal Office for Refugees launched the Berne Initiative in 2001 to 
establish a dialogue between countries of origin, transit, and destination 
on the full range of migration issues with the objective of identifying 
common understandings and enhancing migration management at the 
global level (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003). 
At the International Symposium on Migration (“Berne I”) in June 
2001, some 80 government officials and experts from international 
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia com-
prehensively reviewed current migration dynamics and trends. The 
participants considered the diverging interests and perspectives of 
origin, transit, and destination countries, but also identified interests 
common to all states (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003). 
The “undermining of state sovereignty and security by uncontrolled 
and irregular migration” was identified as a major concern for many 
countries, both in developing and industrialized regions, with important 
financial, economic, social, and legal implications. It was concluded 
that there is a need for a balanced approach to facilitate regular mi-
gration and prevent irregular migration, and that mutual benefits could 
derive from enhanced interstate cooperation. The participants decided 
to pursue the development of a framework of guiding principles for the 
management of migration, through an ongoing and broadened process 
of consultations, rather than through efforts to create new international 
law in this area (Klein, Solomon, and Bartsch 2003). This was obviously 
a decision to avoid formal obligations, but to pursue greater communi-
cation and informal cooperation. 
However, as a first step, the Swiss authorities, in coordination with 
the International Organization for Migration ([IOM], an intergovern-
mental organization that deals with international issues of migration 
management), undertook the preparation and publication of an expert 
stocktaking on existing international law norms relevant to migration. 
The study, International Legal Norms and Migration, seeks to clar-
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ify the existing legal framework and identify gaps and grey areas not 
adequately covered by international law, but where the elaboration of 
effective practices might be useful. To complement the expert study, 
IOM’s Migration Policy and Research Programme prepared a Com-
pilation of Significant International Statements on Migration. This 
compilation focuses on nonbinding common understandings emanating 
from regional consultative processes on migration and selected interna-
tional migration-related conferences (Berne Initiative 2002, 2003). 
The most important outcome of the Berne Initiative process is the 
International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) (Berne Ini-
tiative 2004a), a reference system and nonbinding policy framework 
aimed at facilitating cooperation between states in planning and man-
aging the movement of people in a humane and orderly way. It gathers 
states’ common perspectives and understandings on migration in a com-
prehensive framework in the form of a nonbinding agenda, mapping out 
in a comprehensive manner all major aspects of migration at the inter-
national level (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
2006, p. 23). The IAMM has two components: 1) a set of common un-
derstandings underlying migration management and summarizing the 
values and perceptions that governments bring to migration, and 2) a set 
of “effective practices” for a national approach to migration. It addresses 
the following issues: migration and development, human rights of mi-
grants, labor migration, integration, irregular migration, trafficking and 
migrant smuggling, trade and health, and return (Nielsen 2007).
At the 2004 Berne II Conference, participants engaged in a substan-
tive exchange on three selected sets of issues addressed in the IAMM: 
1) migration, development, and interstate cooperation; 2) labor, regular, 
and irregular migration and interstate cooperation; and 3) rights, re-
sponsibilities, integration, and interstate cooperation (Berne Initiative 
2004a, p. 5). Preparatory work for the Berne II Conference included 
four regional consultations for each of Africa, Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas, where government officials and migration experts discussed 
the further development of the IAMM (Berne Initiative 2004a, p. 3). 
The Berne II Conference culminated in the following recommenda-
tions and suggestions being made. First, the IAMM should be widely 
disseminated amongst governments to assist them in the management 
of migration. Second, international organizations should be invited to 
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assist governments upon their request to put the IAMM to use at the 
national, regional, and global levels (Berne Initiative 2004a, p. 7).
un  g eneral  aSS e Mbl y’ S hI gh- l evel  dI alogue
The UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development took place on September 14–15, 2006, at the UN head-
quarters in New York. The first high-level UN event devoted entirely 
to the topic of migration and development, the High-Level Dialogue 
brought together ministers from UN member states and representatives 
from UN agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil soci-
ety, and the private sector (UN General Assembly [UNGA] 2006, p. 1).
The purpose of the High-Level Dialogue was to discuss the mul-
tidimensional aspects of international migration and development in 
order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its devel-
opment benefits and minimize its negative impacts. Additionally, the 
High-Level Dialogue had a strong focus on policy issues, emphasizing 
the challenge of achieving internationally agreed development goals, 
including the Millennium Development Goals (UNGA 2006, p. 2).
The two-day dialogue included four thematic roundtables covering 
the following topics:
the effects of international migration on economic and social de-• 
velopment;
measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human • 
rights of all migrants, and to prevent and combat smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in persons
the multidimensional aspects of international migration and de-• 
velopment, including remittances;
promoting the building of partnerships and capacity building and • 
the sharing of best practices at all levels, including the bilateral 
and regional levels, for the benefit of countries and migrants 
alike (UNGA 2006, p. 1).
The High-Level Dialogue produced a number of proposals for 
future action; in recognition of the fact that the IOM has consider-
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able experience in the field, proposals were made for the IOM to take 
greater measures to make migration work for development, to enhance 
interagency coordination, and to enhance global intergovernmental co-
operation (IOM 2006). 
It was also at the High-Level Dialogue that the idea of a global fo-
rum on migration and development was first proposed. The first global 
forum on migration and development was held July 9–11, 2007, where 
more than 800 representatives from 156 UN member states and more 
than 20 international organizations participated in two plenary sessions 
and 12 roundtable sessions (UNGA 2007, p. 3).
In Terna TIonal  o rgan Iza TIon For M Igra TIon
The IOM is concerned with management of migration, and assists 
governments by providing expert support and facilitation of regulated 
labor migration, as well as direct assistance to migrants. The IOM fa-
cilitates the development of policies and programs that can individually 
and mutually benefit the concerned governments, migrants and societ-
ies in connection with migration (IOM 2008b).10 
The Commission on Global Governance, meeting in 1993–1994, 
considered a paper on “Movements of People: The Search for a New 
Regime.” This was followed by the launch of a global project, financed
by the United Nations and to be executed through the IOM, toward 
a “new international regime for the orderly movement of people” 
(NIROMP). An intergovernmental meeting in 1997 endorsed the con-
cept of a global arrangement for regulated openness of international 
migration. A second meeting was held in 1999, and this project was de-
bated until 2001, when it was decided not to pursue it through IOM.11 
Since 2001, the IOM Council has conducted an International 
Dialogue on Migration (IDM). The IDM is an informal consultation 
mechanism intended to contribute to a better understanding of migra-
tion and to strengthen cooperative mechanisms between governments 
(Nielsen 2007). 
The IOM assists in harnessing migration to achieve economic devel-
opment objectives in countries of origin and destination by two specific
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types of initiatives. The first type of initiative focuses on building the 
capacity of governments and other stakeholders in countries of origin 
to communicate with and engage their expatriate communities in initia-
tives related to home country development, and on contributing to the 
increase of more development-oriented migration policies. The second 
type of initiative contributes to addressing root causes of economically 
motivated migration by enhancing the ability of governments and other 
key actors to focus development actions more strategically on home 
country migration dynamics. Projects focus on expanding economic op-
portunities and improving social services and community infrastructure 
in specific geographic areas prone to economically induced outward 
migration, or in need of development to absorb and sustain the return of 
migrants to that region.12 
According to the IOM, the return and socioeconomic reinsertion 
of skilled and qualified nationals can benefit the national development 
or rehabilitation and reconstruction processes of developing countries, 
countries with economies in transition, or countries recovering from 
conflict situations. The IOM runs several programs that facilitate Re-
turn and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals and other projects that 
can help shape the economic and social environment in countries of 
origin in a manner conducive to further returns.13 
The IOM’s Technical Cooperation on Migration Division helps 
governments equip themselves with the necessary policy, legislation, 
administrative structures, operational systems, and human resource 
base needed to tackle diverse migration problems, to help lessen the 
root causes of economically forced migration.14 
In June 2006, IOM Brussels hosted a roundtable on labor migration 
gathering 20 representatives of think tanks and the European Commis-
sion. This roundtable aimed to further the public debate, launched with 
the adoption in January 2005 of the European Commission Green Paper 
on “An EU approach to managing economic migration” and the “Policy 
Plan on Legal Migration,” adopted by the European Commission in 
December 2005 as a follow-up to the Green Paper.15 In 2007, as part 
of its initiative of capacity building in countries of origin, the IOM and 
the Republic of Korea have agreed to create a migration research and 
training center in Korea which aims to help governments in the region 
facilitate the movement of human resources.16 
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In Terna TIonal  l abor o rgan Iza TIon
The ILO, the UN specialized agency concerned with labor issues, is 
the leading international organization dealing with labor. The preamble 
of the constitution of the ILO assigns to it the task of protecting “the 
interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own” 
(ILO 1974).
The ILO provides advisory services and technical assistance to 
member states and provides a tripartite (government, worker, and em-
ployer) forum for consultations (ILO 2004a, p. 7). It has established 
international conventions on migration policy and protection of migrant 
workers, as well as a multilateral framework on labor migration in order 
to guide its constituents. The ILO distinguishes among three leading 
forms of labor migration: 1) temporary migration of professional, tech-
nical, managerial, and business workers, as well as people providing 
cross-border services; 2) contract migration for ordinary employment, 
but for a limited period of time, guest workers; and 3) migration to 
settle for ordinary employment purposes (Abella 2000, pp. 113–114). 
In 2004, the 92nd Session of the International Labour Conference 
included a discussion of the challenges of labor migration under global-
ization. The conference concluded with a resolution for a comprehensive 
plan for migrant workers, including a nonbinding multilateral frame-
work for a rights-based approach to labor migration (ILO 2004b).
w orld Trade o rgan Iza TIon
In terms of specific formal commitments, the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) has avoided addressing immigration per se. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that because immigration is importantly related to trade in 
goods and trade in services, immigration will increasingly be linked to 
negotiations on goods and services. The WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) specifically includes commitments on trade 
in services by a service supplier of one member, through presence of 
natural persons of a WTO member in the territory of any other WTO 
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member. However, the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons 
stipulates that the GATS “shall not apply to measures affecting natural 
persons seeking access to the employment market of a member, nor 
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employ-
ment on a permanent basis.” Furthermore, the scope of coverage of 
Mode 4 is limited to the category of “service suppliers.” This is a lim-
ited category, although most developed country gross domestic product 
is derived from services. 
The g lobal  MIgra TIon g roup
The Global Migration Group (formerly the Geneva Migration 
Group) was originally comprised of the heads of the IOM, ILO, UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 
and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and now includes 
the UN Development Program, the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, the UN Population Fund, and the World Bank. The 
aim of the Global Migration Group is to provide policy coherence in 
migration. The Global Migration Group seeks to “promote the wider 
application of all relevant international and regional instruments and 
norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more 
coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue 
of international migration” (Global Migration Group 2006, p. 1).
plan o F The book
The purpose of this book is first to review the economic, ethical, 
and political rationales for greater international legal rules in the field of 
economic migration (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Second, the book describes 
the existing international law of economic migration (Chapters 5–8). 
By analyzing the existing international law of economic migration, this 
book will facilitate discussion and analysis of new proposals. Third, 
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this book attempts to show how the economic, political, and ethical 
rationales that it describes may be aligned with particular international 
legal rules and institutions. Chapters 2–8 form a basis for Chapters 
9–11, which seek to suggest the dynamics of negotiation of new legal 
rules for labor market access, the types of new rules that may be negoti-
ated, and the institutional structures that may be useful to assist in the 
implementation of these rules.
Chapter 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical work on 
the welfare economics of migration. Under a trade-based model of 
welfare, given wide disparities in wage rates across borders, global 
welfare would be increased by permitting greater trade in labor. The 
chapter reviews the various parameters that seem important to the wel-
fare analysis, including distinguishing between global welfare, national 
welfare, welfare of migrants, and welfare of other groups. It addresses 
the distinction between permanent and temporary migration, as well 
as the distinction between migration of skilled and unskilled workers. 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the welfare considerations that 
will be important to negotiations regarding international legal rules for 
economic migration. 
Chapter 3 examines the arguments from ethics for free movement of 
people. These arguments may have an effect on the preferences and vot-
ing patterns of individuals, or on the behavior of government officials.
This chapter shows the weaknesses in some arguments to the effect that 
there is no ethical obligation, or a severely limited ethical obligation, to 
act to improve the circumstances of poor people in foreign states. 
Political economy, reviewed in Chapter 4, adds two important 
dimensions to the analysis. First, how are the dictates of welfare eco-
nomics mediated by domestic politics? Second, how do states fail to 
achieve welfare-enhancing agreements or transactions due to strategic 
problems or other market failures? These two dimensions combine to 
present a cooperation problem in connection with international migra-
tion. How is this cooperation problem different from that experienced 
in other areas, such as international trade in goods and services? What 
are the implications of these differences for legal structures? This chap-
ter develops a political economy schematic of the possible utility of 
legal rules relating to economic migration. International legal rules may 
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induce the formation of domestic political coalitions that support liber-
alized immigration in destination states. 
In order to evaluate possible reforms of the international law of 
migration, it is necessary to describe the existing international law. 
Chapter 5 addresses existing customary international law and treaty 
law relating to human rights, as they pertain to economic migration. 
The core point of this chapter is that states generally have no obligation 
to accept economic migration by citizens of other states. However, it is 
important to establish the general absence of rules in this area, and to 
explain the modest rules that do exist. This chapter plays an additional 
role. It points out some of the possible human rights law requirements 
that may apply in connection with the formation of international legal 
rules to govern economic migration.
The EU has reached a very high degree of formal labor market in-
tegration, although important barriers remain and the level of actual 
integration is modest. The EU has developed a set of disciplines de-
signed to permit a very high degree of labor market integration, while 
respecting national regulatory and public policy prerogatives. Under 
these disciplines, individual nationals of EU member states have the 
formal right to enter the labor market of any other member state, with-
out explicit discrimination, without implicit discrimination, and without 
losing rights that they would otherwise have, such as social security 
rights. The history of the development of labor market integration in the 
EU is salient to a study of broader international labor market integra-
tion, insofar as it represents a kind of maximal menu of labor market 
integration devices. The issues that have arisen, and the way that these 
issues have been addressed, both substantively and institutionally, can 
provide, if not a roadmap, a checklist for anticipating issues that will 
arise as other efforts at international legalization of migration are under-
taken. Chapter 6 attempts to provide this history and description. 
There are several bilateral, regional, and plurilateral arrangements 
for labor mobility beyond the EU. Some of these are based on histori-
cally rooted arrangements, such as the British Commonwealth. Others 
are more recent adjuncts to bilateral or regional free trade agreements 
or customs unions. Examples include the recent free trade area agree-
ments that the United States has entered into with Australia, Chile, and 
Singapore. The goal of Chapter 7 is not to provide a comprehensive 
Job Name: -- /309724t
26   Trachtman
survey of all arrangements, but rather to describe a set of examples and 
develop a basic taxonomy to assess the variety of bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral arrangements for migration.
The WTO does not deal with labor or immigration per se, just as 
it does not deal with finance or investment per se. However, labor has 
entered the WTO in several ways, including, as relevant here, through 
the subject of trade in services. In fact, there is an important overlap 
between trade concerns and immigration concerns. One motivation for 
this book is to bring a trade perspective to the field of immigration. 
From a trade perspective, limits on immigration are analogous to tariffs 
or quantitative restrictions. These limits include quotas or other quan-
titative restrictions on immigration, bureaucratic formalities involved 
with obtaining a visa, visa fees, discrimination against foreign workers, 
and limits on recognition of professional qualifications.
The Doha Development Agenda negotiations included efforts 
by developing countries to increase developed country liberalization 
commitments with respect to the movement of individuals to supply 
low-skilled or semiskilled services. Chapter 8 describes the structure of 
commitments, and the applicable rules, within the WTO. Chapter 8 also 
provides information that will be relevant to the discussion in Chapter 
11 of the extent to which the WTO provides an appropriate institutional 
structure for negotiation and administration of possible international le-
gal rules on labor migration.
Chapter 9 catalogs the potential goals that states might pursue in 
connection with negotiations on global rules regarding labor market 
liberalization. Would states negotiate on a multilateral basis, and would 
they accept a rule of most favored nation nondiscrimination? Would 
negotiations over liberalization be structured around a “positive list” in 
which only those areas that are specifically listed are liberalized, and 
then only to the extent specified, or around a “negative list” in which all 
areas are liberalized except as stated? 
Chapter 10 builds on Chapter 9, by considering what types of spe-
cific disciplines would align with the negotiation goals developed in 
Chapter 9. Issues considered in this chapter include 
rules relating to restrictions on national limits on emigration, • 
the application of an MFN (nondiscrimination across foreign • 
states) principle, 
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the application and scope of a national treatment principle, • 
taxation of migrants, • 
professional regulation and licensing of migrants, • 
access of migrants to public services and transfer payments, and • 
rights to have family members accompany migrants. • 
A number of subsidiary disciplines will be required in order to 
guard against defection from primary disciplines. Examples of these 
specific disciplines are articulated in sample treaty language form in 
Appendix A. 
Chapter 11, building on Chapters 9 and 10, describes the possible 
role of an organization, and structures within an organization, to man-
age international economic migration. An international organization 
may assist in resolving a number of strategic problems. This organi-
zation could provide secretariat services of various kinds, including 
negotiation initiatives, research, surveillance, dispute settlement, and 
even possibly enforcement. The types of services would depend on an 
analysis of the strategic utility of these services provided by an interna-
tional organization in the context of the types of rules that are likely to 
be negotiated. 
Chapter 12 provides some concluding remarks, and suggests a 
number of areas for further inquiry and discussion. 
Appendix A provides an illustrative draft treaty. This illustrative 
draft is intended simply to show the types of specific provisions that 
could be included in an international agreement on international eco-
nomic migration. Indeed, this draft is a framework agreement, which 
would be designed to serve as a facility for states to make the kinds of 
agreements that make sense to them, individually and collectively. It is 
only once these agreements are made that we would truly know whether 
states believed that reciprocal legal commitments were useful. 
Job Name: -- /309724t
28   Trachtman
n otes
Throughout this book, I follow the conventional practice of referring to “emigra-1. 
tion” as the act of leaving one’s home state, “immigration” as the act of entering 
the destination state, and “migration” as the combination of the two. 
Indeed, Polanyi (1944) decried the commodification of labo . 2. 
As Neuman (1993, p. 1883) points out, 3. 
there existed state qualitative regulation of immigration before 1875, 
and this qualitative regulation was an antecedent for federal regulation: 
Thus, state immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation of 
persons likely to become or actually becoming a public charge; preven-
tion of the spread of contagious diseases, including maritime quaran-
tine and suspension of communication by land; and regionally varying 
policies relating to slavery, including prohibition of the slave trade, bans 
on the migration of free blacks, and the seamen's acts. Federal statutes 
backed up the state quarantine laws and state laws barring importation 
of slaves or free black aliens. 
For a broad statement of this argument, see 4. Trachtman (2008).
Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2004) argue that immigration growth can only solve 5. 
demographic problems in the developed world if it is concentrated in high-skilled 
workers from the developing world. See also Gordon’s (2003) argument regarding 
the importance of population growth for economic growth in the United States 
during the near future. 
Unauthorized migrants retain their humanity, but they may enjoy fewer rights 6. 
(Lyon 2005). 
Ghosh estimates that one-fifth of all migrants are unauthorized (Ghosh 2000, 7. 
p. 18). 
In order to do so as accurately as possible, while focusing on the issues of interest 8. 
here, this section liberally adapts from the relevant organizations’ Web sites and 
other published materials. 
As of August 2005, these states included Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, 9. 
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, India, In-
donesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the EC/EU.
10. A list of the projects being undertaken by the IOM to facilitate labor migration can 
be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/706 (IOM 2008a).
11. This discussion is based on personal communication with Bimal Ghosh. 
12. A fuller discussion of the two initiatives can be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/
Jahia/pid/542 (IOM 2008b).
13. A list of such ongoing projects can be found at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/op/
edit/pid/742 (IOM 2008c).
14. The full activities of the TCM Division of IOM are described at http://www.iom 
.int/jahia/Jahia/op/edit/pid/749 (IOM 2008e).
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15. A full discussion on the proceedings of the IOM Brussels Roundtable on Eco-
nomic Migration is available at http://www.belgium.iom.int/index.asp?Selected= 
2&News_ID=483&sm=71 (IOM Brussels 2008).
16. The establishing of the IOM-Korea migration research and training center may 
even be seen as a move to improve migration management between Asia and Eu-
rope. See http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAS/cache/offonce?entryId=15964 
(IOM 2008d). 
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Welfare Economics of Migration
Given existing wide disparities in wage rates across borders, global 
welfare would be greatly increased by permitting greater mobility of 
labor (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983, pp. 61, 70). Rodrik (2001) puts 
it as follows: 
As every economist knows, the efficiency cost of any policy- 
imposed (“artificial”) price wedge is proportional to the square of 
the wedge. Where international markets for commodities and fi
nancial assets are concerned, these price wedges rarely exceed a 
ratio of 2:1. Where labor services are concerned, however, wages 
of similarly qualified individuals in the advanced and low-income 
countries differ by a factor of 10 or more. So the gains from liber-
alizing labor movements across countries are enormous, and much 
larger than the likely benefits from further liberalization in the tra-
ditional areas of goods and capital. 
The artificial price wedge that Rodrik refers to is of course the re-
sult of restrictions on immigration. Empirical studies of factor mobility, 
and estimates prepared by Winters et al. (2002) and the World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group (2006), seem to confirm large potential 
returns from increased liberalization of migration. Barriers to both per-
manent and temporary movement of natural persons are still quite large, 
and many of these barriers lack a compelling noneconomic, or pruden-
tial, justification. Thus, there is a strong initial argument from allocative 
efficiency for liberalization of economic migration.
From the dynamic standpoint of destination states also, immigrants 
may bring many benefits, including skills, knowledge, entrepreneur-
ial spirit, and innovation. These benefits may assist in growth. There 
is little doubt that many likely destination states would gain from im-
migration of skilled workers. Trade in services by virtue of migration 
provides economies of scale, benefits of specialization, and stronger 
competition. Thus, while developing countries bemoan the brain drain, 
developed countries institute “quality-selective” immigration policies 
that seek to ensure that only brains are drained.1 On the other hand, it 
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is at least theoretically possible that destination states may under some 
circumstances lose from immigration of unskilled workers, while origin 
states may gain. 
We will see that economic theory suggests that, for destination 
states, an “optimal immigration policy would admit individuals whose 
skills are in shortest supply and whose tax contributions, net of the cost 
of public services they receive, are as large as possible” (Hanson 2007, 
p. 4). Yet it may not be a simple matter to determine relative scarcity or 
abundance. 
“A given type of worker may be scarce either because the U.S. sup-
ply of his skill type is low relative to the rest of the world, or because 
the U.S. demand for his skill type is high relative to the rest of the 
world, as with computer scientists and engineers” (Hanson 2007, p. 14). 
So it is not strange, as Hanson explains, that in the United States, both 
high-skilled software programmers and engineers employed by rapidly 
expanding technology industries, as well as low-skilled workers in con-
struction, food preparation, and cleaning services, are scarce (Hanson 
2007). 
Perhaps another way of formulating the question of optimality is as 
follows: an optimal immigration policy admits all immigrants so long 
as the benefits they contribute exceed the costs they impose. Immigrants 
may bring benefits or costs in terms of the work they do, and they may 
bring benefits or costs from a fiscal standpoint. The core question ad-
dressed in this chapter is whether increased migration would provide 
welfare benefits, to whom, and how much? Armed with detailed an-
swers, and informed by greater knowledge of the parameters that might 
affect the magnitude and distribution of benefits, it may be possible to 
determine whether these benefits are worthy of efforts toward realiza-
tion, and what will be the best means of realization. 
While it seems fairly clear that there are significant potential global 
gains to be achieved by liberalizing migration, it is also clear that these 
gains are not distributed evenly. Rather, as is the case with trade in 
goods or services, there will be winners and there will be losers. The 
problem for domestic and international politics, and for international 
institutions, is to establish a method of facilitating policy changes that 
are Pareto improvements in the sense that even those who might other-
wise be losers are better off.2 The problem for international institutions 
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is to assist in building domestic coalitions that will enable welfare-
enhancing policy changes. These policy changes may require careful 
structuring of liberalization, or linkage of liberalization of emigration 
to other measures. 
Chapter 3, which examines the distributive justice perspective on 
migration, is predicated on the analysis presented in this chapter of 
the welfare and distributive effects of migration. Of course, individual 
voters and individual governments often seem to reject greater formal 
liberalization of labor movement. Even more powerfully, governments 
and constituencies outside the EU would be skeptical of the value of 
international legal commitments to liberalize. Chapter 4 examines the 
political economy of liberalization of labor movement, analyzing the 
domestic and international political bargaining barriers to realizing the 
welfare benefits identified in the current chapt .
Much of the remainder of this work will be devoted to identifying 
legal mechanisms that may be useful in overcoming political bargain-
ing problems in order to realize these benefits.
The large potential welfare gains from immigration provide an 
important incentive for migration, whether legal or illegal. It is clear 
that the greatest beneficiaries of migration are the migrants themselves, 
often creating high-powered incentives for migration. In many cases, 
the alternative to legal migration will not be “no migration,” but rather 
illegal migration (Hanson 2007). In order to prevent illegal migration, 
powerful disincentives must be structured to overcome the powerful 
incentives to migrate. There are great costs to doing so, especially po-
tential risks to the migrants. 
As a consequence, these welfare gains provide an incentive to struc-
ture legal and institutional mechanisms that can channel, facilitate, and 
regularize legal migration, thereby reducing the incentives for illegal 
migration and the costs of control of illegal migration. It is important to 
note, however, that experience shows that increased legal immigration 
can induce increased illegal immigration, depending on the particular 
context and structure. It appears that the overall effect of legal migra-
tion on illegal migration is ambivalent and context-dependent. 
Thus, these unrealized large welfare gains are an institutional puz-
zle. It would be useful to solve this puzzle and to imagine a way to 
restructure legal and organizational mechanisms to allow these gains to 
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be realized. This work is intended to advance that project, as an exercise 
in institutional imagination. 
Th Eor y
In theory, liberalization of migration should lead to global gains in 
welfare. This is an application of the fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics: under perfect competition, the allocation of resources is ef-
ficient and output is maximized. Immigration restrictions are limits on 
perfect competition. Thus, liberalized migration would cause a rise in 
world welfare. As noted above, a number of leading economists have 
suggested that the potential global benefits from liberalization of mi-
gration are very significant, and therefore merit an effort comparable 
to, or greater than, that devoted to liberalization of trade in goods and 
services. Assuming that a destination country’s higher wages––which 
attract immigrants––result from a higher marginal product of labor, mo-
bility will be efficient. That is, by allowing migrants to move to where 
they can achieve greater productivity, we increase world welfare. 
“By prohibiting the immigration of many persons, the United States 
inevitably shrinks the size of the world economic pie, reducing the 
economic opportunities that could be available to many persons in the 
source countries” (Borjas 1999, p. 181). “If we consider both the send-
ing and the receiving countries as part of the same world, then—and 
on this every economist agrees—the overall effect of the migration on 
the average standard of living of the world’s people is positive. The 
reason for this is that the migrant goes from a place where he or she is 
less productive to a place where he or she is more productive” (Simon 
1999, p. 299). 
While individual workers will by definition do better by moving 
(absent information problems), and while it seems reasonable to expect 
that increased free movement will enhance global welfare, it is difficult
to determine the effects of mobility on the welfare of other individuals 
or on national welfare. Free migration is not necessarily beneficial to 
all. For example, home states that make substantial expenditures on ed-
ucation may lose in a particular emigration transaction. However, there 
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may be an economic payoff to the home state, in the form of remit-
tances, or in the form of returning workers bringing back capital, skills, 
and information. We even encounter a problem in defining the “home 
state”—does welfare of former home state residents count as part of 
home state welfare? A cosmopolitan perspective would ignore differ-
ences between home state and destination state welfare and consider 
only global welfare, but it would certainly examine the distributive con-
sequences of immigration. From a cosmopolitan perspective, if all the 
residents of a home state improved their welfare by leaving the home 
state, immiserating the now-empty home state, that would be a welfare-
improving and desirable outcome. 
Destination states may experience economic benefits but also detri-
ments, especially if they make great expenditures on social services. 
Individual workers in destination states may lose jobs to immigrants, 
and there may be costs associated with dislocation, also putting strains 
on the destination state’s fiscal situation. Furthermore, the destination 
state will incur the costs of administering an immigration system, of as-
similating an immigrant population, and of potential transfer payments 
for medical care, education, retirement benefits, and unemployment 
benefits, among other social services. It would be appropriate for gov-
ernments to assess these costs in formulating immigration policy. 
A basic labor economics model of supply and demand views im-
migration as an increase in the number of workers at any given level of 
the wage rate. “The result is an outward shift of the labor supply curve” 
(Friedberg and Hunt 1999, p. 343). Figure 2.1 depicts how an increase 
in the supply of labor due to immigration affects the earnings of work-
ers for whom the immigrants are assumed to substitute. S is the initial 
supply of labor. Immigration of I persons increases the supply to S + I. 
This reduces the wage from Wo to Wo
1. Total output increases by the 
trapezoid DGHE, but much of this gain, represented by the rectangle 
KGHE (labeled “Immigrant income”), accrues to the immigrants. 
“The gain to residents is the welfare triangle DKE, which consists 
of the loss in incomes to factors that substitute for immigrants of BADK 
and a gain to factors complementary to immigrants” (Freeman 2006). 
Hatton and Williamson (2005, p. 290) find that “the overall gain from 
immigration to all native-born residents is likely to be very small.” 
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All other things being equal, theory predicts that the increased sup-
ply will result in reduced prices (wages) and an increased number of 
employees. (We see below that empirical verification of this effect is 
subject to debate.) However, because the wage falls, some will decide 
not to work, and the employment rate will fall. Output increases, be-
cause inputs become cheaper (Friedberg and Hunt 1999, p. 343). The 
distributional effects are unambiguous in the sense that wage earners 
lose while their employers gain (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 290). 
On the home country side, a converse simple model may be ap-
plied. A reduction in the workforce due to emigration increases wages, 
increases the employment rate, and decreases output. 
Of course, this analysis does not examine the effects on other factors 
of production, or differentiation between different types of workers, not 
to mention both dynamic and fiscal e fects. In recent years, economists 
have engaged in detailed empirical analysis that suggests that additional 
factors must be considered in order to develop a full picture of the ef-
fects of migration. 
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For example, immigrants are often unskilled, focusing the effects of 
immigration on the market for unskilled labor. This focused effect may 
cause substitution of unskilled workers for more skilled workers, affect-
ing the skilled labor market, or it may call for employment of skilled 
workers with complementary skills, such as managers. Therefore, it is 
initially uncertain what the effects of unskilled migration will be on 
skilled workers (Friedberg and Hunt 1999). 
Migration, Trade, and Investment
Globalization in the form of reduced barriers to trade in goods, 
services, and capital may reduce the demand to migrate by increasing 
economic opportunity in the potential departure country. It also re-
duces the potential effects of migration on competing workers. “That 
immigration and trade are substitute ways to obtain the same output 
suggests that changes in the number of immigrants will have less ef-
fect on native incomes in the presence of relatively free trade than they 
otherwise would” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 147). More broadly, 
free trade may also have the effect of leveling wages, reducing incen-
tives to migrate. 
How does migration relate to trade? There are instances of similar-
ity, substitutability, and complementarity. “The primary effect of both 
immigration and international trade is to allow us to specialize in pro-
ducing those things we are good at and to consume something other 
than what we can produce ourselves . . . In the extreme, immigration 
could equalize the composition of labor skills and capital/labor ratios 
across countries, eliminating incentives for much of trade. In principle, 
so too might international flows of capital” (p. 146)
Smith and Edmonston find that in the United States, immigrants 
are disproportionately employed in import-competing sectors, and thus 
largely substitute for imports. They observe that analyses that fail to 
take this aspect into account may overstate the adverse effects of im-
migration on native workers (p. 148). 
As described by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
(2006), migration affects trade through several channels, some of which 
increase and others of which decrease trade. First, to the extent that 
migration raises global incomes, it may increase trade flows. Second, 
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the World Bank model assumes disproportionate migration of skilled 
workers (compared to historical flows), many of whom will work in 
nontraded sectors, such as personal services, rather than produce goods. 
Third, remittances increase imports and decrease exports of develop-
ing countries. Thus, while changes in migration can affect trade flows,
they are not substitutes for one another. On the other hand, trade and 
migration may be complementary along a number of dimensions. For 
example, greater migration may stimulate trade due to the preferences 
or knowledge of migrants (Rauch and Trindade 2002). Economists find
a “migration hump” that arises from increased free trade, meaning that 
upon trade liberalization, the number of migrants first increases, and 
then, due to income and job growth, decreases. 
Immigration of workers who specialize in import competing sectors 
will result in a shift in resources into those sectors. The result should be 
a reduction of the relevant imports. Therefore, the terms of trade would 
shift in favor of the importing state, while the importing state’s com-
parative advantage would be smaller, and it would gain less from trade 
(Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 148). 
On the other hand, immigration of workers who specialize in export 
sectors would tend to increase the destination state’s comparative ad-
vantage. Thus, it is possible that one state would seek to accentuate its 
comparative advantage by attracting and admitting a particular type of 
worker, while other states would seek a different type of worker. 
Where there is a barrier to trade in goods that inefficiently protects a 
domestic manufacturing industry, that domestic manufacturing industry 
may hire increasing numbers of immigrants. Under these circumstances, 
the efficiency of migration is predicated on an inefficient trade barrier. 
If the trade barrier were eliminated, migration would be less attractive. 
However, Sykes (1995) points out that if the trade barriers cannot be 
removed, then migration might be a second-best adaptation. 
h eckscher-o hlin
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade assumes labor im-
mobility as a basis for trade in goods in which labor-abundant countries 
export labor-intensive goods. Trade in goods in this sense substitutes 
for movement of people (and vice versa) (Faini, de Melo, and Zim-
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mermann 1999). The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade holds that, all 
other things being equal, countries endowed with more skilled workers 
will export skill-intensive goods, while countries endowed with fewer 
skilled workers will export unskilled-labor-intensive goods. This is the 
operation of comparative advantage. The operation of this trade will 
move toward relative factor price equalization. 
Trade may result in convergence of wages, in accordance with the 
factor price equalization theorem. Increased wages in the home coun-
try relative to the wages in the potential destination country reduce the 
incentives for migration. This was one of the motivations of the United 
States in entering into NAFTA with Mexico: to reduce incentives for 
illegal migration. 
In order for trade and migration to be considered substitutes, five
assumptions, consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, must be made 
(Martin, Lowell, and Taylor 2000, pp. 149–152):
identical production technology,1) 
same factors of production (factor homogeneity),2) 
constant returns to scale,3) 
instant adjustment to changes in international market environ-4) 
ment, and
perfect competition.5) 
Under these assumptions, factor prices, including wages, will be 
equalized between the two trading countries. There will therefore be no 
economic reason for migration. As Simon explains, this type of trade 
model can only explain why migration need not take place under certain 
conditions––ideal conditions at that. It does not explain why migration 
should occur (Simon 1999, p. 19). 
In this simple Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which technology is 
identical across countries, and in which there are only two factors of 
production, trade and migration are thus substitutes: they have identi-
cal effects on factor prices, leading to factor price convergence, and 
the more one type of liberalization occurs, the less incentive there is 
for the other (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 18). Furthermore, under 
factor price equalization, immigration will not affect wages, which are 
already equal. 
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This perspective may provide a partial answer to the question of 
why barriers to immigration have increased while barriers to trade in 
goods have decreased: the decreasing barriers to trade in goods un-
dermines the incentives for immigration. To the extent that trade and 
migration are substitutes for one another, trade liberalization may re-
duce the pressure for migration, and vice versa. Incidentally, the same 
might be said with regard to investment liberalization. 
Friedberg and Hunt (1999, p. 345) explain that the “predictions of 
this most simple trade model are thought to be unrealistic, but even 
more complex versions of the model predict that small numbers of im-
migrants will have no effect on the wage.” This simple model may be 
supplemented by allowing factor endowments and technology to vary 
between states. Friedberg and Hunt conclude that theoretical models 
“thus have predictions ranging from a definite fall in the wage and em-
ployment rate (the closed economy case) to a wage fall after a certain 
threshold of immigration is passed, to no fall in wages (open economy 
models)” (p. 345). They call for empirical work to address the question 
of the effects of migration on wages. 
Of course, once the assumption that technology is identical across 
countries is abandoned, or once there are more than two factors of 
production, it becomes possible that trade and immigration would be 
complements instead of substitutes. For example, if technology is bet-
ter in the higher-skilled country, or if the higher-skilled country is better 
endowed with another factor compared to the lower-skilled country, 
then it no longer follows that skilled workers will migrate from high-
skilled countries to low-skilled countries (Markusen 1983, p. 341). 
Under some circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers 
may flow toward the high-skilled country. Importantly, differences in 
productivity explain why we still see migration from countries where 
high-skilled labor is scarce to countries where high-skilled labor is 
abundant: in countries where high-skilled labor is abundant, the pro-
ductivity of high-skilled labor is often higher than in countries where 
high-skilled labor is scarce. Therefore, high-skilled workers may mi-
grate to high-skilled countries in order to achieve a higher wage. “This 
is, of course, what happens in the real world, suggesting that richer 
countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor countries, and 
that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that 
matter trade patterns and factor flows” (Markusen 1983).
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Thus, even factor price equalization does not necessarily lead to 
equal wages. Trefler (1993, 1998) shows that the factor price equaliza-
tion theorem must be modified to refer to productivity-adjusted wages. 
“Trade, people flows, and capital flows were not substitutes in the U.S. 
economy during the 1980s and into the 2000s, when imports of goods 
and services, and financial capital, and skilled and unskilled immigrants 
increased” (Freeman 2006, p. 160). Freeman suggests that “one plau-
sible explanation is that countries differ in technology (Markusen 1983; 
Markusen and Svennsson 1985). If an advanced economy uses more 
productive technology than a developing country, then returns to both 
labor and capital will be higher in the advanced economy and both fac-
tors will migrate there” (Gierking and Mutti 1983). Similarly, Martin, 
Lowell and Taylor (2000, p. 150) point out that if infrastructure has im-
portant effects on labor productivity, then migration may be stimulated 
by differences in infrastructure. They give the example of the Mexican 
shoe industry in the 1980s, where Mexican workers moved to Los An-
geles to produce shoes for export to Mexico. 
On the other hand, free trade can change labor supply conditions. 
So, if an advanced country, such as the United States, is able to pro-
duce certain manufactured or agricultural goods using capital intensive 
technology with great efficienc , while a developing country uses less 
efficient labor-intensive production methods, a move to free trade may 
displace workers in the developing country.3 Significant displacement 
of workers by such trade may affect the demand for emigration. 
Let us relax the assumption of free trade. Under a tariff or other bar-
rier, there may be incentives for migration (Sykes 1995). Assume that 
a wealthy country imposes a tariff on a labor-intensive good. This tariff 
is likely to cause domestic firms to increase output, increasing demand 
for labor and therefore increasing wages. The increase in wages may 
induce immigration, reducing the relevant wage. “For example, skill-
abundant countries tend to import low-skilled labor intensive products 
and receive immigrants who are less skilled than natives on average” 
(Mayda 2007; Moses and Letnes 2004, p. 1610). 
As countries move toward free trade in goods, the price of skilled la-
bor rises in the country with more skilled workers, and falls in the country 
with less-skilled workers (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 18). There-
fore, it is expected that in skill-abundant countries, the unskilled would 
favor trade protection, while in low-skilled countries, the skilled would 
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favor protection. This is consistent with the holding of the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theorem: that owners of a country’s abundant factors gain under 
trade liberalization while owners of scarce factors lose (Mayda 2007). 
Of course, from a policy standpoint, those who favor protection might 
favor selective protection that protects their market position. 
In North America, there is an interesting historical connection be-
tween labor market integration and goods integration. The Bracero 
program, which was utilized between 1942 and 1964 to bring Mexican 
temporary workers into the United States, produced a degree of depen-
dence by a group of Mexican workers on U.S. jobs, and also stimulated 
demand in Mexico for U.S. jobs. 
Upon the termination of the Bracero program, the border region of 
Mexico faced a surge in returning workers. Mexico turned to offshore 
assembly processing and created the Maquiladora program (Martin, 
Lowell, and Taylor 2000, pp. 137, 142–143). The Maquiladora pro-
gram allowed U.S. investors to create jobs in the Mexican border areas 
by shipping components for assembly to Mexican plants. The finished
goods would be subject to tariffs only on the Mexican value added. The 
next step was the creation of NAFTA, raising the question of whether 
trade liberalization is a substitute for migration. The U.S. Commission 
for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
Development concluded that “expanded trade between the sending 
countries and the United States is the single most important remedy” 
for unwanted immigration (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice 1990). 
Faini, de Melo, and Zimmermann (1999, p. 7) suggest that in the 
absence of effective means of inhibiting informal migration, “trade 
policy may represent a more effective strategy to deal with migratory 
pressures.” They quote former Mexican president Salinas: “Mexico 
wants to export goods, not people.” 
Furthermore, when domestic agricultural sectors experience strong 
competition from imports, the rural agricultural sector can lose viability, 
leading to internal migration from villages to cities. This internal migra-
tion can increase the pressure to emigrate to another country (Hollifield
2000, pp. 75, 87; Sassen 1996, p. 78). 
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Complementarity
There are certainly elements of complementarity between migra-
tion and trade. In considering the U.S. entry into NAFTA, former U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner McNary put it 
this way: “I feel more than a bit confident in acknowledging that if im-
migration is not formally on the table, someone at the table will sooner 
or later realize as a practical matter, that moving goods and services 
in international commerce involves moving people who trade in these 
goods and services” (McNary 1992). 
Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective, offshoring, foreign in-
vestment, intellectual property licensing, and other globalized economic 
relationships increase the demand for temporary, and in some cases 
permanent, migration. In fact, restrictions on immigration can suppress 
these other forms of commerce. So, to some extent, restrictions on im-
migration are restrictions on trade, investment, etc. This can be seen 
in Modes 2, 3, and 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), where movement of natural persons (Mode 4) is necessary or 
important to other types of trade in services: 1) consumption abroad 
(Mode 2), and 2) commercial presence (Mode 3). Mode 4 is addressed 
in more detail in Chapter 8. 
Bases for Trade: Comparative Advantage, Absolute Advantage, 
and Economies of Scale
Simon (1999, p. 17) argues that the gains from migration are unlike 
the gains from trade. The core difference, based on the simple model 
used by Simon for illustration, is that trade-induced shifts in prices and 
production benefit consumers in both the importing and the exporting 
countries, while migration-induced shifts principally benefit the mi-
grant. Prices of goods remain as they were before migration. “And most 
important, there is no gain to non-moving natives similar to the Ricard-
ian wine-and-cloth increase in total production whose benefit is realized 
by native consumers in both countries” (Simon 1999, p. 20).
Furthermore, trade is based on comparative advantage, while mi-
gration is based on absolute advantage. Therefore, if productivity is 
sufficiently greater across categories of labor in wealthy countries as 
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compared to poor countries, there may be little reason for migration 
from wealthy countries to poor countries. Hatton (2007, p. 359) con-
cludes that for wealthy countries, migration is a one-way street: poor 
country citizens wish to migrate to rich countries, but not vice versa. 
There is significant migration from wealthy countries to poor coun-
tries, but it is a fraction of that from poor countries to wealthy countries 
(UNGA 2006).
Nevertheless, there may be an opportunity for a particular type of 
comparative advantage to operate in the field of migration. Indeed, for 
example, the Philippines seems to specialize in providing maids, nurses, 
and merchant marine sailors to other countries. Think of the worker as a 
product (a capital asset, if you will). Assume that Mexico produces ma-
sons more efficiently due to agglomeration effects, economies of scale, 
or network externalities in training, while the United States produces 
electricians more efficiently for similar reasons.
Under these circumstances, “trade” between the United States and 
Mexico in masons and electricians might produce benefits in accor-
dance with absolute advantage. However, even if Mexico were better at 
producing both masons and electricians, it might make sense for Mexi-
co to concentrate on production of masons if its advantage in producing 
masons is greater than its advantage in producing electricians. This is 
similar to the Ricardian example of transactions in wine and cloth be-
tween England and Portugal. Simon is still correct that those remaining 
in the labor-exporting state do not today generally realize the same type 
of benefits as producers of goods. However, a Bhagwati tax (or perhaps 
expectations of remittances) could allow Mexico to realize the benefits
of its comparative advantage, and thereby provide Mexico with incen-
tives for effici nt production of workers. A “Bhagwati tax,” discussed 
in detail later in this chapter, is a tax applied by the home country to 
earnings of emigrants that are sourced in the destination country. 
Another basis for trade in workers would be economies of scale 
or agglomeration effects in manufacturing or production of services. 
It may be that it is useful for one state to specialize in a particular type 
of production. For example, immigration of workers who specialize in 
export sectors would tend to increase the destination state’s compara-
tive advantage in connection with the relevant exported goods. Thus, 
it is possible that one state would seek to accentuate its comparative 
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advantage by attracting and admitting a particular type of worker, while 
other states would seek a different type of worker. This type of varia-
tion of state preferences could form the basis for a mutually beneficial
arrangement between states. 
Migration and Investment
In addition to a certain degree of substitutability between movement 
of individuals and goods, there is also a certain degree of substitut-
ability between movement of individuals and capital. That is, if the 
increased productivity that may be achieved by migration of individu-
als may also be achieved by movement of capital to the individuals, 
then movement of capital is a substitute for migration. As Wong (2006, 
p. 112) notes, one suggestion made by way of reducing incentives for 
migration is to encourage more investment in the home countries. On 
the other hand, increased emigration may reduce incentives to invest in 
the home country. 
If, as Freeman (2006) and Markusen (1983) suggest, technological 
differences may explain why both capital and labor flow together to 
developed countries—because both are more productive in developed 
countries—then it is also true that reduction of technological differ-
ences may reduce this effect and reduce incentives for skilled persons 
in developing countries to migrate to developed countries. This effect 
may also increase incentives for skilled persons in developed countries 
to migrate to developing countries. 
While we cannot expect that technology will necessarily flow to de-
veloping countries, if it were directed to developing countries, outbound 
migration of skilled persons would likely be reduced. To the extent that 
investment results in technological advancement, investment can serve 
as a substitute for migration. 
Wong develops a theoretical model that argues that there are cases 
in which capital movement and migration are substitutes in the price 
sense, and cases in which they are complements, but that they are most 
likely to be substitutes. Wong’s findings (2006, p. 138) support the com-
mon perception that if the movement of one factor is liberalized, then 
the movement of the other factor will tend to decrease. On the other 
hand, using a Ricardian model that emphasizes technological differ-
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ences, Davis and Weinstein (2002) find complementarity and support 
this view with an empirical analysis. 
GLo BAL EFFECTS
Theory suggests that there are substantial possible benefits from 
migration, but it also suggests that the lion’s share of these benefits ac-
crues to the migrants themselves. In this section, I review the empirical 
analysis of the global effects of migration. In the following sections, I 
review the parameters that determine the separate effects on a number 
of groups. 
In migration, the early work of Hamilton and Whalley (1984) pro-
vides estimates of global gains from a move to free migration. Using 
1977 data, Hamilton and Whalley estimate that gains from completely 
free migration could reach US$16 trillion. This exceeded world GNP 
for 1977. Importantly, Hamilton and Whalley assume that differences 
in the marginal productivity of labor are exclusively the result of bar-
riers to mobility, and their estimates are based on politically infeasible 
levels of migration. They estimate movements of labor once restric-
tions on migration are removed, assuming that labor would continue to 
move until wage rate equalization is achieved. Wage rate equalization 
would raise the wages of the world’s lowest-paid workers substantially. 
While these massive gains may be unrealistic for a number of reasons, 
including failure to reflect fully the transportation costs, externalities, 
and other costs involved with migration, this research motivates further 
research into the scope of achievable global gains. 
Moses and Letnes (2004), noting that there are remarkably few 
analyses of global gains from freer migration, update the Hamilton and 
Whalley (1984) research using 1998 data. In their “most reasonable” 
scenario, the expected global efficiency gains from complete liber-
alization are almost US$3.4 trillion. When these figures are adjusted 
for workforce and efficiency differences, the lowest estimate is still 
US$1.97 trillion, which amounts to 5.6 percent of 1998 world income. 
Moses and Letnes (2004) estimate that even a 10 percent increase in in-
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ternational migration would produce an annual efficiency gain of about 
US$774 billion 1998 dollars. 
The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 31) esti-
mates that a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants to 2025 would 
produce global gains of US$356 billion for 2025, a 0.6 percent increase 
in annual global real income.4 The main gains come from the higher 
incomes that migrants can earn in the destination country. 
Of course, these estimates are contingent on a number of assump-
tions, and it is impossible to determine with specificity the conditions 
that would have to be met in order to increase international migration by 
the specified measures. For example, it is important to note here that the 
World Bank’s assumption is that the 3 percent rise in the workforce is 
allocated between skilled and unskilled workers on the basis of the pro-
portion already existing in the destination developed country economy 
as a whole, rather than the proportion already existing among migrants. 
This requires a much larger increase in the number of skilled migrants 
compared to the increase in the number of unskilled migrants. The 
number of unskilled migrant workers increases by 39 percent, while the 
number of skilled migrant workers rises by 138 percent (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 33). The World Bank does not 
explain what might cause this increase in the proportion of skilled mi-
grants (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006). 
As we consider the effects on migrants, and the antipoverty effects 
of this type of migration, it will be useful to keep in mind the dispropor-
tionate growth in skilled worker migration assumed by the World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group (2006). While this assumption seems 
somewhat implausible, given the fact that many destination states are 
selecting for higher-skilled immigrants, it may be appropriate. 
I will discuss distributional issues in more detail below, but it is 
worthwhile here to note how these gains are distributed between 
wealthy and poor countries. Under a migration increase of 10 percent, 
in Moses and Letnes’s (2004) “middle” scenario, workers in the poorest 
regions receive an increase in wages of 4.1 percent, while wages in the 
richest regions decline by 2.5 percent. On the other hand, capital own-
ers in wealthy states are made better off, while capital owners in poor 
states are made worse off. According to the World Bank model, the ag-
gregate percentage income gain to developing countries (including the 
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new migrants) is 1.8 percent, while the gain to high-income countries 
is 0.4 percent (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006).5 The 
inclusion of the new migrants in the developing countries category, de-
spite their departure, may be questioned by some. That is, if the goal 
is to benefit developing countries, then benefits to migrants per se are 
irrelevant. On the other hand, for those who have a more cosmopolitan 
concern for the effects on former residents of developing countries, as-
suming that they are relatively poor, the inclusion of emigrants in this 
category may seem appropriate. 
These models suggest that the potential global gains from reducing 
restrictions on migration are great. But today, almost no international 
diplomatic resources are devoted to realizing these gains, with the ex-
ception of highly restricted efforts under Mode 4 of GATS. (See Chapter 
8.) On the other hand, the resources devoted to international trade nego-
tiations are much greater, while the expected returns are considerably 
smaller. 
The World Bank’s trade model suggests that the gains from remov-
ing all barriers to goods trade would yield $287 billion in global income 
gains in 2015 (Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). The 
Doha negotiations are not expected to yield anything close to this level 
of liberalization. Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe project 
that a “base Doha scenario” would yield only $96 billion in annual 
gains by 2015, with developing countries capturing a mere $16 billion 
of this amount. 
On the other hand, we have the World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group (2006), Moses and Letnes (2004), and Hamilton and Whalley 
(1984) studies noted above, estimating gains from migration liberaliza-
tion that would exceed, in some cases greatly, the gains from a “likely 
Doha scenario” (Walmsley and Winters 2003). Scaled to the same year, 
2001, the gains from total trade liberalization are $155 billion while 
the gains from a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants is $175 bil-
lion (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 41). Not only 
does migration reform provide greater aggregate gains, but the gains are 
distributed more greatly to developing countries. No wonder thoughtful 
observers wonder why migration is not on the global agenda. How-
ever, these estimates do not appear to take into account possible adverse 
brain drain or dynamic effects on growth in the home country. If these 
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were viewed as significant, they might reduce the value of increasing 
migration, especially to the extent that the migration is heavily oriented 
toward skilled labor. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that liberalization of migration 
presents the possibility of substantial improvement of global welfare, 
even though these are only estimates, with many assumptions and em-
pirical gaps. However, the devil is in the details of the distribution of 
increased (and decreased) welfare, and the political consequences of 
these distributional details. It is also worth noting that the gains from 
increased migration are largest with the initial, even small, increases in 
migration (Moses and Letnes 2004). 
Effects on Migrants
It seems reasonable to assume that under a permissive, as opposed 
to forced, migration regime, individual migrants will benefit from 
their own migration. This assumption follows from the assumption of 
individual rationality, and from methodological and normative individ-
ualism. And indeed, we would expect to see few individuals choosing 
to migrate to a state where their welfare is reduced, based on a compari-
son of the available baskets of wages, public services, general living 
conditions, taxes, transfer payments, and many social and political pa-
rameters. Mexico has far fewer U.S. native immigrants than the United 
States has native Mexican immigrants. 
However, the assumption that individual decision-making is con-
sistent with individual welfare maximization is not always true. There 
may be circumstances in which migrants are prey to information asym-
metry in which their decision to migrate will reduce their expected 
welfare (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 61). Mi-
grants may be unaware of the simultaneous decisions of other migrants, 
causing wage expectations to be frustrated, or causing congestion. 
There may be circumstances where excessive migration would cause 
disruption and adjustment costs that exceed the gains. If, for example, 
Switzerland today were to open its borders to all who wish to become 
Swiss citizens, it might be that so many poor people would suddenly 
move to Switzerland that it would become congested and their welfare 
would actually be diminished. 
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Individual migrants, and their accompanying families, hope that 
they will benefit by migration from two sources: higher wages and bet-
ter living conditions. 
First, they may benefit from higher wages in the destination country 
compared to the home country. This is the main source of gains. Indeed, 
the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 35) estimates 
that under the scenario studied there, migrants increase their own real 
income by 199 percent: they nearly triple their real income, even after 
adjusting for a higher cost of living in the destination country. These 
gains are, of course, striking, although gains will vary depending on 
the particular home country—a less wealthy home country results in 
greater gains. 
Where do these gains come from? Freeman (2006, p. 154) explains 
that 
the huge gains in income that immigrants from a low-income 
country obtain by moving to a high-income country virtually guar-
antees that most of the gains to immigrants occur not because of 
positive selectivity of immigrants but rather because high-income 
countries have more complementary inputs: higher capital-labor 
ratios, more modern technology, superior infrastructure, more ef-
ficient markets due to greater legal protections of property and per-
sons, and lower levels of corruption and rent-seeking. 
So it is generally the factors, such as technology, that are available 
in the wealthy host country that allow immigrants from poor countries 
to achieve greater wages. Conversely, the lack of these factors gener-
ally results in lower wages for similar work in poor countries, ensuring 
that there is no rush of wealthy country individuals to migrate to poor 
countries. 
Second, migrants and their families may benefit from better liv-
ing conditions in the destination country. These better living conditions 
may arise from a number of sources, including the destination country’s 
institutions, transfer payment programs, climate, geography, culture, 
economy, etc. The particular sources of benefits that seem to cause the 
greatest concern, perhaps because they are rival in their consumption, 
are transfer payments and welfare programs. These include unemploy-
ment payments, health care and insurance, retirement benefits, public 
education, and perhaps other programs. 
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There is little doubt that increased wages are an important induce-
ment to migration, and we can expect migrants to improve their own 
lots whenever they migrate. However, other parameters will be impor-
tant to the decision to migrate. These will include the following, each of 
which might be the subject of international legal rules on migration:
Whether the migrant is permitted to remain in the destination • 
country permanently, or is only permitted to remain temporar-
ily. As a potential migrant calculates the total present value of 
migration, he or she would tend to find less value in a short-term 
migration than in a long-term migration. The migrant would of 
course want the option to return, and may well return, but the 
option to stay makes migration most valuable. 
Linguistic and cultural differences and accommodation. Desti-• 
nation states may require facility with local language and cul-
ture, or may provide greater accommodation to those who are 
not familiar with local language and culture.
Licensing and recognition of credentials for skilled workers. For • 
occupations that require credentials or licensing, recognition of 
foreign credentials and licensing would facilitate mobility. 
Access to transfer payments and welfare programs. • 
Ability to bring along family members. • 
h o ME STATE EFFECTS
Although much of the policy discussion of migration focuses on 
destination country effects, the greater effects may be felt by the home 
country of the migrant. As suggested above, liberalization of migra-
tion generally increases global welfare and also generally increases the 
welfare of migrants. But migrants themselves are only one segment of 
society. There are other segments whose welfare and political influence
must be considered. 
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Those r emaining Behind in the h ome State 
First, let us consider those who the migrants leave behind in the 
home country. These people might be hurt in some ways but might also 
be helped in other ways. The World Bank estimates that most developing 
countries will experience some modest aggregate gains from emigra-
tion (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 37). These 
gains depend on continuing average remittances at prior levels equal 
to 17 percent of migrant income. But it is important to emphasize that 
the impact on particular countries will depend on their circumstances, 
including the magnitude of migration, the skill level of migrants, and la-
bor market conditions at home and abroad. In addition to the magnitude 
of remittances, the quality of remittances—most importantly, whether 
they are for consumption or investment—will determine their impact. 
O’Rourke (2004, p. 7) finds that wages rose in emigration countries 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, converging 
with countries of immigration, and that “emigration was an important 
source of living standard convergence for [emigration countries].” 
Taylor and Williamson (1997, p. 27) find that international real wage 
dispersion declined by 28 percent from 1870 to 1910, but that with-
out the mass migrations of this period, wage dispersion would have 
increased by 7 percent. Migration explains about 70 percent of living 
standards convergence during this period. O’Rourke (2004, p. 9) con-
cludes that “emigration was thus a major source of poverty relief in 
these economies, allowing living standards to grow far more rapidly 
than they would have in its absence” (see also Williamson [2002]). 
Hatton and Williamson (2005, p. 3) conclude that “In the first global 
century, emigration raised living standards in poor countries a lot. In the 
second global century, emigration could raise living standards in poor 
countries a lot, but typically it does not.” 
Although the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) 
finds that increasing emigration of low-skilled workers would signifi
cantly reduce poverty in developing countries, those remaining behind 
do not necessarily benefit from the emigration of their compatriots. 
First, emigration of high-skilled workers may reduce welfare in the 
sending country. Second, for the same types of reasons that workers in 
the destination country are not necessarily hurt by immigration, work-
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ers in the home country are not necessarily helped by emigration. It is 
possible, however, that workers in the home country who otherwise 
compete with emigrants would experience a rise in wages. Recall that 
the World Bank simulation assumes an increasing proportion of skilled 
migrants, compared to unskilled migrants, to developed countries. So, 
beyond the ability of emigrants to escape poverty, what are the mecha-
nisms that affect those remaining behind in developing countries? 
Low-Skilled Migration and Domestic Employment in the 
h ome State
Emigration of low-skilled workers can increase wages and reduce 
unemployment and underemployment of poor workers in the home 
country. Migration of low-skilled workers has usually been beneficial to 
developing countries, contributing to poverty alleviation (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 64). However, recent studies 
of Albania, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka show no discernible wage im-
provements, despite large-scale emigration (Lucas 2004). 
“Reducing the restrictions on low-skill emigration, while remain-
ing sensitive to concerns in destination countries over social tensions, 
job opportunities for low-skilled natives and the potential burden on 
public expenditures, may best be achieved through managed migration 
programs designed jointly by origin and destination countries” (World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 58). This is an argument 
for international migration agreements. Whether these agreements are 
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral, and whether they are formal or 
informal, will depend on a number of factors. (See Chapter 9.) 
h igh-Skilled Migration and Brain Drain
Where skilled labor flows from developing countries to developed 
countries, we can expect the destination country to benefit. On the other 
hand, the origin developing country may be harmed by the loss of 
skilled workers, reducing total output, the tax base, and scale economies 
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975, p. 195; Krugman 1971, p. 483; Sykes 
1995). This is known as “brain drain.” “Depending on the length of the 
skilled workers’ absences, such a loss also could reduce an economy’s 
entrepreneurship, the ability to absorb new technologies, and various 
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positive spillovers from skilled to other workers and to society in gen-
eral” (Straubhaar 2000, p. 110; Sykes 1995). 
High-skilled migration has grown as a proportion of migration, 
in part due to selective immigration policies in countries such as the 
United States, Singapore, Canada, and Australia. Those remaining be-
hind may be hurt by brain drain. Brain drain costs to those remaining 
behind may include increased wage costs for employers and consequent 
increased prices paid by consumers and reduced returns to capital. 
High-skilled migration can be expected to affect different countries dif-
ferently. Large developing countries with many skilled people, and the 
capacity to produce large numbers of skilled people, may not be harmed 
by high-skilled migration, whereas smaller countries with fewer skilled 
people, and relatively smaller capacities to produce skilled people, may 
experience greater harm (Bhagwati 2004, p. 215).
Brain drain may reduce both the welfare of those remaining behind 
and growth in developing countries when the emigrant was generating 
or would have generated positive externalities. For example, positive 
externalities from home country education programs may arise because 
the total return to education of workers may exceed the private return—
in fact, one would assume that this is the reason for national investment 
in education. Furthermore, there may be economies of scale or scope 
that become unavailable after a certain level of emigration. Finally, 
emigration may reduce tax receipts; moreover, emigrants, if they re-
mained, might have contributed more to their home country taxes than 
they received in public services (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2006, pp. 58, 67). 
Desai, Kapur, and McHale (2004) calculate that India loses $700 
million annually in tax revenues that would have been realized from 
emigrants to the United States under its H-1B visa program, an amount 
equal to approximately 12 percent of India’s tax revenues. The World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) concludes that it is im-
possible to estimate reliably the benefit or cost to home countries of 
high-skilled emigration. The literature on brain drain is almost ex-
clusively theoretical, with the exception of a 2001 study that found a 
positive and significant correlation between migration prospects and 
human capital formation. There has been no systematic empirical as-
sessment of the effects of brain drain on developing countries, largely 
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due to a lack of harmonized international data (Beine, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2003, p. 4). 
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) have produced estimates of 
migration rates from 61 developing countries, distinguishing three 
educational levels. These estimates confirm that those with greater 
educational levels are more likely to emigrate. Beine, Docquier, and 
Rapoport (2003) find that countries that incur important losses are gen-
erally those that have very high migration rates, but that the magnitude 
of losses and gains, in terms of GDP per capita growth rate, remains 
limited for most countries. Except for Jamaica and Guyana, with very 
high migration rates, the net variation of GDP per capita growth rate is 
always lower than 0.20 percent per year (p. 29). While Beine, Docquier, 
and Rapoport find that more states are losers than winners, the winners 
include the most populous states, representing nearly 80 percent of the 
total population of their sample. These results suggest first that brain 
drain is not a problem in all origin developing states, and that on an 
aggregate basis, it is not a problem at all. However, particular origin 
developing states might experience a welfare loss, and may determine 
to take steps to reduce this loss. 
Kapur and McHale (2005, p. 4) note first that the prospect of mi-
gration affects investment in human capital: potential migrants seek 
human capital to enhance their ability to migrate successfully (see also 
Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport [2003, p. 4]; Stark and Wang [2002]). 
Lundborg (2006) argues that “the prospect of emigration to high-wage 
countries raises the expected returns to education, stimulates human 
capital formation, and raises the growth rate in the emigration country.” 
This has become known as the “brain gain.” Of course, in order for 
this investment in education to enhance growth in the home country, a 
certain number of individuals must erroneously invest in education—
expecting migration opportunities that fail to materialize (Mountford 
1997). Kapur and McHale (2005) also note the adverse effects on the 
home developing country of the loss of human capital. 
There is also a related dynamic public policy problem with brain 
drain, relating to public investment in human capital. If we understand 
brain drain as a positive externality conferred by home countries on 
destination countries in the form of subsidized education of migrants, 
then the home countries may not be able to capture the full benefits of 
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public education. Public education would become a global public good, 
with the risk that states may therefore invest less in public education, 
and public education would tend to be underproduced.6 
Remittances, Return, and Other Diaspora Benefit
There are a number of so-called feedback effects that can improve 
welfare in the origin state, including remittances and return migration 
with additional skills, contacts, and know-how (Beine, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2003, p. 4). 
Perhaps the most significant source of positive feedback effects is 
remittances. The United Nations International Fund for Agricultural 
Development’s 2007 report states that 
the driving force behind this phenomenon is an estimated 150 
million migrants worldwide who sent more than US$300 billion 
to their families in developing countries during 2006, typically 
US$100, US$200 or US$300 at a time, through more than 1.5 bil-
lion separate financial transactions. These funds are used primarily 
to meet immediate family needs (consumption) but a significant
portion is also available for savings, credit mobilization and other 
forms of investment. In other words, the world’s largest poverty 
alleviation programme could also become an effective grass roots 
economic development programme, particularly in the rural areas 
that present some of the greatest challenges to financial inclusion. 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development 2007)
Remittances have been identified as an important compensation to 
origin countries, to compensate them for losses incurred with the de-
parture of workers (Goldfarb, Havrylyshyn, and Mangum 1984). “In 
small countries, remittances can account for a large share of GDP and 
foreign exchange. Even in a large country, remittances can greatly boost 
an economy” (Freeman 2006). 
Home countries are increasingly acting to enhance the quantity 
and quality of remittances. They may establish programs to encour-
age remittances for investment. For example, Mexico has established a 
matching funds program that matches remittances for certain types of 
investment projects. Where migrant communities develop abroad, it is 
also possible for organizations of migrants to band together to assist or 
invest at home.7
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Assuming remittance rates at current levels, the World Bank esti-
mates that those remaining behind would experience a net increase of 
0.9 percent in their real incomes (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2006, p. 34). Unger (2005) estimates that income grew more 
rapidly in Mexican towns experiencing greater emigration, and that in-
come growth was associated with greater remittances. 
Of course, remittances have other effects. For example, while pov-
erty alleviation is an important effect of remittances, an increase in 
remittances used for other consumption can draw resources away from 
more productive or more development-conducive uses. Remittances 
can cause an increase in the real exchange rate, and therefore a loss of 
export competitiveness. This is the standard “Dutch disease” (World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 39).
An IOM survey carried out in Guatemala . . . found that recipi-
ent households used 53 per cent of remittances to buy basic items 
such as food and clothing. A further 11 per cent was spent on edu-
cation and health. As much as 36 per cent was directed to sav-
ings, economic purposes and for the purchase of assets, including 
housing. Studies in CIS countries (Tajikistan, Moldova, Armenia) 
have found that the amount allocated for savings and investment 
is small. In Tajikistan (Olimova and Bosc 2003), labour migration 
and remittances have not led to individual accumulation of wealth 
nor have they accelerated the pace of SME development. Never-
theless, as a survival strategy, labour migration has become a cru-
cial stabilizing factor to offset the effects of economic crisis. (Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2006, p. 77)
Indeed, remittances may be used more for consumption than for in-
vestment, and this may limit their effect on growth (Kapur and McHale 
2005, p. 150). It may be that remittances from more-skilled workers 
more frequently take the form of growth-promoting investment (Desai, 
Kapur, and McHale 2004). For example, highly skilled Indian emigrant 
technicians might make remittances as part of a venture capital project 
in India. Kapur and McHale conclude that the effects of remittances on 
poverty and development are still poorly understood (p. 161). 
Martin (2004) observes that
most studies suggest that each $1 in remittances generates a $2 to 
$3 increase in GDP, as recipients buy goods or invest in housing, 
education, or health care, improving the lives of non-migrants via 
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the multiplier effects of remittance spending. Research suggests 
that the exit of men in the prime of their working lives initially 
leads to reduced output in local economies, but the arrival of remit-
tances can lead to adjustments that maintain output. For example, 
migrant families can shift farming operations from crops to live-
stock, which require less labor, hire labor to produce crops, or rent 
crop land to other farmers, enabling them to achieve economies of 
scale. (p. 15)
Some home countries have tried to capture the value of remittances 
by regulating the activities of their emigrants. 
For example, many Korean migrants in the Middle East in the late 
1970s and early 1980s were considered employees of their Korean 
construction company, and had their Korean currency earnings 
sent to their families in Korea while receiving a stipend in local 
currency abroad. Many Chinese and Vietnamese migrants today 
go abroad as employees of Chinese and Vietnamese firms, and 
their wages are paid in a similar way—most go to the migrant’s 
family or bank account in local currency . . . Similarly, between 
1942 and 1946, Mexican Braceros had 10 per cent of their earnings 
sent from US employers directly to the Bank of Mexico. (p. 15)
 Return of emigrants can provide development benefits (Ellerman 
2003). Brain drain may be turned into “brain circulation,” strengthening 
developing country human capital. For example, in India, IT workers 
may return from the United States with the know-how and contacts to 
start up new high-tech businesses. There have been a number of pro-
grams, organized by destination states or international organizations 
such as the IOM, established to facilitate or encourage return (World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 71). 
In addition, the home country can benefit informally, as “a well- 
educated diaspora can improve access to capital, technology, informa-
tion, foreign exchange, and business contacts for firms in the country of 
origin” (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 58). 
Producers in the h ome State
Producers in developing home countries would be likely to suf-
fer from emigration. Capital returns may decline, while labor returns 
may improve. In fact, multinational corporations that have the ability 
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to invest in developing countries may therefore find liberalization of 
migration unattractive. 
Importantly, and unfortunately, free migration would serve, at least 
in the short term, as a deterrent to investment. In the World Bank simu-
lation, developing country pools of unskilled workers only decline by 
0.3 percent, while skilled workers decline by 1.7 percent (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 44). However, there is at least a 
plausible argument that emigration may raise the productivity of those 
left behind (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 6). Furthermore, the loss to 
capital may be offset by the gain to labor. 
The generally adverse effect of emigration on producers in de-
veloping countries means that it may be difficult to develop political 
coalitions in developing countries to lobby to seek liberalization of im-
migration by destination states. On the other hand, those home state 
residents who anticipate a possibility for migration may support efforts 
to seek liberalization abroad. This will be further elaborated upon in 
Chapter 4. 
DESTIn ATIon S TATE EFFECTS
Destination states are benefited by migration to the extent that the 
migration responds to relative scarcity and/or productivity gains, in-
creasing the general productivity of the economy. By increasing the 
supply of labor, immigration increases the productivity of factors that 
are complementary to that labor. The increased income for destination 
country employers is termed the “immigration surplus.” Smith and 
Edmonston (1997) develop a basic economic model using what they 
believe to be plausible assumptions, including constant returns to scale, 
to show that immigration produces net economic gains for domestic 
residents. Immigration allows existing domestic workers to increase 
their specialization, producing goods more efficientl . On the consump-
tion side, immigrants produce new goods and services and are paid less 
than the value of these goods and services, so domestic residents gain. 
Consumers thus benefit from reduced prices.
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Furthermore, to the extent that immigrants contribute more in taxes 
than they receive in government services and transfer payments, immi-
grants may provide another benefit. The excess is a net fiscal transfer to 
nonimmigrant taxpayers. It is easy to see that high-skilled immigrants 
are likely to pay more in taxes, and consume less in government ser-
vices and transfer payments, than low-skilled immigrants. 
However, destination states may be harmed (in economic terms) 
through three mechanisms. Each of these harms must be balanced 
against potential benefits. First, they may be harmed to the extent that 
certain groups of native or earlier immigrant workers are harmed, 
where the costs of adjustment exceed the productivity benefits. Costs of 
adjustment may include costs of retraining or of providing other social 
welfare programs to displaced workers, or social costs of simply having 
displaced workers. 
Second, the destination state will experience the costs of adminis-
tering an immigration system. Of course, these costs do not necessarily 
militate against liberalized immigration, unless they increase as a func-
tion of the level of immigration.8 
Third, destination states may be harmed through the fiscal mecha-
nism, whereby immigrants receive more in public services and transfer 
payments than they contribute through taxes. Sudak and Trebilcock 
(2006) propose a required insurance mechanism to ensure that each in-
dividual migrant avoids imposing an inappropriate cost to the public 
fisc 9 As Hanson concludes (2007, p. 21), if “immigrants are a net fis
cal drain, the total impact of immigration on the United States would 
be positive only if the immigration surplus exceeded the fiscal transfer 
made to immigrants.” “For low-skilled immigration . . . this does not 
appear to be the case.” 
Of course, immigrants may also enhance the welfare of natives in 
important dimensions. Immigrants may bring greater productivity and 
less expensive goods. Immigrants may also help to fund publicly pro-
vided goods and services. 
There seems to be wide agreement that the United States as a whole, 
and other likely destination states, would benefit from increased im-
migration by highly skilled workers (even though competing domestic 
workers might be harmed). But immigration of less-skilled workers, 
which has been the recent trend, is more ambiguous. This may ex-
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plain why many destination states, such as the United States, Germany, 
Canada, or Singapore, provide more liberal access for high-skilled 
persons.
In the end, Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 6) argue that immi-
gration is unlikely to have a very large effect on earnings or on gross 
domestic product per capita in the large and complex U.S. economy. 
They find savings, investment, and human capital of U.S. workers to be 
“far more critical.” 
There has been a lively empirical debate among economists with 
respect to the destination country effects of immigration to the United 
States, and this debate has spilled over into the public arena (Lowenstein 
2006). This debate has focused, importantly, on the effects of immigra-
tion on low-skilled workers. 
Before reviewing this debate, it is important to state that the out-
come is not the final word with respect to global welfare, or even with 
respect to U.S. aggregate welfare. That is, even if it is found that the 
United States is harmed by liberalized immigration, it may be that 
global welfare is increased, and therefore it would be efficient (albeit 
perhaps unappealing from a distributive standpoint) to compensate the 
United States in order to induce the United States to accept liberal-
ized immigration. Of course, the compensation could take the form of 
a measure that would have beneficial effects on the home states, such 
as liberalization of investment or of trade in high value-added services. 
Recall that in the GATS negotiations, Mode 4 liberalization of move-
ment of natural persons was seen as both compensation for, and linked 
to, Mode 3 liberalization of commercial presence, which often is asso-
ciated with investment. 
Second, even if the poorest workers in the United States are oth-
erwise harmed by liberalized immigration, it may be that the United 
States as a whole benefits from liberalized immigration. Again, under 
these circumstances, it might be efficient to compensate the harmed 
workers in order to induce them to accept liberalized immigration.10 
Workers in the Destination State
Individual workers in destination states may lose jobs to immi-
grants, and there may be costs associated with dislocation. Of course, 
Job Name: -- /309724t
64   Trachtman
in the simplest terms, adding to the supply of workers should result in 
a new supply-demand equilibrium, shifting the price downward (see 
Figure 2.1). 
Supply and demand, and historical data, suggest that the impact on 
specific groups of domestic workers would depend on the composition 
of immigrant worker groups: if the immigrants are largely unskilled, 
or low skilled, their effect will generally be to reduce the wages of the 
unskilled or low skilled (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 14). 
Under the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, we would expect high-skill 
workers to migrate from high-skill countries to low-skill countries, 
and we would expect high-skill workers in low-skill countries to op-
pose immigration (at least by high-skill workers). Conversely, low-skill 
workers would migrate from low-skill countries to high-skill countries, 
and we would expect low-skill workers in high-skill countries to op-
pose immigration (at least by low-skill workers) (O’Rourke and Sinnott 
2003, p. 7). We discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
It is worth noting that “between 1960 and 2000, the share of working- 
age native-born U.S. residents with less than twelve years of schooling 
fell from 50 percent to 12 percent” (Hanson 2007). By comparison, in 
Mexico, “as of 2000, 74 percent of working-age residents had less than 
twelve years of education” (p. 14). While these statistics are not proxies 
for abundance or scarcity, they are highly suggestive. Thus, immigra-
tion from Mexico to the United States, if unregulated, would likely be 
dominated by unskilled workers. 
There are five potential mechanisms by which an influx of foreign 
workers may affect the circumstances of native-born workers (as work-
ers—we will examine the effects on consumers and taxpayers below). 
An increase in the supply of workers competing for particular 1) 
jobs should, in theory, drive down wages. (See Figure 2.1.) This 
could result in reduced employment, as some workers determine 
not to work at the reduced wage. 
An influx of foreign workers may result in some adjustment in 2) 
industry or in the types of capital investment made by industry. 
Producers may adjust the composition of their workforces, or 
their investment, in response to changes in composition of the 
workforce. An increase in the number of unskilled workers by 
immigration may result in adjustment through a change in the 
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output mix—toward more products produced by unskilled work-
ers (Gaston and Nelson 2000, p. 104). 
An influx of foreign workers may induce U.S. industry to invest 3) 
in a particular area, actually increasing the number and quality 
of jobs in that area. 
An influx of foreign workers may cause U.S. workers to seek 4) 
other jobs in other communities. 
A5) n influx of immigrant workers should increase the wages of 
complementary workers—workers whose skills become more 
valuable due to immigration. An influx of chefs results in in-
creased demand for waiters. 
Much depends on the degree to which labor is specific to a particu-
lar sector, and on the mobility of labor between sectors. If labor were 
perfectly immobile between sectors, we would expect concentrated 
effects on the domestic workers in the sector or sectors targeted by im-
migrants. If labor were perfectly mobile, wages would fall by the same 
proportion in all sectors. Of course, it may be that immigrants would 
address a broad range of sectors. The greater the breadth of sectors af-
fected, the more diffuse the effects. 
This type of natural or autonomous “diffusion” can be simulated 
by an “institutional” diffusion—through taxation and adjustment pay- 
ments. 
So, an important question regarding national welfare calculations, 
and political and institutional responses, relates to the composition of 
the immigrant labor pool. If the pool of immigrants were such that over-
all welfare is increased by immigration, or if the pool of immigrants 
could be controlled to ensure that overall welfare is increased, then 
the argument for liberalized immigration would be similar to the argu-
ment for broad liberalization of trade in goods or services: while some 
are made worse off, those who are made better off are benefited in an 
amount greater than the amount by which those made worse off are 
hurt. That is, under these circumstances, liberalized immigration would 
be a potential Pareto improvement. As with the argument for free trade, 
this argument leaves aside the question of whether actual compensation 
would be provided to those made worse off, making the move to liberal-
ized immigration an actual Pareto improvement. 
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But the debate in the United States is even narrower in its focus 
than an analysis of overall U.S. welfare: it examines whether immi-
grants hurt the economic position of the U.S. persons with whom they 
compete. So, it puts aside—it ignores—questions of compensation, al-
though the outcome of the debate might have some bearing on policy 
decisions to make compensation available. Juxtaposing this migration 
policy discussion with that surrounding trade in goods and services, we 
might ask why the immigration debate looks at this narrower question 
of whether some groups are hurt, while the trade discussion is often 
content to deal with potential Pareto efficiency: whether enough sur-
plus is generated to make compensation, even if compensation is not 
actually made. One answer is that the groups who actually seem to be 
hurt by migration to the United States are the lowest income groups, 
whereas trade in goods and services may be less focused in its effects. 
But this narrow focus makes it even more important to consider the pos-
sibility of compensation to those harmed. 
While the United States cannot stand as a proxy for all developed 
destination countries, this section will review this empirical debate re-
garding the effects on native-born workers in the United States.
Examining the U.S. context, Card (1990, p. 245) argues that the link 
between immigration and wage suppression is difficult to isolate. Card’s 
work considers the “natural experiment” of the arrival of 125,000 Cu-
ban “Marielitos” (boat people) in Miami, increasing Miami’s workforce 
by 7 percent. He compares the changes in the labor market structure in 
Miami to that of other cities over the same period, and finds that the 
increased workforce in Miami did not have a discernible effect. 
Borjas (2004, p. 2) responds that intercity comparisons are not re-
vealing because the flow of jobs and workers in response to immigration 
will “effectively diffuse the impact of immigration across the national 
economy.” Inflows of migrants may be associated with outflows of na-
tives, with the natives accepting reduced wages in other cities. However, 
Card and DiNardo (2000) use a three skill-group division and find that 
native mobility has virtually no offsetting effect with respect to supply 
shocks caused by immigration. (See also Card [2005]).
Furthermore, Borjas argues that Card’s method of cross-city com-
parison erroneously assumes that immigrants are randomly distributed 
across labor markets. However, if “immigrants tend to cluster in cities 
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with thriving economies, there would be a built-in spurious positive 
correlation between immigration and wages” (Borjas 2004, p. 2). This 
would mask the negative effects of immigration. In addition, as immi-
grants enter a particular city, owners of capital may move their capital 
to those cities to take advantage of cheap labor. This increase in demand 
would have the effect of supporting labor prices in the city that experi-
ences the inflo , while depressing wages in the city that the owners 
of capital abandoned. Thus, Borjas asserts that “because labor markets 
adjust to immigration, the labor market impact of immigration may be 
measurable only at the national level” (p. 2). 
Therefore, instead of looking at specific cities, Borjas (2003, 2004) 
examines specific skill groups and experience cohorts nationwide. He 
finds that immigration has a very strong effect on earnings. Using data 
from the U.S. censuses between 1960 and 2000, Borjas finds that wages 
grew fastest for workers in those skill groups that were least affected 
by immigration. He develops a statistical model describing the link be-
tween wages and immigration, by relating data across skill groups and 
calendar years. Based on this model, he predicts that an immigrant in-
flux that increases the number of workers in a particular skill group by 
10 percent will reduce annual earnings in that skill group by 8 percent 
(Borjas 2004). By increasing the labor supply from 1980 to 2000, “im-
migration reduced the average annual earnings of native-born men by 
an estimated $1,700 or roughly 4 percent” (Borjas 2003, p. 1359). The 
effect was greater among those without a high school education (7.4 
percent), and smaller for high school graduates (2.1 percent) (Borjas 
2004, p. 5). However, when Ottaviano and Peri (2006) relax the restric-
tive assumptions of Borjas (2003) that capital markets did not respond 
to immigration and that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes, 
they arrive at divergent conclusions.
In a 2005 paper, Borjas and Katz (2005) find that the influx of 
Mexican workers to the United States in recent years has significantly
depressed the earnings of high school dropouts, while enhancing the 
earnings of college graduates. DeLong (2006) argues that Borjas and 
Katz’s finding of these large effects is “imprecisely estimated: their data 
are fuzzy and give an approximately one-sixth chance that the effect on 
high school dropouts is positive.” 
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Borjas (2004, p. 3) cites several national studies (Camarota 1998; 
Jaeger 1995; Smith and Edmonston 1997) that have found that “im-
migration adversely affects the wages of natives in competition with 
immigrants.” 
On the other hand, Card (2005) finds that the wages of less-skilled 
natives are insensitive to supply shocks of immigrants. He reviews the 
possible explanations for the failure of the simple theoretical prediction 
that increased supply depresses prices. Card examines data suggesting 
rejection of both the thesis that selective mobility of native workers 
masks the local effects of immigrants, and the Heckscher-Ohlin mod-
el’s prediction that the supply shock is absorbed by changing industry 
structure. He finds that the bulk of the absorption occurs within indus-
tries, which adapt to use more unskilled labor. 
Card refers to data showing significant local supply effects of im-
migration (Card 2001, 2005), meaning that the supply of immigrant 
labor is not dissipated by mobility (as Borjas, Freeman, and Katz [1997] 
suggest). However, he finds that these significant supply effects do not 
translate into significant wage effects. His estimates suggest that “there 
is no relationship between the supply of high school dropouts [includ-
ing immigrants] and their relative wages . . . As in most of the previous 
work looking at local labor market impacts of immigration, there is 
a surprisingly weak relationship between immigration and less-skilled 
native wages” (Card [2005], p. 11, citing Friedberg and Hunt [1995] and 
Borjas [1994]). He refers to the fact that the relationship between wages 
of native dropouts relative to wages of native high school graduates has 
remained nearly constant since 1980, despite pressure from immigrant 
inflows increasing the supply of labor. Card suggests that the aggregate 
data relied upon by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) are uninforma-
tive without knowing the trend in relative demand for dropouts. 
Further, Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 148) find that in the United 
States, immigrants are disproportionately employed in import-competing 
sectors, and thus they largely substitute for imports. They observe that 
“analyses that ignore this pattern may overstate the possible adverse ef-
fects of immigrants on low-skilled natives.” 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) find that “overall immigration generates 
a large positive effect on the average wages of U.S.-born workers.” 
Their analysis, using both estimation and simulation methods, exam-
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ines closely the effects of skill complementarities and physical capital 
accumulation. They calculate that the average wage of native workers 
increased between 2 percent and 2.5 percent due to the inflow of for-
eign workers from 1990 to 2000, although the wages of native workers 
without a high school degree declined by 1 percent. 
On the other hand, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2003, p. 15), examining 
the literature on effects on the unskilled, conclude broadly that “several 
studies, using various methodologies, have shown that in immigrant na-
tions such as the United States, immigration had a significant negative 
impact on unskilled real wages.” 
In their meta-analysis of studies of this topic extending beyond the 
U.S. context, Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) find that results differ 
across countries and that the effects of migration on wages are small: 
“one percentage point increase in the proportion of immigrants in the 
labor force lowers wages across the investigated studies by only 0.119 
percent.” 
Thus, applying the Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) findings to the 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) simulation (assum-
ing a 3 percent increase in the stock of migrants) we would anticipate 
a 0.357 percent reduction in wages in the destination states. The World 
Bank simulation itself finds that in higher-income countries, unskilled 
native wages decline by around 0.3 percent, while skilled native wages 
decline by 1.1 percent (p. 44). (Recall that the World Bank simulation 
assumes a larger proportion of skilled migration than has occurred in 
the past.) On the other hand, more severe adverse consequences are felt 
by earlier migrants, whose wages decline by more than 10 percent for 
unskilled earlier migrants and 20 percent for skilled earlier migrants. 
These distinctions depend, of course, on the degree of substitutability 
between migrants and native workers. 
Given the diverse positions in this literature, the best conclusion 
that can be reached at this time is one of uncertainty as to whether and 
to what extent immigrants suppress the incomes of competing work-
ers (Gaston and Nelson 2000). However, several things are clear. First, 
under this literature it is by no means clear that the United States, or 
any other destination country, is harmed as a whole by immigration. 
Second, the composition of the class of workers harmed will depend on 
the composition of the class of workers who immigrate, and immigrants 
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(at least to the United States) have had a much higher proportion of 
unskilled persons than the native population (Card 2005, p. 3). Third, 
and of great practical importance, if immigration harms some group of 
native workers, the harm seems to vary directly with the magnitude of 
immigration. So, at least from the standpoint of immigrant-competing 
native workers, a stream is preferable to a flood. Fourth, the histori-
cal experience represented in this empirical literature is not necessarily 
indicative of future experience, especially under significantly changed 
policy. Finally, this literature does not address the possibility that 
the gains from immigration might be sufficient to compensate those 
harmed. 
While there appears to be a consensus that the average destination 
country worker will only experience modest wage pressure (Ottaviano 
and Peri [2005] suggest that the average effect is indeed positive), if 
any, from liberalization of migration, other destination country con-
stituencies will be affected by liberalization. Of course, each individual 
“belongs” to multiple constituencies, moderating or accentuating some 
effects. 
Producers and Consumers in the Destination Country
Producers in the destination country that employ the type of la-
bor supplied by immigrants would tend to benefit from immigration. 
In higher-income countries, capital will enjoy an increase in returns, 
as wages decline (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, 
p. 44). As we will see in Chapter 4, this results in a radically differ-
ent political economy of immigration policy, compared to the political 
economy of trade policy. 
Assuming that migration reduces wages, or increases productiv-
ity, then consumers may gain from lower prices. Those consumers in 
the destination country are situated similarly to consumers of goods in 
importing countries. They enjoy increased welfare by virtue of lower-
priced goods. 
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TEMPor Ar y  An D PEr MAn En T MIGr ATIon 
While the direct economic consequences of temporary migration 
are comparable to those of permanent migration, with the level of 
impact reduced by virtue of the reduced period of foreign residence, 
temporary migration presents less difficult cultural, social, and political 
dimensions. 
However, in the Walmsley-Winters model, permanent residents in 
home developing countries tend to lose from the outflow of even tem-
porary migrants, despite assumed remittances, because the decrease in 
the labor supply reduces the return to capital and other factors of pro-
duction (Martin 1990, p. 81). Winters et al. (2002) find that straight loss 
for the origin country is far from inevitable (as discussed above) and 
will depend on the length of absence. Recall that the skilled workers are 
likely to be achieving productivity gains by moving (assuming that they 
do not move erroneously). If they return or otherwise interact with their 
home markets, they may also bring back innovations, skills, knowledge 
of markets, and capital. The main uncertainty regarding the benefits to 
the origin country of temporary migration relates to the magnitude and 
quality of remittances, and the magnitude and quality of skills brought 
home by returning workers. Indeed, there is a possibility that return 
would reduce the welfare of those remaining behind. Permanent migra-
tion may provide reduced incentives for remittances or return, although 
a Bhagwati tax–type mechanism could address this concern. 
Winters et al. (2002, p. 68) concludes that “developing countries’ 
policies toward the temporary movement of skilled natural persons 
should depend heavily on the net balance of these effects, which is 
currently very uncertain. Moreover, the balance is likely to vary by 
country.” Although temporary movement of natural persons “will clearly 
deliver only some of the economic benefits of straight migration in 
terms of output and income, it avoids most of the latter’s political costs” 
(Winters 2003, p. 69).
Temporary migration schemes are usually selective based on skills. 
A number of industrialized countries have established programs for 
temporary acceptance of workers (OECD 1998). Examples include the 
U.S. H-1B visa program, and temporary skilled migration programs in 
Australia and Canada. 
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The Walmsley-Winters model suggests that although “developing 
countries are the main beneficiaries of [an increase in quotas for tempo-
rary migration], the initial residents of most of the industrial countries 
also experience increases in welfare from the higher returns to capital 
and increased taxes collected” (Martin 1990). In this sense, at least from 
a national aggregate and global perspective, temporary migration has 
the same type of win-win welfare profile that trade in goods has. The 
problem then is to induce those harmed within national economies to 
accept increased temporary migration. 
Importantly, programs for temporary movement may, depending on 
the quality of administration and incentives for return, provide incen-
tives for increased authorized and unauthorized immigration (Ghosh 
2000, p. 15). Temporary guest worker programs, like the Bracero 
(“strong arm”) program which brought Mexican workers to the United 
States from 1943 to 1964, led to a good deal of permanent migration 
(Martin 2001). The Bracero program admitted Mexicans under con-
ditions similar to the currently existing H-2A temporary or seasonal 
agricultural visa program, which allows U.S. farmers to recruit foreign 
workers, after a good-faith effort to recruit U.S. workers. Both the Bra-
cero program and Germany’s Gastarbeiter program increased legal and 
illegal immigration to the host countries. 
Preference of temporary migration over permanent migration may 
arise from a concern to ensure that arrangements benefit developing 
countries. “If the movement is temporary, then we can be fairly con-
fident that both the host and home country will gain. The benefits of 
permanent migration are less clear: the gains from remittances, net-
works, investment, etc. must be weighed against the possible costs of 
‘brain drain’” (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, and Self 2004, p. 15). Rodrik (2004) 
writes, “To ensure that labor mobility produces benefits for developing 
nations it is imperative that the regime be designed in a way that gener-
ates incentives for return to home countries. While remittances can be 
an important source of income support for poor families, they are gen-
erally unable to spark and sustain long-term economic development.” 
Of course, brain drain also presents risks in connection with tem-
porary migration—it is simply assumed to be reduced in magnitude. 
This reduction depends on the temporal relation between the brain drain 
harms and the length of sojourn. It could be that most of the harms 
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are felt during the earlier period of the sojourn, while benefits would 
occur later. Nor is it correct to assume that temporariness ensures ben-
efits to developing countries. Indeed, there will be circumstances where 
limitations to temporariness reduce or destroy benefits to developing 
countries. Furthermore, there must be circumstances where permanent 
migration would be more beneficial globally than temporary migra-
tion, so that if it were possible to compensate developing country home 
states, permanent migration would be superior both for the source de-
veloping country and for the world. 
While few would argue with a goal to ensure that migration ar-
rangements redound to the benefit of the poor, a limitation to temporary 
migration may be too blunt an instrument to achieve the goal. Econ-
omists sometimes also seek to ensure that international economic 
arrangements in trade are “foolproof”: some have argued that interna-
tional trade arrangements should be limited to tariff reduction, because 
that is the only type of liberalization where policymakers can do no 
harm. But it is possible that institutional as opposed to prohibitive re-
sponses to these concerns may allow greater increases in welfare. 
Limitation of migration to temporary migration reduces the incen-
tive to migrate, which can be understood as the present value of the 
lifetime difference in income available in the home state versus that 
available in the destination state. Temporary or rotational migration in-
volves greater transportation and reinstallation costs. Thus, the ratio of 
migration expense to migration benefitswill be reduced under temporary 
migration, with greater expenses and smaller benefits. Requirements 
of temporariness also may exclude the migrant from participation in 
pension and other public welfare programs, and so further reduce the 
incentive to migrate. Requirements of temporariness also artificially
suppress the broader potential benefits of migration. Indeed, it seems 
clear that the main effect of a requirement of temporariness is to moder-
ate the effects of migration. If these effects are good, temporariness is 
bad; conversely, if these effects are bad, temporariness is good. 
To be sure, a more refined instrument that can capture all of the 
benefits of migration of unrestricted duration, while protecting against 
brain drain, may require substantial development of international insti-
tutional arrangements, but the benefits of increased global welfare and 
increased freedom for individuals may justify the costs. Facilitation of 
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remittances, the establishment of a Bhagwati tax, commitments of des-
tination states to accept a specified number of less-skilled immigrants, 
naked transfers from destination states to home states, or some com-
bination of the foregoing, may be used to ensure benefits to the poor. 
Temporary migration has many costs of its own, including administra-
tion, disruption of family and social life, and the naked deadweight loss 
of suppressing the efficient allocation of resources.
Sk ILLED An D Un Sk ILLED MIGr ATIon
Skill levels will affect the economics of migration through at least 
two paths. First, as explained above, high-skilled workers will often 
contribute to the destination state from a fiscal perspective, and their 
departure may confer a loss on the home state from a fiscal perspective. 
Second, also as explained above, to the extent that the destination state 
has a deficit of high-skilled workers, or the high-skilled workers create 
positive externalities, high-skilled workers may benefit the destination 
state. 
Hatton and Williamson explain that the quality of immigrants to the 
United States, and to other OECD destinations, declined between the 
1950s and 2000, largely due to changes in the home country composi-
tion of these immigrants (Hatton and Williamson 2006). In response, 
a number of the wealthy destination countries have moved to quality-
based selection criteria for immigrants. 
In recent years, a number of destination states have moved toward 
“point” or other systems to admit skilled workers while excluding 
less-skilled workers. For example, the United States has periodically 
provided temporary increases in the number of H-1B visas for highly 
skilled workers, in response to industry demands for more skilled 
workers. 
Developed destination states seem to be in a competition to attract 
highly skilled workers (Harris 2002, p. 99). “‘To maintain and improve 
economic growth in the EU, it is essential for Europe to become a mag-
net for the highly skilled,’ said Franco Frattini, the EU justice and home 
affairs commissioner. ‘Qualified and highly qualified migrants prefer 
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the U.S.A., Canada and Australia’” (Bilefsky 2007). The contribution 
of immigrants to high technology is impressive. Wadhwa et al. (2007) 
report as follows:
Our research produced some startling statistics: in 25.3 percent 
of technology and engineering companies started in the United 
States from 1995 to 2005, at least one key founder was foreign-
born; in California, this percentage was 38.8; in North Carolina, 
the percentage was only 13.9. Our analysis of Silicon Valley and 
Research Triangle Park (RTP) showed greater concentrations of 
immigrant founders. In Silicon Valley, 52.4 percent of companies 
had an immigrant as a key founder, as did 18.7 percent of RTP. 
LEGAL An D ILLEGAL MIGr ATIon
Interestingly, from an economic standpoint, regulation of migra-
tion is similar to other market-suppressing regulatory interventions. 
All other things being equal, and assuming perfect competition, this 
intervention reduces welfare. So it is not strange that Hanson (2007) 
concludes that there is little evidence that legal immigration is prefer-
able from an economic standpoint to illegal immigration, and concludes 
that illegal immigration is more responsive to labor market conditions 
than legal immigration. Examining the U.S. context, Hanson argues 
that legal immigration “is subject to arbitrary selection criteria and bu-
reaucratic delays, which tend to disassociate legal inflows from U.S. 
labor-market conditions” (p. 5). Temporary legal immigrants are far 
less flexible than illegal immigrants, as most work visas are linked to 
a particular employer, and the visa holder cannot change jobs without 
employer approval (p. 12).
Of course, market imperfections exist, and the welfare state pro-
vides attractions that may induce inefficient illegal immigration, at 
least insofar as illegal immigrants have access to transfer programs, so 
it is not possible to say that, from a global welfare standpoint, illegal 
immigration is superior to legal immigration. Furthermore, illegal im-
migration can erode the “rule of law” and may reduce the ability to 
enforce workers’ rights. 
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For certain types of employers, illegal immigration may be more 
attractive than legal immigration. Illegal immigrants may be less costly 
and more pliable than legal immigrants. They may be less costly in part 
because they have difficulty joining in efforts to organize, and because 
they fear exposure.11 They may be in the “black economy,” and fail to 
pay taxes or attract contributions to social security or health care funds. 
Illegal immigrants may undercut the pricing and protections of domestic 
workers more severely than legal immigrants. Thus, certain employers 
may be expected to oppose expanded legal immigration. In fact, one of 
the preambular provisions of the International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their 
Families (1990) recites as follows: “Considering that workers who are 
non-documented or in an irregular situation are frequently employed 
under less favourable conditions of work than other workers and that 
certain employers find this an inducement to seek such labour in order 
to reap the benefits of unfair competition . . . 
We would expect that labor interests would prefer legal immigration 
to illegal immigration, all other things being equal. Some labor interests 
would prefer to provide amnesty to existing illegal immigrants, com-
pared to maintaining the status quo. Freeman (2006, p. 163) explains 
with respect to the United States that
in 2000 the AFL-CIO reversed its long-standing support for the 
employer sanctions law that criminalized the hiring of undocu-
mented immigrant workers and endorsed amnesty for millions of 
undocumented workers and repeal of the employer sanctions law. 
The underlying rationale was that the growing immigrant com-
munity would provide good recruits and political allies for unions, 
and that legalizing the workers would reduce the impact of such 
immigrants in reducing wages and opportunities for other workers. 
Of course, if the legal immigration has little effect in suppressing 
illegal immigration, competing domestic labor interests might have less 
of an interest in supporting legal immigration. Similarly, if amnesty 
has the effect of inducing increased illegal immigration, labor interests 
might be ambivalent regarding amnesty. 
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FISCAL EFFECTS
As noted above, migration may be induced not only by greater 
wages, but also by the attraction of destination country public services to 
migrants. Here, migration is different from trade in goods and services. 
And migration of workers for purposes of already identified employ-
ment is different from migration of other individuals. That is, goods and 
services are subject to a natural market discipline, as are workers who 
already have identified employment.12 While imported goods and ser-
vices compete with domestic goods and services, the market naturally 
clears. Individual immigrants may arrive and use resources without 
ever being subjected to market forces. In fact, they may be motivated 
by nonmarket forces to come, especially by social welfare programs 
such as education, health care, or income support. 
Migration induced by public services, as opposed to productivity 
enhancement, may result in inefficiency from a global perspective and 
may harm the destination state. The inefficiency is simply a result of a 
public goods problem, in which public services are transformed from 
a private good available only to natives to a public good available to 
anyone wishing to migrate. So, when we discuss effects of migration 
on the destination state, we must distinguish among different types of 
migrants. The risk of migrants traveling to obtain the benefits of public
services and transfers has increased with the rise of the interventionist, 
or welfare, state and the decline in the costs of transportation. 
The concern from a destination state welfare standpoint is that im-
migrants will cost more in public services than they contribute in taxes, 
or in other terms, resulting in a net welfare loss for natives. Under pro-
gressive income taxation, migrating unskilled workers will be likely to 
pay less in taxes than average natives. So even if these migrants absorb 
an average level of public service and transfer payments, their effect 
will be to dilute the total fisc. Of course, we must keep in mind that 
the “immigration dividend” arising from decreased costs of production 
could countervail this type of welfare loss on an aggregate basis. 
Because of the possibility that immigrants could confer a net welfare 
loss, destination states may determine to limit access to their markets to 
those less likely to use these services, or less likely to use them soon. 
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Alternatively, destination states may limit access to their public 
services. For example, in 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation 
excluding noncitizens from access to a number of entitlement programs 
(the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996). An alternative to this type of exclusion is to establish eligibility 
requirements or waiting periods that would allow immigrants to enter 
but exclude them from these programs. This may be unpalatable, or 
even unconstitutional, for some states. It may raise human rights or 
other international legal issues. Still another alternative is to combine 
some degree of public service harmonization with moves toward liber-
alization of migration.13 
Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 293) find that each immigrant-head-
ed household imposed a net fiscal cost of between $1,613 and $2,206 
on the United States. “If the net fiscal impact of all U.S. immigrant- 
headed households were averaged across all native households in the 
United States, the burden would be . . . on the order of $166 to $226 per 
native household” (p. 9). The reasons for net transfers to immigrants in 
the United States are that immigrants tend to have younger children, 
utilizing school resources; immigrants tend to be poorer, and thus re-
ceive more transfer payments; and under progressive income taxation, 
poorer immigrants contribute less (p. 9). 
However, these figures include the costs of educating the children 
of immigrants but not the taxes that the native-born children of immi-
grants pay after leaving the immigrant-headed household (p. 298). A 
dynamic analysis by Smith and Edmonston including these taxes indi-
cates that the average immigrant confers a net benefit of $80,000 in net 
present value (p. 336).14 
Interestingly, under most scenarios, “the long-run fiscal impact is 
strongly positive at the federal level, but substantially negative at the 
state and local levels” (p. 12). This is largely because of the kinds of 
fiscal responsibilities undertaken by states. States like California, where 
immigrants tend to concentrate, may incur net long-term burdens, while 
other states receive net benefits.
Of course, as mentioned above, any fiscal transfers must be balanced 
against the immigration dividend through consumption and production 
channels. Furthermore, it is clear that more highly skilled immigrants 
would tend to make fiscal contributions rather than receive net trans-
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fers. Simon shows that, at least in the case of immigration to the United 
States, immigrants have been net contributors when dynamic effects 
on production and fiscal effects are taken into account along with labor 
market effects (Simon 1990, pp. 105–164). 
The high-income countries will experience a general decline in 
working-age population during the period 2010 to 2025 (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 29). The expected decline in 
the labor force is accompanied by a rise in these countries’ dependency 
ratios: the ratio of nonworkers to workers. In a “pay as you go” transfer 
system, such as the U.S. Social Security system, a rise in the depen-
dency ratio means that fewer workers must bear a bigger burden. 
Here, much depends on the relative age and skill level of the migrants. 
Examining forward-looking projections of the effects of immigrants, 
Smith and Edmonston (1997, p. 11) find that immigrants arriving at 
ages 10–25 produce net benefits under most scenarios. Young, skilled 
migrants can be expected to be net contributors, while old, unskilled 
migrants would be expected to be net recipients. (See also Rowthorn 
2004 and Storesletten 2000.) This could provide a motivation for gov-
ernments to be selective in immigration. In some contexts, increases in 
immigration at the right age and skill levels could contribute to finan -
ing pensions by improving the dependency ratio. 
While there no doubt are some cases of transfer payment– 
motivated immigration, the greater effect on the transfer payment sys-
tem is likely to be positive, at least insofar as migrants are relatively 
youthful and able to work. However, this effect is too small to support 
hope that migrants from relatively poor countries will, to some extent, 
“bail out” the U.S. Social Security system. Unless migration is very 
large, the bailout from this source will be very small (Freeman 2006; 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 29). In the past, 
migrants have been broadly revenue-neutral in terms of their level of 
consumption of public goods and services compared to their level of 
payment of taxes (OECD 2007; World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2006, pp. 39–40). 
Interestingly, the 2008 annual report on the U.S. Social Security 
system points out that illegal immigrants provide two significant ben-
efits to the system: 1) they are more likely than others to leave before 
they can actually take advantage of benefits, and 2) they tend to be 
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younger than other immigrants and younger than the population as a 
whole. According to the report, the effect of illegal immigrants will 
close 15 percent of the U.S. Social Security system’s projected long-
term deficit (Board of Trustees 2008; New York Times 2008).
While the most politically appealing––and economically 
plausible––argument against liberalization of migration is that individ-
uals will be induced to migrate inefficiently in order to take advantage 
of destination country transfer programs, this phenomenon does not 
appear to have been significant to date. As noted above, one way to 
avoid the risk that migration will be motivated by transfer payments is 
to make immigrants ineligible for relevant programs, but this strategy 
raises ethical, political, and human rights concerns.
MIGr ATIon rEST r ICTIon S An D A Bh AGWATI TAx
As a response to the actuality or perception of harmful brain drain, 
it is certainly possible that home countries would determine to restrict 
or to tax certain types of emigration. From the standpoint of a trade 
model, a numerical restriction would be similar to an export quota on 
goods (generally illegal under Article XI of GATT), while a tax would 
be similar to an export tax (generally permitted). Policy debates in the 
1970s discussed whether a tax on emigration (known as a “Bhagwati 
tax”) could compensate the origin developing countries for brain drain 
(Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2003, p. 3). 
While restrictions on emigration may violate human rights obli-
gations, such restrictions have been seen in the past for a variety of 
reasons, including to block transfer of technology or to maintain high 
land rents (Dowty 1987). For example, Britain restricted emigration 
by skilled workers from 1719 to 1825 (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2003, p. 
1). More recently, the former Soviet Union and its satellites restricted 
emigration in order to retain certain skilled workers, and presumably in 
order to prevent a rush for the exit in a failing state. I discuss the Soviet 
and Chinese tax structures below. 
There may be circumstances under which developing countries 
would benefit from restrictions on emigration. While direct restrictions 
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raise human rights concerns and might prevent some efficient migra-
tion, a well-structured Bhagwati tax may provide a more subtle and 
appealing instrument (Wilson 2007). Perhaps a Bhagwati tax would be 
a superior tool, compared to remittances, for home countries to capture 
some of the benefits of migration. For example, a Bhagwati tax might 
allow states to capture some of the benefits from their public education 
systems, preventing public education from becoming an undersupplied 
public good. 
One of the major criticisms of a Bhagwati tax has been the in-
ability of the home country to enforce collections on migrants who 
reside in the destination country (Sudak and Trebilcock 2006). This 
may be addressed through international agreements or other enforce-
ment cooperation arrangements. While there are no direct precedents 
for cooperative arrangements of this type, there is no a priori reason 
why they could not be implemented. Furthermore, with the rising con-
cern regarding international money laundering, financing of terrorism, 
and tax evasion, efforts such as the Financial Action Task Force could 
be adapted to foster cooperation in this field. International society has 
moved closer to international enforcement of private judgments, which 
are not necessarily more intrusive than a carefully delimited set of tax 
obligations.15 
Indeed, it would be possible to attain a similar effect to a Bhagwati 
tax simply by restructuring the obligation as a debt for money borrowed 
instead of a tax. A Bhagwati tax is not formally very different from 
an obligation to repay tuition or an exit fee that is enforced over time, 
instead of in a lump sum upon migration. Financing arrangements, 
provided either privately or publicly in the destination country, could 
provide a basis for collection. Countries concerned about brain drain 
might establish an obligation to repay the cost of public education upon 
emigration, and require the borrower/migrant to agree in advance to the 
enforceability of this debt in courts around the world (Sudak and Tre-
bilcock 2006). Although enforcement may still be costly, it would not 
be doctrinally exceptional. 
Of course, any exit tax or Bhagwati tax would reduce incentives 
to migrate, except to the extent that the destination country accepted it 
as the basis for a credit or deduction against destination country taxes. 
Deductibility or creditability might be a basis for fiscal competition for 
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migrants among destination countries. Insofar as the destination coun-
try recognizes the value of the contribution of the home country to the 
migrant’s human capital, it may accept the principle that it should re-
duce its taxation in deference to the home country. 
While this type of shared dual taxation arrangement would no 
doubt be quite complex, modern information-processing technology 
might render it reasonably simple to administer. Many modern tax trea-
ties contain arrangements for states to work out in advance the relative 
contribution to income of two states, in order to avoid double taxation 
based on allegations of transfer pricing. The task of determining the 
degree of contribution from human capital to the production of income 
may not be substantially greater. 
Chinese and Soviet Taxes upon Emigration
In this subsection, I describe the Chinese and Soviet taxes on mi-
gration. The purpose is not to advocate these particular types of taxes, 
but to provide an idea of how they were structured. 
In 1993, the Chinese State Education Ministry announced the imple-
mentation of a tax on self-financed students who wished to study abroad 
(the PRC tax) (People’s Republic of China State Education Committee 
1993).16 (Students financed by the government were subject to a differ-
ent regime.) The announcement provided that students may apply for 
self-financed study abroad only if they have worked in the mainland for 
a specified number of years or after they pay the PRC tax.17 The amount 
of the PRC tax payable by the student was calculated with reference to 
their level of education as well as the number of years of work experi-
ence in the mainland.18 The PRC tax was repealed in 2004. 
By the 1990s, it became apparent that the brain drain was a real 
problem for China. The PRC tax was part of a broad education pro-
gram to reduce the brain drain without compromising China’s reliance 
on overseas higher education to produce skilled labor. Steps adopted 
by the Central Party to remedy the situation ranged from measures to 
restrict study abroad (such as the PRC tax) to nonrestrictive measures 
to entice students to return from abroad. Restrictive measures, in addi-
tion to the PRC tax, included placing limitations on students’ abilities 
to obtain funding from foreign aid agencies and limitations on the time 
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allowed for a student to complete his or her studies overseas (Orlean 
1989). Nonrestrictive measures included offering returning students 
high-salaried positions, beneficial tax rates, special business loans, and 
even forgiveness for participation in organizations advocating against 
the government (Liu 2007, pp. 188–189; Xiang 2003).
Students in China have been heavily reliant on the state for provi-
sion of free or heavily subsidized higher education (Wang 2001). Yet, by 
the early 1990s, the traditional mechanism of publicly financed higher 
education began to dissolve. This was due, to a large extent, to unprece-
dented growth in the domestic higher education system (Wang 2001, p. 
208). The quantum of state appropriations for higher education simply 
could not keep up with its costs. As a result, the Central Party decided 
to diversify the sources of funding for higher education, which included 
raising the private costs of higher education to students (Wang 2001, 
pp. 211, 215). Such a diversification would also include injecting funds 
into the higher education system from tax revenue from students who 
had benefited from previous free or heavily subsidized higher educa-
tion. Accordingly, the circular that announced the PRC tax specifically
states that the raison d’etre of the PRC tax was reimbursement for free 
education and development provided by the state to the student.19 More-
over, proceeds of the tax would be used to develop higher education in 
the mainland and support returned overseas students in their careers.20
By 2004, the Central Party’s policies to entice students abroad to 
return to the mainland were proven successful (Xiang 2003, p. 31). 
Moreover, the system of financing higher education stabilized as insti-
tutions of higher learning became largely self-funded through university 
enterprises or by collection of tuition fees, donations, or endowments 
(Wang 2001, p. 214). The Central Party saw fit to repeal the PRC tax 
(People’s Republic of China 2004). 
The concept of a tax imposed on emigrants based on their levels 
of educational attainment was not novel. In 1972, the Soviet Union 
announced the imposition of such a tax which implicitly was directed 
toward Soviet Jewish citizens who wished to emigrate to Israel (the 
“Soviet Tax”) (Bhagwati 1976b, p. 45; Pregelj 2005). Similar policies 
were later adopted in other Soviet bloc countries. This provoked strong 
reactions from the United States and culminated in the Jackson-Vanik 
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amendment, imposing trade penalties on states that restrict emigration, 
as part of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.21
There are apparent similarities between the PRC tax and the Soviet 
tax. However, the operation of and the circumstances surrounding the 
imposition of the PRC tax are clearly different from those of the Soviet 
tax.
While the intent of the Soviet tax was political, the intent of the 
PRC tax was policy-oriented. Tellingly, the PRC tax was repealed after 
the policy objectives of reducing the brain drain and stabilizing the sys-
tem of financing higher education were met.
The Soviet tax contemplated “compensation for the Soviet invest-
ment in the education of the emigrants” (Bhagwati 1976b, p. 45). There 
is a fine but crucial distinction between a tax directed at students and one 
directed at emigrants. While the Soviet tax assumed that the emigrant 
would not return to the Soviet state, China always made the contrary 
assumption. The policy position in the 1990s was “support study over-
seas, encourage returns, guarantee freedom of international movement” 
(Xiang 2003, p. 29). 
The same distinction can be made with the Bhagwati tax. As 
Bhagwati (1976b, p. 45) recognizes, “We conceive of our tax rather 
as compensation for the loss imposed by the emigrant on those left be-
hind, or alternatively as a method of earning, for a poor country, a share 
in the improved income accruing to the émigré.” Indeed, to the extent 
that differences in wages arise from differences in productivity due to 
complementary factors, the Bhagwati tax is a way for the poor home 
country to share in the benefits of increased productivity. It allows not 
only for the individual migrant to cross borders, but allows those left 
behind to share in the benefits of the trip.
Bhagwati (1976b, p. 47) continues, “In a world composed of na-
tion states, where immigration policies are typically devised to reflect
national advantage rather than notions of utopian world order, it surely 
makes sense for countries to seek suitable restrictions on emigration as 
well, in their own interest. A tax of the kind we have proposed seeks 
to combine in a suitable way the pursuit of this national self-interest in 
the poor countries, consistent with maintaining open the possibility of 
emigration as a value itself.”
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In that sense, the imposition of the PRC tax clearly was a policy 
measure taken by China to mitigate the negative effects of brain drain 
while ensuring that its labor force retained opportunities to seek higher 
education abroad.
FISCAL Co MPETITIon An D Th E TIEBo UT Mo DEL 
Most analyses of the welfare economics of migration focus on 
economic effects within the labor market. However, the prior two sub-
sections show that liberalized migration may have effects in the market 
for governmental services. Specificall , mobility of labor may affect 
certain competitive pressures on governments. “Emigration countries 
are challenged to keep their brightest citizens. They have to avoid a 
brain drain and offer attractive local club goods (low taxes, cheap com-
plementary factors of production like infrastructure, construction sites, 
and good business opportunities)” (Straubhaar 2000, p. 127). Similarly, 
there is a growing competition among destination countries for the best 
and the brightest (Shachar 2006). The OECD (2007, p. 96) reports that 
most OECD countries have instituted new policies to attract skilled 
workers in recent years. In 2005, France introduced a special tax regime 
for “impatriates” employed by multinationals in France, taxing these 
individuals in line with the most favorable tax regimes among compet-
ing countries (p. 120).
Interestingly, there are two levels at which welfare may be assessed 
in the international legal context. The first level, addressed in the earlier 
part of this chapter, examines welfare derived from efficiency in the 
market. The fundamental theorem of welfare economics and Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory address this type of efficienc . The second level involves 
welfare in connection with the efficiency of government provision of 
goods and services. A variant of the fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics, the Tiebout model, addresses this type of efficienc . The 
base concern is that efficiency in the market for privately supplied goods 
and services may, under certain circumstances, be inconsistent with ef-
ficiency in the market for publicly supplied goods and services. Where 
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these two types of efficiency may conflict with one another, it would 
make sense to seek an optimal level of each in relation to the other. 
Most claims in favor of regulatory competition are based on the 
Tiebout model (1956, p. 416), which predicts a Pareto optimal (first
best) outcome assuming certain parameters are met. To the extent that 
the criteria for efficiency of the Tiebout model are met,22 it may be that 
mobility increases the efficiency of government provision of goods and 
services. Where these criteria are not met, there can be no assurance that 
mobility enhances the efficiency of governments. The Tiebout model 
has been described and debated in great detail in many important works. 
It posits that competition among small cities for mobile individuals re-
sults in the efficient supply of local public goods by those cities, subject 
to the satisfaction of five conditions (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997)
publicly provided goods and services are produced with a con-1) 
gestible technology (there is an optimal size of jurisdiction),
there is a perfectly elastic supply of jurisdictions, each capable 2) of 
replicating all attractive economic features of its competitors,
mobility of households among jurisdictions is costless,3) 
households are fully informed about the fiscal attributes of each 4) 
jurisdiction, and
there are no interjurisdictional externalities.5) 
Of course, these conditions are never satisfied; in fact, the point of 
this work is that T3 is not close to realization in the legal system that 
presently exists. As to T1, there may not today be an optimal size of 
jurisdiction that is smaller than the entire world for certain global con-
cerns. T2 requires greater homogeneity of resources than exists in the 
international setting. As to T4, again, there are serious concerns regard-
ing whether individuals, firms, or investors are fully informed regarding 
the attributes of each jurisdiction. Finally, as to T5, the world is beset by 
interjurisdictional externalities. 
The theory of the second best suggests that, given that all of the 
conditions of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics are not sat-
isfied, there can be no assurance that increasing the level of satisfaction 
of any other conditions––such as enhanced mobility of individuals––
will yield greater efficienc . While we are uncertain as to whether the 
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competition leads to efficie cy, it seems that states compete, and it 
seems worthwhile to examine the structure of this competition. 
The Tiebout model can only be suggestive in the realm of the sec-
ond best (Bratton and McCahery 1997). However, it contains important 
insights about the benefits of regulatory competition, which should not 
be ignored simply because the model itself cannot be applied. Our ex-
istential task is to engage in policy analysis even where formal tools 
come up short. Moses (2005) expects greater migration to make states 
more responsive to citizens. 
What would be the parameters of fiscal competition? States would, 
in theory, seek to provide a package of governmental goods and ser-
vices that would attract the type and number of constituents that are 
desired. Individuals would migrate in response to their assessments of 
these packages (Moses 2005). So, assuming that there is great demand 
for highly skilled software engineers, due to positive externalities or 
complementary assets, states could reduce taxes on these individuals 
or provide the types of public services that these individuals desire. 
States might finance these attractions by reducing their own invest-
ment in human capital, hoping to attract individuals who have benefited
from human capital investments in other countries. Thus, investment 
in human capital could become an international public good, subject to 
underinvestment. 
 It is worthwhile to address the mechanism by which fiscal compe-
tition operates to induce changes in governmental policy. Presumably 
governments are motivated to maximize the basket of goods that they 
provide, and in order to do so, seek to attract migrants. But this as-
sumption is consistent with a public interest–motivated government. 
Under circumstances where government officials are optimizing their 
own utility by optimizing their political support, there is less reason to 
expect that benevolent fiscal competition will result. Another mecha-
nism by which fiscal competition may operate is through demonstration 
effects, or more simply, observation by citizens of superior baskets of 
goods provided in other states (Salmon 1987). 
Furthermore, there are substantial concerns as to whether the 
Tiebout model can result in a stable equilibrium (Breton 1991; Gram-
lich 1987). The stability of intergovernmental competition is separate 
from its efficiency: an unstable market for regulation might be char-
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acterized by “price wars” or a race to the bottom. Externalities, such 
as the inability of a home state to capture the benefits of its investment 
in human capital, can be a source of instability. Breton points out that 
centralization may not be the best way to provide stability, but the ex-
istence (without necessarily the assertion) of central authority appears 
necessary to address problems of instability. 
Breton concludes that in the international context, it is not possible 
to prevent an unstable competitive process from degenerating, unless, 
in the language of international relations “realists,” a hegemonic power 
undertook to intervene in order to stabilize competition (Breton 1996). 
There appears to be no reason in theory why this hegemonic power must 
be a state; we have seen the EU emerge as just such a power in Europe, 
and it might be argued that the WTO or functional organizations may 
play such a role also. Alternatively, perhaps the United States or EU 
exercise, or share, hegemony through these organizations. But the point 
is that, to realize the benefits of regulatory competition, and to avoid 
the detriments, it may be necessary to centralize certain governance 
areas. This insight suggests at least some linkage between particular 
areas of policy and migration. That is, just as the EU, as it emerged 
and established greater mobility, found it necessary to establish greater 
centralization of policy making, and just as current concerns about glo-
balization may be understood as fundamentally addressing a mismatch 
between economic integration and governance, it may be that increased 
economic integration in the field of migration may give rise to greater 
calls for coordination of some types of regulatory measures. 
Perhaps a dynamic governance structure along the lines of “co-
operative federalism” may provide a kind of contingent hegemony or 
centralization that can maintain stability. Within the U.S. federal sys-
tem, stability is provided by the ability of the federal government to 
intervene; this is an important distinction between regulatory compe-
tition in the U.S. domestic context and regulatory competition in the 
international context, and may be an important distinction between 
corporate law, where the federal government has not intervened, and 
securities law, where it has chosen to intervene. 
In the international context, in order to have a similar institutional 
capability, we would need to build and empower a central authority. 
Furthermore, Breton (1996) argues that horizontal cooperation cannot 
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solve the problem of horizontal instability. The practical question for the 
international community is how much authority it must cede to a central 
“government” in order to develop satisfactory horizontal competition. 
This question of centralization cannot be answered separately from 
other questions about the level at which governmental power should be 
assigned: from questions of subsidiarity. The question of centralization 
to stabilize regulatory competition may best be joined with the question 
of subsidiarity raised in the property rights/theory of the firm literature: 
as we consider the utility of centralization––of institutional ownership 
of regulatory assets––we must consider the utility of establishing an 
authority capable of intervening to support regulatory competition. 
Thus, as we consider modified rules for international migra-
tion, considerations of interjurisdictional competition may enter into 
a cost-benefit analysis of various institutional components. If greater 
migration could induce a beneficial fiscal competition—a race to the 
top—that would make greater migration more attractive. Conversely, 
if externalities or other problems cause an inefficient or unstable fis
cal competition, that would make greater migration less attractive, as it 
would presumably accentuate this effect. 
Wilson (2007) explains that the “literature on optimal income taxa-
tion in an open economy has built a case for home-country taxation 
of skilled emigrants by analyzing the difficulties in collecting a pro-
gressive income tax when emigrants cannot be taxed.” Wilson argues 
that progressive taxation increases the incentive to migrate (although it 
should be kept in mind that the destination state will also be likely to 
impose progressive taxation). 
Hufbauer (1989) criticizes a Bhagwati tax as inconsistent with 
beneficial fiscal competition, on the basis of the Tiebout model. How-
ever, as noted above, the Tiebout model assumes no spillovers, whereas 
migration of educated workers may be understood as a positive exter-
nality conferred on the destination state. Therefore, an appropriately 
structured Bhagwati tax—one that is well-designed to internalize this 
externality—might be conducive to efficient regulatory competition
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Con CLUSIon
The foregoing analysis of the welfare economics of international 
migration supports an analysis of the potential value, in welfare terms, 
of agreements to liberalize migration. Generally speaking, migration 
results in global gains, but in local winners and losers. And so, while 
agreements to liberalize migration will often be potential Pareto im-
provements, this will depend on the particular circumstances, including 
whether losers are actually compensated. The international legal system 
generally requires consent as a basis for obligation, so states that would 
be losers would be expected to decline to consent to a treaty that re-
duces their welfare, unless there is an alternative worse than the status 
quo that can be imposed upon them.23 
Legal rules in this area cannot be derived solely from a priori 
analysis. While Chapter 3 develops a distributive justice analysis that 
suggests the normative appeal of obligations to liberalize, distributive 
justice analysis does not necessarily carry the day in political discourse, 
and perhaps even more importantly, distributive justice analysis does not 
provide detailed answers to most of the important questions. Therefore, 
legal rules must be analyzed in terms of their utility to increase welfare, 
or to change the distribution of welfare. In Chapter 10, I develop a set 
of possible legal rules for consideration in light of the welfare econom-
ics analysis described here, the distributive justice analysis described in 
Chapter 3, and the political economy analysis described in Chapter 4. 
n otes
See Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2003)1. . Many developed countries favor visa 
applicants with academic degrees or specific professional skills.
It is not correct that every policy change must be a Pareto improvement, but as 2. 
a first approximation of political feasibility, the Pareto improvement criterion is 
useful. Indeed, it is possible that a policy change that made the very wealthy some-
what less wealthy would be determined to be desirable, despite its inability to 
satisfy the Pareto criterion. In the trade policy context, analysts often use the po-
tential Pareto improvement criterion (also known as the Kaldor Hicks criterion): if 
enough surplus is created to compensate the losers, even if actual compensation is 
not made, then the measure is a potential Pareto improvement. This criterion raises 
important distributional, fairness, and political problems.
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Martin, Lowell, and Taylor (2000, p. 150) use the example of corn between the 3. 
United States and Mexico.  
More specificall , the World Bank introduces an increase in migration from devel-4. 
oping to high-income countries sufficient to raise the labor force of high-income 
countries by a total of 3 percent over the period 2001–2025. This assumed in-
crease, roughly one-eighth of a percentage point a year, is close to that which took 
place over the 1970–2000 period. The World Bank analysis uses the welfare theory 
concept of “equivalent variation.” Welfare is affected by changes in income as well 
as by changes in prices. For new migrants to high-income countries, it is usually 
possible to achieve much greater income, but prices are higher also. The equiva-
lent variation concept allows the inclusion of changes of prices in the calculation. 
Perhaps more importantly, in order to estimate global gains, it is necessary to sum 
equivalent variation across households. Economic analysis generally refrains from 
interpersonal comparison of utility, so it is not possible to compare the gains of 
the “winners” with the losses of the “losers.” As in the trade context, it is useful to 
evaluate whether there is a net increase in welfare, even if there is no mechanism 
by which to compensate the losers in order to ensure that the policy change is a 
Pareto improvement. It may be best analytically to first evaluate whether there is 
a significant global increase in welfare, and then consider the distributional effects 
(World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, pp. 36–37). 
This distribution includes the gain to migrants, which makes up the largest share 5. 
of the gain, on the developing country side. Of course, other than remittances and 
perhaps other transfers, the gain itself would not actually redound to the benefit of 
the home country itself, but it would redound to the benefit of people who, ex ante 
but not ex post, lived in the home country. It is important to recognize, however, 
that under this assumption, the gains are available to improve the situation of poor 
people, but not necessarily poor countries. One might criticize this assumption, 
and combine it with the assumption that the proportion of skilled migrants would 
increase, to argue that the World Bank simulation assumes that the wealthier in-
habitants of poor countries move to rich countries and become even wealthier, 
while the less-skilled and less-wealthy inhabitants of the poor countries stay be-
hind, both physically and economically. 
While it might be argued that a move to private education, paid for by the student, 6. 
could solve this problem, the financial markets in many countries do not efficiently
allow poor students to finance their education based on future earnings. A “Bhag-
wati tax” might be a method for the home country government to achieve a similar 
result. 
Clubs of Mexican immigrants to the United States have formed to invest in their 7. 
local communities at home (Lapper 2007). 
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for noting this clarification.8. 
This insurance mechanism is reminiscent of early requirements of bonds and head 9. 
taxes. See Neuman (1993).
10. Compensation has sometimes come in the form of adjustment assistance. It should 
be noted that in a complex government with a variety of harmed groups and ben-
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efited groups, compensation may not be direct or specific. Often, compensation 
does not occur at all. 
11. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2002): Aware of the desperation of 
these people and the unprotected state in which they normally live, particularly 
from a legal standpoint, employers very frequently offer employment in condi-
tions that fall a long way short of safety and sanitation standards and pay very 
low salaries, normally less than the legal minimum wage. Furthermore, they deny 
them labor benefits, such as health or industrial accident insurance, and restrict 
their freedom of association. Situations of exploitation in which the employer 
forces migrant workers to work exhausting hours without rest, or in which they 
simply do not pay them for their work, are also common. Accusations of physi-
cal mistreatment and intimidation—such as threatening to report undocumented 
persons to the authorities—to discourage complaints of abuse are also reported. 
12. Trebilcock (2003) makes prescriptions motivated by the idea that it is useful to 
devolve and decentralize power over immigration decisions to private parties. 
13. See the discussion of the EU in Chapter 6. A program of essential harmonization 
and mutual recognition—or interstate allocation of responsibility for individuals 
who cross borders—may be required. 
14, I am grateful to an anonymous referee for noting this point. 
15. The EU governs the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judg-
ments among its member states by a regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No. 
44/2001 of December 22, 2000 (see European Union [2001]). For a convention 
among OAS member states, see the Inter-American Convention on the Extrater-
ritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (1979). See also the 
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Ex-
traterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments (1985). 
16. The idea of restrictions on study abroad was reported to be under consideration as 
early as February 1990. However, as of 1990, it was “unclear to what extent (the 
PRC Tax) had been implemented” (Shive 1990). 
17. Id. at Section 2(1). The Circular states that to be exempted from payment of the 
PRC tax, a self-financed student shall be required to have worked five years for 
undergraduates, three years for graduate (nondoctoral graduates) students, and 
two years for faculty graduates and adult university graduates. 
18. Id. at Section 2(4). 
19. Section 1(2) of the Circular.
20. Section 1(4) of the Circular.
21. Pregelj (2006, p. 1) notes: 
The enactment of the so-called Jackson-Vanik (“freedom-of-emigra-
tion”) amendment (Section 402) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 
January 3, 1975) was a U.S. reaction to the Soviet Union’s highly re-
strictive emigration policy of the time, but particularly to the assess-
ment, begun in August 1972, of exorbitant “education reimbursement 
fees” (also referred to as “diploma taxes”) on its citizens wishing to 
emigrate to nonsocialist countries . . . The legislation would condition 
the restoration of most-favored-nation status to nonmarket economy 
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(NME) countries (including the Soviet Union), their access to U.S. fi
nancial facilities, and their ability to conclude a trade agreement with 
the United States on their compliance with the free-emigration criteria 
of the proposed legislation. 
22. After stating that current empirical evidence is suggestive that competitive local 
governments can provide an efficient level of congestible (local) public goods, 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) offer the following caveat: What is not assured is the 
efficient allocation of public goods with significant spillovers. In this case, a sub-
sidy is needed to internalize the externalities. But any such policy to control inter-
jurisdictional spillovers would require the agreement of the competitive city-states. 
For such agreements we must look to more encompassing political institutions. In 
Madison’s compound republic this is the representative central government. 
23. For example, in connection with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, some observers argued that the U.S. threat to withdraw from the 
existing GATT agreement served to coerce developing countries to accept a WTO 
bargain that was worse than the status quo, but better than the alternative. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the welfare economics of international migration 
in order to develop a “map” of the benefits and detriments of migra-
tion. The underlying assumption, of course, is that these benefits and 
detriments, and the maximization of benefits, will or should influence
domestic and international policy relating to migration. However, an-
other influenc  on domestic and international policy is likely to be an 
ethical analysis of the distributive effects of alternative migration re-
gimes that may influence the political preferences of individual voters.
This chapter reviews the distributive ethics of international migra-
tion. It explores and challenges the moral right of nationals of a state 
to exclude foreign persons from the opportunities associated with resi-
dence in that state. Conversely, it suggests the rights of a citizen of one 
state to migrate to another.  
While the ethical analysis presented in this chapter supports a duty 
of individuals, and their states, to work to provide freedom of move-
ment for other individuals, it must be recognized that this duty will 
not be fulfille  in the near future. Rather, it seems best to understand 
changing perceptions of our duties as a contributing vector in complex 
domestic politics in destination states. In Chapter 4, I will focus on what 
I assume to be the strongest vector in domestic politics: rational citizen 
perceptions of their economic interests. I will even propose arrange-
ments to harness these rational citizen perceptions in order to promote 
agreements to liberalize migration. However, these arrangements might 
result in discrimination against migrants in areas such as taxation, and 
in this dimension they would be likely to be inconsistent with the ethi-
cal duties outlined in this chapter. 
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Th E righ T To b E a  Migran T
Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, described the 
present international distribution of wealth in terms of “global apart-
heid.” We might understand this phrase as describing a circumstance in 
which the legal system is used to lock certain people into a position of 
poverty, inequality, and disenfranchisement, or to artifici lly separate 
groups of people. Under apartheid, the accident of birth into a particular 
race radically affected one’s life opportunities. Under the international 
legal system as it exists, the accident of birth into a particular nationality 
has a similar effect. “Indeed, geographic variation in wages and living 
standards around the world gives the global economy the appearance 
of a gated wealthy community consisting of the advanced countries, 
surrounded by impoverished ghettos, with immigration restrictions pre-
venting the ghetto residents from moving to where their productivity 
and well-being would be higher” (Freeman 2006).
Global apartheid could be reduced by allowing workers from poor 
countries to take jobs in wealthier countries––the current global system 
of restricted migration may be understood in at least one dimension 
as a macrocosm of the internal passport system that was used under 
apartheid.1 Joseph Carens observes that “citizenship in Western liberal 
democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege—an inherited 
status that greatly enhances one’s life chances” (Carens 1987). 
The iconic American political philosopher John Rawls would seem 
to accept global apartheid, with a limited duty of interstate assistance 
that is not intended to lift the poor out of poverty, and sharply limited 
rights to immigrate.2 Up until 1993, with the publication of the article 
“The Law of Peoples” (Rawls 1993), Rawls seemed simply to assume 
closed societies, isolated from other societies, as a modelling device 
rather than as a normative commitment.3 In the article, Rawls seeks to 
defend closed societies, principally on moral hazard grounds.4 
This chapter develops a Rawlsian perspective on migration, argu-
ing that a fully realized Rawlsian perspective would not defend closed 
societies. The argument will support the position that borders are ethi-
cally artificial and therefore should not be accepted as determinative of 
ethical duties or life opportunity.5 
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Crossing iMaginar y  bord Ers: a  Cri Tiqu E of   
TErri Torial  bord Ers in Th E l aw  of  PEo Pl Es
Is there an ethical duty to open wealthy countries to immigration 
from poor countries? Let us begin with the Rawlsian analysis of the 
foundation of ethical responsibility to assist the poor. As is well known, 
Rawls argues that his two principles of justice only apply within a do-
mestic society. (Note that the second principle of justice, the difference 
principle, permits inequalities only to the extent that they improve the 
position of those who are worst off.) For Rawls, the factual context of 
political borders, which are territorial borders, is decisive. 
Rawls’s work has been intensively criticized for finding a lesser 
duty to foreign persons than to compatriots. This criticism is concerned 
with the justificatory role that Rawls’s work may play, for nothing less 
is at stake than the question of whether individuals in wealthy countries, 
and therefore their governments, have an ethical duty to open their mar-
kets to immigration by poor persons. If we find no duty, there will be 
less basis to encourage the growth of political will for change. 
g oal and background a ssumptions r egarding the a ppropriate 
Political u nit
All social scientists must be careful to ensure that their methodolog-
ical assumptions do not insinuate themselves into normative positions. 
Rawls’s goal in his monumental Theory of Justice (1971) was to articu-
late principles of justice for a national society, and so it made sense, as a 
methodological convenience and first approximation, to assume closed 
borders. 
If a closed system was all that was required, however, he could have 
described a global theory of justice, using that closed system (Pogge 
2004). So, in this sense the particular selection of the state or people 
as the salient vertical unit of society is largely arbitrary, and therefore, 
like gender, race, and other arbitrary categories, has no moral force for 
our purposes (Nussbaum 2004). If one defends Rawls’s choice as part 
of ideal theory, as Beitz does (2000, pp. 669, 680), then the “people” 
would be a mere variable, rather than a substantive concept related to 
the world as it exists today.6 
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Another defense of Rawls’s choice is that the principles of justice 
that he articulated in A Theory of Justice are applicable only within 
politically liberal societies and peoples. Thus, one argument for focus-
ing on the state, or the people, is that it may support an assumption of 
consensus around political liberalism, which is a predicate for Rawls’s 
domestic theory of justice. However, this assumption is just as problem-
atic in a real domestic society as it is in global society. After all, today it 
is often as implausible to assume consensus regarding political liberal-
ism within a society, as to assume consensus across societies. Part of the 
reason for this implausibility is immigration itself. Indeed, as we will 
see below, integration has undermined Rawls’s assumptions. 
Rawls’s main topic is the basic structure of society, defined as “a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (1996, p. 4). In his later 
work, responding to skepticism expressed by Brian Barry (1982, pp. 
232–234) regarding the determinacy of the concept of mutual advan-
tage, Rawls focused on reciprocity based on a “benchmark of equality.” 
This reference to reciprocity based on a benchmark of equality also fails 
to achieve the intended goal of distinguishing domestic society from 
international society. 
As many have now pointed out, globalization has at least raised a 
question regarding the salience, or exclusive salience, of the state under 
this definition of society.7 Again, lawyers can point to scores of interna-
tional cooperative ventures for mutual advantage: all international law 
may fit this description, and international law is a rapidly growing body 
(Benhabib 2004; Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999). There is increased 
discussion of international public goods. World Trade Organization law 
is replete with references to reciprocity, and is understood by many as a 
system of reciprocal economic liberalization.8 The arbitrary selection of 
the state as the exclusive system for mutual advantage, or for reciproc-
ity, cannot withstand much factual pressure. 
International lawyers can assert pressure on the essential differences 
between the national state and other subdivisions, or other suprana-
tional organizations, and it is impossible to specify a sharp substantive 
distinction. Is a Swiss canton the right unit? What about a member state 
of the EU? When in U.S. federal history did the states of the union stop 
being the salient unit? The rise of the national state and the increasing 
globalization of concerns and governance structures demonstrate the 
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historical contingency of the state. Mathias Risse (2006) has used this 
data to show that even those who are not reflexively cosmopolitan can 
no longer take the normative role of the state for granted. It is strange 
for a moral theory to depend so much on such incompletely specified
categories. 
w hose o riginal Position, with w hat r esults?
Rawls begins with his well-known original position, in which each 
representative operates under a veil of ignorance as to his principal’s 
actual position in society. This original position is a heuristic, designed 
to generate principles that would be acceptable to each person under 
ignorance as to his or her actual position. 
Importantly, in order to develop the law of peoples, Rawls articulates 
a second original position, among diplomats representing “peoples.” 
Rawls thereby takes for granted an international, as opposed to a trans-
national, world. He does so because he wishes to take the world “as we 
see it” (Rawls [1993]; revised and updated in Rawls [1999, p. 83]) and 
work out a foreign policy for a “liberal people.” 
Furthermore, Rawls’s analytical goal is sharply and arbitrarily in-
consistent with his method in developing the rules of justice among 
individuals (Pogge 2004, pp. 1739, 1755) where he does not take so-
ciety “as we see it,” but takes social rules as wholly contingent and 
subject to formulation ab initio in the original position. 
Rawls argues that in the domestic original position, representatives 
of individuals would select two principles of justice. The first principle 
of justice holds that “each person has an equal right to a fully ade-
quate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for all” (Rawls 1971, p. 291). The second principle 
of justice holds that “social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are 
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” 
(pp. 5–6). These two principles of justice would be implemented differ-
ently in different societies. 
According to Rawls, neither of these principles would be selected 
in the second original position among representatives of peoples, and 
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therefore they would not apply across national borders. In fact, Rawls 
appears to subscribe to a standard Westphalian concept of internation-
al law (Buchanan 2000), with ruggedly independent states and, most 
importantly, where the rights and obligations, even relating to human 
rights, appear to be available only to states. This is definite y, and inten-
tionally, not a cosmopolitan vision (Rawls 1993; 1999, p. 119). Rawls 
concludes that his approach in The Law of Peoples is concerned not 
with individual welfare, but with justice and stability of liberal and de-
cent societies. So, under Rawls’s law of peoples model, the kind of 
broad equality of liberty, opportunity, and redistribution available at 
home would not be available to foreigners. 
Yet we might ask why would the representatives of peoples choose 
different principles of justice from those selected by the representatives 
of individuals? At least from a normative individualist perspective, peo-
ples are merely aggregates of individuals.9 Would not true diplomatic 
representatives of aggregates of individuals select exactly the same 
safeguards as the individuals themselves selected in the first original 
position? If, as I have suggested, the “people” unit is arbitrary, why 
would the principles chosen within a people be different from those 
chosen by multiple peoples together? In order to posit a different selec-
tion of principles of justice, it is necessary to assume a different set of 
concerns.10 
Thus, even if we imagine, as Rawls does, an original position among 
representatives of peoples, we must understand this two-level original 
position as an integrated original position. That is, the representatives 
of states should be assumed to represent their principles with perfect 
fairness and accuracy, not with the public choice and other agency 
problems that are endemic in the real world.11 This integrated two-level 
original position, then, should not be assumed to be different from a 
single, global, original position. Under perfect representation, a federal 
original position is not different from a unitary original position. 
Rawls’s heuristic assumption regarding the participants in the inter-
national original position results in the inapplicability of the principles 
of justice, including the difference principle, the core redistributive 
component of Rawls’s theory of justice. This is because strangely, arbi-
trarily, and counterfactually, Rawls assumes that states (or peoples) do 
not have interests in the distribution of wealth.12 Therefore, instead of 
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requiring conformity with the difference principle, the law of peoples 
prescribes at the global level only a modest “duty of assistance,” which 
does not have any specified redistributive goal (Rawls 1999, pp. 105–
120). It certainly does not appear to have the power of the difference 
principle, as the recipient state may remain “relatively poor.”13 
Rawls’s position is contradicted, however, by the consistent be-
havior of states: no one can study the international economic system 
without recognizing that states seek wealth (among other things). Ac-
tually, the states that fail to seek wealth are generally failed states: the 
states where dictators are able to enrich themselves the most by declin-
ing to seek broad wealth for their constituents. Shall we construct a 
theory of justice based on the preferences of failed states? 
There are important arguments that Rawls’s separation between na-
tional and international society—that is, his particular conception of a 
two-part original position, one for international and one for domestic 
principles—is artificial (Beitz 2001; Carens 1987; Forst 2001). Political 
philosophers, including Charles Beitz (1999) and Thomas Pogge (Pogge 
1989), argue for a cosmopolitan approach, in which each individual, 
regardless of borders, enters into a global original position.14 Of course, 
under this global original position, individuals (or their representa-
tives), fearing that they might in the real world be among the poorest 
persons, would almost certainly decide on a difference principle, in the 
same way that they would in a domestic original position (Carens 1987, 
pp. 257–258). As the risks are the same, or even greater, the principles 
would be the same. 
Under the law of peoples, Rawls believes that “a people has at least 
a qualified right to limit immigration” (1993, p. 48). He articulates two 
reasons for this “right.” The first reason is rooted in efficienc , in the 
sense of avoiding moral hazard. For Rawls, restrictions on immigration 
serve to avoid moral hazard in the form of failure to husband territorial 
resources. I discuss the efficiency or moral hazard argument in detail 
below. 
Second, Rawls refers to Walzer’s argument (1983) based on a desire 
to protect a people’s political culture.15 However, this argument seems 
susceptible to an economic critique. Chang (2006, p. 10) shows that 
rational people would be willing to sacrifice the purity of their national 
political culture in exchange for the welfare benefits of international 
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mobility. Furthermore, it is clear that distinctive culture (including po-
litical culture) can survive free immigration, as we have found in the 
EU.16 Even if it cannot, we cannot assume that individuals in an original 
position would value distinctive culture over other benefits, especially 
under poverty. 
Walzer’s argument, as adopted by Rawls, would seem artificially
to insulate existing cultures from challenge, although Walzer concedes 
that “the collective version of mutual aid might require a limited and 
complex redistribution of membership and/or territory” (p. 47). Indeed, 
Walzer would go farther than Rawls. He cites Sidgwick’s proposal 
(1891, pp. 296–297) that immigration might be restricted “in order to 
maintain an adequately high standard of life among the members of 
the community generally—especially the poorer classes” as a “primi-
tive and parochial version of Rawls’s difference principle . . .” (Walzer 
1983). However, it is important to note that this proposal is parochial: 
it artificially restricts the scope of concern to local poorer classes. This 
is highly relevant in connection with the discussion in Chapter 2 of 
the effects of immigration on unskilled workers. Given that there are 
other, less restrictive ways to ensure that local poorer classes are pro-
tected, such as redistributive domestic taxation, can the protection of 
local poorer classes serve as a justification for the imposition of harm 
on foreign poorer classes?
Of course, it is necessary, both ethically and politically, to ensure 
that the domestic poor do not bear the burden of improving the lot of the 
foreign poor: “If securing native benefits is a means to maintain domes-
tic support of immigration, this should also serve an enhanced role of 
international migration in the global attempt to alleviate world poverty” 
(Felbermayr and Kohler 2006).
The important point is that the artificially constrained domestic dif-
ference principle conflicts with an international difference principle. 
This economic concern is real but may be addressed through domestic 
redistribution. That is, it is not possible to justify injustice to outsiders 
in order to provide justice to insiders, when the insiders who are hurt by 
a policy that satisfies obligations to outsiders may be compensated for 
their harm in a way that satisfies the domestic difference principle. If 
this argument were accepted, an “intrafamily” or “intralocality” differ-
ence principle could trump the statewide difference principle. 
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Also, we must note the fear that concerns for cultural integrity may 
be a disguise for irredentism. It is worth considering the argument made 
by Hampton (1995) that “in most of the world the concept of national-
ity is intimately connected to the ethnicity or race (narrowly defined)
of the members of that society.” Irredentism is morally questionable, 
and it raises important issues for the “encompassing group” concept 
advanced by Raz and Margalit (1990, p. 439). As Carens (1987, p. 258) 
points out, ideal theory does not require the elimination of all linguistic, 
cultural, and historical differences. Nor does it mean that restrictions on 
immigration are justified, that all differences are to be preserved, or that 
all existing features of state sovereignty are justified.
If proximity resulting from immigration is the basis for solidarity 
or redistribution, and proximity is restricted in order to maintain cul-
tural integrity, it must be asked whether the true motivation is cultural 
integrity, or to what extent reluctance to engage in redistribution is the 
motivating force. If there were an obligation to redistribute regardless 
of proximity, then we could at least be certain of the bona fides of the 
cultural integrity motivation. 
Furthermore, most of the arguments for free immigration parallel 
the arguments for free trade, which Rawls seems to endorse. It may be 
that some states are hurt and some are helped by free immigration, and 
that some individuals are hurt and some are helped. For example, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, states with high-quality public education systems 
may undesirably confer a positive externality on other states through 
emigration. In addition, natives of destination states who compete with 
immigrants may find their incomes reduced by immigration. Therefore, 
we might expect representatives in the original position to agree to free 
immigration accompanied by a redistributive mechanism in order to 
compensate those who are hurt by free immigration. 
l iberty or d istribution? 
I have been focusing on distribution, but from a very practical 
standpoint, international borders restrict liberty. They restrict the liberty 
to move, the liberty to engage in commerce, and the liberty to accept 
employment. It is worth noting from the outset that, at some level, these 
liberties are included in Rawls’s list of basic (domestic) liberties (1996), 
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protected by his first principle of justice. However, Rawls also stipulates 
that “while some principle of opportunity is surely [a constitutional] es-
sential, for example, a principle requiring at least freedom of movement 
and free choice of occupation, fair equality of opportunity . . . goes 
beyond that and is not such an essential” (p. 228). While this distinction 
may make sense in Rawls’s framework, in a practical sense, freedom of 
movement and free choice of occupation go a long way toward achieve-
ment of equality of opportunity. So, we must recognize that Rawls’s 
first principle of justice is supportive of liberalized immigration to the 
benefit of poor persons.
But does the first principle of justice apply to foreign persons? Can 
it be restricted to exercise by foreign persons from politically liberal 
states? It would seem an artificial constraint on freedom of movement 
and free choice of occupation to say that “you can have all the freedom 
you want, so long as you exercise it within your own state’s borders.” 
It would seem sensible, and likely, that diplomats in the original posi-
tion would reciprocally agree to extend these liberties to one another’s 
citizens. 
Once we relax the assumption of closed societies, restraints on 
immigration seem to interfere with liberty in a way that violates the 
domestic principles of justice. However, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls 
supports restrictions on immigration. How are we to distinguish be-
tween immigration on the one hand, and the liberties of freedom of 
movement and occupation on the other? One way is to use a guest 
worker category. However, guest worker categories, to the extent that 
they constitute second-class citizenships, may be deeply problematic, 
particularly if they do not convert over some reasonable period of time 
into first-class citizenship.
There is a conflict between the domestic and international principles 
of justice in the context of international immigration. When applied 
globally to the immigration context, the principles of justice would sug-
gest freedom to emigrate. However, when applied domestically in a 
poor state, the second principle of justice requires that constitutional 
arrangements be structured to benefit the poorest. It may be that brain 
drain of the middle class would confer a detriment on the poorest, and 
so a domestic difference principle would limit migration. 
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As Sidgwick (1891) pointed out, there may be settings in which free 
immigration, as well as foreign assistance, would confer a detriment on 
the poorest members of domestic society.17 Under these circumstances, 
the operation of the domestic difference principle would either prevent 
these cosmopolitan acts, or would require domestic compensation suf-
ficient to balance the damage done to the poorest. Recall that the first
principle is lexically prior to the second (Rawls 2001). So, in order to 
comply with a global difference principle, or even a global first prin-
ciple of justice, it may be necessary to compensate the domestic poor. 
There is a systemic relationship between domestic and global justice. 
Moral h azard and r egulatory Competition
Rawls (1999, pp. 8, 39) assumes that people will only act respon-
sibly in connection with the stewardship of their physical territory if 
they are confined to it, in perpetuity. Importantly, this incentive-based 
rationale is not sufficient even for Rawls, as he argues that the problem 
of immigration is not simply left aside, but is eliminated by virtue of the 
establishment of social justice in a realistic utopia—within each state. 
Under a realistic utopia, Rawls suggests, people simply would not have 
any motivation to migrate. Note the tension between this perspective, 
which would seem to assume that citizens have an identical utility func-
tion, or perhaps that there are a limited number of utility functions, and 
the Tiebout regulatory competition perspective, outlined in Chapter 2, 
which assumes a wide variety of objective functions and incentives to 
migrate in order to find matching arrays of public services.
Will national societies have appropriate incentives to become pros-
perous if outsiders can simply invite themselves to the table, or if they 
can simply call for a redistributive bailout when lack of industry has 
its inevitable results? This is the issue of public goods or policy exter-
nalities addressed in Chapter 2. If citizens could rely on unconditional 
global redistribution, or simply move to share in the fruits of the in-
dustry of others, they would lack appropriate incentives to cause their 
own state efficiently to achieve their goals––in economic terms, there 
would be “moral hazard” or a “soft market constraint.”18 Rawls and 
other philosophers reject global redistribution largely because they do 
not believe this soft market constraint can be overcome. So the moral 
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hazard argument stands in the way of both free immigration and inter-
national redistribution. 
Rawls’s argument, which Pogge (2001, pp. 139–144) calls “ex-
planatory nationalism,” assumes first that differences in position result 
from governance choices, and second that citizens are responsible for 
governance choices. Thus, explanatory nationalism argues that if citi-
zens could rely on global redistribution, they would lack appropriate 
incentives to cause their own state to achieve their goals efficiently; in 
economic terms, there would be a “soft market constraint” or “moral 
hazard.” The argument is that because the apparatus of the state exists 
and has responsibilities, the consequences of failure must be felt by 
those who control the state.19 
While the underlying assumptions are suspect, there is a sense in 
which states and their citizens should bear the consequences of their 
choices.20 Under ideal circumstances, we might assume that states are 
accountable to citizens. However, in the non-ideal world, governments 
are often not accountable. Furthermore, there are other ways to make 
governments accountable than to leave their citizens in misery. Three 
important mechanisms of accountability are regulatory competition, in-
ternational legal requirements, and conditionality. 
Actually, as suggested in Chapter 2, free immigration may, under 
certain conditions, have beneficial competitive effects on governments, 
as well as on producers of goods and services. In fact, the very mobility 
that Rawls would restrict is a critical assumption within the powerful 
literature of competition among governments (Breton 1996).21 
It is entirely plausible that in a global original position, representa-
tives would not agree to closed states but to states open to immigration, 
in order to enhance regulatory competition, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
I do not want to assert this argument too strongly, as there are sub-
stantial questions regarding the mechanism and efficiency of regulatory 
competition (Trachtman 2000, p. 331), but I do want to highlight this 
additional reason why, in an original position, openness might be se-
lected. The critical question is how we can maximize incentives for 
good government while minimizing punishment of innocent citizens. 
This question has much in common with the sanctions debate with re-
spect to so-called rogue states. 
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Furthermore, economists and lawyers have much experience with 
moral hazard in the fields of corporate law, bank regulation, and insur-
ance. There may be ways to obtain the benefits of appropriate incentives 
for good governance without giving up the possibility of “bailout.” In 
the private sector, this is done through insurance premiums and deduct-
ibles, supervision, or other mechanisms. If this possibility exists, why 
would representatives in the original position give it up? 
Moreover, Rawls’s moral hazard position is dependent on citi-
zen empowerment: the ability of citizens to get the government they 
want, and so to have the government they deserve. A host of failed and 
kleptocratic states have demonstrated that letting citizens absorb the 
consequences of their governments’ failures does not necessarily result 
in governmental reform. The predatory state seems to benefit from a 
vicious cycle of predation of its citizens, giving rise to further con-
centration of power and wealth that, in turn, allows further predation. 
Government officials may find that policies that reduce total welfare 
maximize their individual welfare. Thus, the moral hazard argument for 
restrictions on emigration may be undermined in just the type of case 
where Rawls would most hope that it would be operative. 
Furthermore, if the moral hazard problem could be addressed 
through a mechanism other than restricting emigration by citizens, this 
argument against liberalized migration would fall away. So, is there a 
less-restrictive alternative? It is possible that conditionality in the in-
tergovernmental context can play a role similar to bank supervision 
or risk-based deposit insurance premia in the private banking sector. 
Although conditionality as applied by the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) has many critics, it is an example of 
externally applied discipline on the state—of a constraint that might 
reduce the problem of moral hazard and disrupt the cycle of preda-
tion. Conditionality is a form of intervention, and some call it a form 
of neocolonialism. Conditionality certainly reduces the bundle of au-
tonomous state rights known as “sovereignty.” But sovereignty, in the 
form of absolute state control over its own affairs, has been oversold to 
poor small states, and more specifically to citizens. Local control does 
not benefit individuals when the control is in the hands of predatory 
or incompetent governments––we must be open to a post-postcolonial 
possibility of intervention, in cases of failed domestic governance. If 
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predatory governments can be disciplined, through a regime of analy-
sis, transparency, and conditionality, it is possible to improve the lot of 
their citizens. 
It may seem strange to be advancing greater international interven-
tion and conditionality, at a time when the policies underlying World 
Bank and IMF conditionality have been hotly criticized. While interna-
tional governance is quite imperfect, to the extent that it can engage in a 
policy dialogue with poor countries, it is possible that useful measures 
will result, and will be less imperfect than the alternatives. Mechanisms 
need to be created to ensure and facilitate reasoned dialogue based on 
agreed principles and citizen welfare, rather than on theory and diktat. 
With such a dialogue, states may be subjected to appropriate disciplines 
without imposing excessive restrictions on migration. 
Even within a state-based original position, diplomats faithful to 
their constituents might agree that if they empower states, there should 
be restrictions on the authority of states and a possibility of international 
intervention under certain circumstances—specificall , in order to pro-
vide the constituents a minimum level of security and welfare. This is 
the role of international law. Such an agreement might be compared to a 
form of federalism in that the individuals would be authorizing a central, 
supranational government to intervene—to exercise jurisdiction—in 
particular areas. Certainly diplomats faithful to individual constituents 
would adhere to contingent intervention under some conditions. 
Con Clusion
Under a liberal, normative individualist, ethical framework, each 
of us would enter into society to maximize the achievement of our 
preferences. Given variations in economies of scale, externalities, and 
preferences, it is natural that we would work together in different hori-
zontal and vertical frameworks. It is also natural that in a Rawlsian 
original position as to each of our social structures, we would be con-
cerned with distributive justice.22 Furthermore, it is natural that we 
would link our various horizontal and vertical social structures so as 
to maximize the achievement of our preferences: a federal style sys-
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tem, or a network of international legal commitments, characterized by 
subsidiarity. 
Imagine a global cosmopolitan original position. It would begin 
with representatives not of peoples but of individuals. These individu-
als would pay no regard to political borders in formulating exactly the 
two principles of justice that Rawls derives from the domestic original 
position. But they might also agree to establish subunits called states, or 
peoples. As Rawls finds, principles of justice would need to be worked 
out for different social units. 
Considering the vertical structure of society, whether the sequence 
of pyramidic original positions is top-down, from global to domestic, or 
bottom-up would not make any difference. Either way, the cosmopolitan 
nature of the original position would draw on individual perspectives. 
Either way, the deliberations would be recursive, and so would draw 
together lower and higher levels of organization. In fact, participants 
in a domestic original position, aware of global society, would choose 
precisely the same principles that would be chosen in a global original 
position. 
Similarly, participants in the global original position, without par-
ticular cultures and without histories, would also stipulate some rules of 
permitted diversity. In this ideal context, there is no path dependence; 
therefore the participants can choose any unit of organization. But they 
would wish to establish units that allow individuals to maximize the 
achievement of their somewhat diverse preferences. This wish would 
give rise to a rule of constitutional subsidiarity, determining allocations 
of authority and responsibility to subglobal units based on preference 
maximization. Of course, preferences here include those for cultural 
diversity, as well as all of the rights to influence government, and to be 
protected from excesses of government, that people would wish for in 
establishing subglobal units. However, before we show too much re-
spect to culture, let us remember that not all cultures are beneficial, and 
that cultural change is an instrument of human improvement. 
A global system following these principles would seek to institute 
free movement of labor. From a practical standpoint, as Chapter 2 shows 
and as Rawls understood, free movement of labor puts some pressure 
on welfare states, and may perpetuate failed states. Therefore, it may 
give rise to some need for contingent intervention or harmonization. As 
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discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, at some level, it would be necessary to 
compensate those harmed by these liberalization measures. 
This system of governance would entail some difficult allocative 
decisions. But the decision of whether to help a compatriot to obtain 
goods above basic goods while foreigners suffered without basic goods 
would always be unacceptable, just as the decision to give one’s own 
child a luxury before taking care of the basic needs of a neighbor’s child 
would always be morally unacceptable. 
Perhaps a governance system along these lines would have some 
degree of proximity-based tiering in the intensity of redistribution, after 
basic needs are met, or more properly some reflection of the human 
tendency to compare ourselves with those nearby. Perhaps it would 
also have a kind of extended purchasing power parity concept, which 
would accept that different integrated baskets of goods are needed for a 
good life in different contexts. In the end, it seems clear that borders, as 
part of the basic construction of society, must be structured—including 
features of permeability—in order to advance the position of the least 
fortunate. 
My basic premise is cosmopolitan in the sense of individual duty, as 
well as individual rights, so we need to begin with the duty of individu-
als as opposed to the duty of states or peoples. Should we really feel 
that we owe duties to those near but not those far? Certainly the idea of 
the original position is to identify ideal duties, as opposed to narrowly 
reciprocal real obligations. So the fact that a compatriot is behaviorally 
more likely to reciprocate, should not, in the original position, make a 
difference. And in the original position, distance is a mere abstraction 
and should count for little. 
Could it be that Rawls declined to apply the principles of justice 
developed for domestic society to international society because of the 
tremendously disruptive, even revolutionary, redistributive effect of 
applying these principles in an international context?23 If we consider 
Rawls’s formulation (1971, pp. 212 –213) of the lexically prior first
principle of justice, we see that even its liberties can be constrained 
in favor of public order. As Carens (1987, p. 259) points out, even in a 
global original position, participants would approve restrictions on im-
migration in order to avoid chaos and the breakdown of order. 
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A sudden move to global free migration would be unattractive. In-
dividuals need time to adjust, and might agree in the original position to 
gradually make some changes, even those required to do justice. Over 
time, complex factors may provide natural and beneficial limits on emi-
gration that would not be able to operate instantly. As we discussed in 
Chapter 2, economic integration is a self-equilibrating mechanism in 
the sense that trade, migration, and investment are to some extent sub-
stitutes and result in a degree of price homogenization. 
Clearly one might back away from recommending—indeed, call-
ing for—disruptive changes, but it is striking that the position Rawls 
takes on this matter calls for little change, and seems difficult to justify 
within his own framework. An alternative approach seems consistent 
with Rawls’s methodology, and could avoid sudden revolutionary dis-
ruption. Modeled on the experience of trade liberalization over the past 
60 years, a gradual approach combined with adjustment seems intui-
tively appealing within a global original position. “You are not required 
to finish the task, but neither are you free to abstain from it” (Pirke Avot 
2:21). 
Thus, we might understand Rawls’s duty of assistance as a starting 
point. Expanded immigration could be introduced gradually in order 
to avoid disorder and allow adjustment, and in order to provide time 
for the other parameters to have an effect that reduces the desire to 
emigrate. 
n otes
Howard Chang (2006) makes an explicit comparison between apartheid and re-1. 
strictions on immigration: “Just as we condemn segregation at the local level 
for undermining equality of opportunity in the domestic context, I suggest, we 
should condemn immigration restrictions for undermining global equality of 
opportunity.” 
In using Rawls’s work as a basis and as a foil, I follow an established tradition. 2. 
“Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is generally considered to be the most complete and 
systematic account of a rights-based justice in contemporary philosophy. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the important attempts at developing a systematic theory 
of global justice have been attempts at ‘globalizing’ Rawls’s theory of justice” 
(Tan 2004, p. 54).
Rawls (1971, 1996) notes: “I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a rea-3. 
sonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the 
time being as a closed system isolated from other societies . . . It is natural to 
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conjecture that once we have a sound theory for this case, the remaining problems 
of justice will prove more tractable in the light of it.” 
“Moral hazard” is an economic concept describing a circumstance in which indi-4. 
viduals do not bear the full adverse consequences of their decisions, and so may 
have perverse incentives to act in a way that diminishes social welfare. 
For a similar perspective, see Johnson (2003). 5. 
The distinction between peoples and states need not concern us, as Rawls’s 6. 
intent (1993) is to emphasize the responsibility of states to their individual con-
stituents—the people, and avoid implicit acceptance of some of the powers he 
understands states to have at traditional international law. This position is revised 
and expanded in Rawls (1999). 
This question seems to have been asked by Beitz (1979).7. 
The third preambular statement of the WTO Charter may be cited as evidence 8. 
of the existence of a reciprocal cooperative venture for mutual advantage: Be-
ing desirous of contributing to these objectives [raising standards of living, full 
employment, expanded production, sustainable development] by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial re-
duction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations (emphasis added: the italicized language 
suggests that the draftsmen were aware of the international justice debate). 
For a criticism of the use of “peoples” from both an empirical and methodological 9. 
perspective, see Benhabib (2004).
10. Even assuming an illiberal people, it seems subversive of Rawls’s domestic prin-
ciples of justice to assume that individuals in the domestic original position would 
select an illiberal political culture. 
11. Rawls (1993, 1999) makes the assumption of fair representation in the domestic 
original position. 
12. Their interest is to live in a well-ordered (liberal or decent) society. This society is 
one that can provide basic goods (Wenar [2001], citing Rawls [1993]; revised and 
expanded in Rawls [1999]). 
13. This duty is limited to an amount sufficient “to help burdened societies to be able 
to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become 
members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples” (Rawls 1999, p. 111).
14. Beitz (1999, p. 291) states that, “I believe that the philosophical weakness most 
characteristic of cosmopolitan theories—although not found equally in all of 
them—is a failure to take seriously enough the associative relationships that in-
dividuals do and almost certainly must develop to live successful and rewarding 
lives.” However, Beitz accepts a federal possibility: “It is hardly clear that a so-
phisticated cosmopolitanism cannot explain how local affiliations might give rise 
to special responsibilities. Such a view would recognize the value to individuals of 
their associations with domestic or local communities and argue that ethically sig-
nificant properties of these associations justify internal distributive arrangements 
that are different from, although not inconsistent with, what is required by global 
principles.” (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
15. For a summary and critique of Walzer’s argument, see Bosniak (1994).
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16. See the interesting argument by Kok-Chor Tan (2004) that nationalism can be 
reconciled with cosmopolitanism. 
17. There is no clear evidence that free immigration would generally confer a detri-
ment on domestic workers. See Chapter 2. 
18. Rawls (1999, p. 8) makes this argument explicitly.
19. It is also worth noting the flip side of this argument: that states would have re-
duced incentives to become wealthy due to the prospect that they would be taxed 
to help the poor. Of course, this argument has no more impact internationally than 
it would in domestic society; the difference principle seems to survive this con-
cern. 
20. Tan (2004, pp. 74–76) makes an important argument that Rawls seems to accept 
collective responsibility for governmental choices, in a manner inconsistent with 
his domestic focus on normative individualism. 
21. For application in the migration field, see Straubhaar (2000, p. 127)
22. On application of the principles of political justice to all domains, see Rawls 
(2001, p. 166).
23. This issue is touched upon by Caney (2001). 
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4 
International Political  
Economy of Migration
Chapter 2 discusses the welfare economics of migration, raising 
the possibility that legal rules might be structured to enhance global 
welfare. Yet it is well understood that states do not necessarily behave 
in accordance with the dictates of welfare economics (Dixit 1998). Not 
only is it possible that they would take actions that are inconsistent 
with global welfare, in pursuit of their individual welfare, but it is also 
possible that states would take actions that are inconsistent with their 
domestic welfare. Rather, the distributive consequences within states, 
and the relative political influence of the various constituencies, de-
termine national policy. The political decision-making and behavior of 
states in connection with international economic relations is the subject 
of international political economy. 
However, the international political economy academy has devoted 
much less attention to migration than to international trade or finance,
both theoretically and empirically (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2007). 
This chapter reviews some of the work to date, and suggests the impli-
cations of this analysis for international legal rules relating to migration. 
As Grossman and Helpman (1994, p. 849) put it, at the conclusion of 
their leading work on the political economy of protectionism in trade, 
“A next step might be to assess the relative desirability of alternative in-
ternational ‘rules of the game.’ Such rules limit the policy choices open 
to national governments and change the nature of the strategic interac-
tions between elected officials and their constituents. Our framework 
could be used to generate predictions about what domestic policies will 
emerge from the political process in different [international] institu- 
tional settings, and therefore to evaluate which rules give rise to pre-
ferred policy outcomes.”
Chapter 3 assesses the ethics of migration, yet it is also well un-
derstood that states do not necessarily behave in accordance with the 
dictates of ethics, and of course, the dictates of ethics are more contest-
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able than the dictates of welfare economics. Martin (2004) shows that 
destination states tend to structure restrictions on immigration to meet 
their own needs, pursuing national gains, rather than altruism. Yet we 
must recognize that altruism may have some marginal effect on domes-
tic politics in destination states. 
In this chapter, I examine how welfare economics concerns, and 
others, are mediated through national political processes, and how the 
resulting national political equilibria may result in an international po-
litical equilibrium. I then take up the Grossman and Helpman challenge 
to assess the relative desirability of international legal rules to change 
the nature of the strategic equilibrium, both between governments and 
within domestic coalition politics. Once we evaluate the domestic poli-
tics of states arising from the distributive consequences of migration, 
we must also recognize that other factors, including recession, income 
inequality, history, ignorance, demagogic scapegoating, chauvinism, 
and even racism may be added to the forces that determine policy, and 
that the alchemy of domestic coalitions is complex. 
As seen in Chapter 2, the welfare factors themselves are complex 
and variegated, and welfare analysis would require individual country 
evaluation, and customized solutions, with the possibility for change 
over time. Despite this complexity, at the level of the state we may gen-
eralize and say at least that in the current world economy, most states 
will benefit from immigration of high-skilled persons, while they may 
be more ambivalent about low-skilled persons. Some states may be 
harmed by emigration of high-skilled persons: brain drain. Some sug-
gest that temporary migration may present a win-win possibility for 
home states and destination states. 
Within each state, some groups of individuals will be harmed by 
liberalization, while some will be helped. In order to assess domestic 
political dynamics, we must analyze and synthesize the domestic coali-
tion politics of migration. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, those 
domestic workers who compete with immigrants may experience re-
duced wages and, unless adjustment assistance is provided, reduced 
welfare. This result is not certain, nor is the magnitude necessarily very 
great. Nor does it appear that immigrant workers generally consume 
public services excessively. However, in certain cases it may be that 
some segments of native workers are hurt significantly or that immi-
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grants consume greater amounts of public services than they contribute. 
Alternatively, perhaps workers and voters may succumb to prejudice or 
demagogic appeals, and therefore oppose immigration (Faini, de Melo, 
and Zimmermann 1999, pp. 6–7). 
It is worthwhile to compare the political economy of migration with 
the political economy of trade. The standard political economy account 
of protectionism in trade in goods is as follows. Domestic manufactur-
ers for domestic consumption, perhaps supported by domestic labor, 
are interested in protection against imports in order to increase their 
profitabilit . Domestic manufacturers for domestic consumption are 
more concentrated, and therefore better organized and more powerful 
politically, than domestic consumers interested in cheap imports. Being 
better organized than consumers, domestic manufacturers for domestic 
consumption succeed in determining policy (Olson 1965; WTO 2007). 
In contrast, one would assume generally that domestic manufac-
turers that compete with imports, domestic manufacturers seeking to 
export, domestic workers in complementary industries, and domestic 
consumers, would all welcome immigrants who are presumed to bring 
reduced labor costs (see Chapter 2 for more on this point). However, 
for some multinational corporations that already have the advantage of 
being able to access foreign labor markets at low prices, it may be more 
advantageous to locate labor-intensive activities in cheap labor markets, 
which may not benefit from higher prevailing wages, minimum wages, 
collective bargaining, or costly safety standards. At the same time, these 
multinational corporations may wish to deprive their domestic competi-
tors of cheap labor by promoting immigration restrictions. This presents 
the possibility of bootlegger-Baptist coalitions between multinational 
corporations on the one hand, and wealthy country unskilled labor on 
the other hand, in support of restrictions on immigration. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some domestic employers may prefer il-
legal immigration to legal immigration, because of the bargaining power 
they may hold in relation to illegal immigrants. These employers may 
lobby against policies that would liberalize legal migration, while possi-
bly opposing enforcement of restrictions on illegal immigration. Along 
with nativists, these employers may form another type of bootlegger- 
Baptist coalition. 
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We might expect better-organized producer interests, combined with 
diffuse consumer interests, to be able to overcome less well-organized 
labor interests. As suggested above, much would depend on the extent 
to which producer interests benefit from use of illegal immigrants, or 
derive a competitive advantage from differential access to cheap labor 
markets abroad. In addition, much would depend on the extent of labor 
organization. If labor interests were less well-organized, or otherwise 
weaker, under the standard political economy simplification that gov-
ernment decision-makers are rational political support–maximizers, 
we would expect government policy to be favorable to immigration. 
Indeed, Freeman (1995, pp. 882–883) argues in 1995 that “there is in 
general an expansionary bias in the politics of immigration in liberal de-
mocracies such that official policies tend to be more liberal than public 
opinion and annual intakes larger than is politically optimal.”1 
Freeman (1995) suggests that the liberal bias may depend on a cli-
entelistic political influence model in which policy interactions take 
place outside of public view. The governments of destination states have 
sometimes been able to overcome skeptical public opinion, in favor of 
the superior organization of employers. They did so by making policy 
in administrative settings, “without public participation and with little 
parliamentary supervision” (p. 891, citing Hammar [1985]). In order to 
liberalize outside of public view, informal or illegal immigration may 
be preferred to formal arrangements, including larger quotas or interna-
tional legal commitments, which draw greater attention. So, while the 
bias may be liberal, it may also be suboptimal if informal immigration 
produces less welfare than formal immigration. 
Freeman argues that “there are serious barriers to the acquisition 
of information about immigration and . . . there is a highly constrained 
process by which immigration issues are debated that distorts the in-
formation that is available” (p. 883). We need only refer to the debate 
among economists such as George Borjas and Andrew Card, discussed 
in Chapter 2, as to the effects of immigration on wages, to understand 
that the problem goes even further, in that consensus-based information 
simply is not necessarily available. Yet this lack of information could 
cut either way in the political debate. 
“Despite public indifference or opposition, and often in apparent 
disregard of rising unemployment rates, governments in the settler soci-
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eties substantially increased immigration intakes [from 1975 to 1995]” 
(p. 887). The “settler societies” include the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. What caused these increased intakes? Presumably business 
interests influenced public policy where the voting public was either 
indifferent or opposed. In these societies, unions did not directly oppose 
immigration during this period, and political parties avoided intense 
political debate regarding immigration. The United States in the early 
twenty-first century may constitute a departure from this pattern, but 
even there, the debate often transcends party politics. 
The so-called new countries of immigration—Portugal, Spain, Ita-
ly, and Greece—became both receivers and senders of migrants in the 
1970s and 1980s. Mass publics varied in their reaction to immigration, 
but public opinion was not a major influence on policy, and each of 
these states remained receptive in the 1990s. As in the western Europe-
an states, much decision making took place at the administrative level, 
and was not the subject of intense political debate (p. 895). 
Freeman concludes more broadly that “the concentrated benefits
and diffuse costs of immigration mean that the interest group system 
around immigration issues is dominated by those groups supportive of 
larger intakes, and, by implication, the organized public is more favor-
able to immigration than the unorganized public” (p. 885). 
Interestingly, Freeman suggested in 1995 that this liberal dynamic 
is reinforced by an antipopulist norm in mainstream political parties, 
according to which politicians decline to exploit racial, ethnic, or 
immigration-related fears in order to succeed. We might wonder wheth-
er the same observation would be made today. Politicians do sometimes 
engage in demagoguery to exploit or precipitate these meaner sensi-
bilities of their constituents, and it appears more acceptable to target 
“outsiders” through immigration-related fears than to target citizens of 
particular racial or ethnic groups. As discussed below, political, cul-
tural, ethnic, religious, nationalist, and other factors may play a role, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate, in the national politics of immigra-
tion. Ethnic groups may play a role in limiting migration from some 
areas, and promoting migration from other areas.
As suggested above, politics is driven by more than just welfare, and 
it is certainly driven by the intranational distributive aspects of welfare. 
That is, the politics of migration policy involves complex historical, so-
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cial, patriotic, chauvinistic, and other factors, and experience has shown 
that it is too much to expect politicians consistently to play to the best 
interests or to the greater virtues of their constituents. Second, politics 
involves the examination not just of aggregate effects, but of effects 
on particular interest groups. Furthermore, political analysis requires 
examination of the relative intensity of the preferences and influence of 
these particular interest groups: their concern and clout. 
Therefore, while Chapter 2 begins with global welfare, and then 
examines the welfare of individual states and groups of constituents, 
this chapter begins at the local level, and then moves to the global, or 
in this case international, level. Once we are able to establish a set of 
parameters that determine national policies with respect to migration, 
we are able to turn to the international politics of migration. Once we 
understand the national politics and the international politics, we can 
examine the potential role of international law. 
Political economy analysis thus adds three important dimensions to 
our analysis: 
At the domestic level, how and to what extent are the distribu-1) 
tive outcomes indicated by welfare economics transformed into 
political pressure in domestic politics? This is a question both 
of economic effects and of the mediation of economic effects 
through political and social mechanisms. What additional pa-
rameters are important to political decision-making regarding 
migration?
At the international level, how do states fail to achieve welfare-2) 
enhancing agreements or transactions due to strategic problems 
or other market failures? 
The prior two dimensions interact to present a cooperation prob-3) 
lem in connection with international migration. In order for 
welfare-enhancing international agreements to be entered into, 
they must engage the domestic politics of member states. They 
require the assembly of domestic coalitions that have the politi-
cal power to approve international agreements that will be ac-
ceptable to foreign counterparties. In order to convince foreign 
counterparties to engage in reciprocal concessions, they require 
the assembly or contingent assembly of domestic coalitions that 
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have the political power to induce continued compliance with the 
relevant agreement. Compliance coalitions may be supported, in 
part or in whole, by international legal commitments that include 
the threat of specific or diffuse, formal or informal, retaliation, or 
of other types of consequences. How is this cooperation problem 
different from that experienced in other areas, such as interna-
tional trade in goods and services? What are the implications of 
these differences for legal structures?
This chapter is an exercise in normative political economy, insofar 
as it examines the extent to which existing national and international 
political equilibria are consistent with the maximization of global, na-
tional, and individual welfare. Alternative legal rules and institutions 
may allow achievement of welfare-enhancing domestic and interna-
tional political equilibria. 
Trad E Pol ITIcs and M Igra TIon Pol ITIcs: a  d ual  
Pol Icy  Paradox?
A number of scholars have asked, if there is some equivalence 
between importing a good and importing a worker capable of making 
the same good (see Chapter 2), why does it appear that domestic labor 
is strong enough to block greater openness in immigration, while the 
world has moved toward greater liberalization in trade in goods? The 
factual predicates for this question are not unassailable, as the economic 
equivalence between these two phenomena is questionable, as liber-
alization of trade in goods still has substantial deficits, and as it is not 
clear that domestic labor has indeed successfully blocked openness in 
immigration. However, at least from the standpoint of competing do-
mestic workers there are important similarities. 
Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Mayda (2007) explore this “dual 
policy paradox” that a simplified theory predicts that immigration and 
import restriction policy should coincide, but never have. Hatton and 
Williamson find that immigration policy was very open compared to 
trade policy up to 1914. The policies of the United States, Canada, Ar-
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gentina, Brazil, and Australia were proimmigration from 1860 to 1890, 
and then gradually tightened. 
Hatton and Williamson emphasize the fiscal importance to destina-
tion governments of tariff revenues during the earlier periods, providing 
disincentives to liberalize in trade that do not apply with respect to im-
migration. In fact, since government welfare functions were still rather 
modest, and since immigrants were more productive compared to na-
tives, threats to the national treasury did not play the role prior to 1914 
that they do today. “Thus, tariffs brought plenty of fiscal benefit in the 
era before 1914 while immigrants brought no fiscal costs” (p. 13).
As the fiscal importance of tariffs declined in industrializing states 
that introduced income taxation, and as increased governmental ser- 
vices and transfer programs increased the potential fiscal cost as-
sociated with immigrants, this pattern began to change. Hatton and 
Williamson explain that these factors, combined with increased voting 
by lower-skilled and unskilled workers, combined to explain restrictive 
immigration policy in the later period. Restrictions were raised sharply 
in destination states, led by the United States, beginning in 1917, and 
immigration was subjected to a general worldwide clampdown with the 
onset of the Great Depression. 
Hatton and Williamson (p. 20) find that in the present context, the 
average citizen in 14 relatively labor-scarce OECD countries would 
like to see both immigration and imported goods reduced—they find
little difference in the average opposition. 
Analyzing modern survey data, Mayda (2007) finds, consistent 
with the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
that individual skill and protrade attitudes are positively correlated in 
skill-abundant countries and negatively correlated in skill-scarce coun-
tries. Similarly, she finds that individual skill and promigration attitudes 
are positively correlated in countries that receive unskilled immigrants 
and negatively correlated in countries that receive skilled immigrants. 
Along similar lines, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2002) find that unskilled 
workers in wealthy countries evince the greatest opposition to immigra-
tion, and that this opposition is stronger in more egalitarian countries, 
such as continental European countries. 
On the other hand, Hainmuller and Hiscox (2007) find that “In 
contrast to predictions based upon conventional arguments about la-
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bor market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose 
immigration of workers with similar skills to their own, but support 
immigration of workers with different skill levels . . . people with 
higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to 
favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants 
in question.” 
Mayda finds that individuals are today more protrade than proim-
migration across several countries studied. She suggests that the reason 
for this difference is that in the trade context, as compared to the im-
migration context, there is a distinction between individuals working in 
traded as opposed to nontraded sectors. Individuals in nontraded sectors 
do not oppose trade. When Mayda examines labor market determinants 
of trade and immigration preferences in a short-run sector-specific
model, where factors are immobile across sectors, she finds that the 
distinction between traded goods and nontraded goods sectors applies 
only to trade, and not to immigration. The proliberalization perspective 
of workers in nontraded goods sectors does not apply to immigration. 
“Workers in nontraded sectors feel shielded from foreign competition 
working through trade but not from labor-market competition of im-
migrants” (p. 4). 
Thus we see that the political economy of migration policy has sub-
stantial differences from the political economy of trade, and that the 
factors driving the political economy of migration policy are distinct, 
although there are some overlaps. So, it is not surprising that migration 
and trade policy have diverged, and converged, at various times. 
l abor versus c apital
One important distinction between the political economy of trade in 
goods and that of migration is the fact that labor and capital often have 
more antagonistic interests in relation to migration. While owners of 
firms that manufacture for the domestic market may be hurt by imports 
of goods, they are generally not hurt by imports of workers that make 
the same goods. In fact, the opposite is often true. 
Importantly, greater mobility of labor has a double-edged effect on 
workers. Mobility can allow workers to overcome barriers, enabling 
them to engage in the same type of factor arbitrage that multinational 
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corporations are able to achieve. In fact, to the extent that this arbitrage 
involves the competition of immobile factors for mobile resources, mo-
bility of labor can change bargaining power. Multinational corporations 
seek the cheapest inputs (including labor) and the greatest prices for 
their output. Mobile labor can also seek the greatest prices for its out-
put and thereby counter the market power of local employers and even 
multinational corporations. 
However, it must be recognized that not all labor can be made mobile, 
and the types of workers that will be hurt most by immigration—those 
whose types are scarce—would ordinarily find that international mo-
bility does not help them. On the other hand, workers whose types are 
abundant may be assisted by mobility and unharmed by immigration. 
According to Freeman (1995), immigration tends to result in con-
centrated benefits and diffuse costs within the destination state. Those 
who benefit from immigration in the destination state therefore have 
greater prospects to organize than those who are hurt. This is similar 
to, but the reverse of, the politics of protectionism in trade (where the 
illiberal policy causes concentrated benefits and diffuse costs). In des-
tination states, the principal beneficiaries of liberal immigration are 
generally employers in labor-intensive and in particular unskilled la-
bor-intensive industries. Other beneficiaries may include industries that 
benefit from population growth, such as the construction industry, and 
family members of the immigrant who migrated earlier. 
However, perhaps it can be argued that the more intense or directly 
observable nature of the effects on employees, by virtue of the fact 
that they may observe immigrant workers employed at lower wages, 
causes them to lobby with greater intensity against immigration than 
they do in connection with trade. In connection with trade, the compet-
ing workers would be abroad rather than at home. Indeed, it may be 
that this intensity could give rise to a greater lobbying effort, explaining 
a more protectionist approach to immigration. However, the other dif-
ference between trade and immigration is that, largely due to the way 
tariff schedules are negotiated, each separate manufacturer of a par-
ticular classification of product, and its workers, may lobby intensely 
and separately with respect to trade in the relevant good. This lobbying 
may be more fragmented than lobbying regarding general immigration 
policy, but it is focused on a much more precisely specified target. Im-
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migration lobbying does not necessarily distinguish among particular 
types of production, or narrow categories of worker. On the other hand, 
in connection with licensing or qualification requirements for particular 
professions, we might expect to see more focused lobbying. 
The initial costs of immigration fall directly on workers who com-
pete with the immigrants, as well as others who compete with immigrants 
for housing and other consumption items. These latter individuals may 
lack the ability to organize or to mobilize resources to influence policy, 
and they may fail to observe the effects that immigrants have on the 
prices that they pay. 
However, immigrant-competing workers may be members of 
unions, and so may be able to pool resources and organize effectively 
to oppose immigration. It would be an interesting test of this political 
economy model to examine whether migration is more liberal in coun-
tries and sectors where labor is less well-organized. 
On the other hand, Freeman (1995, p. 888) observes that in Austra-
lia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S., unions “have generally come 
to support immigration, resigning themselves to defensive rather than 
restrictive measures, such as employer sanctions against hiring illegal 
workers and labor certificati n programs tying the composition of in-
flows to employment sectors where demand is high” (citations omitted). 
Watts (2002, p. 3) finds that French, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. unions 
carry out educational programs for their members to convince them that 
the best strategy is to seek more open immigration policies. French, 
Italian, and German union leaders have worked to facilitate legal im-
migration and improve the treatment of migrant workers. 
The opposition of unions to illegal immigration suggests the pos-
sible validity of the assumption that illegal immigration reduces the 
bargaining power of unions. Illegal immigrants have more limited op-
tions than comparable natives or legal immigrants, and so may have 
reduced bargaining power (Friedberg and Hunt, 1999, p. 344). An al-
ternative or contributory explanation may be that illegal immigrants 
are less likely to join unions, reducing the income of unions. The will-
ingness of unions to support selective immigration pursuant to labor 
certification programs suggests a sophisticated willingness to be selec-
tive in determining market access. 
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It is important to recognize that while migration may have adverse 
effects on the wages of scarce classes of workers in the destination state, 
similar mobility could provide market power to abundant classes of 
workers in the home state. Thus, in a state that is as likely to be a send-
ing state as a destination state, workers as an aggregate may not have 
a very strong position for or against migration. In effect, under nonse-
lective liberalized migration, scarce types of workers give up market 
power so that abundant types of workers may gain market power. 
Thus, a possible basis for international agreement to liberalize mi-
gration may be the decision of labor to accept inbound migration in 
exchange for promises of mobility that confers market power. Indeed, 
labor may be at the heart of potential international commitments to re-
duce barriers to migration, insofar as labor in any particular country 
would like to attain mobility. I discuss this possibility in more detail in 
the latter part of this chapter. 
Fiscal c onsiderations
In many modern OECD states, there is a concern that immigrants 
may contribute less to the welfare state than they receive. This issue did 
not arise in earlier periods of mass migration, as the welfare state was 
much smaller (Felbermayr and Kohler 2006).
The research discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that immigrants have 
not generally caused significant adverse or beneficial effects in fi -
cal terms: either in taxes collected or in public resources used. Note, 
though, that if more unskilled immigrants, or other immigrants who 
could not contribute to the workforce and tax revenues, were admitted, 
they could have adverse fiscal effects. Over the long term, immigrants 
and their children are more likely to be net fiscal contributors.
a djustment
Of course, at the most fundamental levels of both trade and migra-
tion, there will be some who are harmed by liberalization. Assuming 
aggregate national benefits, adjustment assistance may promote the 
development of proimmigration coalitions.2 Many have argued per-
suasively, in connection with trade, that liberalization is facilitated by 
appropriate safety net or other redistributive mechanisms that allow 
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working voters to accept liberalization without worrying about their 
livelihoods.3 Presumably, a similar approach of “embedded liberalism” 
(Howse 2002; Polanyi 1944; Rodrik 1999; Ruggie 1982) could apply 
to address the distributive impacts of migration. However, in order to 
fund the adjustment assistance and other programs of embedded liberal-
ism, it will be necessary for the government to identify the necessary 
revenues. 
Endog Enous Pol Icy  Mod Els o F Trad E 
and I MMIgra TIon
Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a paradigmatic model of 
trade politics in which owners of particular factors organize a lobbying 
group in order to influence the government by political contributions. 
Grossman and Helpman focus on the campaign contributions channel 
of influence on government. In this model, the motivation of lobbyists 
to contribute to political campaigns is not necessarily to affect the out-
come of elections, but to “buy influence.”
In the Grossman-Helpman model, each interest group has a “contri-
bution schedule” linked to various alternative policy vectors. In response, 
government chooses a policy vector in order to maximize a weighted 
sum of both contributions and national social welfare. National social 
welfare is part of the calculus because it is assumed to affect votes. The 
Grossman-Helpman model relates an industry’s equilibrium protection 
to its political organization, its ratio of domestic output to net trade, and 
the elasticity of import demand or export supply. The equilibrium is 
that set of contribution schedules such that each lobby’s schedule maxi-
mizes the aggregate utility of the lobby’s members, taking as a given 
the schedules of other lobby groups. 
Grossman and Helpman assume a small competitive economy, for 
which free trade is optimal. Under that assumption, government in-
terventions in the form of tariffs or subsidies may be assumed to be 
motivated by political considerations rather than national welfare. The 
standard trade model of protectionism explains protection in national 
public welfare terms by reference to terms of trade externalities, and 
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holds that protectionism can only be welfare-improving for a large 
country (with market power), which can use trade barriers to improve 
its welfare as compared with free trade (Bagwell and Staiger 1999, 
p. 215; 2001, p. 281; 2003).4 
One commonly accepted extension of the Grossman-Helpman 
approach to the domestic political economy of trade recognizes the 
possibility to link the interests of domestic producers for export to the 
interests of domestic consumers through reciprocal free trade agree-
ments. By virtue of these agreements, the political power of domestic 
producers for export is added to the political power of domestic consum-
ers, overcoming the political power of domestic producers that compete 
with imports for domestic consumption. The possibility of reciprocal 
international trade agreements induces an antiprotection coalition to 
form, in support of liberalization pursuant to these agreements. Thus, 
the domestic political economy of trade is critically linked, by recipro-
cal trade agreements, to the international political economy of trade. 
 Is this approach to international trade relations adaptable to migra-
tion? As discussed above, migration does not display the same pattern 
of domestic interests as trade. In the migration context, destination 
state manufacturers, both for domestic consumption and for export, 
would generally be expected to be in favor of liberalized immigration. 
Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2007) suggest that migration politics is 
strongly affected by political contributions by manufacturers, as well 
as by labor union activity. However, destination state manufacturers 
may experience difficulties in organizing, as the breadth of interest in 
immigration could result in collective action problems unless immigra-
tion policy is selective by sector. Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra assume 
selectivity in their model of protection against immigration.
We show that in equilibrium, in a given sector, the amount of pro-
tection afforded to labor, i.e. the restrictiveness of the migration 
policy adopted by the government, depends on both the lobbying 
expenditures made by organized labor, as well as on the expen-
ditures made by capital (which is its complement). In particular, 
if labor in a sector spends larger amounts, ceteris paribus it will 
obtain higher levels of protection from foreign inflows of workers 
to that sector and, hence, it will lower the equilibrium number of 
immigrants. At the same time, if organized business owners spend 
higher amounts, this will ceteris paribus make migration policy in 
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that sector less restrictive and, therefore, increase the number of 
immigrants. (p. 4)5
In that model, a lobby for labor and a lobby for capital engage in 
a noncooperative game where each chooses an amount to pay in order 
to maximize its own net welfare.6 It is uncertain, however, to what ex-
tent the sectoral divisions assumed by Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 
actually exist. In the United States, for example, there are few formal 
distinctions between different occupations at the legislative level where 
lobbying is expected to operate. 
If destination states had no market power, as Grossman-Helpman 
assume with respect to importing states, then the Facchini, Mayda, and 
Mishra model would seem to provide a plausible tool by which to ana-
lyze immigration policy. However, popular destination states seem to 
wield important market power, allowing them to improve their welfare 
at the expense of migrants and home states. The ability to import labor 
at a price lower than the price that would otherwise apply, by using pol-
icy measures to extract some of the income from the imported worker, 
or to extract welfare from the home state, seems analogous to the use of 
tariffs to increase domestic welfare at the expense of foreign welfare. 
Market power of this type might be a more important factor in connec-
tion with less skilled labor than in connection with highly skilled labor. 
Even wealthy states may find that they must compete in order to attract 
highly skilled labor. 
Some destinations, such as the United States, the EU, Canada, 
Australia, and other wealthy states, undoubtedly are attractive to immi-
grants. Part of this attraction arises from the wages that can be earned in 
these destinations, presumably due to high levels of productivity. This 
strong attraction may give rise to market power, in the sense that supply 
of immigration opportunities is limited, demand for immigration oppor-
tunities is high, and the governments of the destination countries have 
control of entry. Of course, market power also requires that a state be 
sufficiently large as a fraction of the global economy to affect the world 
price of labor through its policies.7 Do these leading destination states 
use market power to extract welfare gains from immigration? Consider 
the following three possibilities: 
States with market power in this context may exert that power by 1) 
accepting immigrants and denying the home state of the immi-
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grants the ability to tax those migrants—declining to implement 
a Bhagwati tax. By doing so, the destination state may impose a 
negative externality on the home state.8 
Another way by which states with market power may exert their 2) 
power is to accept only highly skilled immigrants—those who 
will make a positive contribution in terms of an immigration div-
idend and in terms of a fiscal contribution. Thus, we can interpret 
brain drain as a negative externality imposed by the destination 
state on the home state. 
It is also possible that destination states could use their market 3) 
power to impose discriminatory taxes or other burdens on immi-
grants, or to deny immigrants public benefits that are available 
to natives, causing immigrants to give up some of the surplus 
from migration that they might otherwise capture (Bucovetsky 
2003). Considering the United States’ relationship with Mexican 
or other illegal immigrants, it may be that denial of public ser-
vices or public transfer payment benefits could be understood as 
discriminatory provision of public benefits, with the same moti-
vation and effect. Of course, illegal immigrants are more likely 
to suffer from this type of “discrimination.” Under U.S. law, il-
legal immigrants are denied certain public benefits. So, could it 
be that a preference for illegal immigration can be explained in 
terms of negative externalities?9 
These types of measures are likely to provide disincentives for 
migration, in a way that may reduce global welfare insofar as migra-
tion would otherwise be efficient 10 Indeed, it may be that a sufficient
rationale for states to cooperate in this area is simply to agree to sup-
press these types of measures in order to increase volumes of migration, 
and thereby enhance global welfare. According to this rationale, states 
could agree to increase international migration, and thereby increase 
global welfare, provided that they are able to agree on the distribution 
of the gains. 
Note, however, that the home state is not necessarily directly harmed 
by the destination state’s exercise of market power, nor does it feel the 
full welfare loss caused by the destination state’s policy. Therefore, the 
home state may not be sufficiently motivated to negotiate to protect its 
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emigrants. On the other hand, if home states sought more actively to tax 
their emigrants, they might understand refusal by destination states to 
enforce these taxes as harmful, and discrimination may reduce amounts 
available for remittances or to be used for investment upon return. Tem-
porary migration arrangements may provide greater incentives for home 
states to protect their emigrants: under these arrangements, the goal of 
the home state is to have migrants send remittances and then return with 
capital, skills, and contacts. 
To the extent that these types of policy externalities are recognized 
by the home state, it may have incentives to negotiate with the destina-
tion state over their reduction. Staiger (2006) explains this motivation 
in the trade context as follows: “Beginning from the inefficient trade 
policy choices made in the presence of this international cost-shifting, 
the purpose of international trade negotiations is then clear: to provide 
an avenue by which foreign exporters can have their interests repre-
sented in the trade protection choices of the national governments to 
whose markets these exporters seek access, and thereby to face those 
governments with internationally appropriate incentives that lead them 
to choose internationally efficient levels of trade protection.”
Note that this is a political representation argument. The goal in 
migration is also to induce destination states to choose internationally 
efficient levels of restriction on immigration. To paraphrase Staiger, the 
goal is to provide an avenue by which emigrants and those left behind in 
home states can have their interests represented in immigration policies 
of destination state governments. To the extent that destination state 
governments take these interests into account, they will be more likely 
to choose internationally efficient levels of immigration protection.
In the trade context, the terms of trade approach, focusing on the 
exercise of market power, seems only to provide a rationale for nego-
tiations among states with market power. As noted above, economists 
expect that welfare-maximizing states without market power would 
unilaterally make policy choices that are internationally efficient, since 
they cannot gain welfare by raising barriers. Furthermore, they there-
fore expect that states with market power would see little benefit from 
negotiating agreements with states that lack market power (WTO 2007). 
There is no clear understanding regarding the extent of poor or small 
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states’ market power, except an understanding that it is generally less 
than that of wealthy and rich states. 
In the labor migration context, it appears that states without mar-
ket power frequently do not impose restrictions on immigration. One 
reason, no doubt, is that the demand to immigrate to those states is, by 
definition, not very great: their productivity rates generally do not result 
in increased wages for immigrants. But the important point here is that 
states without market power in migration would have little to bargain 
with in a reciprocal liberalization transaction. On the other hand, we 
must remember that in this context, market power is relative. Thus, a 
middle-income developing country may have market power as a des-
tination state vis-à-vis a lower-income developing country: it may be 
attractive for residents of the latter to migrate to the former in order to 
realize wage gains. 
In the trade model addressing terms of trade externalities, the role 
of international law is to allow states credibly to commit to exercise 
reciprocal restraint. Even in a model that does not include terms of trade 
externalities, in which states are failing to achieve optimal volumes of 
trade and therefore are failing to achieve maximum global welfare, in-
ternational law could play a similar role in allowing states credibly to 
commit to exercise restraint, or to make compensation, as appropriate. 
This type of cooperation problem has often been modeled, assum-
ing a certain structure of payoffs, using the prisoner’s dilemma game. 
The assumption is that the states could be better off if neither of them 
defected, but that each is individually better off if it defects while the 
other cooperates, and receives the worst payoff if it cooperates while 
the other defects. The dominant solution—the expected behavior—is 
defection by all states. However, by using international legal rules to 
change (make negative) the payoffs from defection, states are able to 
achieve the collectively optimal outcome of mutual cooperation. 
Figure 4.1 shows a diagram of the prisoner’s dilemma, as applied 
to trade. In this set of assumed payoffs, if international legal rules can 
impose a cost on defectors (states that fail to liberalize or impose terms 
of trade externalities) greater than 1 (in Figure 4.2, for illustration, I use 
1.5), then they will decide to liberalize instead. 
In Figure 4.2, the dominant solution for each player is to liberalize: 
no matter what State B does, the best payoff for State A is to liberalize. 
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If, in the migration context, home states saw themselves as harmed 
by the kinds of negative externalities described above imposed by des-
tination states in connection with migration, and if the positions were 
symmetrical, a similar set of payoffs might arise. Alternatively, if states 
saw themselves as harmed by global failure to achieve optimal volumes 
of migration, a similar strategic setting, based on a public goods prob-
lem, might arise. On the basis of the example of trade, we might too 
quickly assume that international migration agreements could play a 
similar role. However, as I have suggested, the explanations developed 
in connection with the political economy of trade do not neatly map 
into the migration context: while the welfare economics analysis bears 
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some limited similarities, and the international setting may be compara-
ble, the domestic political economy parameters are different. There are
important reasons why we do not observe international agreements for 
liberalization of migration. 
Greenaway and Nelson (2006) state that there is little empirical re-
search on immigration policy with a direct link to endogenous policy 
modeling, in part due to weak evidence of economic impact and strong 
evidence of noneconomic forces in determining preferences. They find
that “endogenous policy models of migration policy seem to provide 
very little analytical leverage” (p. 312). One reason is that “there is no 
equivalent, long-lived, group-based politics surrounding immigration” 
(p. 314). Greenaway and Nelson conclude that “trade is seen as national 
and essentially economic; while immigration is local and essentially 
social” (p. 315). However, this conclusion may be seen as more an 
observation of a result than an identification of a cause. A casual ob-
server of U.S. immigration politics might conclude that immigration 
is becoming more like trade: group-based, national if not international, 
and essentially economic. Indeed, Willmann (2006), commenting on 
Greenaway and Nelson, finds counterevidence in the work of Borjas 
(2003) and Mayda (2003). Willmann (2006, p. 329) cites examples of 
political positions that seem consistent with economic expectations. 
Ma PPIng Th E dE s TIna TIon sTa TE Pol ITIcal  
Econo My  o F MIgra TIon
In order to develop some simple schematics of the possible coali-
tion dynamics in the political economy of the destination state regarding 
migration, comparable to the model of the political economy of the im-
porting state regarding trade described above, it is necessary to make a 
number of simplifying assumptions and to exclude much detail.11 These 
assumptions are supported by the discussion above, as well as in Chap-
ter 2. 
For simplicity’s sake, I largely exclude from these schematics the 
more contextual, historical, social, and political factors discussed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. Hatton and Williamson (2005, p. 
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179) find that in the long run, “the New World countries tried to protect 
the economic position of their scarce factor, the unskilled worker.” They 
find “no compelling evidence that xenophobia or racism was driving im-
migration policy in the New World economies,” once you ignore Asian 
exclusions and absent Africans. These factors are not unimportant, but 
the purpose of these schematics is not to determine how states will nec-
essarily behave, or what kind of international legal commitments they 
will necessarily establish. Rather, it is to develop an idea of the way 
that the welfare economics considerations may be translated into politi-
cal pressures, the strategic constraints that domestic interests face, and 
the strategic constraints that states face, in order to be able to suggest 
how international legal commitments may facilitate the achievement of 
these goals. By doing so, I hope to develop an idea of the broad param-
eters of possible international legal commitments in this area. 
This strategy is predicated on a simplifying assumption that welfare 
considerations will be strong and may, over time and in appropriate 
contexts, overcome some of the contextual, social, historical, and po-
litical factors. Furthermore, these factors do not necessarily always 
militate against liberalization. So, these schematics are simplifications.
However, an international negotiation toward an agreement would nec-
essarily involve states determining their positions based on all of the 
relevant factors, not only welfare. 
I assume that citizens seek to influence their own governments 
through two main channels: 1) political contributions, and 2) voting. 
Governments act in response to utility functions based on an attempt 
to maximize a weighted sum of these two components: they maximize 
political support.12 
As noted above, there is a domestic coalition-building game and a 
linked international cooperation game: thus, migration policy is a two-
level game in the Putnam sense (1988). The question raised by this 
book is whether governments may find it useful to enter into interna-
tional agreements in order to induce the formation of domestic political 
coalitions in support of liberalization. I describe the domestic coalition-
building problem textually, and show how it may drive an international 
coordination or cooperation game with game theory matrices. I show 
that, at least under certain hypothesized circumstances where, without 
international agreements, proliberalization forces would not be suc-
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cessful in inducing formal liberalization, international agreements may 
increase the possibility of formation of proliberalization coalitions. 
In the following four sections, I develop four simple schematics of 
possible structures of political support for liberalization of immigration. 
The first two schematics use the assumption, based on Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory, that unskilled labor would migrate to where it is scarce, and 
skilled labor would migrate to where it is scarce. Opposition also fol-
lows Heckscher-Ohlin theory: the scarce factor in the destination state 
has the most to lose in connection with immigration. The third sche-
matic adds the possibility of capital mobility or offshoring, or illegal 
immigration. The fourth schematic assumes that wealthy country labor 
has no interest in migrating to poor countries. Under this schematic, 
potential reciprocity within migration policy would play no role, as 
wealthy country labor would not seek access to poor country markets. 
Symmetric labor markets.1)  I develop a schematic in which two 
states are symmetric, with equal endowments of labor, including 
equal proportions of skilled and unskilled labor. This schematic 
could describe migration between poor or middle-income states 
or between wealthy states. An example might be the migration 
relationship between the United States and the EU. Here, engi-
neers, doctors, or professors might migrate in search of a particu-
lar type of position or better pay. Although I assume symmetry 
in terms of general endowments, it would be likely that some 
states might have an advantage in producing a particular type of 
worker. France would be expected to produce better chefs than 
the United States, while the United States might be expected to 
produce better basketball players than France. (While this sche-
matic is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, since there is no 
differential between the two states in relative abundance and 
scarcity, migration cannot be said to be motivated by Heckscher-
Ohlin factors.) 
Asymmetric labor markets with two-way migration2) . I develop a 
schematic that assumes asymmetry, where one state has abun-
dant skilled labor while the other has abundant unskilled labor. 
Here, the relationship between Spain and Morocco, or between 
the United States and Mexico, are examples. Generally, develop-
ing countries are likely to have greater abundance of unskilled 
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labor, while developed countries have greater abundance of 
skilled labor. 
Asymmetric labor markets with offshoring or illegal immigra-3) 
tion. I add to the asymmetric context the possibility of offshor-
ing or illegal immigration as an alternative to liberalization of 
migration. 
Asymmetric labor markets with one-way migration4) . I develop a 
schematic that assumes asymmetry, but, contrary to Heckscher-
Ohlin theory, assumes that poor country labor flows only toward 
the wealthy country: wealthy country natives do not wish to mi-
grate to the poor country. 
These schematics are structured in bilateral terms. Obviously, 
multilateral arrangements will be more complex. Indeed, multilateral 
arrangements with most-favored nation nondiscrimination may be very 
difficult to achieve where they include both relationships of symmetry 
and asymmetry, and both “two-way street” migration relationships and 
“one-way street” relationships. 
s y MMETr Ic l abor Mark ETs: a  c oord Ina TIon  
(sTag h un T) g a ME
Assume two symmetric states: domestic labor and foreign labor 
are symmetric overall in quantity and skill level. Assume that in each 
economy, skilled labor is abundant, and unskilled labor is scarce. (This 
schematic would also apply to the opposite: symmetric economies 
where unskilled labor is abundant and skilled labor is scarce.) Levels 
of productivity and wages are closely aligned. In this context, there 
may be little reason for migration, and little by way of welfare gains to 
be captured by liberalizing migration. Conversely, there may be little 
reason to oppose immigration, because it brings no pressure on wages 
in the destination country. On the other hand, within certain sectors, 
such as cooking, language training, software engineering, or baseball, 
some countries might produce more highly skilled workers than others. 
This would constitute a basis for migration, within the particular sec-
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tor. It might also constitute a basis for protectionism by the competing 
domestic workers. 
Nielson (2003, pp. 93, 94) suggests that generally, agreements 
among countries that are geographically proximate and at similar levels 
of development entail greater liberalization of labor mobility. Ghosh 
(2007, p. 102) suggests that migration liberalization agreements among 
countries of similar levels of income are most likely to emerge and 
survive. 
In Table 4.1, I set forth a stylized conjecture as to the likely posi-
tions of different broad groups under this condition of labor market 
symmetry. I first describe each state’s unilateral policy and then ex-
amine how a regime of reciprocity would affect the groups’ positions. 
Below the table, I explain my reasons for characterizing each group’s 
position as I do. The main difference between the nonreciprocal case 
and the reciprocal case is that the abundant labor factor, seeing oppor-
tunities abroad that could be opened up by reciprocity, favors reciprocal 
liberalization. In some cases, this will be sufficient to change the bal-
ance of lobbying power, resulting in a new, proreciprocal liberalization 
equilibrium. Indeed, this may be especially true in particular vocational 
sectors, and not true in other vocational sectors. So it may be that an in-
ternational agreement that differentiates by vocational sector, in which 
states make schedules of liberalization commitments by vocational sec-
tor, would allow states to make the most precise choices in this field.
This would allow a kind of cross-vocational reciprocity, in which, for 
example, the United States opens its market to French chefs in return 
for France opening its market to U.S. basketball players. 
Table 4.1  s ymmetric l abor Markets with Equal Productivity
Scarce labor Abundant labor Capital Consumers
No reciprocity Opposed to 
liberalization
Weakly in favor 
of liberalization




Weakly in favor 
of liberalization 
(dispersed)




Weakly in favor Weakly in favor 
(dispersed)
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s carce labor factor opposes liberalization. Assume, consistent 
with Heckscher-Ohlin, that unskilled workers believe that they are hurt 
by immigration.13 Unskilled workers therefore oppose liberalization of 
immigration. However, under conditions of equal productivity and sym-
metry, with little wage differential between the symmetric states, and 
little expected migration, this opposition may not be strong. As noted 
above, certain sectors may demonstrate greater concern than others. 
c apital weakly supports liberalization. Domestic capital supports 
liberalization of immigration. (See Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra [2007] 
on the contributions of labor and capital to policy.) Benefits to capital 
may include greater labor market flexibilit . As wage differentials are 
assumed not to be significant, the benefits to capital are not great, and 
therefore the support is not strong. 
Furthermore, capital may have a more difficult time organizing in 
connection with immigration than in connection with trade liberaliza-
tion, because of accentuated collective action problems, unless the state 
permits sector-selective immigration policy. In connection with trade, 
tariffs are industry or product specific, as are many subsidies, giving rise 
to concentrated incentives for lobbying. Immigration policy may not be 
product or industry specific, at least at the legislative level, and so there 
may be temptations to free ride. This will vary by state. While many 
states require labor market certification, it is unclear to what extent this 
type of certifi ation is susceptible to lobbying influence. Some states 
have point systems or other devices for preferring individuals with cer-
tain vocations over others. On the other hand, GATS, as described in 
Chapter 8, allows states to make vocation-specific commitments.
c onsumers weakly support liberalization. Except to the extent 
that they compete with immigrants for consumption opportunities, con-
sumers would benefit in welfare terms from immigration. However, as 
the wage differentials are not significant, the likely savings to consum-
ers would not be great. Moreover, as in trade, consumers are often not 
sufficiently organized to articulate this preference in destination coun-
try politics. 
a bundant labor factor weakly supports liberalization. Abun-
dant types of workers benefit from liberalization to the extent that there 
are complementarities by virtue of which increased immigration of un-
skilled workers may increase the returns to skilled workers. These are 
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not powerful incentives for skilled workers to advocate liberalization, 
and the actual position of the abundant type of workers would depend 
on many factors.14 As noted above, one important caveat is that within 
certain sectors, skilled workers may benefit from liberalization.
a bundant labor factor seeks mobility—a basis for recipro-
cation. Assume that domestic abundant labor believes that it would 
benefit from its own international mobility, allowing its workers to 
emigrate to where they are scarce, in search of higher prices. This ben-
efit is presumed to accrue to the segment of labor that is plentiful. But 
note that under the assumption of symmetry, mobility is not as valuable 
as it would be under an assumption of asymmetry. This benefit gives 
plentiful labor a modest added incentive to seek foreign liberalization.15 
Again, within certain sectors, we might see greater interest in mobility. 
Mobility of labor allows workers to “countervail” multinational 
corporation mobility, allowing labor to seek the highest wages. Further-
more, foreign labor mobility would increase foreign labor bargaining 
power and price, and therefore reduce the possibility that domestic 
multinational corporations might offshore to foreign labor. However, 
for the same reason that the scarce labor factor’s opposition is weak 
in this symmetric context, mobility in this context does not provide 
great incentives for support by the abundant factor. As noted above, 
however, one important caveat is that within certain vocations, workers 
may benefit more greatly from liberalization, and so to the extent that 
liberalization can be differentiated by vocation, there may be stronger 
support for liberalization in some vocations than in others. 
Thus, it is possible that the added factor of reciprocal foreign lib-
eralization, perhaps with the possibility for differentiation by vocation, 
could induce the formation of a coalition between capital and abundant 
labor, along with consumers, to overcome scarce labor’s opposition to 
liberalization of immigration. However, note that while capital sup-
ports liberalization of immigration at home, it is unlikely to support 
increased emigration by virtue of liberalization of immigration abroad. 
Thus, reciprocal liberalization may actually reduce capital’s support. 
The position of capital would depend on the extent to which capital is 
a complement for emigrant labor, and the degree of mobility of capital. 
Mobile capital might actually benefit from a more efficient allocation of 
labor between countries.16 
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On the other hand, it may be that if the true costs and benefits are 
quite different depending on the sector involved, we would observe sec-
torally differentiated positions among workers. 
a djustment and voters. Under this symmetric context, the gains 
from liberalization are not likely to be very great. Therefore, the sur-
plus generated may not be sufficient to cover the costs of adjustment 
assistance plus its administration. It may be that unskilled labor simply 
absorbs any loss that accrues to it—this loss is not likely to be great. If 
the gains from liberalization accrue largely to capital, it might be ap-
propriate to tax capital in order to acquire funds to provide adjustment 
assistance. If the gains accrue largely to migrants, which is likely, it 
may be useful to impose some type of charge or tax on migrants in order 
to capture a sufficient portion of the surplus to be able to provide ad-
justment assistance. The United States charges such a fee in connection 
with its H-1B visa program, discussed in Chapter 7. If these domestic 
institutional arrangements could be made, a wider range of reciprocal 
commitments to liberalize would become feasible. All other things be-
ing equal, if we can assume that liberalization improves global welfare, 
and if this redounds to the general benefit of voters, we might expect a 
slight impulse toward liberalization. This impulse would be vulnerable 
to being countervailed by concern for those who lose their jobs, and by 
a variety of noneconomic factors. 
c oordination game. Given all these factors, it may be that the best 
outcome for both states may be reciprocal liberalization. Under these 
circumstances, this game could be understood as a coordination game, 
like a stag hunt, in which each state government does better in this 
political support game if it seeks liberalization, but only if other states 
reciprocally liberalize. The critical question, then, is whether states may 
provide assurance to one another regarding their liberalization. This as-
surance need not be great, as there are not strong incentives to defect. 
This may explain why liberalization of migration among wealthy states 
generally appears to require no international legal commitments to pro-
vide additional incentives for compliance. Note that the inducement to 
domestic skilled labor to support liberalization is foreign market access. 
If foreign market access can be achieved without liberalizing at home—
without reciprocation—domestic skilled labor will still be satisfied. But 
Job Name: -- /309724t
142   Trachtman
liberalizing at home does not harm domestic skilled labor, and so the 
only reason to defect would be the concerns of unskilled labor. 
Under the stag hunt, which is a type of “assurance” game, each state 
may obtain smaller payoffs—in our case, a lower level of gains from 
liberalization—by seeking protection for its own workers, without pro-
viding liberalization for foreign workers, while the other state liberalizes. 
But if states are able to coordinate to forego settling for lower payoffs 
from their own protection in favor of greater payoffs from global mobil-
ity, they will each be better off. Part of these increased payoffs will come 
from increased global output. Cooperation may break down if players 
are uncertain about the preferences and strategy of others. 
 The stag hunt game is derived from a Rousseauvian fable of coop-
eration among hunters (Abbott 1989). Unless all hunters are committed 
to catching the stag, it will escape. Each individual hunter may be 
tempted by a passing rabbit. Each hunter prefers a share of stag to an 
individual portion of rabbit, but is uncertain about whether other hunt-
ers are sufficiently committed to capturing stag. Figure 4.3 shows the 
analogy to international migration policy: each state prefers its share of 
global liberalization of migration (stag), but may be distracted by the 
opportunity to obtain local protection (rabbit), especially if it is unsure 
of the commitment of other states.
In international legal or organizational terms, compared to a pris-
oner’s dilemma context, a stag hunt context may require a lesser level 
of international legal inducements to compliance because each player’s 
best strategy is to cooperate in global liberalization. Sufficient clarity re-
garding the definition of the cooperative behavior, monitoring to ensure 
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compliance, and modest penalties should be sufficient. Note that 
we are assuming symmetry of preferences: no player actually prefers 
protection. However, Sandler (2008) shows that as the number of play-
ers increases, depending on whether gains are dependent on uniform 
compliance, coordination can become quite difficult.
Externalities. I have assumed no labor market externalities in 
this model—no benefits that accrue more broadly than to the specific
groups named. However, if skilled labor is scarce (even where unskilled 
labor is also scarce) and brings positive fiscal growth or other exter-
nalities, while unskilled labor brings negative externalities, this game 
could be transformed into a prisoner’s dilemma (illustrated in Figure 
4.1) between governments seeking to attract and retain skilled labor, 
depending on the magnitude of the effects and how the political con-
stituencies influence government decisions. Given positive externalities 
of this type, states would compete to attract skilled labor. There is evi-
dence that increasing numbers of wealthy states see themselves in such 
competition for skilled labor. International agreements might be used to 
resolve the prisoner’s dilemma (to change the payoff structure so that it 
is a different game), assuming that the aggregate payoffs from coopera-
tion exceed the aggregate payoffs from defection.  
a symmetric l abor Markets with Equal Productivity: a  Prisoner’s 
d ilemma or “bully” g ame
Now, assume that domestic labor and foreign labor are asymmetric 
in skill level: labor in State A is largely high skilled, while labor in State 
B is largely low skilled. 
Under this assumed asymmetry, as contrasted with schematic (1), 
there are significant gains from trade: aggregate welfare in each of State 
A and State B can be increased by reciprocal liberalization (see Figure 
4.3). This is an important part of each government’s utility function, 
and may help to induce the government to enter into international legal 
commitments to unlock this welfare increase. In Table 4.2, I summarize 
a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different broad groups 
under this condition of labor market asymmetry, assuming equal pro-
ductivity across markets.
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Table 4.2  a symmetric l abor Markets with Equal Productivity
Scarce labor Abundant labor Capital Consumers
No reciprocity Strongly 
opposed to 
liberalization
Weakly in favor 
of liberalization
Strongly in favor 
of liberalization





Strongly in favor Still strongly 
in favor but 
reciprocity may 
reduce returns due 
to emigration
Weakly in favor 
(dispersed)
s carce labor factor opposes liberalization. Given that these states 
have asymmetric labor markets, under Heckscher-Ohlin, mobility (if 
made available without selectivity between classes of labor) is likely 
to benefit skilled labor in State A, and unskilled labor in State B, and 
conversely, is likely to harm unskilled labor in State A and skilled labor 
in State B.17 Actual positions, here and in connection with other factors, 
would depend on cross-elasticities of substitution among the various 
factors of production. Therefore, we would expect unskilled labor in 
State A to oppose liberalization, while skilled labor in State B opposes 
liberalization.
c apital strongly supports liberalization. Besides the migrants 
themselves, capital is the main beneficiary of liberalization of immi-
gration. Here, under asymmetry, there are greater cross-country price 
differences, strengthening capital’s support for liberalization. 
c onsumers weakly support liberalization. Except to the extent 
that they compete with immigrants for consumption opportunities, con-
sumers would be likely to benefit in welfare terms from immigration. 
Here, under asymmetry, there are greater cross-country price differ-
ences, strengthening consumer support for liberalization. However, as 
in trade, consumers are not well-organized to articulate this preference 
in destination country politics. 
a bundant labor factor weakly supports liberalization. Abundant 
labor may benefit from liberalization by virtue of increased immigra-
tion of complementary types of workers. These complementary workers 
may increase the returns to the abundant types of workers. These are not 
powerful incentives to advocate liberalization. 
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a bundant labor factor seeks mobility—a basis for reciproca-
tion. As in the symmetric case, however, the abundant factor believes 
that it would benefit from its own international mobility, allowing its 
workers to emigrate to where they are scarce, in search of higher prices. 
This benefit gives plentiful labor an added incentive to seek foreign 
liberalization, as discussed above. 
Thus, the added possibility of reciprocal foreign liberalization in-
duces the formation of a coalition among capital, the abundant labor 
factor, and consumers to overcome the scarce labor factor’s opposition 
to liberalization of immigration. 
However, note that while capital supports liberalization of immi-
gration at home, it is less likely to support increased emigration by 
virtue of liberalization of immigration abroad, at least with respect 
to scarce labor factors. So, we would expect to see some diversity of 
position within capital: some employers would benefit from increased 
immigration, while others would be harmed by increased emigration. 
Thus, unselective reciprocal liberalization may actually reduce capital’s 
support. Selective reciprocal liberalization—by which the partner state 
liberalizes its immigration policy only with respect to factors abundant 
in the first state—would help to overcome this problem.
c ooperation game. Under these circumstances, each state would 
generally have strong interests in liberalization by the other state, but 
would prefer—in terms of political contributions and votes from scarce 
labor—to avoid its own liberalization. This strategic setting may give 
rise to a prisoner’s dilemma–type situation, in which each state is best 
off protecting while the other state liberalizes, but both states are better 
off if both liberalize than if both protect (see Figure 4.1). 
In this asymmetric schematic, international legal rules could play 
a role in migration similar to that described above with respect to in-
ternational legal rules in trade (see Figure 4.2): international legal rules 
could be entered into by states in order to resolve the prisoner’s di-
lemma, allowing states to achieve greater welfare. 
Note the difference between the role of international legal rules in 
schematic (1) and the role described here in the context of schematic 
(2). Schematic (1) involved principally a coordination game, in which 
international legal rules are useful in order to provide a focal point, but 
each player has incentives to cooperate. Schematic (2), on the other 
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hand, involves a prisoner’s dilemma in which each party has an in-
centive to play a strategy that would confer harm on the other party. 
However, sufficiently strong international legal rules, changing the pay-
offs so that states comply, may restrain this behavior. 
A reciprocal agreement to liberalize would create increased sur-
plus, possibly allowing government to utilize this surplus to redistribute 
to those harmed (the scarce factor). Arrangements within each state in 
order to compensate previously scarce labor for the loss of its market 
power may be necessary to induce agreement. If the gains accrue largely 
to capital, it may be appropriate to tax capital in order to acquire funds 
to provide adjustment assistance. If the gains accrue largely to migrants, 
which is likely, it may be useful to impose some type of charge or tax on 
migrants in order to capture a sufficient portion of the surplus to be able 
to provide adjustment assistance (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 382). 
If these domestic institutional arrangements could be made, a wider 
range of reciprocal commitments to liberalize would become feasible. 
Externalities. Alternatively, if skilled labor brings sufficient posi-
tive fiscal growth or other externalities while unskilled labor brings 
sufficient negative externalities, this game could be transformed into a 
“bully” game between governments, depending on the magnitude of the 
effects and how the political constituencies influence government deci-
sions. In this “bully” game, the state that has abundant high-skilled labor 
may have little incentive to liberalize reciprocally, in order to encourage 
outflows of high-skilled labor in exchange for inflows of low-skilled 
labor, particularly if it will have to compensate its low-skilled labor for 
its losses.
Note that protection by State A with liberalization by State B is not 
only State A’s dominant strategy, but it is also the efficien  outcome of 
this game: it maximizes the joint payoffs. State A’s payoffs from protec-
tion are derived from its ability to avoid harm to its unskilled labor, and 
its ability to avoid loss of skilled labor where State B also protects. State 
B does not have a dominant strategy, but if State B understands State 
A’s dominant strategy to protect, it can increase its payoff from 0 to 1 
by playing “liberalize” while State A protects. Assuming that State A 
understands State B’s dilemma, it will simply protect. This strategic set-
ting may describe the typical relationship between developed countries 
and developing countries. It is not attractive to developing countries 
from a distributive standpoint. 
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a symmetric l abor Markets, with Mobile c apital/o ffshoring or 
Illegal Immigration 
In the prior schematics, capital has not played a decisive role, in part 
because it is not allied with labor, as it often is in the trade context. Yet 
offshoring or illegal immigration may give capital a further source of 
power that is not necessarily dependent on affirmative government ac-
tion.18 The ability to offshore, or to hire illegal immigrants, reduces the 
benefits of protection to scarce labor, thereby reducing its opposition to 
legal immigration. Indeed, as suggested above, simple liberalization of 
trade in goods or services plays a similar role. However, greater capital 
mobility and greater access to illegal immigrants will reduce the returns 
to capital from liberalization of immigration, reducing its support for 
formal liberalization. 
“That immigration and trade are substitute ways to obtain the same 
output suggests that changes in the number of immigrants will have 
less effect on native incomes in the presence of relatively free trade 
than they otherwise would” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 147). This 
is a critical point, as it suggests that resistance to immigration may be 
reduced as trade in goods and services is liberalized. While this prop-
osition depends on whether migration and trade are complements or 
substitutes, the threat value of offshoring might persist even where they 
are complements. Perhaps this point helps to account for the ability of 
the EU to engage in extensive liberalization of labor movement, and 
suggests that multilateral liberalization of markets for goods, services, 
and investment will facilitate, and yet render less valuable, liberaliza-
tion of labor movement. For further discussion, see Chapters 2 and 9. 
Interestingly, globalization in one factor supports globalization in other 
factors by reducing the returns to protection. In Table 4.3, I summarize 
a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different broad groups 
under this condition of labor market asymmetry, with the possibility of 
offshoring or illegal immigration.
Thus, workers and their unions must recognize the alternatives 
available to them and their opponents as they decide what policy to 
support. Technological or institutional change that makes it possible to 
offshore jobs to developing countries with lower wages is analytically 
similar, assuming free trade in the products of this work, to a policy 
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Table 4.3  a symmetric l abor Markets, with Mobile c apital/o ffshoring        
or Illegal Immigration (Position of c ountry of Immigration)
Scarce labor Abundant labor Capital Consumers
No reciprocity Weaker 
opposition
Weakly in  
favor of 
liberalization










due to emigration, 
reducing support
Weakly in favor
change relaxing restrictions on immigration (Jain, Kapur, and Mukand
2006). For example, U.S. farmers are increasingly shifting production 
to Mexico in order to overcome barriers to immigration in the United 
States.19 
This type of change would ordinarily benefit owners of firms and 
complementary inputs, including complementary workers, while hurt-
ing those whose work it replaces. With declining trade protection, 
increasing liberalization of foreign investment, and technological 
advances, offshoring must be understood as a growing strategic alter-
native available to firms. It may be that in some contexts, support for 
relaxation of formal immigration controls is a superior alternative from 
the standpoint of unions, compared to the default alternative of allow-
ing offshoring. 
Furthermore, if illiberal formal migration policies will result in 
greater informal migration, with unorganized and vulnerable illegal im-
migrants competing with organized labor in the destination state, then 
organized labor might find some attraction in managed formal migration 
(Watts 2002).20 Watts suggests that labor unions may form a coalition 
with employers in favor of legal immigration. 
In an asymmetric context, offshoring or illegal immigration may 
reduce the value to domestic scarce labor of blocking formal liberaliza-
tion of immigration. Under these circumstances, domestic labor may 
determine to support increased formal migration, as legal immigrants 
might join unions and would be subject to destination country cost 
structures, resulting in less competitive pressure than under the alterna-
tives. Thus, offshoring and illegal immigration would tend to promote 
greater permission from labor for formal migration to the wealthy state. 
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On the other hand, these same factors of capital mobility or offshoring, 
or illegal immigration, may reduce the returns to capital from liberaliza-
tion of migration. 
a symmetric o ne-Way Flow with c ompensation
Despite the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
there is some reason to believe that for citizens of popular destina-
tion states, there may not be great interest in migration to the typical 
sending states. As suggested above (Trefler 1993, 1998), under some 
circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers may flow toward the 
high-skilled country—the wealthy country (Hanson 2007, p. 14). “This 
is, of course, what happens in the real world, suggesting that richer 
countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor countries, and 
that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that 
matter trade patterns and factor flows” (Markusen 1983). In Table 4.4, 
I summarize a stylized conjecture as to the likely positions of different 
broad groups under this condition of labor market asymmetry, assum-
ing unequal productivity across markets.
Table 4.4  a symmetric o ne-Way Flow: u nequal Productivity (Position of 










Strongly in favor 
of liberalization
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a bundant skilled labor in s tate a  does not support reciproc-
ity. I assume here that the skilled labor in the skilled labor–abundant 
country is not interested in migrating to the unskilled labor–abundant 
country because the wages are substantially lower. Therefore, it is not 
valuable to State A’s abundant skilled labor to secure liberalization by 
State B, so State A labor does not support liberalization by State A, and 
reciprocity within the migration field is not appealing.
c apital supports liberalization. Under circumstances of asymme-
try, capital is strongly in favor of liberalization. However, as in the prior 
schematics, I assume that State A capital is not sufficientl  powerful by 
itself to procure a policy of liberalization. 
bully game. State A’s dominant strategy will likely be to protect, 
and it will protect unless some other arrangements are made to induce 
a different move by State A. The payoffs may be similar to the Bully 
Game scenario described in connection with the externalities variation 
of schematic (2) above. Thus, the question is whether State A constitu-
encies could be given increased incentives to support liberalization, in 
order to unlock an expected global welfare increase from liberalized 
migration. Figure 4.4 illustrates the Bully Game.
s ide payments or linkage. Although a side payment might re-
sult in an efficient solution, it might also be unappealing for State B to 
make financia  compensation to State A. However, it is possible that if, 
for example, State B were willing to liberalize in relevant high value- 
added services sectors, under the GATS, State A capital might find this 
opportunity valuable, and State A skilled labor might benefit from op-
portunities to be employed or otherwise to provide services to State B. 
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A similar type of side payment or linkage could arise from investment 
liberalization in State B, providing opportunities for State A capital and 
State A skilled labor. 
This provides an argument for cross-sectoral linkage, by which two 
efficient policy changes that do not have the political support to be ef-
fected alone, may be viable together under linkage. This is similar to 
what is believed to have happened within the trade field, where mer-
cantilism balances mercantilism. In fact, now that wealthy states have 
few tariff barriers, while developing states still have substantial tariff 
barriers, the outlines of a “grand bargain” toward a virtuous cycle of 
efficiency may be identified: wealthy states allow greater immigration 
of skilled and unskilled workers, perhaps also agreeing to enforce a 
Bhagwati tax, while poor states reduce tariffs and barriers to investment 
and high value-added services. 
Migration fee or bhagwati tax. Another alternative or additional 
type of “side payment” is to allow State A to achieve compensation by 
imposing a special fee or tax on immigrants (Clarke 1994; Freeman 
2006). 
Because most of the gains from immigration accrue to the immi-
grants rather than to the residents of destination countries . . . there 
is little incentive for destination countries to ease immigration re-
strictions. The only way I can think of to increase the receptivity 
of destination countries to accept more immigrants would be to 
redistribute the benefits of immigration so that a greater share of 
the benefits flow to natives and a lower share of the benefits to im-
migrants. The “radically economic” policy here would be to use 
the price system to equilibrate the market for immigrants rather 
than to ration entry. An immigrant receiving country could charge 
admission fees or auction immigration visas or place special taxes 
on immigrants, and use those funds to redistribute the gains from 
immigration to existing citizens. (Freeman 2006, p. 165)
Thus, the institutional capacity of home and destination states to 
jointly charge a migration fee might allow them to enjoy a greater por-
tion of the surplus from migration. This capacity might transform the 
payoff structure of the migration schematic into more of a collective 
action problem between states, with greater incentives for coopera-
tion. Of course, the problem with a migration fee alone is that it would 
not necessarily provide incentives for any particular political group to 
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lobby for liberalization of immigration. So, the migration fee might be 
used to fund adjustment assistance in the destination state, and perhaps 
development assistance in the home state. 
Any proposal of a special fee or tax on immigrants would have to 
separate itself from the stigma associated with the early twentieth cen-
tury “head taxes” imposed by the United States and Canada in order to 
deter Chinese immigration. 
oT h Er F ac Tors In Flu Enc Ing dE s TIna TIon 
c oun Tr y  Pol ITIcs
As we develop a political economy model of migration, it is useful 
to examine some of the historical experience, as a source of data regard-
ing determinants of national policy beyond the economic welfare-based 
factors discussed above. While the factors discussed here would add 
too much complexity for it to be practical to include them in the simple 
schematics developed above, they may affect policy in any particular 
state.21 Furthermore, they suggest some of the concerns that may be 
raised in connection with proposals for legal agreements to liberalize 
migration, and some of the possible legal solutions to these concerns. 
Given the possible divergence in the way the various parameters that 
influence policy may arise in different countries, we would expect some 
diversity in perspective across countries and across sectors. Different 
perspectives may arise because states have idiosyncratic approaches to 
policy making, or because specific situational or historical factors in the 
experience of specific countries have a distinct effect on current policy 
(Freeman 2006). In addition to the economic factors discussed above, 
we must recognize that cultural, ethnic, religious, nationalist, and other 
factors may play a role, whether legitimate or illegitimate, in the na-
tional politics of immigration. Ethnic groups may play a role in limiting 
migration from some areas, and promoting migration from other areas. 
However, Meyers (2004, p. 173) finds “extraordinary” similarity 
among destination states in immigration policy for over a century. He 
shows that immigration policy moved in broad synchronization for the 
major destination states from the 1770s to the present. He argues that 
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“the main reason for the similarities among the immigration control 
policies of the major receiving countries is the international interde-
pendence between the socioeconomic and foreign policy factors that 
produce these policies” (p. 181). On the other hand, he sees greater 
room for diversity of policy in connection with “structural factors” and 
preferences over permanent versus temporary migration. The structural 
factors include the economic structure of the country, the geopolitical 
position of the country, and the population density of the country. 
Hatton and Williamson (2006, p. 24) find that “today, country 
differences in anti-immigration opinion are driven by: the scale of immi-
gration, which represents the labor market threat; the size of the welfare 
state, which represents the potential welfare burden; and the univer-
sal franchise, which assures that those concerns are reflected in tough 
immigration policies.” They argue that public opinion would be much 
more negative if immigration policies were more liberal. However, they 
also find that today’s median voter is no longer unskilled, accounting 
for the fact that immigration policies are not even tougher than they are. 
Note that the driving forces that Hatton and Williamson identify are es-
sentially economic forces, as mediated by political processes. 
backlash 
In the early nineteenth century, long distances, high transport costs, 
and poverty at home formed natural barriers limiting emigration from 
poorer countries, or even emigration from wealthy countries by poorer 
individuals. As poverty and transportation costs decreased, more poor 
began to emigrate. 
In the United States, after the unprecedented immigration of the 
nineteenth century, there was a backlash that resulted in the head taxes, 
the Chinese exclusion acts, and other measures to restrict immigration 
(O’Rourke 2004, p. 15). When the United States began to restrict ac-
cess, it was in response to the concerns of the unskilled or semiskilled 
urban working man median U.S. voter (Hatton and Williamson 2006). 
O’Rourke (2004, p. 17) concludes that the “big political lesson from 
the period is . . . that immigration can be hard to sustain politically.” 
“Moreover, the basic factor leading to the nineteenth century anti- 
immigration backlash—the impact of immigration on wages—is present 
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in today’s world as well.” As detailed in Chapter 2, there is a continu-
ing debate regarding the empirical support for the latter proposition. 
Perhaps the most important point for purposes of this chapter is that the 
link between immigration and wage suppression has significant politi-
cal traction, if not clear empirical support. 
Freeman (1995, p. 886) posits a political, as opposed to economic, 
rationale for cyclicality in political attitudes toward migration. The po-
litical cycle is caused by the growth of opposition over the life of a 
natural immigration cycle. Waves of immigrants give rise to political 
opposition after they have been present long enough to have substantial 
effects. This political cycle may or may not be synchronous with the 
economic cycle. 
r ecession and s capegoating
Furthermore, by virtue of vulnerability to scapegoating in connec-
tion with wage declines, migration policy is likely to be cyclical, with 
greater openness during good times, and reduced openness during bad 
times (Meyers 2004). Immigrants may be blamed for the effects of re-
cessions that arise from other causes. 
Meyers (2004) uses a comparative case study method examining the 
history of immigration policy in the United States, Britain, Germany, 
and the Netherlands to evaluate a number of hypotheses regarding the 
cause of migration policy. He finds that, largely through an interest 
group causal channel, and partly through partisan politics, recessions 
cause a restrictive policy, while expansions cause liberalization. For 
example, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States 
moved to restrict immigration. Perhaps one reason for this phenomenon 
is that the coalition of employers would not be interested in further im-
migration in the midst of an economic recession, when labor is plentiful 
and cheap. Presumably, labor would be especially reluctant to allow 
entry of additional workers during a recession, and politicians would be 
especially sensitive to these concerns. 
The western European states have served as laboratories for tem-
porary migration, which was heralded as providing the “allocational” 
benefits of migration without the “distributional” costs (Freeman 1995, 
p. 891, citing Straubhaar 1992). Prompted by recession in the 1970s, 
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European public opinion was stimulated and European citizens orga-
nized, providing an effective counter to proimmigration forces. 
The observation (Meyers 2004) that recessions lead to restrictions 
may suggest either a safeguard or a sliding scale approach to liberaliza-
tion commitments that states may make in the future. Note that this 
political cause is not dependent on an economic finding of causation 
by immigration either of recession or of wage reduction. It thus may 
(or may not) be consistent with a demagogic or mistaken view of the 
factual relation between immigration and recession. 
Income Inequality
In economic theory, immigration may accentuate income inequal-
ity. An increase in the labor supply reduces wages relative to returns to 
capital and rents on land. “Since capital and land are held by those at 
the top of the distribution pyramid, immigration-induced labor supply 
growth should create more inequality, and the demise of immigra-
tion should create less, ceteris paribus” (Hatton and Williamson 2005, 
p. 192).
In connection with immigration policy in the United States, Can-
ada, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from 1850 to 1930, Timmer and 
Williamson (1998) show a significant relationship between income in-
equality and increasing barriers to immigration. O’Rourke and Sinnott 
(2002, p. 16) argue that “The late nineteenth century experience indi-
cates that absent international institutions which can restrain individual 
countries’ policies, globalization can undermine itself. Labor market 
integration undermined itself by increasing income inequality in the 
New World, which in turn led to immigration barriers.” 
During the late nineteenth century, “immigration restrictions ap-
pear to have been motivated by economic concerns, and in particular by 
fears that the immigration of unskilled workers would lead to increased 
levels of inequality” (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002, p. 28). Consistent 
with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, unskilled workers moved from Europe 
to the “new world” (where unskilled workers were relatively scarce), 
reducing wages of unskilled workers in the new world. “It was this fact 
above all else which prompted immigration restrictions in the decades 
leading up to the Great War” (p. 29). 
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This research suggests that in order for liberalization to be sustain-
able, it should be combined with mechanisms that reduce or stabilize 
income inequality. It would be innovative for international legal rules to 
provide for this type of mechanism directly, but a variety of adjustment 
or aid mechanisms could serve this purpose. 
n ational h istory and Foundational Experience
Freeman links divergent immigration politics to particular immigra-
tion histories, dividing destination states into three main subsets, each 
with distinct modes of immigration politics: 1) English-speaking settler 
societies, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States; 2) western European states, including Germany, France, Britain, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium, and 3) southern 
European states, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece (Freeman 
1995). 
Meyers (2004) suggests that “English speaking settler societies” 
tend to favor large-scale permanent migration, while “ethnic societies” 
(European societies) tend to prefer temporary migration. For the English- 
speaking settler societies, immigration is part of their foundational pe-
riods and “folklore.” In these countries, however, polling data does not 
support larger intakes of immigration, but only maintenance or reduc-
tion of immigrant numbers (Freeman 1995, p. 887). 
The western European states mentioned above are distinguished, 
according to Freeman, by the fact that their modern experience of mass 
immigration occurred after they were already fully developed states, 
and after the Second World War. This migration was “narrowly eco-
nomic,” and for some states was a result of their colonial history. When 
migrants were welcomed or recruited, it was as a necessary measure to 
meet postwar labor needs. “The politics of immigration in these states 
today is haunted by the mistakes, failures, and unforeseen consequences 
of the guestworker era and by the social conflicts associated with the 
new ethnic minorities created during that time” (Freeman 1995, p. 890). 
These states are much less positive toward immigration (although we 
must note that these states have all subscribed to broadly free migration 
within the context of, and among the states of, the EU). 
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Ethnicity, n ationalism, and c hauvinism
As we consider the political economy of migration, it is not possible 
to ignore the noneconomic politics of immigration. Heterogeneous soci-
eties are more likely to accept dissimilar immigrants than homogeneous 
societies, such as Japan. While Meyers (2004) finds that migration pol-
icy is largely determined by the state of the economy, he also finds, inter 
alia, that large-scale immigration of ethnically, culturally, or racially 
dissimilar people may result in greater resistance to immigration. 
This could be explained in terms of racism or ethnocentrism, or 
irredentism, although Meyers suggests a less unattractive possible ratio-
nale in terms of maintaining existing bloc political power. For example, 
the German and Irish waves of immigration to the United States in the 
middle of the nineteenth century provoked anti-immigrant sentiment in 
part due to concerns about the values of Catholicism and their consis-
tency with individual freedom, and in part due to concerns regarding 
European radicalism (Meyers 2004, pp. 29–30). Another benevolent 
explanation may be that there are benefits to broad agreement on gover-
nance and on the types of public goods that will be provided; increased 
diversity could result in less efficient production of public goods.
During the late twentieth century, the United States and other des-
tination countries began to eliminate ethnic discrimination, which had 
served as a proxy for economic discrimination. Hatton and Williamson 
(2006, p. 9) conclude that “immigration policy is much tougher now 
than a century ago simply because there are far more potential immi-
grants from poor countries to keep out.” 
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) examine international survey evi-
dence, and find that noneconomic factors such as patriotism and 
chauvinism (the sense that locals are “better” than immigrants) play a 
major role in determining attitudes of voters, and that individual views 
relate to individual skill levels in a manner consistent with Heckscher-
Ohlin theory. They find that patriotism and chauvinism are significant
factors in hostile attitudes toward immigration during the modern pe-
riod, while economic factors remain important. 
While in a number of European countries, right-wing parties have 
adopted chauvinistic positions and have attracted substantial support 
at times, they generally have not been able to convert their positions 
Job Name: -- /309724t
158   Trachtman
to policy. Examples include Le Pen’s National Front party in France, 
Fortuyn’s eponymous party in the Netherlands, and Haider’s Freedom 
Party in Austria. Freeman warns that “their general failure is more the 
result of their extreme positions than an indicator that the alarms they 
raise about immigration fail to touch profound chords within mass pub-
lics” (Freeman 1995, p. 885). Indeed, in the 2008 U.S. election cycle, 
opposition to immigration has achieved a great deal of political sa-
lience. Xenophobia of the right, and sometimes of the left, is not fully 
explained by economic factors. 
In the trade context, we have seen demagogues of both the left and 
of the right attack the loss of local autonomy or the loss of local jobs 
due to adherence to WTO rules, with scant attention to the value of 
the reciprocal benefits and jobs gained (Buchanan 2006). These same 
demagogues, especially those of the right, attack immigrants and immi-
gration with even greater vitriol. Any move toward greater international 
legal commitments in the migration context must include an active pub-
lic education and public relations component in order to counter these 
opportunists. One critical question, in migration as in trade, is whether 
global welfare could be improved by a global research and education 
effort that would lay out the facts regarding migration (and trade) more 
clearly and honestly. 
Determinants of Specific Components of Destinatio  
c ountry Policy
Of course, in addition to the more general factors adduced above, 
government decisions on where to liberalize would depend on several 
factors. These factors would include relative scarcity or abundance of 
workers in particular categories, elasticity of demand for workers in 
these categories, likely effects on wages and employment, relative po-
litical clout of the affected workers, importance of wages to domestic 
employers in the relevant sector, and political clout of the affected em-
ployers (Freeman 1995, 2005; Joppke 1998, p. 266). With respect to 
domestic employers, it is important to recognize that not all businesses 
can appropriately be fully included in this category. Some multinational 
corporations able themselves to arbitrage among labor markets may 
benefit from labor market segmentation, and may prefer barriers to im-
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migration in order to deny their domestic competitors access to cheaper 
labor. Since those barriers would simultaneously provide cheaper labor 
to producers abroad, whether multinational corporations derive a net 
advantage from migration barriers is ambiguous. However, they may de-
rive a more obvious benefit from the efficient allocation of labor among 
countries, which would maximize the return to mobile capital.22
Meyers (2004) seeks to explain how governments decide on 
the number of immigrants they will accept, whether to differentiate 
between various ethnic groups, and whether to favor permanent immi-
gration over migrant workers. We might add to these three dependent 
variables—number of immigrants (size), 2) ethnic selectivity (ethnic 
composition), and 3) permanence versus temporariness—the additional 
dependent variable of 4) skill level (skill composition). Meyers finds
that in practice the size and ethnic composition variables have been 
closely linked because most migrants have been dissimilar in an ethnic 
sense, and most countries applied more liberal policies with respect to 
those who are ethnically similar. 
As suggested above, it is also important to distinguish between 
high-skilled migration and low-skilled migration. Freeman suggests 
that skilled labor recruitment schemes are proliferating across rich de-
mocracies and only provoke modest conflict (Freeman 2005). “The 
recruitment of the highly-skilled [in certain societies] has been suc-
cessfully sold as a cost-free policy that produces substantial, if diffuse, 
benefits for the society in a global economy privileging technology and 
creativity” (p. 238). On the other hand, in the United States, more vigor-
ous interest group politics has developed in this field.
h o ME c oun Tr y  Pol ITIcs
Home country policy seems less critical: most home countries al-
low freedom of emigration, and as we will see in Chapter 5, there are 
international human rights norms that require this freedom. But it is 
important to determine whether and with what level of enthusiasm 
home countries would seek liberalization abroad. Governments would 
consider their tax base, the local effects on domestic wages and em-
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ployment, the local welfare and growth effects of departing workers, 
the magnitude of potential remittances, and the political clout of both 
potential emigrants, and domestic employers. As discussed in Chapter 
2, emigration of skilled labor may have a negative effect on per capita 
income in the sending state under increasing returns to scale (Krugman 
1971, p. 483). Home states may also lose positive externalities from 
human capital. 
Furthermore, home state capital might oppose, or at least be am-
bivalent with respect to, international negotiations to seek liberalization 
of immigration abroad, as increased emigration from the home state 
might reduce returns to capital in the home state. Home state capital 
would presumably prefer selective reciprocity, where foreign states lib-
eralize with respect to immigration of labor sectors that are abundant in 
the home state. 
There is an analogous problem in trade negotiations: exporting 
state consumers may be hurt by liberalization commitments abroad, or 
by reductions of export subsidies abroad. However, in the trade con-
text, this consumer perspective is rarely articulated with force. A similar 
concern felt by capital might be expressed with more force, but there is 
also a collective action problem for capital’s lobbying here. That is, be-
cause labor liberalization is not necessarily sector-specific (unlike trade 
liberalization), no single sector of capital would necessarily have con-
centrated incentives to lobby against requesting foreign liberalization. 
As the greatest benefits of migration accrue to the migrants them-
selves, no political economy account of international migration would 
be complete without evaluating the impact of migrants. However, mi-
grants in this political sense are truly between societies: before they 
migrate, they are not a part of the destination state political community, 
while their hope for migration will, if realized, at least partially or tem-
porarily remove them from the home state political community. 
On the other hand, once they have migrated to the destination state, 
immigrants might not support additional migration. First, there is some 
evidence that the group of destination state workers hurt most by ad-
ditional migration is recent immigrants. Second, recent immigrants 
generally have no financial interest in additional immigration, although 
they may be interested in family reunion–type immigration. Third, re-
cent immigrants may not be politically active or have voting rights in 
their new country. 
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This political “dual outsider” situation of migrants may go a long 
way toward explaining why we see few moves to liberalize migration: 
those who would benefit the most are not full members of either the 
home or the destination state political community. In all, the greater 
political influence of migrants would appear to occur when they are 
potential migrants, prior to their actual departure. This group may also 
have some influence on the sending state after their departure, through 
remittances, diaspora politics, or other mechanisms. 
While few states any longer control emigration, due in part to the 
influence of human rights concerns, the home state has a choice wheth-
er to seek liberalization commitments by destination states, or not. This 
is a source of indirect control. In fact, where the default rule is restric-
tion in the destination state, we might say that destination states seem 
to cooperate with home states in refraining from liberalization of im-
migration. So, for example, Indonesia could theoretically determine to 
seek commitments by the United States to liberalize immigration to the 
United States of unskilled and semiskilled labor, while at the same time 
refraining from requesting the United States to reduce restrictions on 
immigration from Indonesia of software engineers or medical doctors. 
The result is substantively similar to a restriction on emigration. 
In connection with trade in goods, it is relatively unusual to engage 
in tariff harmonization—thus, in connection with goods, we do not see 
narrow reciprocity of commitments within a single sector. Similarly, 
in services, we see little explicit harmonization of liberalization. So, in 
connection with migration, we might expect to see exchanges of diverse 
commitments. For example, the EU might liberalize in connection with 
immigration of nurses in exchange for the Philippines liberalizing in 
connection with immigration of architects. This type of flexibilit , or 
specificit , would allow governments to appease stronger political 
constituencies, and to tailor commitments to maximize local political 
support. 
 But, examined from the standpoint of the home state, as opposed 
to the potential migrants within the home state, and putting aside for 
a moment remittances, potential benefits upon return, and a possible 
Bhagwati tax, there is little for the home state to gain from emigration 
of skilled workers, and the possibility of loss. There are possibly greater 
gains from emigration of unskilled workers. However, it is highly un-
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likely that a wealthy country unskilled worker would migrate to a poor 
country. In contrast to the situation with trade in goods, where trade is 
bilateral, and all states stand to gain on both the import and the export 
side, in migration as it stands today, benefits are not bilateral, in part 
because migration is generally not substantially bidirectional. That is, 
as Hatton (2007) points out, migration of the most important type is not 
a “two-way street.” 
On the other hand, as suggested above, migration between similar 
economies may be much more of a two-way street, and may involve 
the operation of comparative advantage. This suggests that bilateral or 
plurilateral agreements regarding migration, among similar countries, 
may be more likely than agreements between different countries. 
The fact that home states do not generally benefit from emigration 
of skilled workers may help to explain why we do not see international 
legal commitments to liberalize in the migration context: putting aside 
remittances and returns, sending states have little interest in liberaliza-
tion by destination states. In fact, just the opposite: sending states should 
be glad to see restrictions on immigration in the destination states, at 
least as to skilled migration. But these types of restrictions are inconsis-
tent with global welfare and the welfare of migrants. 
How could sending states be given a stake in emigration in order 
to induce them to seek welfare-enhancing liberalization commitments 
by destination states?23 One answer is by facilitating the imposition of 
a Bhagwati tax, or by enhancing the role of remittances or return. In 
addition, perhaps sending states would be interested in commitments 
to admit unskilled workers along with the skilled workers. Perhaps by 
inducing destination states to decline to distinguish between skilled and 
unskilled workers, or to make commitments to admit a specified num-
ber of unskilled workers, home states could see their welfare enhanced 
by liberalization commitments. 
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To Ward a  r a TIonal E For In TErna TIonal  l aW 
o F MIgra TIon
The above analysis suggests that different states will have different 
strategic positions, that different economic sectors within these states 
will have different strategic positions, and even that different occupa-
tional groups will have different strategic positions. Thus, it is clearly 
impossible to specify a single arrangement for international coopera-
tion, or even to predict whether international cooperation will occur. 
However, we know that in the aggregate, liberalization is expected 
to provide increased surplus, and, assuming that there are mechanisms 
that can be devised to overcome the strategic problems that may exist 
between different domestic constituencies, and between different states, 
and that the increased surplus exceeds the cost of its capture, we would 
expect states to move to do so. This book is an exercise in institutional 
imagination intended first to evaluate whether the surplus may exceed 
the cost of its capture, and how states may move to capture it. That they 
have not made these moves generally thus far does not mean that such 
moves are not available: it would be difficult to argue that the interna-
tional legal system as we see it is already efficient. Some may argue 
that capital markets, with their clear pricing, narrow profit motives, and 
numerous transactions, are already efficient, and that therefore, new 
transactions cannot result in profits. However, the international legal 
system is far less efficient, so we may expect that new transactions—of 
the nature described above—could make the parties better off. 
In order to move forward, it will be necessary to analyze different 
states, different sectors within states, and different occupations within 
those sectors in order to understand the strategic position of each. Then, 
once we know what game is being played, we can evaluate which inter-
national legal rules, if any, are useful in order to allow for the maximum 
net payoffs. 
A framework agreement that allows for states to agree on the struc-
ture of reciprocity, to allow sending states to share in the benefits of 
liberalization through a Bhagwati tax or other mechanism, to make side 
payments through linkage to other areas of liberalization, and to make 
side payments through immigration fees, would establish an appropriate 
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institutional framework—would minimize the transaction costs—for 
states to negotiate optimal arrangements. While such a framework 
agreement might best be legally binding, it is possible that it might 
alternatively be best kept informal. In international law, the distinction 
may have only subtle behavioral implications. 
Assuming that liberalization of migration is potentially Pareto 
efficient, it may be that states are unable to achieve the efficient liberal-
ization unless a move is made toward actual Pareto efficiency: toward 
compensation of states and individuals that are otherwise made worse 
off. 
The national political economy of international migration is com-
plex: it mediates imperfectly the welfare considerations developed in 
Chapter 2, and mediates even more imperfectly the ethical consider-
ations developed in Chapter 3. However, even an imprecise assessment 
of the interplay of interest and power yields insights into the possibility 
that international legal rules may play a role in committing other states 
to act, in order to support domestic coalitions that will support liber-
alization. The game theoretic abstractions developed here are merely 
conjectures as to the possible interplay of interest and power, but the 
research discussed in this chapter makes these conjectures plausible. 
n otes
In a liberal democracy, it is possible to define optimal immigration policy as “that 1. 
preferred by the median voter where voters are utility-maximizers with complete 
information” (Freeman 1995, p. 883).
Even under aggregate global benefits, international adjustment assistance may 2. 
compensate losing states for liberalization that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
This is the concept of embedded liberalism first theorized by Karl Polanyi and 3. 
recently extended and popularized by John Ruggie. For a recent example, see 
Scheve and Slaughter (2007). 
“Terms of trade” refers to the relative prices of a state’s imports and exports. 4. 
States may improve their terms of trade, and their welfare, by reducing the price 
of imports relative to exports or increasing the price of exports relative to imports. 
Under this model, international trade agreements are understood to be beneficial
in order to avoid a “beggar thy neighbor” trade war in which states, in a strategic 
prisoner’s dilemma, obtain suboptimal outcomes by imposing terms of trade ex-
ternalities on one another.
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Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2007) thus assume that migration policy can be 5. 
disaggregated into sectoral components. This assumption raises significant ques-
tions regarding the extent to which migration policy is disaggregated into specific
sectoral components. 
Their model, following Grossman and Helpman (1994), does not include the abil-6. 
ity of lobbies to influence voting, except to the extent that this is captured in the 
amount of the lobby’s expenditures. 
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 7. 
The fact that the home state does not protest, and perhaps does not see this state 8. 
of affairs as the imposition of a negative externality, is not necessarily determina-
tive. Many externalities seem “natural” until they are identified and sought to be 
internalized. 
 9. An empirical test might examine the scope of “differential fiscal treatment” in 
different destination states, and compare it to the proportion of legal versus illegal 
immigration in those states. The hypothesis is that the greater the differential fiscal
treatment, the greater the immigration.
10. Below, I suggest that discriminatory taxation of immigrants may, under limited 
circumstances, be useful to promote liberalization, or to reduce transfer program–
motivated migration. 
11. I do not try to model the political economy of the home state, but this would be 
an important exercise in connection with attempts to evaluate the possibility that 
home states would enter into international migration agreements. 
12. Grossman and Helpman (1994) substitute aggregate social welfare for voting. 
They do so partly, it appears, because aggregate social welfare is a proxy for vot-
ing, and partly because they have a hybrid model of government official behavior 
that may partially reflect fidelity to public welfare. In the politics of immigration 
policy, domestic employers would largely deploy political contributions, while 
labor unions could deploy both political contributions and voting. 
13. This set of assumptions seems slightly more pessimistic than the economic reality, 
but it seems to comport with popular opinion regarding the effects of immigration. 
14. Illegal immigration, as opposed to legal immigration, accentuates negative effects 
on labor. Labor prefers legal to illegal immigration, because legal immigration 
maximizes bargaining power of immigrants, allows unionization of immigrants, 
and allows gradualism or regulation of immigration. Therefore, where the alterna-
tive to increased legal immigration is increased illegal immigration, labor may 
support increased legal immigration. On the other hand, increased illegal immi-
gration may be inevitable, and may be accentuated by increased legal immigration, 
and so labor may simply decline to support increased legal immigration. Assume 
that capital’s first-best alternative is increased illegal immigration, and that its 
second-best alternative is increased legal immigration. So far, without introducing 
international arrangements, the political equilibrium may be in equipoise. While 
it is possible that the influence of capital, and the threat of increased illegal immi-
gration, would cause labor to support increased legal immigration, the incentives 
are not great. Labor solidarity may prevent acceptance of increased immigration, 
unless adjustment assistance is provided to compensate those unskilled workers 
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who are made worse off. Furthermore, under uncertainty as to the magnitude and 
distribution of gains, labor may simply determine to maintain the status quo. 
15. In the two-country, symmetrical model I have been assuming, the abundant labor 
factor may not seek mobility, because the other country has a symmetrical labor 
market. 
16. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
17. Hiscox (2002) suggests that highly skilled workers may already have greater mo-
bility across sectors, and therefore may be less concerned about migration. 
18. It may be dependent upon government inaction; that is, offshoring could be pro-
hibited or otherwise deterred. In the 2004 presidential elections in the United 
States, John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, referred to companies that offshored 
as “Benedict Arnold” companies (Rai 2004).
19. Of course, Mexico benefits from free trade in goods under NAFTA, and transport 
costs are relatively low (Preston 2007, p. A:1). 
20. Undocumented workers benefit from fewer labor rights protections than autho-
rized workers or citizens (American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial 
Organizations 2007). 
21. Hollifield (2000, p. 92) states that “economic arguments [in the migration context] 
tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and ideological arguments . . .” He 
finds that migration policy is heavily influenced by national or founding myths, 
codified in citizenship and nationality laws.
22. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
23. In connection with negotiations for the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations, 
the Indian Minister of Commerce, Kamal Nath, insisted that the United States 
should provide a greater number of H-1B visas—should provide greater liberal-
ization as a destination state for migrants (Beattie and Johnson 2007).
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5  
Customary International Law, 
Human Rights Law, and 
Multilateral Migration Conventions
In order to evaluate possible reforms of the international law of eco-
nomic migration, it is necessary to describe the existing international 
law. The core point is simple: despite the argument for a moral obliga-
tion presented in Chapter 3, states generally have no legal obligation to 
accept economic migration of citizens of other states. Furthermore, de-
spite the right to emigrate discussed in this chapter, the right to emigrate 
may be seen as incomplete without a right to immigrate somewhere 
(Ghosh 2007, p. 102). However, other rules are salient to a compre-
hensive approach to economic migration. It is worth emphasizing that 
neither this chapter nor the book deals with forced migration.1 
The existing international law consists of both customary and 
conventional law.2 In this chapter, I describe existing customary interna-
tional law, including customary human rights law relevant to migration. 
I also discuss conventional human rights law relevant to migration, as it 
does not make expository sense to treat conventional human rights law 
separately from customary human rights law in this context. In Chap-
ters 6 and 7, I discuss other existing conventional law of migration.
As we commence our discussion of the international law of mi-
gration, it is appropriate to refer to the Lotus principle: states retain 
sovereign discretion except to the extent that they have accepted interna-
tional legal constraints (Case of the S.S. Lotus 1927). These constraints 
generally arise either by custom or by convention. In the field of labor 
market access, there do not appear to be customary international con-
straints on the discretion of states to exclude foreign persons from their 
domestic labor markets. 
The U.S. Supreme Court said in 1892 that “it is an accepted maxim 
of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as in-
herent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
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entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in 
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe” 
(Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S. 1892).
As a matter of customary international law, this seems to remain 
true, although Plender (1988) argues that this principle does not have the 
long pedigree sometimes asserted.3 In fact, Nafziger (1983) points out 
that in the same year that the U.S. Supreme Court made the statement 
above, the Institute of International Law made a contrary proposal:
Article 6. Free entrance of aliens to the territory of a civilized State 
may not be generally and permanently forbidden except in the 
public interest and for very serious reasons, for example, because 
of fundamental differences in customs or civilization, or because 
of a dangerous organization or gathering of aliens who come in 
great numbers . . .
Article 7. The protection of national labor is not, in itself, a suf-
ficient reason for non-admission . . 
Article 12. Entrance to a country may be forbidden to any alien 
individual in a condition of vagabondage or beggary, or suffering 
from a malady liable to endanger the public health, or strongly 
suspected of serious offenses committed abroad against the life or 
health of human beings or against public property or faith, as well 
as to aliens who have been convicted of the said offenses.4
While there may be a growing custom of admission for tourism, 
commerce, investment, or other temporary purposes, or even of admis-
sion for refugees, this is not the concern of this study. (Furthermore, in 
most cases, the question of whether this custom is supported by opinio 
juris, and is therefore customary international law, would likely be an-
swered in the negative.) This study is concerned with international law 
of migration for labor purposes, and it seems fairly clear today that 
there is no customary international law rule requiring states to provide 
access to their labor markets. However, it is worthwhile to review other 
relevant customary international law rules, including possible rules of 
access and egress for nationals, residents, and aliens, as they may have 
important effects on labor migration. 
Of course, while the customary international law of international 
migration still does not seem to establish any obligation on the part of 
states to accept immigrant workers, it is entirely possible that states 
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would enter into new customary or conventional commitments to ac-
cept these immigrants. The reasons why states may turn from a policy 
of remaining unbound to a policy of accepting commitments are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this work. 
The main relevant principle of customary international law today 
seems to be one of national discretion in determining the entry of aliens, 
subject to the possibility of treaty or other modification  (Aleinikoff 
2003, p. 3). There is greater treaty- and custom-based regulation of na-
tional discretion regarding entry of nationals, and exit of both aliens and 
nationals.5 During the nineteenth century, on the other hand, state prac-
tice differed, with individuals unrestricted in their movements (Nafziger 
1983; Sohn and Buergenthal 1992, p. 3). 
There seems to be some argument that the right to be free of arbi-
trary restrictions on departure is part of customary international law. Of 
course, it is also expressed in human rights instruments, such as Article 
13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.6 
Cust o Ma Ry  Inte Rna t Iona L Law  and Hu Man  
RIg Hts La w
In this section, I discuss rights of migrants derived from customary 
international law and from human rights law. In subsequent sections, I 
examine rights under ILO treaties and under the UN Migrant Workers 
Convention.
Citizenship and n aturalization
Importantly, there do not seem to be substantial legal limits on the 
authority of states to determine which individuals are or become citi-
zens.7 States may use the principle of jus soli or jus sanguinis. Thus, it 
is possible for states to determine to deny citizenship to children of im-
migrants born within the state (on the basis of jus sanguinis). 
Given general state autonomy in determining nationality, on varying 
bases, it is possible for individuals to become stateless, or to intention-
ally or inadvertently become citizens of multiple states (Martin and 
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Hailbronner 2003). To the extent that individuals are subjected to tax, 
military service, or other obligations by multiple states, migration or 
other actions that may result in multiple nationality will be deterred. 
The European Convention on Nationality (ECN) states that in-
dividuals shall only be obligated to perform military service for one 
state.  Hailbronner suggests that the primary obligation of dual nation-
als should be to the country of habitual residence (Hailbronner 2003, 
p. 81). Another possible disadvantage for multiple nationals is the pos-
sibility that diplomatic protection may be unavailable against a state of 
which the individual is a national. 
For long-term migrants and their children, acquisition of host coun-
try citizenship may be an important attraction and protection. While 
customary international law of citizenship per se does not accord any 
right to become a citizen, it may be argued that human rights law pro-
vides some limited rights (Orentlicher 1998; Zilbershats 2002). 
Of course, conventional law may provide rights to citizenship. 
For example, the ECN provides that each state party “shall provide 
in its internal law for the possibility of naturalisation of persons law-
fully and habitually resident on its territory” (European Convention on 
Nationality 1997). While the ECN permits states to set conditions for 
naturalization, they may not require residence longer than 10 years. 
Many destination states have experienced the truth of Max Frisch’s 
words quoted at the beginning of this book: “We imported workers and 
got men instead” (Borjas 2007).
d iscrimination in a dmission
While there are extensive international human rights protections 
against discrimination, these protections do not necessarily guard 
against discrimination in admission policy. Generally, of course, there 
is no obligation in customary international law or in human rights law 
to treat foreign persons as well as nationals in connection with admis-
sion: nationals generally have a right to admission to their home state. 
Other types of discrimination in connection with admission may raise 
issues under human rights law. 
Some have argued that states must come forward with a plausible 
justification for distinctions among foreign persons (Martin 2003, p. 
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35; Sohn and Buergenthal 1992, p. 18). Explicit racial discrimination 
is thought to violate international human rights law, while nationality-
based discrimination does not (Martin 2003, p. 35). The latter principle 
is important: otherwise human rights law would supply a rule of most 
favored nation (MFN) nondiscriminatory treatment in connection with 
immigration. 
For example, in the East African Asians Case (Patel and Others v. 
U.K. [1971]), the European Commission on Human Rights found that 
the United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 discrimi-
nated against immigrants on the basis of race, violating Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 3 does not expressly 
address discrimination, but it prohibits degrading treatment. 
In Chapter 9, I discuss the potential application of the MFN prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination to immigration. This principle is central to 
the trade context, as it allows the operation of comparative advantage 
among states. Most favored nation would seem to play a similar role in 
labor markets, allowing the operation of comparative advantage among 
nationals of states. Furthermore, MFN may be supported by ethical 
principles of nondiscrimination. 
Postadmission d iscrimination and Minimum s tandard
Discrimination inevitably involves a comparison of treatment. In 
the present context, there are two relevant references for comparison: 
citizens and other immigrants from different home countries. As sug-
gested above, the two corresponding types of antidiscrimination rule 
are national treatment and MFN treatment. As stated above, it is clear 
that foreign persons do not benefit from national treatment in connec-
tion with admission, meaning that foreign persons have no customary 
international law or human rights law–based right of entry. However, 
once they have been permitted entry, they are entitled to a certain level 
of treatment. 
While, as set forth above, states may not have substantial general 
international law obligations to admit aliens, much of the general cus-
tomary and conventional international law of human rights applies to 
aliens in a host state (Hailbronner 2003; United Nations Human Rights 
Committee 2000). For example, the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to “all individuals within [a State 
Party’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” “With narrow excep-
tions relating to citizens’ rights to political participation and exemption 
from immigration measures, the denial or limitation of migrants’ hu-
man rights must be justified as serving legitimate state aims pursuant 
to measures that are proportionately linked to their migration status” 
(Fitzpatrick 2003).
In addition, of course, aliens may enjoy certain additional rights be-
yond those available to citizens. For example, aliens may benefit from 
bilateral investment treaties, while citizens may not. 
e xpulsion and Return
Under general international law, states seem to have wide discretion 
to accept or expel aliens. For example, Article 13 of the ICCPR requires 
that expulsion be decided in accordance with law and minimal pro-
cedural requirements.8 The grounds for individual expulsion asserted 
by states have generally not been economic. However, it is difficult to 
say that a rule of customary international law prohibiting expulsion on 
economic grounds has developed. 
There seems to be little consensus that states are required by cus-
tomary international law to accept the return of their citizens. To some 
extent, this debate was colored by the Cold War, in which the Soviet 
Union sought to deter emigration by blocking the return of those who left 
without permission. It is often argued that the customary international 
law obligation to accept return is a corollary of the customary interna-
tional law right of a host state to remove nonnationals (Noll 2003).
In some cases, states have entered into bilateral agreements regard-
ing readmission of returned citizens. These agreements may distinguish 
between voluntary returnees and involuntary ones. Further, some home 
states have conditioned acceptance on development or adjustment as-
sistance, in order to be able to deal with the economic consequences of 
large numbers of returnees (Noll 2003, p. 67). 
t he Right to e migrate 
A number of human rights instruments specify a right to leave for 
both nationals of the host state and aliens. Indeed, Article 13(2) of the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies that “Everyone has 
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.” The ICCPR specifies a right to leave in Article 12, subject to 
exceptions that are provided by law, are necessary to protect national 
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in that convention. 
The right to leave includes both the right to travel abroad temporar-
ily, and the right to emigrate for a more indefinite period (Chetail 2003, 
pp. 47, 54). In this work, we are more interested in the latter—the “right 
to emigrate.” While most of this study is concerned with limitations on 
entry to the host state—the right to immigrate—there are important rea-
sons to pay attention to limitations on exit from the home state. 
In its General Comment No. 27, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (1999, para. 8) suggests that home states are prohibited to 
make freedom to emigrate “dependent on any specific purpose or on 
the period of time the individual chooses to stay outside the country . . . 
Likewise, the right of the individual to determine the state of destina-
tion is part of the legal guarantee.” The Human Rights Committee also 
suggests that the right to leave includes the right to obtain necessary 
travel documents (para. 9). 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 
2006, p. 56) reports that 
in Asian labour-sending countries, however, there exist a varying 
range of exit controls as part of protection measures. In the Philip-
pines, for example, it is mandatory for migrant workers to have 
[Philippines Overseas Employment Administration] clearance be-
fore leaving the country. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia have 
varying degrees of restrictions on female migrant workers leaving 
the country. In India, emigration clearance is required for certain 
blue-collar occupations. 
It is worth noting that the Philippines Overseas Employment Ad-
ministration plays a role in ensuring the protection of migrating workers, 
but also charges them a significant fee.
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Inte Rna t Ion a L Labo R o Rgan Iza t Ion  
(ILo ) Convent Ions
While each ILO convention provides rights for migrants (Sivaku-
maran 2004, p. 120), two of them focus directly on migrant workers. 
These are the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (No. 97) 
(the “Migration Convention”) and the Migrant Workers (Supplemen-
tary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143) (the “Supplementary 
Provisions”).
Forty-eight states ratified the Migration Convention as of January 
15, 2009, including a number of European states, but excluding, for 
example, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada. The Supple-
mentary Provisions have been ratified by only 23 states at January 15, 
2009, and of these the only wealthy states are Italy, Norway, Portugal, 
and Sweden. 
The Migration Convention includes an interesting and important 
antipropaganda provision in Article 3: parties are required “so far as na-
tional laws and regulations permit, [to] take all appropriate steps against 
misleading propaganda relating to emigration and immigration.” While 
this type of provision might not have a substantial formal effect, it 
shows that parties recognized the concern that populist or scapegoating 
propaganda might be leveled against migrants. 
The Migration Convention has an important nondiscrimination 
obligation in Article 6. The nondiscrimination obligation is limited to 
lawful immigrants. Furthermore, the obligation is limited to areas that 
are subject to regulation or governmental control. On the other hand, 
the nondiscrimination obligation includes labor conditions such as 
membership of trade unions and access to social security. 
Under Article 9 of the Supplementary Provisions, an illegal im-
migrant is entitled to “enjoy equality of treatment for himself and his 
family in respect of rights arising out of past employment as regards 
remuneration, social security and other benefits.” The limited rule of 
nondiscrimination provided in the Migration Convention is extended in 
Article 10 of the Supplementary Provisions, which provides that “each 
Member for which the Convention is in force undertakes to declare 
and pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee, by 
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methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of op-
portunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of 
social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and 
collective freedoms for persons who as migrant workers or as members 
of their families are lawfully within its territory.”
Article 9 of the Migration Convention requires member states to 
allow remittances, but permits them to take into account their own rules 
regarding inflows and outflows of money. This is an area of overlap 
between migration law and international monetary law. 
Under Article 14 of the Supplementary Provisions, states are per-
mitted to “make the free choice of employment, while assuring migrant 
workers the right to geographical mobility, subject to the conditions that 
the migrant worker has resided lawfully in its territory for the purpose 
of employment for a prescribed period not exceeding two years or, if 
its laws or regulations provide for contracts for a fixed term of less than 
two years, that the worker has completed his first work contract.
Optional Annex 1 of the Migration Convention regulates recruitment 
activities. These activities are limited to public bodies, except insofar as 
national law or international agreement permits certain private bodies to 
engage in recruitment. Article 8 of the Annex provides that “any person 
who promotes clandestine or illegal immigration shall be subject to ap-
propriate penalties.” Article 3 of the Supplementary Provisions requires 
each member to take all necessary and appropriate measures “to sup-
press clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal 
employment of migrants.” Article 6 of the Supplementary Provisions 
further requires states to make arrangements to detect and to sanction 
illegal employment of migrants, as well as organization and assistance 
of movement of migrants. In fact, the Supplementary Provisions seem 
more concerned with preventing unauthorized migration than with any 
other issue. The reference in Article 3 to a purpose to prevent abuse of 
migrants does not appear to limit the scope of obligations to suppress 
illegal immigration. 
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un  Convent Ion on t He R Ig Hts of   
MIg Rant  w o Rke Rs
In July 2003, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(“Migrant Workers Convention”) entered into force. At that time, 21 
states had acceded to the convention. As of January 15, 2009, the follow-
ing states had signed, ratified, or acceded: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Timor, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, and Uruguay. 
The wealthy destination states are notable for their absence. So, 
while the Migrant Workers Convention no doubt will benefit some mi-
grants, it will not be available to immigrants to wealthy states, unless 
those wealthy states accept its obligations. 
Importantly, the Migrant Workers Convention provides no com-
mitments regarding access to the employment market of any state. 
Interestingly, Article 66 of the Convention leaves open the possibility 
for either home states or destination states to limit recruitment activities 
in the home state to public bodies of the destination state. 
Article 7 of the Migrant Workers Convention provides an obliga-
tion of nondiscrimination among migrant workers in terms of the rights 
provided under the convention. These rights must be provided with-
out discrimination based, inter alia, on nationality, race, ethnicity, or 
economic position. While this provision has broad application, one 
component of it provides a kind of MFN obligation. However, there 
are some important limitations on MFN treatment. For example, Article 
52:3(b) provides that for migrants whose permission to stay in the des-
tination state is limited by time, the destination state may “limit access 
by a migrant worker to remunerated activities in pursuance of a policy 
of granting priority to its nationals or to persons who are assimilated to 
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them for these purposes by virtue of legislation or bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements.” 
Article 25 provides for national treatment in respect of conditions 
of work and terms of employment, including for illegal aliens. But note 
the language of Article 52:3(b) mentioned above. Article 27 extends 
national treatment rights to migrant workers with respect to social se-
curity. It leaves it to the competent authorities of the state of origin and 
the state of employment to “establish the necessary arrangements to 
determine the modalities of application of this norm.” Article 30 pro-
vides rights to education for the children of migrant workers, on the 
basis of national treatment. Article 54 provides national treatment for 
documented migrants in connection with protection against dismissal, 
unemployment benefits, and access to public work schemes intended to 
combat unemployment. Article 8 protects the right of departure, includ-
ing from the state of origin.
A number of the substantive provisions of the Migrant Workers 
Convention deal with human rights issues, such as freedom from invol-
untary servitudes, right to life, freedom of conscience, etc. These rights 
apply to both legal and illegal immigrants. 
Part IV of the Migrant Workers Convention grants certain additional 
rights only to documented migrants. These include rights of free move-
ment within the territory of the destination state, rights to unionize, and 
rights to vote. Further, Article 43 provides documented migrants with 
national treatment in connection with access to education, health ser-
vices, and housing. 
Article 46 addresses customs duties on personal belongings—an 
interesting connection between migration and trade. Article 47 protects 
the right to remit money to the migrant’s home country or any other 
state—an interesting connection between migration and international 
monetary law.
Article 48 provides for a sort of national treatment in connection 
with taxation. It also calls on a state’s party to endeavor to adopt ap-
propriate measures to avoid double taxation. 
Article 49:2 provides that, where separate permissions to reside and 
to engage in employment are required, “migrant workers who in the 
State of employment are allowed freely to choose their remunerated 
activity shall neither be regarded as in an irregular situation nor shall 
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they lose their authorization of residence by the mere fact of the termi-
nation of their remunerated activity prior to the expiration of their work 
permits or similar authorizations.”
Thus, legal migrants are not required to remain in any particular 
employment, but enjoy flexibility as to their employment. Article 52 
provides that legal migrants generally have the right to freely choose 
their remunerated activities, subject to limitations such as limitations 
on alien occupation in certain activities and requirements for licensing 
for regulated occupations. 
Finally, Article 68 of the Migrant Workers Convention requires 
states to collaborate to prevent illegal immigration and employment 
of workers in an “irregular situation.” In particular, destination states 
are required to “take all adequate and effective measures to eliminate 
employment in their territory of migrant workers in an irregular situa-
tion, including, whenever appropriate, sanctions on employers of such 
workers.” Article 69 provides that states “shall, when there are migrant 
workers and members of their families within their territory in an irreg-
ular situation, take appropriate measures to ensure that such a situation 
does not persist.”
Con CLus Ion
Individuals seem to enjoy a wide range of human rights in connec-
tion with their treatment once they arrive in foreign states. However, 
this chapter has found that, under human rights law, individuals do not 
have rights, vis-à-vis destination states, to immigrate. It is interesting 
that individuals have reasonably clear rights to emigrate, or to depart. 
Of course, the right to emigrate without a right to immigrate may be 
viewed as rather empty, or at least limited by the available destination 
states (Sané 2007). Human rights law is currently undergoing a period 
of uncertainty regarding the obligor of particular human rights obliga-
tions. In some cases corporations are charged with protecting human 
rights under the rubric of “corporate social responsibility.” In other 
cases states other than the state of residency or citizenship are argued to 
bear responsibilities to protect certain human rights of foreign citizens, 
Job Name: -- /309724t
Customary Laws and Multilateral Migration Conventions   181
as in the argument that states should not seek to enforce their legal 
rights under the WTO’s intellectual property agreement in cases where 
to do so would restrict the ability of the home state to satisfy its obliga-
tions under the right to health. It would be too speculative, however, to 
say today whether destination states will ever have human rights–based 
obligations to admit aliens. 
n otes
However, it may be that the substantive division, in terms of human security, be-1. 
tween forced migration and economic migration, is less than clear (United Nations 
Human Rights Committee 2000). 
Customary international law arises from the practice of states, combined with 2. 
opinion juris: a sense of being legally bound. Conventional international law is 
treaty law: formal written agreements between states. 
Plender (1988) notes, “As recently as at the end of the nineteenth century there 3. 
continued to be support for the view that the power to control the ingress and 
egress of aliens was circumscribed by international law.” (See also Goodwin-Gill 
[1978].)
Resolutions of the Institute of International Law 104 4. et seq. (Institute of Interna-
tional Law 1916). The Institute of International Law was a private body, involved 
in formulating principles for adoption by states.
For a historical perspective, see Plender5.  (1988). 
See also Article 12(2) of the ICCPR 1966 and Article 5(d)(ii) of the International 6. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Hannum 
(1985). 
See Martin (2003, p. 43), who cites the Hague Convention on Certain Questions 7. 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 12 April 1930, Art. 1, 179 LNTS 89, 
which states that it is “for each state to determine under its own laws who are its 
nationals.” See also Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (1923).
See also Protocol 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 8. 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950).
Job Name: -- /309724t




The EU has reached a very high level of formal labor market inte-
gration. It is fair to say that the EU has developed a set of disciplines 
designed to ensure a high degree of labor market integration, while 
respecting national regulatory and public policy prerogatives. Under 
these disciplines, individual nationals of EU member states have the 
formal right to enter the labor market of any other member state, with-
out explicit or implicit discrimination, and without losing rights that 
they would otherwise have, such as social security rights. 
The history of the development of labor market integration in the 
EU is salient to a study of broader international labor market integra-
tion, insofar as it represents a kind of maximal menu of labor market 
integration devices. It is important to keep in mind that in the EU, free 
movement of workers is the fourth freedom, with free movement of 
goods, services, and capital, and is part of a broader integration project. 
It is also important to keep in mind that Europe exhibits a high degree 
of ethnic and political homogeneity. The issues that have arisen, and the 
way that these issues have been addressed, both substantively and insti-
tutionally, can provide a checklist for anticipating issues that will arise 
as other efforts at international legalization of migration are undertaken. 
Therefore, this chapter attempts to provide a brief historical perspective 
on the legal measures taken toward EU labor market integration. The 
treatment is by no means exhaustive or detailed, but it is designed to 
show the relative depth of integration. 
It is also important to note at the outset that the EU still allows cer-
tain restrictions on freedom of movement, which include the possibility 
of exclusion, the possibility of expulsion from the state of residence, 
and limitations on the recognition of professional qualifications. For 
example, persons who have never worked and who are dependent on 
social assistance are generally denied the right of free movement, al-
though Union citizens may have short-term rights of residence, and 
family members of workers have greater rights. 
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Finally, it is important to note that despite the formal facilitation of 
intra-EU free movement through a remarkably extensive set of rules for 
market access, equal treatment, and avoidance of disadvantage, Euro-
peans do not migrate within Europe with great alacrity. There has been 
a high degree of economic homogeneity, making migration less attrac-
tive. Given the heterogeneity in the broader international context, we 
could not expect the experience of the EU to be replicated. Indeed, the 
lesson of the EU is one of integration on a number of fronts, with in-
vestment and free movement of goods and services rendering migration 
less compelling. While there are relations both of complementarity and 
substitutability among these types of integration, it seems reasonable 
to believe that the parallel integration along a number of dimensions 
moderates the extent to which any one dimension experiences exces-
sive flows.
There are four important components of free movement in EU 
law. 
Article 39 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, formerly Article 48, pro-1) 
vides for free movement of European Community “workers” 
within the European Community, without discrimination as to 
employment.1 Article 39(3) permits exceptions for “public pol-
icy, public security, or public health” reasons.2 
Article 43 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the “right of estab-2) 
lishment,” including the right to take up and to pursue activities 
as self-employed persons. 
Article 49 prohibits restrictions on freedom to provide services 3) 
within the community, in respect of nationals of member states 
who are established in a member state other than that of the per-
son for whom the services are intended. 
Finally, under Article 18 of the Treaty of Rome, added in the 4) 
2001 Treaty of Nice, “every citizen of the Union shall have the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Mem-
ber States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in 
this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.” This 
incorporated in the Treaty of Rome extensions of the right of 
movement that had been adopted by directives in June 1990.3 
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Fr EE Mov EMEnt  o F Work Ers
Article 39, which provides the basic commitment to free movement 
of workers, is worth quoting in full:
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the 1) 
Community.
Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any dis-2) 
crimination based on nationality between workers of the Member 
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions 
of work and employment.
It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds 3) 
of public policy, public security or public health:
to accept offers of employment actually made;a) 
to move freely within the territory of Member States for this b) 
purpose;
to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in c) 
accordance with the provisions governing the employment 
of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action;
to remain in the territory of a Member State after having d) 
been employed in that State, subject to conditions which 
shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn 
up by the Commission.
The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in 4) 
the public service.
As discussed in subsequent sections, similar freedoms apply to self-
employed persons who wish to establish in another member state, and 
to service providers who wish to travel to another member state tempo-
rarily in order to provide services. 
Most member states of the EU have gone further to eliminate most 
border formalities between member states through the 1985 and 1990 
Schengen Agreements.4 See the discussion below. A total of 30 states, 
including also three non-EU members (Iceland, Norway, and Swit-
zerland), have adhered to the Schengen Agreements. Ireland and the 
United Kingdom do not participate in the common border control or 
visa arrangements. 
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s cope of Application: “Workers” 
Article 39 only provides direct obligations with respect to “work-
ers,” understood to be employees.5 Under Article 39, “the essential 
feature of an employment relationship . . . is that for a certain period of 
time a person performs services for and under the direction of another 
person in return for which he receives remuneration” (Lawrie-Blum v. 
Land Baden-Wurttemberg 1986, para. 17). The definition of “workers” 
is a community definition, not one determined by national law (para. 
16). 
Although Article 39 grants free movement to “workers” or “work-
ers of member states,” and does not explicitly require that these workers 
be nationals of EU member states, as opposed to nationals of third 
countries, the implementing regulation limits freedom of movement to 
nationals of member states (Council of the European Union 1968a). The 
issue of nationality is a matter of member state law.6 Furthermore, recall 
that all “citizens” of the EU—meaning all member state citizens—are 
now entitled to free movement under Article 18 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Under Article 39(3), movement is predicated on the employment re-
lationship—the freedom of movement is to accept offers of employment 
actually made. Individuals also have the right to look for employment 
in another member state (Royer 1976).7 The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has found a “right for nationals of the Member States to move 
freely within the territory of other Member States and to stay there for 
the purpose of seeking employment” (Antonissen 1991). However, the 
duration of the stay for purposes of seeking employment is limited to “a 
reasonable time” (Commission v. Belgium 1997). 
Regulation 1251/70 provided that workers and family members 
may remain in the territory of a member state after the worker’s em-
ployment there terminates.8 This provision has been supplemented, and 
probably obviated, by the Residence Directive. 9 The Residence Direc-
tive also provides for certain rights of permanent residence for workers 
who have reached pension age, or who have become incapacitated. Un-
der Article 17 of the Residence Directive, family members who reside 
with a worker in a host member state are entitled to remain if the worker 
has acquired permanent residence, and under certain circumstances if 
the worker dies while still working but before acquiring permanent 
residence. 
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Furthermore, individuals have the right to reside in another Mem-
ber State regardless of their employment relationship, so long as they 
meet an economic needs test and are covered by health insurance 
(Council of the European Union 1990c.) Retirees also have the right of 
residence.10
s cope of Application: s elf-Employed Persons through 
Establishment or Freedom to Provide s ervices
Self-employed persons benefit from protections similar to those 
available to employed persons. Self-employed persons may benefit
either from freedom to provide services, or from freedom of establish-
ment, depending on the circumstances (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p. 
89). Self-employed persons who establish in a host state are covered by 
Articles 43–48 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 49 provides that “restric-
tions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be 
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established 
in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom 
the services are intended.” Establishment in this context “involves the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for 
an indefinite period” (Council of the European Union 2000).
Self-employed persons who engage in temporary travel in order 
to provide services are covered by Articles 49–55. Under Article 50, a 
“person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue 
his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same 
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.” Services 
include activities of an industrial character, activities of a commercial 
character, activities of craftsmen, and activities of the professions. Un-
der these provisions, travel must be temporary, the services must be 
remunerated, and the services must have some transnational, as op-
posed to wholly domestic, character. 
Citizenship
Citizenship of the EU was established under the Maastricht Treaty, 
which entered into force on November 1, 1993. Under Article 17(1) 
of the Treaty of Rome, “[e]very person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.” The first recital of the 
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Residence Directive states that citizenship of the Union confers on ev-
ery citizen of the Union a primary and individual right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and to the measures 
adopted to give it effect.
One of the goals of the Residence Directive was to link movement 
more firmly to the citizenship status of citizens, rather than to their sta-
tus as workers, retirees, students, or other categories. The Residence 
Directive makes clear that citizens have 
rights of entry and exit; • 
the right of residency for up to three months without conditions; • 
the right of residency for longer if they are workers or self- • 
employed persons, or if they have sufficient resources not to b -
come a burden on the host state’s social security system as well 
as health insurance;
the right to have family members accompany them; and • 
the right to permanent residence after a period of five years• 
s cope of Application: n ew Member s tates
Interestingly, a transitional arrangement was put in place in 2004 
with respect to migration by workers from 10 newly acceding mem-
ber states. This transition arrangement provided for three periods of 
two years, three years, and two years. At the end of each period states 
that had previously been members of the EU—the “EU 15”—would 
determine whether they would liberalize for the subsequent period. A 
similar arrangement was put in place for the two states that acceded in 
2007, Bulgaria and Romania. These temporary derogations from free-
dom of movement of workers were required to expire after seven years. 
Therefore, from May 1, 2011, for the initial 10 new adherents, and from 
January 1, 2014, for Bulgaria and Romania, the transition period will 
end and free movement of workers will be applicable in full. 
Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom did not opt to apply the 
transition provisions to the first round of 10 new adherents, and so ini-
tially decided not to restrict immigration from the new member states. 
After a review of the transition arrangements in 2006, Greece, Italy, 
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Spain, Portugal, and Finland decided to lift their transition restrictions, 
and Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg de-
cided to reduce their restrictions. With respect to the first round of 10 
new adherents, only Germany and Austria have maintained full restric-
tions through the end of the transition period. 
In 2007, in connection with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
all EU-15 countries except Sweden and Finland decided to restrict Bul-
garians’ and Romanians’ access to their labor markets. 
In 2006, the EU Commission was able to conclude, as to migration 
from the 10 initial acceding states to the EU 15 as follows: “mobility 
flows between the EU-10 and the EU-15 are very limited and are simply 
not large enough to affect the EU labour market in general” (Commis-
sion of the European Communities 2006, p. 13).
Dis Cri Min Ation
The pattern of nondiscrimination protection, and other protection, 
applied to migrant workers from EU member states, is extensive. It is 
extensive enough that there is little room for host state measures to de-
ter or to disadvantage immigration, and thus little scope for extraction 
of rents from immigrants. 
Under Article 39(2) of the Treaty of Rome, migrant workers who 
are EU citizens are protected from discrimination based on national-
ity, as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work 
and employment. Regulation 1612/68 was intended, and has been inter-
preted by the ECJ, to prohibit discrimination of various kinds against 
workers from other Member States (Apap 2002, p. 35). Under Article 
1, nationals of Member States have the right to take up employment in 
other Member States under the same conditions as nationals. 
Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 prohibits all forms of direct and 
indirect, de jure and de facto, discrimination. Areas covered include so-
cial, housing, and tax advantages. Those in search of work are excluded 
from coverage of Article 7.
Interestingly, Article 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68 provides that any 
clause of a collective agreement or individual agreement concerning 
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eligibility for employment, remuneration, or other conditions of work 
is null and void insofar as it provides for discrimination against nation-
als of other Member States. This type of provision is needed to ensure 
that restrictions under domestic collective bargaining agreements are 
not used to replace immigration restrictions in order to exclude foreign 
workers. Furthermore, Article 8 of the regulation provides for equality 
of treatment in connection with membership in trade unions. 
Dependents and s ocial s ecurity
Free movement may be less attractive to workers if their depen-
dents are not permitted to join them, or to work once they arrive, or if 
by moving they may forfeit accrued social security rights, or the oppor-
tunity to accrue social security rights. 
Under Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68, the families of migrants 
are required to be admitted to the host state. Under Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68, families of workers are entitled to the same social 
advantages as families of national workers. Article 11 entitles a com-
munity worker’s family members to work in the host state, even where 
they are not community nationals. These provisions have been repealed 
and replaced by similar provisions in the Residence Directive. Article 
12 of Regulation 1612/68 provides that children of migrants shall be 
admitted to general education and vocational training under the same 
conditions as nationals. Council Directive 77/486/EC requires that 
children of migrant workers be provided with tuition-free education, 
including teaching of the official language of the host state (Council of 
the European Union 1977). 
Under Article 39(2) of the Treaty of Rome, workers from other 
member states are entitled to equal treatment as to employment, re-
muneration, and other conditions of work and employment. This 
entails the same social and tax advantages as nationals of the host state 
(Council of the European Union 1971, Article 7[2]). The requirement 
of nondiscrimination includes such programs as interest-free loans for 
parents (Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden Wurttemberg 1982) educa-
tional grants for students (Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Munchen 
1974), and even certain nonpecuniary benefits (Netherlands v. Ann 
Florence Reed 1985). Member states have coordinated their social se-
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curity legislation in order to ensure that these measures do not restrict 
mobility or result in unequal treatment. This coordination addresses 
both workers and self-employed persons. Regulation 1408/71 address-
es the application of social security schemes to workers. Regulation 
1390/81 extends this pattern of arrangements to self-employed per-
sons. It should be emphasized that this is a system for coordination 
rather than harmonization. 
The general approach is to ensure that an individual only must 
contribute to a single social security scheme, and that the individual 
obtains benefits that are not reduced by virtue of his or her transnational 
movement. Three principles are involved. First, Community citizens 
are permitted to receive benefits from the “source” state—the state in 
which they were earned, despite a change in residency (Council of the 
European Union 1971). Second, periods of employment or residence 
in multiple member states are aggregated for purposes of meeting the 
paying member state’s requirements. Third, the law of the state of em-
ployment is generally the governing law; Article 13(2) and Title II of 
Regulation 1408/71 establish the principle of lex loci laboris. 
Regulation 1408/71 covers sickness and maternity benefits, occu-
pational accident and disease benefits, family benefits, unemployment 
benefits, invalidity pensions and benefits, old age benefits, death grants 
and survivors’ benefits (Council of the European Union 1971). It ex-
cludes social and medical assistance (Council Regulation 1408/71, 
Article 4[4]). Nondiscrimination in social assistance and other “social 
advantages” is addressed in Regulation 1612/68. 
n on Dis Cri Min At or y  (in Distin Ctl y  APPli CAbl E) 
rE gul Ation An D Pro FEssion Al  Qu Ali FiCAtions
Generally speaking, the freedom to provide services “may be re-
stricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements to public 
interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings operating in the 
territory of the State where the service is provided, in so far as the ser-
vice is not safeguarded by rules to which the provider of such a service 
is subject in the Member State where he is established” (Arblade 1999). 
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In Terhoeve the ECJ held that “provisions which preclude or deter a na-
tional of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to 
exercise his freedom of movement constitutes an obstacle to that free-
dom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers 
concerned. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether there is in-
deed discrimination on grounds of nationality” (Terhoeve 1999). This 
principle was established for the first time in Van Binsbergen (1974). 
Under these cases, a restriction may be justified if it is adopted in pursuit 
of a public interest that is not incompatible with community objectives, 
is nondiscriminatory, and is proportionate to the aim pursued. 
For workers in regulated fields, which may require specified quali-
fications or licensing, freedom of movement requires that the relevant 
qualifications be accepted in the host state, and that a license be made 
available. The right of establishment under Articles 43, 49, and 54 of the 
Treaty of Rome has been found to include a right of national treatment, 
barring limitation of specified professions to nationals of the host state 
(Reyners v. Belgium 1974). It also includes a right to have educational 
qualifications from another member state recognized in the host state 
(Patrick v. Ministre des Affaires Culturelles 1977; Thieffry v. Conseil de 
l’Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris 1977). 
Thus, “even if applied without any discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, national requirements concerning qualificatio s may have 
the effect of hindering nationals of other member states in the exercise 
of their right of establishment guaranteed to them by Article [43] of the 
EEC Treaty. That could be the case if the national rules in question took 
no account of the knowledge and qualifications already acquired by the 
person concerned in another member state” (Vlassopoulou 1991). 
Article 47 of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the Council of Minis-
ters to legislate directives on the mutual recognition of diplomas and 
other evidence of qualificati ns, and the council produced a number 
of sectoral directives for certain professions. These sectoral directives 
provided for essential harmonization, and conditions for recognition of 
diplomas and other qualifications in particular sectors.
In addition, the so-called General Systems Directives, generally 
provided for recognition across regulated professions, other than those 
covered by sectoral directives. These directives had broad coverage, 
basing recognition of qualifications on the principle of mutual trust. 
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This principle of mutual trust seems more likely to be workable within 
a broader integration project, within a thick institutional context, than 
on a stand-alone basis. 
The General Systems Directives, and the sectoral directives noted 
above, were repealed as of October 20, 2007, and were replaced by 
Directive 2005/36/EC, providing for both freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide services (Council of the European Union 2005; 
Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, pp. 24, 96–109). However, the method of 
recognition of qualifications established in the General Systems Direc-
tives will continue. The purpose of this new directive is expressed as 
follows: “This Directive establishes rules according to which a Member 
State which makes access to or pursuit of a regulated profession in its 
territory contingent upon possession of specific professional qualific -
tions (referred to hereinafter as the host Member State) shall recognise 
professional qualifications obtained in one or more other Member States 
(referred to hereinafter as the home Member State) and which allow the 
holder of the said qualifications to pursue the same profession there, for 
access to and pursuit of that profession.”
Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2005/36/EC prohibit restrictions on 
the freedom to provide services based on lack of professional qualific -
tions if the service provider is legally established in another member 
state for purposes of pursuing the same profession there. This structure 
is usefully compared with the process provided under GATS, described 
in Chapter 8 below. 
Under Directive 2005/36/EC, the member states retain the sover-
eignty to set their own standards of competency, but they must accept 
foreign credentials as satisfactory of these standards. They may also 
impose “compensation” requirements, such as adaptation periods, in 
order to make up for differences in training and preparation in different 
member states. 
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Publi C Poli Cy  Ex CEPtions, Ex Pulsion, An D Publi C 
sE r vi CE Ex CEPtions
Under Article 39(3) of the Treaty of Rome, member states may 
limit freedom of movement for certain public policy reasons. Similarly, 
Article 46 allows limitations on the right of establishment by self- 
employed persons. Directive 64/221 stipulates that exclusions under 
these provisions must be based on the “personal conduct” of the in-
dividual concerned. “Personal conduct” can include the individual’s 
membership in an organization (Van Duyn v. Home Offic  1974). Fur-
thermore, to rely on a public policy exception, member states must act 
in a nondiscriminatory manner by prohibiting similar conduct domesti-
cally (Rutili 1975; Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgium 1982). Generally, 
these exceptions are to be construed narrowly. 
Article 28 of the Residence Directive provides detailed restrictions 
on a member state’s right to expel nationals of other member states. 
EU citizens and their family members who have acquired permanent 
residence cannot be expelled except on the basis of serious grounds of 
public policy or public security. These grounds must be “imperative 
grounds of public security” if the individuals have resided in the host 
state for 10 years or more. 
Under Article 29 of the Residence Directive, “the only diseases jus-
tifying measures restricting freedom of movement shall be the diseases 
with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the 
World Health Organization and other infectious diseases or contagious 
parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions apply-
ing to nationals of the host Member State.”
This type of external reference to an expert multilateral organiza-
tion with a different functional remit may be understood as a response 
to the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law. 
Articles 39(4) and 45 of the Treaty of Rome provide that the freedom 
of movement to provide services, and the freedom of establishment, do 
not apply to employment in the public service. This exception is limited 
to activities involving “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of 
powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the 
general interest of the State or of other public authorities. Such posts 
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in fact presume on the part of those occupying them the existence of 
a special relationship of allegiance to the state . . . ” (Commission v. 
Belgium 1980).
bor DEr Controls An D sC h Eng En 
Under the original Treaty of Rome, member states retained the right 
to impose identity checks at their borders. In 1985, however, France, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created an area 
without internal borders: the “Schengen area.” 
The Schengen agreements do not extend the right of movement per 
se, but facilitate it by abolishing border controls for all people among 
the EU member states that are party to the Schengen agreements. A 
protocol to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (the “Schengen Protocol”) 
incorporated the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen 
Convention (the “Schengen Agreements”) into the EU. The Schengen 
Protocol authorized the signatories of the Schengen Agreements to 
establish closer cooperation among themselves, so long as the coopera-
tion takes place within the institutional framework of the EU (Weiss 
and Wooldridge 2007, p. 38). Thus, the Schengen “acquis” has been 
incorporated within the EU. 
Article 62 of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the adoption of “mea-
sures with a view to ensuring, in compliance with Article 14, the absence 
of any controls on persons, be they citizens of the Union or nationals 
of third countries, when crossing internal borders.” This authorization 
is intended to work with the Schengen Protocol to create the concept of 
“free circulation” within the EU: once an immigrant crosses the external 
border, he or she may travel throughout the internal borderless territory. 
Within the Schengen area, only one state—the state of entry—is respon-
sible for carrying out European immigration formalities. The principle 
is something like “mutual recognition” for prudential regulation: it re-
quires member states to trust the initial state to apply appropriate rules: 
“The removal of internal border controls under the Schengen Agree-
ment is compensated for by an extensive range of measures relating to 
the intensifica ion of police cooperation; judicial cooperation regarding 
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mutual assistance and extradition; the handing over of criminals; coop-
eration in combating drugs; the creation of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS, a centralized databank of people and objects): the imple-
mentation of unified and stricter border controls, and the coordination 
of asylum policies” (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p. 36). 
This suggests that removal of border controls (as opposed to liber-
alization of the right of movement per se) can only be effected under 
conditions where collateral measures are in place or may be implement-
ed in coordination with the removal of border controls. 
Currently, European immigration law includes a common visa re-
gime, common requirements for crossing external borders, common 
standards for border controls, and common conditions governing the 
movement of third country nationals within the EU (Hailbronner 2000, 
p. 125).
The United Kingdom and Ireland join in limited aspects of the 
Schengen area, including police matters. According to the Protocol on 
the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland are entitled to exercise such border con-
trols as they “may consider necessary” in order to determine the right to 
enter their territories of citizens of European Economic Area Member 
States, and in order to determine whether or not to grant other persons 
admission. Ireland exercises its rights under this protocol in order to 
maintain its “common travel area” with the United Kingdom. 
The 10 member states that acceded to the EU in 2004 will partici-
pate in Schengen following a transition period intended to allow them 
to upgrade their border controls and information systems. 
It is worth noting that the Schengen agreements, and the general 
treatment of free movement of people in Europe, owe much to the Be-
nelux treaty arrangements. These arrangements themselves had a long 
and complex history, growing functionally and geographically over the 
years from 1945 (Plender 1988, pp. 273–276). 
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s u MMAr y
Table 6.1 sets out the basic points of the EU program for free move-
ment of labor. As has been apparent from the discussion thus far, the EU 
has addressed the issues that are critical to migration within the EU. Up 
until recent eastern European accessions, the EU was characterized by 
a high degree of labor market homogeneity compared to the rest of the 
world. This homogeneity, as suggested in Chapters 2 and 4, makes it 
less likely that large numbers of workers will migrate. It is also true that 
the extensive liberalization of movement of goods and services trade 
across EU borders also makes it less likely that large numbers of work-
ers will migrate (except to the extent that migration is complementary 
to trade). This latter effect also applies to the new accession states. With 
the Fifth Enlargement, in 2004 and 2007, greater migration was ex-
pected due to greater wage differentials. However, thus far, migration 
has not been as great as expected. 
int Ern Ation Al  Migr Ation t o th E Eu
Of course, the EU has both an internal migration policy and an 
international migration policy. While EU citizens have broad internal 
migration rights, third-party nationals also obtain more limited internal 
migration rights and practically nonexistent rights to migrate into the 
EU. 
The EU has not extended to third-country nationals broad rights to 
enter the EU in order to work. The Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 
on limitation on admission of third-country nationals to the territory of 
the member states for employment mandates that “Member States will 
refuse entry to their territories of third country nationals for the purpose 
of employment.”11 It then provides a number of exceptions, and sets out 
procedures for admission of third-country nationals for employment. 
Articles 61, 62, and 63 of the Treaty of Rome, added in the Amster-
dam Treaty of 1999, provide authority for establishment of a common 
approach to immigration of third-country nationals. Under Article 63, 
Job Name: -- /309724t
198t able 6.1  European Migration instruments
Free movement  
of labor
Free movement to 
seek employment
Free movement 







ECT 18, 39 ECT 18, Antonissen 
(1991), C-292-89
ECT 18, 43–49 ECT 39, Reg 
1612/68

















Europe   199
the council is directed to adopt measures, inter alia, on “conditions of 
entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Mem-
ber States of long term visas and residence permits, including those for 
the purpose of family reunion . . . ” 
The European Council agreed in Tampere (Finland) in October 
1999 on the elements of an EU immigration policy: 
It will be based on a comprehensive approach to the management • 
of migratory flows so as to find a balance between humanitarian 
and economic admission. 
It will include fair treatment for third-country nationals aiming • 
as far as possible to give them comparable rights and obligations 
to those of nationals of the member state in which they live. 
A key element in management strategies must be the develop-• 
ment of partnerships with countries of origin including policies 
of codevelopment (Commission of the European Communities 
2000). 
Third-country nationals present in the territory of the EU occupy 
an ambiguous position in connection with their eligibility for EU rights 
(Hailbronner 2000, p. 307). Moreover, different groups of third-country 
nationals have different rights. We must distinguish among different 
types of rights. For example, the social rights incorporated in Articles 
138, 139, and 140 of the Treaty of Rome are generally applicable to 
third-country nationals. For these purposes, we must also distinguish 
among different categories of third-country nationals, including refu-
gees, family members of EU citizens, and those who acquire rights 
pursuant to an association agreement, cooperation agreement, or other 
international agreement. 
Eu  blu E CAr D Pro Pos Al
Pursuant to Article 63, the EU has proposed the introduction of 
a Blue Card program as part of a plan to encourage the migration of 
skilled labor in the form of third-country nationals into the EU (the Blue 
Card Proposal) (Commission of the European Communities 2007a,b). 
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This proposal is expected to be implemented in 2009. The proposed 
draft directive (the Draft Directive) provides that, like the U.S. Green 
Card, the Blue Card shall be a combination of a residence permit and a 
work visa that would allow holders and their families to live, work, and 
travel within the EU. The Blue Card shall be administered by individual 
member states. 
Specificall , Article 5 of the Draft Directive provides that third-
country nationals may apply for a Blue Card if they present a valid 
work contract or an offer of a job of at least one year in the member state 
concerned and satisfy the conditions set out under the member state’s 
national regulations in the case of particular regulated professions or 
have at least three years’ professional experience in unregulated profes-
sions. Further, Article 9 of the Draft Directive allows member states 
to apply their labor market policies regarding vacancies in their labor 
markets when deciding whether or not to approve an application for the 
Blue Card. As noted in the preamble to the Draft Directive, the Blue 
Card proposal is meant to be a “flexible demand driven entry system” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007a).
Once granted, the Blue Card entitles the holder to the same tax ben-
efits, social assistance, and payment of pensions as EU nationals when 
moving to another country (Article 15 of the Draft Directive). Also, 
Article 13 provides that the Blue Card shall be valid for two years and 
may be renewed. Further, the holder of a Blue Card shall be allowed 
to cumulate periods of residence in different member states (after two 
years of legal residence in a member state) so as to apply for long-term 
residence status in the EU (Articles 17 and 19 of the Draft Directive).
The Blue Card proposal requires approval from the EU Member 
States but has been hailed by the EC as a step toward solving problems 
of the EU’s aging population (European Union 2007). Most recently, it 
was noted by EC President Jose Barroso that the EU attracts 5 percent 
of skilled labor from developing countries while the U.S. attracts 55 
percent. It is hoped that the Blue Card proposal will help to even this 
out (EurActiv 2008). Despite this optimism, the proposal has seen some 
resistance from inside and outside the EU. Germany has commented 
that immigration should remain the competence of individual member 
states. Further, the Netherlands has expressed reservations while Aus-
tria called for further “clarifications” in the field of social security and 
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minimum wages, saying it was already offering higher levels of protec-
tion. The UK has also suggested an alternative plan which is based on 
a points system (Deutsche Welle 2007). In addition, the African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific Countries commented that the Blue Card proposal 
may cause a brain drain in Africa. 
t h E Eu  An D t urk Ey
Turkey has a closer and more complex relationship with the EU, es-
pecially in the field of migration, than any other associated state. Article 
12 of the association agreement between Turkey and the EU provides 
that the contracting parties shall be guided by Articles 39, 40, and 41 of 
the Treaty of Rome for the purpose of progressively securing freedom 
of movement of workers. This provision is aspirational, and does not 
have direct effect. Member states are prohibited under Article 37 of the 
additional protocol to the association agreement to discriminate against 
Turkish workers in relation to conditions of work and remuneration. 
This requirement amounts to a requirement of national treatment and 
has direct effect (Weiss and Wooldridge 2007, p. 209). 
Under Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkish Council of Association, a 
Turkish worker who has been duly admitted and registered to work in a 
member state of the EU has the following rights (Weiss and Wooldridge 
2007, p. 210):
After one year of legal employment, to the renewal of his permit 1) 
to work for the same employer.
After three years of legal employment and subject to the priority 2) 
of EU workers, to take up another offer of employment for the 
same occupation with an employer of his choice. 
After four years of legal employment, to have access to any legal 3) 
employment of his choice. 
This type of graduated accretion of rights is a way of managing 
the transition from worker to man, while providing some protections 
against excessive numbers of foreign workers claiming permanent 
rights to work. It may be instructive in terms of the management of a 
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transition from temporary to permanent employment in other interna-
tional migration arrangements. 
A similar graduated structure is provided for family members under 
Article 7 of Decision 1/80: The members of the family of a Turkish 
worker duly registered as belonging to the labor force of a member state 
who have been authorized to join him: 
Shall be entitled—subject to the priority given to Member States 
of the Community—to respond to any offer of employment after 
they have been legally resident for at least three years in that Mem-
ber State.
Shall enjoy free access to any paid employment of their choice 
provided they have been resident there for at least five years.
Children of Turkish workers who have completed a course of vo-
cational training in the host country may respond to any offer of 
employment there, irrespective of the length of time they have 
been resident in that Member State, provided that one of their par-
ents has been legally employed in the Member State concerned for 
at least three years.
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7  
Other Bilateral, Regional, 
and Plurilateral Arrangements
The intellectual history of international agreements regarding mi-
gration is reflected in preexisting international agreements. Draftsmen 
prefer to use existing precedents, existing precedents often have been 
produced through negotiations under similar constraints, and negotia-
tors often find it compelling to request a concession granted by their 
counterparty in another context. So each international agreement that 
addresses migration has antecedents and descendents. Furthermore, as 
negotiators seek to determine what may come next, it is useful to exam-
ine what already exists and ask why it exists. Regional or plurilateral 
agreements have served as models for the WTO’s GATS, and have also 
incorporated and expanded upon GATS commitments. I point out in 
Chapter 6 how some of the EU’s arrangements may serve as models for 
future agreements. The EU’s arrangements are the most sophisticated 
and are among the most liberal arrangements so far devised for interna-
tional legal liberalization of movement of workers. 
However, there are several bilateral, regional, and plurilateral ar-
rangements for labor mobility beyond the EU. Some of these are based 
on historically rooted arrangements, such as the British Commonwealth, 
the Nordic arrangements, or bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, 
and navigation. Others are bilateral agreements for management of la-
bor flows. Others are more recent adjuncts to bilateral or regional free 
trade agreements or customs unions. The goal of this chapter is not to 
provide a comprehensive survey of all arrangements, but to provide a 
reasonably descriptive set of modern examples in order to assess the 
variety of arrangements for migration. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Nielson suggests that, generally, agree-
ments among countries that are geographically proximate and at similar 
levels of development entail greater liberalization of labor mobility 
(Nielson 2003, pp. 93, 94). This itself is an interesting observation and 
may be suggestive of patterns that we might expect to see in global ar-
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rangements. Of course, if global arrangements are subjected to a broad 
MFN-type principle of nondiscrimination, then liberalizations moti-
vated by proximity and economic similarity would also benefit those 
farther away and at differing levels of development. 
Indeed, it is worthwhile here to observe that, as we will see below, 
the states of virtually all of Europe, most of Latin America, much of Af-
rica, and Australia and New Zealand are party to fairly comprehensive 
regional agreements for liberalization of labor movement. These agree-
ments do operate at fairly homogeneous economic levels, and in fairly 
proximate geographic circumstances. However, some of these agree-
ments in Africa and Latin America have not been fully implemented. 
These agreements demonstrate that, at least outside of Asia and North 
America, states have been willing to negotiate legal commitments for 
liberalization of labor migration. 
One of the critical questions in any global liberalization of migra-
tion will be the scope of application, if any, of the principle of MFN. Of 
course, the arrangements examined in this chapter are all inconsistent 
with a global principle of MFN, and may even raise issues under ex-
isting GATS MFN obligations. I discuss the issue of MFN in detail in 
Chapter 9. 
Bil Ate RAl  lABOR  Ag Reements
The principal type of international arrangement—formal or infor-
mal—between states relating to labor migration is the bilateral labor 
agreement. These agreements are generally, although not exclusively, 
concluded between labor sending and labor receiving countries. These 
agreements generally exclude coverage of commitments to accept mi-
grants: they are not labor market access agreements. While they do not 
contain commitments, they often have the result of providing privileged 
labor market access to citizens of the sending country partner. They 
therefore raise some issues of MFN-type treatment, and of competition 
among potential sending countries (Panizzon 2008).
Job Name: -- /309724t
Other Bilateral, Regional, and Plurilateral Arrangements   207
Puri (2007, p. 105) warns
There exists the danger of exclusivity and marginalization for coun-
tries that are not on the radar screen of major developed country 
receiving markets for political, cultural, or geographical reasons. 
Not all developing countries wishing to export their labour can 
expect to be engaged by the major developed countries in bilateral 
labour agreements. Even if they do, their bargaining power would 
be very weak as receiving countries would have the upper hand in 
determining the conditions of the bilateral relations, for example, 
in terms of defining the sector, job or occupation, quotas, period of 
stay and renewability, and terms and conditions of employment.
Most bilateral labor agreements deal, often in nonbinding terms, 
with managerial and collateral issues of recruitment, remittances, and 
return: they address important issues of management related to migra-
tion that will be permitted unilaterally by the home and destination 
states. Sending countries may be responsible for prescreening migrant 
workers, including ensuring that they do not have criminal records. 
These agreements also may provide for measures to ensure return to 
the home country. These measures may include incentives or sanctions 
applied to employers or employees to ensure return. Recent agreements 
have also sought to ensure cooperation to restrict illegal immigration. 
There are hundreds of bilateral labor agreements in force. The 
OECD countries alone have entered into more than 176 bilateral labor 
agreements (OECD 2004). 
Geronimi (2004, pp. 23–26) lists 24 basic elements of an interna-
tional labor agreement. I have highlighted the provisions that might be 
expected to be found in an international agreement for labor market 
access: 
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The competent govern-1) 
ment authority.
Exchange of information.2) 
Migrants in an irregular 3) 
situation.
Notification of jo  4) 
opportunities.
Drawing up a list of 5) 
candidates.
Pre-selection of candi-6) 
dates.
Final selection of candi-7) 
dates.
Nomination of candidates 8) 
by the employers (possi-
bility for the employer to 
provide directly the name 
of a person to be hired).
Medical examination.9) 
e ntry documents.10) 






Conflict esolution 15) 
mechanism.
t he role of trade 16) 
unions and collective 
bargaining rights.
s ocial security.17) 
Remittances.18) 
Provision of housing.19) 
Family reunification20) 
Activities of social and 21) 
religious organizations.
Establishment of a joint 22) 
commission (to monitor 
the agreements’ imple-
mentation).
Validity and renewal of 23) 
the agreement.
Applicable jurisdiction.24) 
These bilateral agreements, while very important to deal with a 
number of managerial and practical issues, ordinarily do not provide 
formal commitments to market access, national treatment, or most fa-
vored nation treatment, or address other important economic issues. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of northern European countries 
had bilateral agreements with southern European and North African 
countries, or with developing countries, seeking to ensure orderly migra-
tion (Leary 2003). Germany, France, and Belgium had similar programs 
in the late 1950s and 1960s, sometimes covered by bilateral agreements 
governing working conditions and home country obligations. 
From 1942 to 1964, the United States and Mexico had a series of 
agreements relating to temporary farm work, generally known as the 
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Bracero program. The Bracero program was initiated due to predic-
tions in the U.S. agricultural market that there would be labor shortages 
during the fall harvest in 1942. Accordingly, the U.S. agricultural sector 
requested the U.S. government to recruit Mexican workers. Conse-
quently, a number of bilateral agreements were concluded between the 
two governments. The Mexican government, sensitive about the condi-
tions under which some of its nationals had previously worked in the 
United States, and doubtful that there was a real labor shortage, in-
sisted that the U.S. government guarantee the contracts that the farmers 
provided the migrant workers. The Bracero program brought 5 million 
rural Mexicans to the rural United States over the next two decades, 
and the status of many Mexicans was legalized after they arrived in the 
United States (Martin 1993, pp. 60–61). 
More recently, bilateral labor agreements have emphasized issues of 
management, focusing on recruitment, remittances, and return, as well 
as action to limit informal migration. These bilateral labor agreements 
may be viewed as incorporating a particular type of reciprocity. The 
home state assists with recruitment, remittances, and ensuring return, 
while also perhaps acting to limit informal migration, and in exchange 
the destination state unilaterally accepts migrants from the home state 
(Panizzon 2008). 
FRee tRA de ARe As And Cust Oms u ni Ons
This section examines the migration features of free trade area and 
customs union agreements. These agreements address broader issues of 
trade in goods and services, but also accept that migration is relevant 
to trade in goods and services. These agreements also sometimes ad-
dress migration in its own right, as a “fourth freedom” of movement of 
factors. 
Comprehensive Arrangements for mobility
In this section, I describe arrangements that provide for compre-
hensive free movement of workers. In the next section, I describe 
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arrangements that provide for free movement by selected groups of 
workers. Nielson (2003) provides a more refined taxonomy of these 
agreements, from which the organization of this section is adapted. 
t he e uropean e conomic Area and the e uropean Free 
t rade Agreement
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway are members of the EEA, with 
the EU. The European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) states are Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
Under the European Economic Area Agreement (EEAA), EEA na-
tionals may enter the EU as workers, self-employed persons, or service 
providers. These arrangements are very similar to those available to EU 
citizens, as described in Chapter 6. 
The EEAA agreement provides that workers can stay or move 
freely within EU and EFTA states for the purpose of employment and 
remain after having been employed. Immigrants are required to have 
sufficient funds to avoid reliance on public support. There are a num-
ber of exceptions from liberalization, including access to public service 
employment. The EEAA protects workers against discrimination based 
on nationality with regard to employment, remuneration, and other con-
ditions of work and employment (Nielson 2003, p. 99).
Article 28 of the EEAA provides as follows:
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured among EC 1) 
member states and EFTA states. 
Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any dis-2) 
crimination based on nationality between workers of EC mem-
ber states and EFTA states as regards employment, remunera-
tion, and other conditions of work and employment. 
It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds 3) 
of public policy, public security, or public health 
to accept offers of employment actually made; • 
to move freely within the territory of EC member states and • 
EFTA States for this purpose; 
to stay in the territory of an EC member state or an EFTA • 
state for the purpose of employment in accordance with the 
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provisions governing the employment of nationals of that 
state laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action; 
and
to remain in the territory of an EC member state or an EFTA • 
state after having been employed there. 
The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in 4) 
the public service. 
Annex V contains specific provisions on the free movement of 5) 
workers.
Rights of establishment are also guaranteed, even for self-employed 
persons (Article 31 of the EEAA). There are no restrictions on the 
freedom to provide services, and temporary service providers receive 
national treatment. However, there are exceptions for public policy, 
public security, or public health and the exercise of official authority. 
Exceptions also apply for the exercise of official authority, and special 
conditions apply to transport, financial, audiovisual, and telecommuni-
cations services (Nielson 2003, p. 99).
Moreover, the EEAA facilitates the free movement of labor by 
providing for an integrated social security structure. Article 29 of the 
EEAA states that
in order to provide freedom of movement for workers and self- 
employed persons, the Contracting Parties shall, in the field of so-
cial security, secure, as provided for in Annex VI, for workers and 
self-employed persons and their dependants, in particular: 
aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the a) 
right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of 
all periods taken into account under the laws of the several 
countries; 
payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of b) 
Contracting Parties. 
Furthermore, Article 30 of the EEAA ensures that measures are 
taken for mutual recognition of educational and professional qualifi-
cations: “In order to make it easier for persons to take up and pursue 
activities as workers and self-employed persons, the Contracting Parties 
shall take the necessary measures, as contained in Annex VII, concern-
ing the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence 
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of formal qualifications, and the coordination of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Contracting Par-
ties concerning the taking up and pursuit of activities by workers and 
self-employed persons.”
The Agreement Amending the Convention Establishing the EFTA 
(which entered into force on June 1, 2002) (the EFTA Agreement) has 
similar provisions to the EEAA. These amendments largely extend to 
the entire EFTA area (i.e., also including Switzerland) the arrangements 
existing amongst the EFTA-EEA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Nor-
way). However, there are some limits and transition periods. Freedom 
of movement into Switzerland from the other EFTA states is subject 
to transition periods of up to five years. Switzerland reserves special 
quotas for EFTA citizens. Special rules govern frontier workers, public 
service and public authority activities, and the acquisition of real estate 
in Switzerland (Nielson 2003, p. 99). 
However, Annex K to Chapter VIII of the EFTA Agreement is a 
new development in comparison to the EEAA provisions on free move-
ment of persons, as it sets out a comprehensive framework with respect 
to administration of free movement of persons. In particular, it specifies
particular rights of such persons and consolidates previously elucidated 
rights into a specific document. Specific provision is made for right 
of entry, right of residence, nondiscrimination, recognition of profes-
sional qualifications, and coordination of social security. One notable 
development in Annex K of Chapter VIII of the EFTA Agreement is the 
establishment of a “Committee on the Movement of Persons,” which 
provides a centralized authority for the management and proper imple-
mentation of Annex K. 
t he t rans-t asman t ravel Arrangement and Australia–n ew 
Zealand Closer e conomic Relations t rade Agreement
The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) is not a formal 
treaty but a set of parallel policies whereby Australian and New Zea-
land citizens may live and work in the other country indefinitel . 
Although the TTTA previously required no visas, New Zealand na-
tionals are currently required to hold a Special Category Visa, denoted 
in their passports with an arrival date stamp. This requirement stems 
from the negotiation of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
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Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) Review of 1992 where there 
were concerns on the part of Australia over use of New Zealand as 
an easy transit point for international criminals who could use liberal 
movement privileges to enter Australia. This requirement was only ac-
cepted by New Zealand after Australia had made assurances that this 
new policy would not violate the spirit of the TTTA. Use of a special 
category visa meant that there would be no cumbersome application 
procedures for New Zealand citizens entering Australia (Hoadley 1995, 
pp. 89, 94–97).
Australian citizens are exempt from any requirement to hold a visa 
to travel to New Zealand or a permit to be in New Zealand, and residents 
of Australia are exempt from the requirement to obtain a temporary or 
residence visa. Certain exclusions apply, principally for persons with 
a criminal record. Australians traveling to New Zealand require only a 
valid Australian passport.
The most recent reaffirmation of the TTTA was on February 26, 
2001, when Prime Ministers Helen Clark and John Howard announced 
new trans-Tasman social security arrangements (New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001). Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement 
on Social Security provide that a person would be entitled to receive a 
benefit under the social security laws of either New Zealand or Austra-
lia except that he or she is not ordinarily resident or resident and present 
in either state on the date of application for that benefit, that person shall 
be deemed, for the purposes of that application, to be ordinarily resident 
and resident and present in either state on that date, if he or she is pres-
ent in either state, is a resident of either state, or intends to be a resident 
of either state.
The ANZCERTA regime, through its protocol on services, provides 
a parallel arrangement relating to the provision of full market access 
and national treatment for all service providers, including individual 
service providers. Article 4 of the ANZCERTA Protocol on Services 
provides as follows:
Each Member State shall grant to persons of the other Member 
State and services provided by them access rights in its market no 
less favourable than those allowed to its own persons and services 
provided by them. 
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Article 5 of the ANZCERTA Protocol provides for national 
treatment:
Each Member State shall accord to persons of the other Member 1) 
State and services provided by them treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded in like circumstances to its persons and ser-
vices provided by them.
Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the treatment a 2) 
Member State accords to persons of the other Member State may 
be different from the treatment the Member State accords to its 
persons, provided that:
the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary a) 
for prudential, fiduciar , health and safety or consumer pro-
tection reasons; and
such different treatment is equivalent in effect to the treat-b) 
ment accorded by the Member State to its ordinary residents 
for such reasons.
The Member State proposing or according different treatment 3) 
under paragraph 2 of this Article shall have the burden of estab-
lishing that such treatment is consistent with that paragraph.
No provision of this Article shall be construed as imposing ob-4) 
ligations or conferring rights upon either Member State with re-
spect to Government procurement or subsidies.
Further, Article 6 of the ANZCERTA Protocol provides MFN treat-
ment: “In relation to the provision of services inscribed by it in the 
Annex, each Member State shall accord to persons of the other Member 
State and services provided by them treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded in like circumstances to persons of third States.”
Nielson (2003, p. 100) notes, “Because all service suppliers are 
covered, the agreement does not feature detailed definitio s of types of 
personnel, nor does it distinguish between different modes of delivering 
services. However, certain service sectors are excluded from coverage 
by the parties (in the Annex to ANZCERTA Protocol) and the agreement 
also is subject to the foreign investment policies of the member states.” 
Sectors excluded by the annex to the ANZCERTA Protocol include, for 
both states, aviation sector, communications, and shipping.
Moreover, to facilitate the liberalization of trade in services, 
ANZCERTA’s ancillary agreement, the Trans-Tasman Mutual Rec-
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ognition Agreement (TTMRA), provides for mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications
Article 5.1.1 of the TTMRA provides as follows:
Under this Arrangement, a person who is Registered to practise an 
occupation under a law of an Australian Party will be entitled to 
practise an Equivalent occupation under the law of New Zealand 
and a person Registered to practise an occupation under a law of 
New Zealand will be entitled to practise an Equivalent occupation 
under the law of any Australian Party. As a condition of Registra-
tion the person seeking Registration will be required to lodge with 
the relevant Local Registration Authority a written notice contain-
ing certain basic information relating to his or her current Registration.
Further, Article 5.1.2 of the TTMRA states: “The Arrangement is 
not intended to affect the operation of laws that regulate the manner of 
carrying on an occupation, provided those laws: (a) apply equally to 
all persons carrying on or seeking to carry on the occupation; and (b) 
are not based on the attainment or possession of some qualification or 
experience relating to fitness to practise the occupation.
Yet, despite these developments, a completely integrated Trans-
Tasman labor market has not yet developed. As Carmichael, Buetow, 
and Farmer (1993, p. 9) note, “[the TTMA and ANZCERTA] have ren-
dered unlikely any major restriction of the free flow of people between 
Australia and New Zealand . . . ANZCERTA may have promoted some 
long-term migration at the upper end of the occupational spectrum as 
companies became more Australasian in outlook. According to many 
commentators, a common trans-Tasman labour market has been devel-
oping. It is characterized by free access but persistent wage differences, 
with specific occupational groups migrating in response to changes in 
demand.” 
Andean Community
In 2003, the Andean Community adopted the Andean Community 
Labour Migration Instrument (Decision 545), which provides for the 
progressive establishment of freedom of movement and temporary res-
idence for employment purposes among the member states: Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (Andean Community 2003a). 
(Venezuela has since withdrawn from the Andean Community.) The In-
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strument was preceded by an earlier effort, Decision 503, which was 
limited to entry and exit for tourism, and did not address establishment 
or movement for labor. Therefore, Decision 545 provides as follows: 
Article 1. The objective of this Instrument is to establish provi-
sions that will progressively and gradually permit the unhampered 
movement and temporary residence of Andean nationals in the 
subregion as wage workers.
Article 2. This Decision shall be applicable to Andean migratory 
workers. Excluded from its sphere of application are people who 
work for the public administration and those whose activities 
threaten public morals, law and order, human life and health and 
the essential interests of national security.
Decision 545 establishes four categories of migrant workers: 1) 
individually moving workers; 2) company workers; 3) seasonal work-
ers; and 4) border workers (Article 4). Individually moving workers are 
those who have signed an employment contract or answered a call for 
employment (Article 5). Company workers are already employed and 
are sent to another Andean country by their employer (Article 6).
The decision also establishes the rights of Andean migrant workers. 
In particular, it guarantees equal treatment (Article 10), and provides 
for protection of the families of migrant workers. It includes permission 
for unhampered entry and exit of migrant workers and their spouses, 
children, parents, and dependents. 
Decision 545 elucidates additional rights of migrant workers in-
tended to facilitate migration. Article 13 provides as follows:
Member Countries shall guarantee Andean migrant workers the 
following:
Freedom to transfer funds earned by their work, with the a) 
observance of the pertinent legal provisions insofar as tax 
obligations or judicial orders are concerned;
Freedom to transfer sums owned by migrant workers in pay-b) 
ment for food; this cannot be impeded in any case;
That the income from their work can be taxed only in the c) 
country where it was earned;
Free access to the competent administrative and legal au-d) 
thorities in order to exercise and defend their rights;
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Access to the social security systems, in keeping with the e) 
Community provisions that are in effect; and
The payment of social benefits to Andean migrant workers f) 
who work or have worked in the territory of the Member 
Countries, in keeping with the legislation of the Country of 
Immigration.
Importantly, Decision 545 provides for a safeguard mechanism, 
which is worth quoting at length: 
Article 16.
In the event of a disturbance that seriously threatens the employ-
ment situation in a given geographic zone or a given sector or 
branch of economic activity, that is capable of causing effective 
damage or that poses an exceptional risk to the people’s standard 
of living, Member Countries may make a temporary exception 
of up to six months in the principle of equal access to employ-
ment and shall communicate that circumstance and the period of 
that exception to the rest of the Member Countries and to the An-
dean Community General Secretariat. The latter may propose the 
amendment or suspension of the measure if it is not proportional 
to the damage or risk that is to be avoided or is not in keeping with 
the principles established in Andean law. Venezuela may establish 
a temporary exception lasting up to one year, for reciprocal appli-
cation by the rest of the Member Countries.
If the situation envisaged in this article makes it necessary to take 
immediate measures, the interested Member Country may apply 
those measures as an emergency response, and shall in that case 
communicate them immediately to the General Secretariat, which 
shall announce its decision within the following thirty days, either 
authorizing, amending or suspending the measures.
The Member Country that has adopted that exception, with the 
presentation of the pertinent substantiation, may extend that mea-
sure once only and for an equal period of time with the authoriza-
tion of the Andean Community General Secretariat.
A Member Country that makes use of the safeguard clause con-
tained in this article shall respect the stability of the workers who 
migrated before the date of its application.
The right of access to social security was given particular empha-
sis in Decision 546 on the creation of the Andean Community Social 
Job Name: -- /309724t
218   Trachtman
Security Instrument, which recognizes the need to “guarantee the ap-
propriate social protection of migrant workers and their beneficiaries
so that their social rights are not reduced as a result of their migration” 
(Andean Community 2003b). It further provides in the preamble that 
“migrant workers and their beneficiaries shall be acknowledged in any 
of the Member Countries to possess the same social security rights and 
obligations as the nationals of those countries.” 
The Andean Community Social Security Instrument provides 
guidelines to determine the national legislation that governs a particular 
migrant worker’s access to social security (Articles 5 and 6 of the So-
cial Security Instrument).
t he e conomic Community of West African s tates
In 1975, the member states of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) entered into the ECOWAS Treaty, provid-
ing for free movement of individuals, the right of establishment, and 
the prohibition of discrimination (ECOWAS 2001a).1 ECOWAS mem-
bers include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo. Article 59 of the ECOWAS Treaty provides 
that “citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence 
and establishment and Member States undertake to recognize these 
rights of Community citizens in their territories” in accordance with the 
Protocols entered into by the member states.2 
The 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Per-
sons, Residence and Establishment, A/P.1/5/79, provides in Article 2 as 
follows:
The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and estab-
lish in the territory of Member States. The right of entry, residence 
and establishment referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be pro-
gressively established in the course of a maximum transitional 
period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of 
this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles to free movement of 
persons and the right of residence and establishment. 
The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be 
established in the course of a transitional period shall be accom-
plished in three phases, namely: 
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Phase I—Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa
Phase II—Right of Residence
Phase III—Right of Establishment
Upon the expiration of a maximum period of five (5) years from 
the definitive entry into force of this Protocol, the Commission, 
based upon the experience gained from the implementation of the 
first phase as set out in Article 3 below, shall make proposals to the 
Council of Ministers for further liberalisation towards the subse-
quent phases of freedom of residence and establishment of persons 
within the Community and phases shall be dealt with in subse-
quent Annexes to this Protocol. (ECOWAS 2001b)
Phase I was to be implemented via Article 3 which provides that any 
citizen of the community who wishes to enter the territory of another 
member state shall be required to possess a valid travel document and 
an international health certificate. Moreover, citizens are not required 
to have visas if they are visiting for less than 90 days. Article 11 of this 
protocol also provides for the circumstances in which a citizen may be 
expelled and the rights of expelled citizens.
This was followed by several supplementary protocols. Supplemen-
tary Protocol A/SP.2/7/85 on the Code of Conduct for the Implementation 
of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence 
and Establishment specifies the obligations of states to establish coop-
eration between respective immigration authorities, clarifying the rights 
of illegal immigrants. Also, Decision A/DEC.2/7/85 on the Establish-
ment of ECOWAS Travel Certificates for Member States provides for a 
harmonized travel document other than national passports for use with-
in ECOWAS in order to facilitate and simplify formalities governing 
movement of persons across borders (ECOWAS 1999).
In 1986, Supplementary Protocol A/SP/.1/7/86 (the Phase II Proto-
col) implemented Phase II, providing for rights of residence (ECOWAS 
2001c). Article 2 of the Phase II Protocol provides as follows: “For 
the purpose of implementing the second phase (right of residence) of 
the Protocol on free movement of persons, the right of residence and 
establishment, each of the Member States shall grant to citizens of the 
Community, who are nationals of other Member States, the right of resi-
dence in its territory for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income 
earning employment.”
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Further, the right of residence includes the right to apply for jobs 
offered, to travel freely for the purposes of applying for jobs, to reside 
in one of the member states in order to take up employment and to live 
in the territory of a member state. Exercise of these rights is only con-
tingent upon the citizen of the community’s acquisition of an ECOWAS 
residence card or residence permit (Article 5 of the Phase II Protocol). 
The Phase II Protocol also distinguishes between border area, sea-
sonal, or itinerant workers. Articles 10, 11, and 12 provide for the rights 
of each category respectively. Border area workers have the right to 
choose their employment freely and also enjoy all rights to which they 
are entitled through their presence and their work in the territory of the 
host member state, with the exception of rights relating to residence. 
Seasonal workers are entitled to enjoy all rights to which they are en-
titled through their presence and their work in the territory of the host 
member state. Itinerant workers shall enjoy the same except with re-
spect to rights relating to residence or to employment.
Further, Articles 13 and 14 of the Phase II Protocol provide for pro-
tection against collective and arbitrary expulsion as well as individual 
expulsion. They also provide for respect for the fundamental rights of 
the migrant worker. Article 25 states that rights guaranteed in this proto-
col may not be withdrawn or waived: “Any form of pressure exerted on 
migrant workers or members of their families to force them to give up 
any of these rights or to refrain from exercising them shall be prohibited. 
Any clause of an Agreement or Contract designed to force the migrant 
worker to give up any of these rights or refrain from exercising them 
shall be null and void according to the provisions of this Protocol.”
To facilitate the free movement of the migrant workers specified in 
the Phase II Protocol, Article 17 provides for freedom of remittance. 
In 1990, Supplementary Protocol A/SP/2/5/90 was entered into to 
provide for the implementation of Phase III (the Phase III Protocol): the 
right of establishment (ECOWAS 2001d). Article 4 states:
In matters of establishment and services, each Member State shall 
undertake to accord non-discriminatory treatment to nationals and 
companies of other Member States. If, however, for a specific
activity, a Member State is unable to accord such treatment, the 
Member State must indicate as much, in writing, to the Executive 
Secretariat. Other Member States shall then not be bound to accord 
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non-discriminatory treatment to nationals and companies of the 
State concerned. 
The provisions of this Protocol and measures taken as a result 
thereof shall be without prejudice to the application of legislative 
and administrative provisions, which provide a special treatment 
for non-nationals and are justified by exigencies of public order, 
security or public health. 
On the recommendation of the Commission, and on the proposal 
of the Council, the Authority shall take the relevant decision for 
the co-operation and harmonisation of legislative, statutory and 
administrative provisions which, in at least one Member State, 
make access to certain non-salaried activities (liberal or non-liberal  
professionals) and the exercise of such activities subject to protec-
tive or restrictive measures. 
To facilitate access to non-salaried activities and the exercise of 
such activities, the Commission shall recommend to the Council, 
which shall propose to the Authority that decisions be taken for the 
mutual recognition at Community level of diplomas, certificates
and other qualifications.
Activities which, in a Member State, form part, even occasionally, 
of the exercise of public authority, shall be exempted from the pro-
visions of this Protocol. 
Despite this impressive set of legal rules, implementation of free 
movement within ECOWAS remains a challenge. “Most countries of 
the subregion have enacted, or retained, a series of laws that in effect re-
strict ‘foreigners’ (including nationals of ECOWAS) from participating 
in certain kinds of economic activities . . .” (Adepoju 2007). Addressing 
a media briefing ahead of the ECOWAS commission’s 32nd anniver-
sary scheduled for May 28, 2007, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, president 
of the ECOWAS Commission, said that “the effective implementation 
of our regional protocol on free movement of persons remains one of 
our major challenges since the creation of ECOWAS” (People’s Daily 
Online 2007).
t he Common market for e astern and s outhern Africa 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
is the largest regional organization including southern African coun-
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tries. Article 4 of the COMESA Treaty states that one of the objectives 
of COMESA is to “remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
labor and services, right of establishment for investors and right of 
residence within the Common Market . . . In the interim, COMESA is 
implementing a Protocol on the gradual relaxation and eventual elimi-
nation of visa requirements and a Protocol on the free movement of 
persons, labour, services and the right of establishment and residence” 
(Nielson 2003, p. 100). COMESA members are Angola, Burundi, the 
Comoros, the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Article 164 of the COMESA Treaty provides: 
The Member States agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or 1) 
regional levels the necessary measures in order to achieve pro-
gressively the free movement of persons, labour and services 
and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of establishment and 
residence by their citizens within the Common Market.
The Member States agree to conclude a Protocol on the Free 2) 
Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment 
and Right of Residence.
The Member States agree that the Protocol on the Gradual Re-3) 
laxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements within 
the PTA adopted under the PTA Treaty shall remain in force until 
such time that a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, La-
bour, Service, Right of Establishment and Residence enters into 
force.
While protocols have been prepared, as of May 2007, only four 
member states (Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zimbabwe) had signed 
the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, 
Right of Establishment and Residence. Implementation has also lagged 
(COMESA 2007, p. 45). 
One possible reason behind the failure of member states to ratify 
the various protocols may be the wide jurisdiction that the COMESA 
Treaty accords to the COMESA Court. Pursuant to Article 23 of the 
COMESA Treaty, the COMESA Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
regarding all matters referred to in the Treaty. Further, Article 26 pro-
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vides that a resident of a member state may refer to the COMESA Court 
for determination on the legality of any act of state on the grounds that 
any such act is unlawful or an infringement of the treaty. This is itself 
a novel creation, as it allows nationals to have direct access to an inter-
national tribunal, similar to that allowed in the ECJ. However, this type 
of strong adjudication may present states with concerns regarding the 
strictness of enforcement of their obligations. 
Arrangements for mobility for s elected t ypes of Workers
The agreements described below provide for mobility for selected 
groups of workers. The selectivity is established in two ways. First, it is 
applied by focusing on “business persons,” a category which includes 
certain business visitors, traders and investors, intracorporate transfer-
ees and professionals. Second, selectivity can be based on a schedule of 
commitments that is selective as to the type of vocation or profession 
that will be admitted. However, it is quite clear in these agreements that 
liberalization of immigration is neither comprehensive nor normally 
available to low-skilled workers. 
u .s . Free t rade Agreements: n AFt A, Chile, s ingapore, 
Australia, and Jordan
The structure and content of the migration provisions of recent 
free trade agreements to which the United States is a party largely re-
flect important congressional resistance to negotiating immigration 
commitments in the context of trade agreements. Congressman James 
Sensenbrenner, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, noted in 2003 
that 
members of this Committee spoke with a united bipartisan voice 
that immigration provisions in future free trade agreements will not 
receive the support of this Committee. . . . I am also concerned that 
there not be future changes in the basic immigration law contained 
in future trade agreements. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
makes immigration and naturalization law an exclusive enumer-
ated power of the Congress, and we intend to follow the Constitu-
tion and not to delegate this authority to the executive branch of 
Government. (U.S. Congress 2003) 
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Of course, the trade agreements that Congressman Sensenbrenner 
discussed are required to be approved by Congress pursuant to majority 
voting, so there is little formal question of full delegation of authority 
to the Executive. The Naturalization Clause of Article I, Section 8, of 
the U.S. Constitution, in relevant part, states that “Congress shall have 
Power . . . To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” However, 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution also makes regulation of com-
merce with foreign nations the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress—this 
is the reason why the U.S. has used “Fast Track,” now termed “Trade 
Promotion Authority,” to bring trade agreements to an up or down vote 
in Congress without amendment. So there is really no significant con-
stitutional difference between migration and trade in terms of the role 
of Congress. However, Sensenbrenner describes a substantial political 
difference, and it is true that Congress has not made the kinds of delega-
tions or preliminary delegations in the immigration area that it has made 
in the trade area. 
U.S. organized labor has opposed the negotiation of immigration 
commitments in trade agreements. Hart noted that while negotiating 
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), “The United States was 
prepared to see relatively easier access for managerial and professional 
travelers, but was reluctant to include general service and sale person-
nel, largely due to strong opposition from organized labour” (Hart 1994, 
p. 305).
Hence, to varying degrees, the U.S. FTA regime does not treat im-
migration commitments in the same manner as the EU, EEAA, EFTA, 
and certain other preferential trade agreement–based regimes, some of 
which provide for freedom of movement, establishment, and residence. 
The U.S. FTA approach to negotiating immigration commitments, like 
its approach to GATS, focuses on facilitating liberalization of trade in 
services, providing for temporary entry for business persons. 
To a large extent, as a reflect on of consistent United States policy 
with respect to negotiating immigration commitments in the context of 
trade agreements, the immigration provisions in the various agreements 
in the United States FTA regime appear to be modeled after or struc-
tured similarly to corresponding provisions in NAFTA. 
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n AFt A
Signed in 1992, NAFTA established immigration provisions for 
certain types of business persons modeled on commitments in the 1988 
U.S.-Canada FTA (Wasem 2006). For avoidance of doubt, NAFTA 
states clearly that nothing in the relevant chapter, Chapter 12 on Cross-
Border Trade in Services, shall “impose any obligation on a Party with 
respect to a national of the other Party seeking access to its employment 
market, or employed on a permanent basis in its territory, and does not 
confer any right on that national with respect to that access or employ-
ment” (Article1201[3] of NAFTA). 
Similar language is found in the MONP Annex to the GATS, and 
has been replicated in a number of subsequent FTAs. (See Chapter 8.) 
Chapter 16 of NAFTA, “Temporary Entry for Business Persons,” 
contains commitments from Mexico, Canada, and the United States to 
allow for temporary migration of business workers. Importantly, these 
provisions are limited to temporary entry (NAFTA Secretariat 2001). 
Article 1601 of NAFTA provides as follows: “This Chapter reflects the
preferential trading relationship between the Parties, the desirability of 
facilitating temporary entry on a reciprocal basis and of establishing 
transparent criteria and procedures for temporary entry, and the need 
to ensure border security and to protect the domestic labor force and 
permanent employment in their respective territories.”
The agreement defines “business person” as “a citizen of a Party 
who is engaged in trade in goods, the provision of services or the conduct 
of investment activities” (NAFTA, Article 1608). NAFTA distinguishes 
among four main categories of temporary entry for business persons: 1) 
business visitors, 2) traders and investors, 3) intracorporate transferees, 
and 4) professionals (Annex to Article 1603 of NAFTA).
Business visitors include persons in research and design, growth, 
manufacture and production, sales, marketing, and other sectors. 
Traders and investors include “business person[s] seeking to: (a) 
carry on substantial trade in goods or services principally between the 
territory of the Party of which the business person is a citizen and the 
territory of the Party into which entry is sought, or (b) establish, de-
velop, administer or provide advice or key technical services to the op-
eration of an investment to which the business person or the business 
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person’s enterprise has committed, or is in the process of committing, 
a substantial amount of capital, in a capacity that is supervisory, execu-
tive or involves essential skills.”
Intracorporate transferee is defined as a “business person employed 
by an enterprise who seeks to render services to that enterprise or a sub-
sidiary or affiliate thereof, in a capacity that is managerial, executive 
or involves specialized knowledge, provided that the business person 
otherwise complies with existing immigration measures applicable to 
temporary entry.” Further, “a Party may require the business person to 
have been employed continuously by the enterprise for one year within 
the three year period immediately preceding the date of the applica-
tion for admission.” No party may limit the number of “intra-corporate 
transferees.”
Professionals are provided for in Appendix 1603.D.1, which also 
specifies the minimum education qualifications for each profession. 
States may not provide a numerical restriction on the number of profes-
sionals except for particular circumstances. 
These categories parallel similar categories in U.S. visa law under 
§101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act: B-2 visitors, E-
1 treaty traders, L-1 intracompany transferees, and H-1B professional 
workers. 
The NAFTA professional status is designated “TN.” Neither Ca-
nadian nor Mexican professional workers otherwise meeting the 
requirements for TN status are subject to labor certification or simi-
lar tests. In the U.S. system, labor certification requires that employers 
conduct a search for U.S. workers and that the Department of Labor de-
termine that admitting alien workers will not adversely affect the wages 
and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers (Wasem 
2006, p. 5). 
Under NAFTA, “each Party shall grant temporary entry to business 
persons who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable measures 
relating to public health and safety and national security, in accordance 
with this Chapter, including the provisions of Annex 1603” (Article 
1603[1] of NAFTA). “Work permits are required for all but business 
visitors and visas are still required but are limited to the approximate 
costs of services” (Nielson 2003, p. 101). Other existing immigration 
requirements (relating to public health and national security) continue 
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to apply. Furthermore, a “Party may refuse to issue an immigration 
document authorizing employment to a business person where the tem-
porary entry of that person might affect adversely: (a) the settlement of 
any labor dispute that is in progress at the place or intended place of 
employment; or (b) the employment of any person who is involved in 
such dispute” (Article 1603[2] of NAFTA). The applicant must submit 
an application including a letter of offer of professional employment 
that describes the activity to be performed, the purpose of entry, and the 
proposed duration of stay, along with evidence of professional status. 
The United States amended its Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 to accommodate the new commitments. 
The major nonimmigrant category for temporary workers is the 
H visa. The current H-1 categories include professional specialty 
workers (H-1B) and nurses (H-1C). There are two visa catego-
ries for temporarily importing seasonal workers, i.e., guest work-
ers: agricultural workers enter with H-2A visas and other seasonal 
workers enter with H-2B visas. Temporary professional workers 
from Canada and Mexico may enter according to terms set by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on TN visas. 
The law sets numerical restrictions on annual admissions of the H-
1B (65,000), the H-2B (66,000) and the H-1C (500) visas. (Wasem 
2005, p. 5, citations omitted)
Under the agreement, the United States initially made a numerical-
ly limited commitment for up to 5,500 Mexican professionals to enter 
annually under H-1 visas (Section 1 of the Appendix to 1603.D.4 of 
NAFTA). This limitation on the U.S. commitment expired in 2005 and 
was not renewed. Thus, there is no limit on TN visas (Wasem 2006). 
The U.S. visa commitments with respect to temporary business visitors, 
traders, and investors, and intracorporate transferees have remained the 
same. NAFTA prohibited the imposition of numerical restrictions on the 
quantity of visas available to these three categories of business persons 
(Section A[4], section B[2] and section C[2] of the Annex to Article 
1603 of NAFTA). Canadians may obtain a TN visa at the port of entry, 
so long as they present a letter from a U.S. employer. Mexicans must 
have their employer file a labor condition application before applying 
for a visa at the U.S. embassy. 
Under NAFTA, “parties shall encourage the relevant bodies in their 
respective territories to develop mutually acceptable standards and cri-
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teria for licensing and certific tion of professional service providers and 
to provide recommendations on mutual recognition to the Commission” 
(Section 2 of Annex to Article 1210.5 of NAFTA).
Under Chapter 16 of NAFTA, a party may initiate dispute settlement 
proceedings under Article 2007 in relation to denial of opportunities to 
business persons, only if: “(a) the matter involves a pattern of practice; 
and (b) the business person has exhausted the available administrative 
remedies regarding the particular matter.” The remedies upon successful 
dispute resolution are deemed to be exhausted if a final determination 
in the matter has not been issued by the competent authority within one 
year of the institution of an administrative proceeding, and the failure 
to issue a determination is not attributable to delay caused by the busi-
ness person.
u .s .-Chile Ft A 
The United States and Chile entered into a free trade agreement in 
2003 (U.S. Congress 2003). Chapter 14 of the U.S.-Chile FTA, based 
largely on Chapter 16 of NAFTA, is devoted to temporary entry of 
business persons. The “general principles” of Chapter 14 state that the 
parties seek to establish an agreement on temporary entry in order to 
enhance “ . . . the preferential trading relationship between the Parties, 
the mutual desire of the Parties to facilitate temporary entry of business 
persons under the provisions of Annex 14.3 on a reciprocal basis and 
of establishing transparent criteria and procedures for temporary entry, 
and the need to ensure border security and to protect the domestic labor 
force and permanent employment in their respective territories.”
Like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA also contains the express qualific -
tion that “this chapter does not apply to measures regarding citizenship, 
nationality, permanent residence, or employment on a permanent ba-
sis” (Article 14.1.2). Like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA makes the same 
distinction among traders and investors, professionals, intracorporate 
transferees, and business visitors. In addition, there is a definition of 
professional: “a national of a Party who is engaged in a specialty oc-
cupation requiring: (a) theoretical and practical application of a body of 
specialized knowledge, and (b) attainment of a post-secondary degree 
in the specialty requiring four or more years of study (or the equivalent 
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of such a degree) as a minimum for entry into the occupation” (Article 
14.9 of the U.S.-Chile FTA). Additionally, the U.S.-Chile FTA requires 
a “labor attestation” (Section D(5) of Annex to Article 14.3 of the U.S.-
Chile FTA). 
Notably, the number of visas that the United States is to issue for 
professionals under the U.S.-Chile FTA is 1,400 (Appendix to Article 
14.3(D)(6) of the U.S.-Chile FTA).3 An aggregate of 6,800 visas is set 
aside during each fiscal year for the H-1B1 program under the terms of 
the legislation implementing the U.S.-Chile FTA and the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA together. This block of 6,800 H-1B1 visas is initially reserved from 
the annual limit (currently 65,000) for H-1B visas. Unused numbers in 
this pool can be made available for H-1B use. For fiscal year 2008, the 
U.S. Customs and Immigration Service has estimated that only 1000 of 
the H-1B1 visas will be used, and therefore has added 5,800 visas to the 
number of H-1B visas available for fiscal year 2008.
H-1B1 professional worker visas are counted against the aggregate 
U.S. H-1B cap of 65,000 visas during the first year and again after the 
fifth year of renewal.4 Of course, the fact that these visas are counted 
against the total U.S. H-1B cap means that visas issued under these pro-
grams reduce those available to nationals of other states. This raises the 
same type of MFN issue that we see in trade law and investment law, 
albeit with distinct economic ramifications. From a trade perspective, 
we can think of this arrangement as a quota (the total cap) administered 
on a non-MFN basis. When the EU attempted to justify such a quota 
with respect to goods in the Bananas litigation, the WTO appellate body 
found a violation of the MFN requirement.5 
There is also provision for mutual recognition of each state’s aca-
demic structure. Hence, Chile recognizes the baccalaureate, master’s, 
and doctoral degrees conferred by institutions in the United States as 
such, while the United States recognizes the licenciatura degree and 
titulo profesional and higher degrees conferred by institutions in Chile 
as such degrees (footnote to Article 14.9 of the U.S.-Chile FTA).
Dispute settlement is also similar to NAFTA insofar as there is no 
direct access to dispute resolution without having to prove continuous 
conduct as well as exhaustion of existing administrative remedies (Ar-
ticle 14.6 of the U.S.-Chile FTA).
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u .s .-s ingapore Ft A
The U.S.-Singapore FTA contains temporary entry provisions simi-
lar to the U.S.-Chile FTA and NAFTA, including provisions allowing 
for temporary entry of business persons, traders and investors, and in-
tracompany transferees. 
As with the U.S.-Chile FTA, the chapter in the U.S.-Singapore 
FTA that provides for temporary entry of business persons starts with a 
strong qualifying statement that “this chapter does not impose any ob-
ligation on a Party with respect to a national of the other Party seeking 
access to its employment market, or employed on a permanent basis in 
its territory, and does not confer any right on that national with respect 
to that access or employment” (U.S. Trade Representative 2003a).
Similar to the U.S.-Chile FTA, the U.S.-Singapore FTA provides 
that professionals must have the following credentials to qualify for 
temporary entry: “(a) theoretical and practical application of a body of 
specialized knowledge; and (b) attainment of a post-secondary degree 
in the specialty requiring four or more years of study (or the equivalent 
of such a degree) as a minimum for entry into the occupation. Such de-
grees include the Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, and the Doctoral 
Degree conferred by institutions in the United States and Singapore” 
(Section IV[1] of Annex to Article 11A of the U.S.-Singapore FTA).
As noted above, the qualifi ations for temporary entry in these 
FTAs prevent entry under these agreements by lower-skilled persons. 
Although certain types of business exchanges were deemed suitable for 
the FTA, the importation of lower-skilled labor was not open to negotia-
tion. This was as agreeable to Singapore as it was to the United States, 
as Singapore had a preexisting “Foreign Talent” policy where it seeks 
to attract highly skilled, as opposed to lower-skilled, labor (Koh and 
Chang 2004, p. 210).6 
The U.S.-Singapore FTA provides the same types of obligations as 
the U.S.-Chile FTA with respect to entry of “professionals.” Notably 
there is also a similar requirement for labor market attestation. This 
can be found in the side letter between the U.S. Trade Representative 
and the Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry. In addition, another 
side letter clarifies that Singapore’s intention of setting a salary criterion 
does not constitute breach (U.S. Trade Representative 2003b).
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Under the U.S.-Singapore FTA, the United States committed to 
provide up to 5,400 visas annually to Singaporeans (appendix to Ar-
ticle 11A.3 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA). Holders of an FTA professional 
worker visa, unlike holders of an H-1B visa, may remain in the United 
States indefinitel . Holders of the FTA professional worker visa are 
temporary residents, and may only work for employers that meet the la-
bor attestation requirements. The U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Chile FTAs 
provide that the United States shall not require labor certification as 
a condition of entry and shall not impose numerical limits on intra- 
company transfers.7 
The same types of arrangements as those found in NAFTA and the 
U.S.-Chile FTA were used in the U.S.-Singapore FTA in relation to the 
issues of dispute resolution and bases for denial of visa (Article 11.4 
and Article 11.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, respectively).
u .s .-Jordan Ft A and Australia-u .s . Ft A 
The U.S.-Jordan FTA and the U.S.-Australia FTA do not follow 
the NAFTA structure of regulating the temporary entry of business per-
sons. While the U.S.-Australia FTA, signed May 18, 2004, contains 
no immigration provisions, the United States subsequently passed leg-
islation for 10,500 visas for Australian nationals to perform services 
in specialty occupations under a new E-3 temporary visa, as part of 
supplemental appropriations for 2005 to support military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Trade Representative 2004). The profes-
sional requirements of the E-3 visa mirror requirements in the Chile and 
Singapore FTAs, but eligibility is significantly expanded. According to 
the Government of Australia’s Department of Home Affairs and Trade 
(and illustrating the MFN issue raised above),
Qualified Australians, wishing to reside and work in the United 
States, now find themselves in a privileged position. They have ac-
cess to a dedicated visa that is easier and less costly to obtain than 
the traditional H-1B business visa. Under the regulations, 10,500 
E-3 visas per annum have been reserved exclusively for Australian 
nationals (by comparison only 900 Australians succeeded in gain-
ing the US H-1B business visa in 2004). Unlike the H-1B visa, 
spouses of E-3 visa holders are now able to work in the United 
States, eliminating a barrier that in practice stopped many Aus-
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tralians from applying for the H-1B visa. E-3 visa holders will be 
able to apply for extensions. (Australian Government, Free Trade 
Agreements 2005)
The commitments to Chile, Singapore, and Australia, like those 
made in the WTO GATS, generally exclude low-skilled workers. 
The introduction of the “E-3” visa in connection with the U.S.- 
Australia FTA in May 2005, which is essentially an H-1B visa only for 
10,500 Australians a year, will make the annual congressional H-1B 
cap less reliable as a measure of foreign high-skilled labor inflows into 
the United States. As the Immigration and Nationality Act draws a clear 
distinction between H-1B visas and E-3 visas, the number of E-3 visas 
provided to Australians should not count against the numerical limit 
which only applies to H-1B visas. However, this special treatment for 
Australia raises MFN-type issues. The E-3 arrangements for Austra-
lia further indicate that at least for “allied developed countries,” visas 
for high-skilled persons are increasingly becoming a bargaining chip in 
FTA negotiations. This does not so far seem to be the case in U.S. FTA 
negotiations with developing countries (Kirkegaard 2005, p. 10).
The U.S.-Jordan FTA is also different from the NAFTA model. 
Nielson defines it as “an agreement using the GATS model with some 
additional elements” (Nielson 2003, p. 103). In the U.S.-Jordan FTA, 
labor mobility is covered under the section on trade in services, which 
is modeled after GATS. Accordingly, the same types of limitations on 
rights and obligations relating to immigration and entry of the domestic 
labor market provided under the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons, discussed in Chapter 8, apply under this agreement. Addition-
ally, the U.S.-Jordan FTA provides that Jordan nationals are eligible to 
apply for treaty-trader (E-1) and treaty-investor (E-2) visas (footnote 
12 to Article 8(2) of the U.S.-Jordan FTA), no numerical limitation or 
commitment was stipulated. Moreover, the numerical limitations that 
apply to H-1 visas as provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
would not apply to E visas (U.S. Trade Representative 2002). 
While additional U.S. FTA partners have requested inclusion of 
temporary entry provisions, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has 
consistently demurred and instead referred FTA partners to Congress 
for any potential new visa commitments.8 United States-Dominican 
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement has no explicit im-
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migration provisions. This is noteworthy in light of the large amount of 
illegal immigration to the United States from these countries. 
It is reasonably clear, after a survey of the above U.S. FTAs, that 
most of them follow a distinct NAFTA prototype. Even in the cases 
of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the Australia-U.S. FTA, deviations from 
the NAFTA prototype are explained according to the specific negotia-
tion contexts. As will be seen later, some other countries (in particular, 
Japan and Singapore in the JSCEPA) have also adopted the NAFTA 
model to some degree.
Caribbean Community
The original 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas did not address migra-
tion, but merely stated that member states should “as far as practicable” 
extend to persons belonging to other member states, preferential treat-
ment over persons belonging to states outside the common market with 
regard to the provision of services. A 2001 revised Treaty of Chaguara-
mas (CARICOM 2001) integrates the obligations contained in a 1998 
protocol, and provides for the prohibition of new restrictions to the right 
of establishment and removal of existing restrictions on the right of 
establishment. Article 32(3) provides as follows: 
The right of establishment within the meaning of this Chapter 1) 
shall include the right to:
engage in any non-wage-earning activities of a commercial, a) 
industrial, agricultural, professional or artisanal nature; 
create and manage economic enterprises referred to in para-b) 
graph 5(b) of this Article. 
For the purposes of this Chapter “non-wage earning activities” 2) 
means activities undertaken by self-employed persons.
Further, the management of removal of restrictions is also provided 
for in Article 34. A committee of national ministers of trade and devel-
opment (COTED) is generally empowered, by a three-fourths majority 
vote, to take a number of types of supplementary actions to secure the 
right of establishment, including to “require the Member States to re-
move all restrictions on the movement of managerial, technical and 
supervisory staff of economic enterprises and on establishing agencies, 
branches and subsidiaries of companies and other entities established in 
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the 23” (Article 34[c]). COTED is also empowered to make decisions 
relating to “the conditions governing the entry of managerial, techni-
cal or supervisory personnel employed in such agencies, branches and 
subsidiaries, including the spouses and immediate dependent family 
members of such personnel” (Article 34[d][2]). 
Furthermore, Article 45 of the revised Treaty establishes a commit-
ment to the “goal” of free movement of Community nationals within 
the Community. Article 46 establishes free movement in order to seek 
employment for university graduates, media workers, sportspersons, 
“artistes,” and musicians. It also provides that member states must act 
in order to 
provide for movement of Community nationals into and within 
their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of impedi-
ments, including
the elimination of the requirement for passports for Com-i) 
munity nationals travelling to their jurisdictions; 
the elimination of the requirement for work permits for ii) 
Community nationals seeking approved employment in their 
jurisdictions; 
establishment of mechanisms for certifying and establishing iii) 
equivalency of degrees and for accrediting institutions; 
harmonisation and transferability of social security benefitsiv) 
To facilitate the free movement of highly skilled labor, the revised 
Treaty also provides for the establishment of “common standards and 
measures for accreditation or when necessary for the mutual recogni-
tion of diplomas, certificate  and other evidence of qualifications of 
the nationals of the Member States in order to facilitate access to, and 
engagement in, employment and non-wage-earning activities in the 
Community.” Further, 
Member States shall establish or employ, as the case may be, ap-
propriate mechanisms to establish common standards to determine 
equivalency or accord accreditation to diplomas, certificates and 
other evidence of qualificationssecured by nationals of other Mem-
ber States and COHSOD [the Council for Human and Social De-
velopment] shall also establish measures for the co-ordination of 
legislative and administrative requirements of the Member States 
for the participation of Community nationals in employment and 
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for the conduct of non-wage-earning activities in the Community. 
(Article 35 of the revised Treaty) 
In addition, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) regime pro-
vides a “safeguard mechanism” which allows for derogation from 
obligations by states in cases of hardship. Article 47 provides a nuanced 
procedure that can allow states to respond to “serious difficulties in any 
sector of the economy of a Member State or occasions of economic 
hardships in a region of the Community.”
Despite these measures, however, there are still significant gaps in 
CARICOM labor mobility, including limitations of free movement of 
labor to highly skilled labor, and slow and inconsistent implementation 
(Jessen and Rodriguez 1999, pp. 16–71).9
CARICOM has also implemented a CARICOM visa arrangement 
in 2007. This new visa arrangement was intended to enhance measures 
being taken to reduce the risks associated with drug trafficking, terror-
ism and trafficking in humans during ICC Cricket World Cup 2007. 
More importantly, it also is a step toward harmonization of visa policy 
and procedures as part of common policy on the free movement of 
persons.
Japan-s ingapore Closer e conomic Partnership 
Agreement (Js Ce PA)
The obligations with respect to movement of labor in the JSCEPA 
are modeled after the GATS framework, and only apply to movement 
of persons entering either territory for business purposes. As Nielson 
(2003, pp. 102–103) notes, “Chapter 9 (Movement of natural persons) 
applies to measures affecting the movement of natural persons of a 
Party (nationals of Japan and nationals and permanent residents of Sin-
gapore) who enter the territory of the other Party for business purposes 
(including as investors). Carve-outs are similar to the GATS Annex 
(i.e., regarding nationality, citizenship, residence or employment on a 
permanent basis).”
Further, like the U.S. FTA regime, the JSCEPA provides for specific
commitments which distinguish between four kinds of persons entering 
for business purposes. They are business visitors, intracorporate trans-
ferees, investors, and natural persons who engage in work on the basis 
of a personal contract with public or private organizations. 
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Article 92(4) limits the specific commitments to allow entry of per-
sons for business purposes only to sectors provided under Chapter 7 
(the chapter that deals with trade in services).
Singapore’s specific commitments allow for business visitors to 
stay for one month, extendable up to three months. Intracorporate trans-
ferees who are managers, executives, or specialists of firms providing 
services in Singapore (note the linkage to services), and have been in 
the employ of their firm for at least one year, may remain for a two-year 
period extendable for periods of up to three additional years each time 
for a total term not exceeding eight years (further extensions may be 
possible). Independent service suppliers are limited to engineers rec-
ognized under the domestic laws and regulations of Singapore, and are 
admissible under similar terms. 
Japan’s specific commitments allow for business visitors (as de-
fined) to remain for a period not exceeding 90 days. Intracorporate 
transferees who have been employed for at least a year, and who are 
high-level managers, work with high technology or high-level human 
science, and certain types of legal specialists, may also enter and stay 
without specific limits. Finally, independent engineering professionals 
are permitted to enter and stay without specific limits.
Also, the JSCEPA, in Article 93, provides that either state may rec-
ognize the professional qualifications of the other state. To this end, 
Article 94 establishes a Joint Committee on Mutual Recognition of Pro-
fessional Qualifications. The Joint Committee is responsible to review 
the issues concerning the effective implementation of Article 93, iden-
tifying and recommending areas for and ways of furthering cooperation 
between the parties.
Agreements u sing the g Ats  model with s ome Additional e lements
eu -mexico Free t rade Agreement
The EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (EU-Mexico FTA) called 
for the negotiation of a services integration agreement under Article V 
of GATS and addresses labor mobility through trade in services. Article 
27(4) guarantees that individual states retain their sovereignty to regu-
late immigration in their own jurisdictions.
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Nothing in this title shall prevent a party from applying its laws, 
regulations, and requirements regarding entry and stay, work, labor 
conditions, and establishment of natural persons provided that, in so 
doing, it does not apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the 
benefits accruing to the other party under the terms of a specific provi-
sion of this title.
Article 9 of the EU-Mexico FTA also provides that parties shall 
move toward mutual recognition of requirements, qualific tions, licens-
es, and other regulations, for the purpose of the fulfillment, in whole or 
in part, by service suppliers of the criteria applied by each party for the 
authorization, licensing, operation, and certification of service suppliers 
and, in particular, professional services. 
Agreements t hat u se the g Ats  model
mercosur
 Mercosur has not moved toward general free movement of labor. 
As can be seen from the Protocol of Montevideo on Services (the Mon-
tevideo Protocol), Mercosur’s treatment of movement of labor directly 
replicates the GATS model.10 Market access is based solely on specific
commitments which are annexed to the Montevideo Protocol covering 
the movement of all categories of natural persons who provide services 
within the framework of the protocol (Pena 2000, p. 158). The Annex 
to the Montevideo Protocol on the Movement of Natural Persons Sup-
plying Services is largely similar to that under GATS. 
Article XI of the Montevideo Protocol addresses the possibility that 
a Mercosur member state might enter into an arrangement for mutual 
recognition of profession qualifications with a third state. It provides 
in paragraph (a) that this will not necessarily violate the obligation to 
provide MFN treatment.
When a Member recognizes, unilaterally or by way of an agree-
ment, the education, experience, licenses, matriculation records, 
or certificates obtained in the territory of another Member or any 
country that is not a member of Mercosur:
Nothing in this Protocol shall be construed to require this a) 
Member to recognize the education, experience, matricula-
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tion records or certificates obtained in the territory of an-
other Member; and
The Member shall accord to any other Member an adequate b) 
opportunity to i) demonstrate that the education, experience, 
licenses and certificates obtained in its territory should also 
be recognized; or ii) to conclude an agreement or treaty of 
equivalent effect.
Modest progress toward liberalization has been made in other areas. 
Mercosur approved in two decisions in 1999 and 2000 an agreement to 
facilitate movement across neighboring borders. In 1997, Mercosur had 
approved an agreement to coordinate social security rights. In 2000, 
Mercosur approved an agreement on visa exemptions allowing artists, 
scientists, sportspersons, journalists, specialized technicians, and pro-
fessionals to enter other member states without a visa for a stay of up to 
90 days, extendible to up to 180 days. 
The 2002 Agreement on Residence in Mercosur States, Bolivia and 
Chile (the Residence Agreement) provides that citizens of the member 
states may live and work in other member states. The Residence Agree-
ment is not yet in force. It provides that citizens of member states may 
apply for temporary residence in other member states, with a maximum 
of two years, and may apply for permanent residence thereafter. Immi-
grants are permitted to bring their families with them, except for those 
who are disabled. Immigrants are permitted to work in any occupation, 
and are accorded broad rights of national treatment. 
The Residence Agreement is an important step, as it was motivated 
in part by the need to stop illegal human trafficking and exploitation—it 
does so by making movement legal. 
COn Clusi On
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the review of agreements 
performed here advances our discussion in two ways. First, it provides 
evidence that many states are indeed engaging in negotiations of liberal-
ization of international labor migration. While these efforts are regional 
and often limited, they show that states believe that cooperation may 
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be useful in this area. Second, this review provides a broader supply of 
examples of methods of cooperation. It will assist negotiators as they 
examine the possible methods of cooperation available to them. 
n otes
For a recent look at the state of legislation on migrant workers in West Africa, see 1. 
Ba and Fall (2006).
It should be noted that due to the conclusion of the various protocols relating 2. 
to freedom of movement, residence and establishment, the ECOWAS Treaty has 
been amended to reflect the rights and obligations contained in the respective pro-
tocols. References to the ECOWAS Treaty here all are made to the revised treaty.
The implementing legislation amended §101(a)(15)(H) of the Immigration and 3. 
Nationality Act to designate a portion of the aggregate H-1B visas (H-1B1 visas) 
for professional workers entering pursuant to the Chile and Singapore FTAs.
Arguably, U.S. commitments under NAFTA to provide H-1B visas are not subject 4. 
to the general numerical limitation on H-1B visas as provided in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. Sections 214(e)(i) and 214(e)(ii) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act give the Attorney General the authority to regulate the admission of 
Canadian and Mexican nationals pursuant to NAFTA and the Canadian-U.S. FTA, 
including establishing numerical limits on the admission on Mexican nationals. 
Further, U.S. commitments under the U.S.-Australia FTA and U.S.-Jordan FTA are 
not affected by the numerical limitations in the Immigration and Nationality Act as 
the limitations only relate to H-1B (professional worker) visas and not to E visas. 
WTO (1997). Adopted by Dispute Settlement Body, November 17, 1997.5. 
See also Low (2002, pp. 409–425) for discussion on aspects of Singapore’s For-6. 
eign Talent Policy. 
Chapter 11, §3 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, Annex 11A, signed May 6, 2003; 7. 
Chapter 14, §3 of the U.S.-Chile FTA, Annex 14.3, signed June 6, 2003.
Mikael Lurie, who served, along with Jeremy Leong, as research assistant to the 8. 
author in connection with the preparation of this chapter, participated in FTA ne-
gotiations between the United States and the United Arab Emirates in November 
2005 where the UAE delegation repeatedly requested temporary entry provisions 
in the FTA USTR and State Department negotiators insisted that the United Arab 
Emirates negotiators would have to lobby the U.S. Congress directly, akin to the 
strategy employed by Australia following Judiciary Chairman Sensenbrenner’s 
objections to including immigration provisions in the Chile and Singapore FTAs.
Duchs and Straubhaar provide a useful overview of the state of ratification of the 9. 
various CARICOM protocols (Duchs and Straubhaar 2003, p. 12). They conclude 
that “Fourth, the establishment of free movement within CARICOM might not 
stimulate strong migration flows. There are not many incentives for a broad real-
location of labour within CARICOM” (Duchs and Straubhaar 2003, p. 55).
Job Name: -- /309724t
240   Trachtman
10. Franciso Prieto (2000, p. 230) argues that commitments negotiated in regional 
trade agreements for services provided through GATS (temporary movement of 
natural persons) are limited. He states, “The limited commitments in this field are 
restricted to intracompany personnel movements and to top-level executives, with 
little progress in the provision of professional services and much less or none at 
all in the provision of technical and specialized services.” The same criticism may 
also be directed by analogy to arrangements using the GATS model with some 
additional elements as discussed above.
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Mode 4 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services
The WTO does not deal with labor or migration per se, just as it 
does not deal with finance or investment per se. However, labor has en-
tered the WTO in several ways, including through the subject of trade in 
services. In fact, there is an important overlap between trade in services 
concerns and migration concerns. 
From a trade standpoint, limits on immigration, where immigra-
tion is necessary to cross-border trade in services, are barriers to that 
trade. These barriers include quotas or other quantitative restrictions on 
immigration, bureaucratic formalities involved with obtaining a visa, 
visa fees, discrimination against foreign workers, and limits on recogni-
tion of professional qualifications (Chaudhuri, Mattoo, and Self 2004). 
Indeed, some states have imposed wage parity conditions that require 
those employing foreign personnel to pay them a wage similar to that 
paid to domestic personnel. This is reminiscent of antidumping mea-
sures in connection with goods trade. Other states impose economic 
needs tests or labor market conditions that have not been used in con-
nection with trade in goods or other types of trade in services (although 
economic needs tests have been scheduled in some sectors under Mode 
3). Of course, individuals are not commodities, but there are salient 
analogies and overlaps between trade and migration. 
From the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades 
(GATT) in 1947 until the founding of the WTO in 1994, the multilateral 
trade system paid little attention to labor (Charnovitz  2003a, p. 241). 
Under the 1994 WTO GATS, one mode of supply of services across 
borders is the so-called Mode 4, specified in Article I:2(d) of GATS: 
“by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural per-
sons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.” 
Perhaps surprisingly, Mode 4 was seen as compensation to devel-
oping countries for inclusion of Mode 3 (commercial presence, which 
includes investment in services enterprises) at the request of developed 
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countries (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 6).1 This is surprising from an 
economic standpoint because, first, investment is generally understood 
to be beneficial to developing countries, and second, the risk of brain 
drain makes Mode 4 of uncertain benefit to developing countries, es-
pecially because Mode 4 commitments as agreed in 1994 generally did 
not cover unskilled labor (although there is no a priori reason why they 
could not have). Of course, the fact that Mode 4 is limited to temporary 
migration reduces any brain drain concern. 
Furthermore, the 1994 Uruguay Round commitments in Mode 4 
were modest (see Carzaniga 2003; OECD 2002; and WTO 1999a). 
The GATS is a framework agreement in the sense that it is a positive 
list in which most obligations only apply to service sectors listed and 
then only to the extent not excluded. Most countries only made limited 
commitments. However, this does not mean that greater commitments 
cannot be made in the future, or that the character of GATS as a positive 
list agreement cannot be modified if states determine to do so.
The basic GATS disciplines include national treatment and market 
access. But in connection with these disciplines, GATS is a positive 
list-based agreement. Therefore, the application of these disciplines is 
dependent upon scheduling of the relevant service sector in the sched-
ule of commitments of the relevant state. In other words, unless the 
service sector is scheduled, there is no national treatment or market ac-
cess obligation. States were permitted to specify limits to their national 
treatment or market access obligations on the face of their schedules 
of commitments, and the schedules are replete with such limits. On 
the other hand, the MFN obligation contained in GATS applies regard-
less of the scheduling of the relevant service sector. This obligation 
was subject to the much more limited, and degressive, list of Article II 
exemptions. Finally, GATS contains rather modest disciplines on do-
mestic regulation. 
There are three critical limitations on Mode 4 as agreed in the Uru-
guay Round. First, GATS does not cover all labor, only that which is 
related to the supply of services as specified in Article I:2(d). So, labor 
related to the production of goods is generally not covered (even though 
in theoretical terms production of goods results from the application 
of “services” to raw materials).2 Second, as mentioned above, GATS 
is a positive list agreement, meaning that only those service sectors 
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that are scheduled are the subject of commitments, and states negotiate 
over these schedules. In the 1994 WTO agreement, Mode 4 services 
commitments did not fare very well. Third, the GATS Annex on Move-
ment of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement (the 
MONP Annex) restricts the scope of application of GATS to immigra-
tion measures. 
In fact, the commitments were generally limited to high-skill-based 
services. Many commitments were linked to Mode 3—commercial 
presence: movement of natural persons as intracorporate transferees 
in connection with commercial establishments. Most commitments 
were limited to cases of intracorporate transferees where the transferee 
had worked for the corporate transferor for a minimum period of time. 
The requirement of a Mode 3 linkage limits availability to developing 
countries, which are generally capital importing rather than exporting 
countries. For commitments relating to independent service providers, 
most commitments specified that a prior contract would be required: 
Mode 4 did not open up the domestic market to contract seekers. See 
the discussion of the MONP Annex below. Many of the commitments 
still contain economic needs tests or labor market condition tests that 
are highly discretionary with the destination state. 
The MONP  ANNex
The MONP Annex specifies as follows:
This Annex applies to measures affecting natural persons who are 1) 
service suppliers of a Member, and natural persons of a Member 
who are employed by a service supplier of a Member, in respect 
of the supply of a service.
The Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural per-2) 
sons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor 
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or em-
ployment on a permanent basis. 
. . . Natural persons covered by a specific commitment shall be 3) 
allowed to supply the service in accordance with the terms of that 
commitment.
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The Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying mea-4) 
sures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their tem-
porary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary 
to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of 
natural persons across, its borders, provided that such measures 
are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the ben-
efits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific com-
mitment. (footnote omitted) 
Under the first clause of paragraph 2, states have no obligations un-
der GATS with respect to those seeking employment. The exclusion by 
paragraph 2 of the GATS MONP Annex of “measures affecting natural 
persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member” would 
seem to allow member states to prevent individuals from looking for 
a job within the member state (Mattoo 2003, p. 4). However, once an 
individual secures a position, it would seem that GATS would apply. 
One interpretation of the MONP Annex is that it adds emphasis 
to the limitation imposed by the first clause of Article I:2(d) of GATS: 
“by a service supplier of one member” (emphasis added). “Service 
supplier” includes both juridical and natural persons.3 This interpreta-
tion assumes a distinction between service supplier and job seeker. Of 
course, at the margins the difference between an individual as service 
supplier seeking clients (covered) and an individual as labor market 
entrant (excluded) is one of contractual style, and not necessarily of 
substance (Winters et al. 2002, p. 87). This is the distinction between an 
independent contractor and an employee. 
The second clause of paragraph 2 also makes clear that GATS does 
not apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence, or employ-
ment on a permanent basis. Thus, GATS does not address permanent 
migration. However, the second clause of paragraph 2 would seem to 
suggest, by reverse implication, that GATS does apply at least to mea-
sures regarding employment on a temporary basis. This understanding 
is especially interesting when combined with paragraph 4. The “shall 
not prevent” language of paragraph 4 can reasonably be understood as a 
“necessity” test. Paragraph 3 seems to confirm this understanding.
In its Turkey–Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Prod-
ucts decision, the appellate body examined the relationship between 
Article XXIV of GATT, regulating the formation of customs unions 
and free trade areas, and other provisions of GATT. In that provision, 
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the appellate body emphasized the words “shall not prevent” and held 
that “Article XXIV can justify the adoption of a measure which is in-
consistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is 
introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the ex-
tent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the 
introduction of the measure were not allowed” (see WTO 1999b, para. 
46). If the same language in paragraph 4 of the MONP were understood 
similarly, it would mean that the purposes listed in paragraph 4 would 
justify action inconsistent with GATS only to the extent that achieve-
ment of those purposes would be prevented if the measure were not 
allowed. 
By allowing states unrestricted authority to “regulate” the entry of 
natural persons, does paragraph 4 allow prohibition, or is “regulate” 
meant in a narrower sense? After the appellate body decision in U.S.—
Gambling Services, we might expect some bias toward foreclosing state 
discretion that could be used to reduce the value of concessions (see 
WTO 2005). Thus, a narrower approach to “regulate” seems more like-
ly (Charnovitz 2003a, pp. 243–244). 
Paragraph 4 of the MONP Annex provides that immigration mea-
sures shall not violate the GATS “provided that such measures are not 
applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing 
to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment.” Thus, no 
exception is available for immigration measures that nullify or impair 
benefits accruing under a specific commitment
Footnote 13 to paragraph 4 states that “the sole fact of requiring a 
visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others 
shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific
commitment.” This clarifica ion can be read under an expressio unius 
interpretation to mean that other types of discrimination among natural 
persons of members might nullify or impair specific commitments. The 
“specific commitment” most likely to be considered nullified or im-
paired by discrimination between natural persons of different members 
would be the MFN obligation in Article II, although there is certainly 
an argument that by “specific commitment” the authors intended to ad-
dress positive list–type commitments for national treatment and market 
access, rather than the “negative list” MFN obligation, which is appli-
cable unless specifically excepted.
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Furthermore, there is at least some question whether such measures 
could be the basis for a complaint that they nullify or impair existing 
concessions, even if no violation of a specific GATS obligation exists. 
Article XXIII of GATS provides the possibility for this type of nonvio-
lation complaint. The possibility for such a complaint, against measures 
specifically excluded from coverage in the agreement, is not free from 
doubt. Moreover, a nonviolation nullification or impairment claim 
would generally depend on the restriction being imposed after the date 
that the nullifi d or impaired concession is made, and in a way that the 
complaining state should not have anticipated (Trachtman 1998).
The GATS MONP Annex seems to require states to allow service 
suppliers and employees of service suppliers to enter temporarily, pro-
vided that they are covered by a commitment (Arup 2000, p. 125). As 
suggested above, the temporary nature of entry is derived by reverse 
inference from the second clause of paragraph 2 of the GATS MONP 
Annex. 
No guidance is given by GATS as to what is meant by “temporary,” 
which itself is not treaty language but is inferred from the exclusion of 
“permanent” employment. While this issue was debated extensively in 
the original GATS negotiations, negotiators determined to allow fle -
ibility to reflect different circumstances (Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35). 
Thus, it is open to states in their schedules of commitments to specify 
the period of time for which people admitted under particular conces-
sions may remain. Where states do not define the period of time for 
admittance in their schedules, they could be understood not to make any 
commitment as to the period of admittance (WTO 2001b). 
In any event, there seem to be substantial limits on the scope of 
labor market access that can be provided by Mode 4. This seems in-
tentional. In 1994, few would have thought it practical to suggest that 
extensive commitments for labor market access would be feasible. 
This work argues elsewhere that it may be normatively attractive to 
reconsider the possibility for such commitments, and to do so in a com-
prehensive manner that considers detailed issues to an extent similar to, 
or even beyond, the level addressed in the GATT and GATS. 
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GATS COMMiTMe NTS
GATS is best understood as a framework agreement, providing a 
structure that states may use in order to negotiate services commitments 
over time. So the discussion above of the framework must be qualified
by the degree to which states actually have made, or will make, com-
mitments in particular areas. 
It is also worth noting that states approached their Mode 4 commit-
ments in the Uruguay Round, as they did other services commitments: 
warily. In connection with Mode 4, they generally made commitments 
at lower levels of liberalization than those applied in practice (Chaud-
huri, Mattoo, and Self 2004, p. 7; Nielson and Cattaneo 2003). 
So far, commitments in Mode 4 have been quite limited. Mode 4 
today is estimated to account for less than 2 percent of the total value of 
services trade. Present commitments refer almost exclusively to higher- 
level personnel. More than 40 percent of Mode 4 commitments are 
for intracorporate transferees whose mobility is intimately related to 
foreign direct investment; another 50 percent of commitments cover ex-
ecutives, managers and specialists, and business visitors. All this means 
that the Mode 4 liberalization achieved to date has been of limited sig-
nificance for developing countries whose comparative advantage lies in 
the export of medium- and low-skilled, labor-intensive services (World 
Bank 2004). It also means that Mode 4 might facilitate brain drain, with 
the possibility of adverse effects for developing countries under some 
conditions, although the limitation of Mode 4 to temporary movement 
ameliorates this risk. 
Schedules of Commitments
States may make different commitments in different service sectors 
or subsectors and as they make these commitments, they are permit-
ted to impose limitations on the extent to which these commitments 
provide national treatment or market access. National treatment and 
market access only apply to the extent of commitments. Thus, states 
can craft their schedules of commitments to respond to particular con-
cerns, or to allow space for particular types of protective measures. For 
example, many GATS commitments refer to short-term employment, 
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and distinguish between business visitors staying less than three months 
and temporary movement of up to a few years (Nielson and Taglioni 
2003, p. 6). 
States are also permitted to distinguish among the four modes of 
supply comprehended by GATS. So, they may make a commitment as 
to commercial presence (Mode 3) in accountancy services but deter-
mine not to make any Mode 4 commitment in accountancy services. 
Again, the key is that states may determine the scope of their commit-
ments, even to the extent of including in their commitments rules that 
are discriminatory against foreign service providers. It is in this sense 
that GATS must be understood as a framework agreement. Moreover, 
in connection with Mode 4, many schedules begin by stating that the 
sector is “unbound” in Mode 4, and then make narrow exceptions to 
this basic unbound position. 
The main exception to the positive list principle is in MFN: states 
are required to provide unconditional MFN treatment in connection 
with all measures covered by GATS, except in the rather limited cases 
where they listed an exemption to their MFN obligations.4 This raises 
important questions for bilateral, plurilateral, or regional agreements 
for labor market integration or free trade in services. These questions 
are addressed below. 
Sectors Addressed
Most of the Uruguay Round service commitments in Mode 4 are 
confined to higher-skilled types of service: manager, executive, or 
specialist (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 8). “Only 17 percent of all hor-
izontal entries cover low skilled personnel (e.g., ‘business sellers’) and 
only 10 countries have allowed some form of restricted entry to ‘other 
level’ personnel” (Nielson and Taglioni 2003, p. 12). States made fewer 
fully liberal commitments in Mode 4 than in other modes. Where states 
made Mode 4 commitments, they often imposed restrictions. For ex-
ample, there are a number of commitments that are subject to economic 
needs tests or labor market tests: is the relevant area underserved, or is it 
glutted? Other types of restrictions include quotas or specified propor-
tions of foreign versus local workers and senior staff. 
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h orizontal Commitments
Nearly all WTO members made liberalizing commitments under 
Mode 4 in the Uruguay Round (Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35). Most of 
these commitments were in the form of horizontal commitments—ap-
plying broadly to all sectors listed subsequently in the member state’s 
schedule of commitments. However, these horizontal commitments 
often take the form of “unbound, except for . . .” and then specify par-
ticular conditions for admission of particular types of service workers. 
The sector covered by these horizontal commitments are themselves 
limited: an OECD study found that “there is a particularly low inci-
dence of commitments in those sectors of particular importance to 
Mode 4” and that generally, “commitments for Mode 4 are restricted 
compared to other modes” (OECD 2002).
According to a WTO analysis of GATS horizontal Mode 4 com-
mitments made in the Uruguay Round (and through 2002), 42 percent 
of these commitments relate to intracorporate transferees, 28 percent 
relate to other executives, managers, or specialists, and 23 percent 
relate to business visitors. Thus, 93 percent of commitments are irrel-
evant to semiskilled or unskilled labor. In connection with Mode 4, the 
horizontal part of many states’ schedules represents the limit of their 
commitment (Carzaniga 2003, p. 24). 
The original U.S. GATS schedule of commitments included a hori-
zontal commitment relating to Mode 4. However, this commitment was 
limited to temporary entry of services salespersons for up to 90 days, 
intracorporate transferee managers, executives, and specialists, as de-
fined, for up to three years with the possibility of extension for up to two 
years, and managers or executives in connection with establishment of 
commercial presence under the GATS. Note that service salespersons do 
not perform the services themselves. Currently, managers and executives 
can remain in the United States for a total of up to seven years (under the 
L1-A program) and “specialists” can remain up to five years (L1-B). The 
U.S. Immigration Service is subject to no limits in the number of L-1 
visas that it can issue, and these visas are not subject to a wage parity or 
economic needs test. 
Thus, like the commitments of many other developed countries, 
these U.S. commitments are limited to certain hierarchical criteria that 
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tend to exclude low-skilled labor. Horizontal commitments as of April 
2002 are largely concerned with executives, managers, and special-
ists (Carzaniga 2003, p. 25). With respect to intracorporate transfer 
and managers and executives in connection with the establishment of 
a commercial presence, developed countries such as the United States 
have linked Mode 4 to Mode 3 and have thereby ensured the movement 
of capital (or at least establishment) in connection with labor. As the 
users of Mode 3 are more likely to be capital-exporting countries, this 
type of linkage results in a certain bias. 
In addition, in connection with employment-based movement, 
the U.S. bound temporary entry for up to 65,000 persons annually as 
set out in the U.S. H-1B visa program (Grimmett 1998), consisting of 
certain fashion models and persons engaged in a specialty occupation, 
requiring theoretical and practical application of a body of highly spe-
cialized knowledge and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in 
the specialty. This horizontal commitment represents the maximum 
U.S. commitment—specific sectors do not provide additional market 
access, but in some cases reduce market access. For the H-1B program, 
employers must not pay below the prevailing wage, and there may be 
no layoffs for the position within six months before or 90 days after the 
date of hiring. Workers entering under this program can stay for three 
years, with a possible extension to a maximum total stay of six years.5 
Many H1-B visa holders move from temporary migration to permanent 
residence status (Lowell 2000). 
e conomic Needs and Wage Parity Tests
As discussed above in connection with GATS commitments, many 
states continue to impose economic needs tests—or labor market needs 
tests—as conditions for market access. Another related test is a wage 
parity test, which seeks to ensure that imported labor does not undercut 
the pricing of domestic labor. Wage parity tests, while distinct from 
antidumping duties and antisubsidies countervailing duties in the goods 
field, serve a similar purpose: to limit the degree to which domestic 
persons are placed under price pressure by imports. 
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DOh A Ne GOTiATiONS
Many developing countries have emphasized Mode 4 in the Doha 
Round negotiations, which began in 2002 (the services negotiations ac-
tually began in 2000, pursuant to the “built-in agenda” of the Uruguay 
Round agreements). The negotiations for increased market access pro-
ceed through a “request-offer” system in which states make requests to 
other states that they liberalize, which respond with initial offers. 
Immigration and Mode 4 interests of developing countries have 
received some attention in the Doha Round, but there are few signs 
that substantial commitments will be made that would allow develop-
ing country personnel, especially at less than the highest skill levels, to 
enter other countries (Winters 2003). 
Fourteen developing countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, The 
People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, and Thai-
land) made an informal proposal in 2003 (WTO 2003a). They stated 
that “developing countries in general have comparative advantages 
only across a narrow range of service activities. The primary mode for 
most of these relates to Mode 4.” They suggested that 
commitments in Mode 4 are primarily horizontal and bound for 
only a small subset of personnel related to commercial presence 
and at higher levels of skills. There is an asymmetrical absence of 
commitments for categories of personnel delinked from commer-
cial presence and at lower skill levels, areas in which developing 
countries have comparative advantage. Recognition of common 
categories of movement, both linked to as well as delinked from 
commercial presence in the horizontal commitments of Members 
could prove useful and valuable. (WTO 2003a)
These states also suggested the codification or abolition of eco-
nomic needs tests. As mentioned above, economic needs tests as 
structured in the Uruguay Round left wide discretion to states. They 
may be understood to play a similar role to that of safeguards, without 
the multilateral discipline. 
In 2006, India prepared a collective request on behalf of itself and 
14 other developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Co-
lombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, Morocco, 
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Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Uruguay. The target of the request was a 
group of wealthy countries. One of the main thrusts of this request was 
to de-link Mode 4 commitments from Mode 3, and to establish commit-
ments relating to contractual service suppliers (CSS) and independent 
professionals (IP). Contractual service suppliers are employees of 
foreign-based enterprises with no commercial presence in the territory 
of the other WTO member. Independent professionals also provide ser-
vices pursuant to contract, but as self-employed persons. Access would 
be permitted only for provision of services at a level of complexity and 
specialty that require, at a minimum, a diploma or a university degree, 
or demonstrated experience. For both CSS and IP, market access would 
not be subject to wage parity or economic needs tests, or if economic 
needs tests persist, they would be subject to narrower definition. Dura-
tion of stay would be for one year or for the duration of the contract (if 
longer) with provision for renewal. The concept of these categories is 
to address high-skilled-type activities. 
Immigration and visa issues have generally been avoided. There 
has been discussion of a so-called GATS visa, which would facilitate 
temporary movement of natural persons through greater transparency 
and ease of administration, and impose clear limitations on the duration 
of stay. 
The relationship between movement of natural persons under Mode 
4 and immigration should be addressed directly, with specific commit-
ments regarding the relationship between immigration rules and market 
access. Instead, under the MONP Annex, immigration is largely re-
tained within the domaine reservé. Immigration might be understood 
as a “border measure” not unlike a tariff or a quota, while domestic 
regulation is an “internal measure.” While this distinction should not 
be accorded great substantive effect, it may be useful to consider the 
approach to immigration and Mode 4 commitments as part of general 
liberalization, while domestic regulation issues are treated separately. 
Transparency has been a critical issue in Doha Round negotia-
tions around Mode 4. Immigration rules, and visa and qualification
requirements, remain complex and difficult, especially for unskilled 
and semiskilled labor unable to afford sophisticated legal advice. De-
veloping countries have made proposals for greater predictability and 
transparency. 
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India proposed establishment of a “GATS visa” to ease entry of 
individuals benefiting from Mode 4 liberalization.6 The United States 
and EU service industry associations have made similar proposals. This 
would entail a streamlined process for a limited visa. The Indian pro-
posal includes more transparent criteria and improved administrative 
procedures for visas and work permits.
MFN Obli GATiONS AND e x Ce PTiONS Rel ATiNG TO 
eCONOM iC iNTe GRATiON, lA bOR MARke TS 
iNTe GRATiON, AND Re COGNiTiON
As we evaluate the lessons of GATS for rules relating to free move-
ment of labor, one of the most critical issues is the role of MFN-type 
antidiscrimination rules, and the exceptions to these rules for arrange-
ments for closer economic integration. 
Article II of GATS provides as follows: “With respect to any mea-
sure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately 
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of any other country.”
Thus, bilateral, regional, or other plurilateral agreements for ser-
vice market integration, relating to measures covered by GATS, such 
as some of those discussed in Chapter 7, are regulated by Article II of 
GATS. These obligations are not dependent upon scheduling. However, 
bilateral, regional, or other plurilateral agreements may be eligible for 
exceptions under Article V (economic integration), Article V bis (labor 
markets integration agreements) and Article VII (recognition). 
Of course, before we go too far it is necessary to recall that to the 
extent that the MONP Annex effectively excludes “measures affecting 
natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member 
. . . [as well as] measures regarding citizenship, residence or employ-
ment on a permanent basis,” these types of measures are not subject to 
the Article II MFN obligation, because these measures are not covered 
by the GATS. On the other hand, measures relating to temporary em-
ployment other than those affecting access to the employment market of 
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a member would generally be subject to the MFN obligation. So these 
distinctions will determine whether the MFN obligation applies or not. 
However, Article V of GATS, similar to Article XXIV of GATT 
pertaining to goods, permits agreements for economic integration that 
cover services. Article V of GATS sets two main requirements. First, 
agreements must have “substantial sectoral coverage.” Footnote 1 of 
GATS provides that “this condition is understood in terms of number of 
sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet 
this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori exclusion 
of any mode of supply.” Importantly, Mode 4 should not be a priori 
excluded. Second, within covered sectors, “substantially all discrimina-
tion” must be eliminated. 
Article V bis of GATS provides that GATS shall not prevent states 
from entering into agreements for full labor market integration, pro-
vided that they exempt citizens of other parties to the agreement from 
requirements concerning residency and work permits. Footnote 2 to 
GATS states that “typically, such integration provides citizens of the 
parties concerned with a right of free entry to the employment markets 
of the parties and includes measures concerning conditions of pay, other 
conditions of employment and social benefits.” Qualifying agreements 
must exempt “citizens of parties to the agreement from requirements 
concerning residency and work permits.” Some of the GATS negotia-
tors speculate that this provision may be ineffective because, as noted 
above, the MONP Annex excludes issues of access to labor markets 
(Self and Zutshi 2003, p. 35).
Under GATS Article VII, member states that develop mutual rec-
ognition arrangements are required to “afford adequate opportunity 
for other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such an 
agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it.” 
Recognition arrangements provide that the receiving state will recog-
nize certain licenses or credentials attained in the home state. GATS 
Article V permits economic integration arrangements. The relation-
ship between these two provisions, and the circumstances under which 
developing countries will be permitted to participate in recognition ar-
rangements among developed countries, is an emerging issue. Under 
the WTO appellate body’s jurisprudence, it is at least arguable that rec-
ognition arrangements within regional integration arrangements are not 
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protected by Article V, and would be required to comply with Article 
VII. 
Both Article V and Article V bis state that “this Agreement shall not 
prevent” entry into plurilateral services liberalization or labor market 
integration agreements. This type of language has been interpreted by 
the WTO appellate body (in the GATT Article XXIV context) as estab-
lishing a kind of “necessity” test (Trachtman 2003b). This necessity test 
in this context would permit measures necessary to fulfill the require-
ments specified in order to constitute a qualifying services liberalization 
agreement or labor market integration agreement. 
Finally, Article VII of GATS, discussed below, allows member states 
to enter into recognition arrangements relating to standards or criteria 
for the authorization, licensing, or certification of services suppliers.
NATiONAl  TRe ATMe NT u NDe R ARTiCle x Vii
In trade law, national treatment obligations are generally used to 
ensure that domestic regulation or taxes are not used so as to protect do-
mestic production, implicitly reneging on liberalization commitments. 
National treatment obligations are generally understood as “behind the 
border” measures, although they can of course be applied at the border 
with respect to imported goods. In services, there is often no customs 
or other border administration, so that all services regulation is, in ef-
fect, behind the border. In services, GATS was intended in part simply 
to establish national treatment as a direct form of liberalization, where 
domestic regulation sometimes simply prohibited foreign persons from 
supplying a particular service. In migration, national treatment obliga-
tions would serve a similar function. However, they may serve a more 
extensive function as well. Not only would they provide for market ac-
cess, but they would also ensure that destination states do not, through 
discriminatory treatment, reduce the value of migration to the migrant, 
diverting rents to themselves. In this way, some types of discrimination 
may function similarly to a tariff. 
Article XVII:1 of GATS provides that “in the sectors inscribed in 
its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out 
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therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like 
services and service suppliers.”
Thus, as already noted, national treatment under GATS is not uni-
versal, but is subject to the positive listing of the relevant service sector 
in the relevant state’s schedule. In addition, it is subject within each 
listed sector to the negative listing of any exception to the national 
treatment obligation in that schedule. Deciding that national treatment 
should not be a general principle as in GATT, but a concession to be 
bargained over, is one of the distinctive features of GATS. The core of 
a nondiscrimination obligation such as national treatment is the com-
parison between the favored good, service, or service supplier, and the 
disfavored one. Article XVII sets up the comparison as being one be-
tween “like” services or service suppliers, referring on its face to the 
“like products” concept articulated pursuant to Article III of GATT. 
What makes two services alike? For example, is Swedish massage 
like chiropractic adjustment? Similarly, is Internet telephony like stan-
dard telephone service? More fundamentally, is it permissible to make 
distinctions between services on the basis of the identity of the service 
supplier as well as the way the service appears to the consumer? While 
it would be plausible to attempt to apply the border tax adjustments 
factors to services, it is not clear that these parameters of likeness make 
sense even in GATT. And, of course, the word “like” has meant differ-
ent things in different contexts, even within GATT. 
The majority of the appellate body in E.C.—Asbestos found that 
likeness under Article III:4 is, “fundamentally, a determination about 
the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among 
products.”7 To perform such an assessment, the appellate body recalled 
that the four basic criteria, derived from the border tax adjustment re-
port (GATT BISD 1970)—1) the physical properties of the products 
in question, 2) their end uses, 3) consumer tastes and habits vis-à-vis 
those products, and 4) tariff classification—are to be used as tools in 
the determination of this competitive relationship between products. 
These criteria do not exhaust inquiry (WTO 2001a, para. 101). This ap-
proach is intended to approximate the competitive relationship between 
the relevant goods—it is not as accurate or refined as simply testing 
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cross-elasticity of demand. But the more important point is that this test 
is relatively ignorant of factors that motivate regulation. The economic 
theory of regulation suggests that regulation is necessary precisely 
where consumers cannot adequately distinguish relevant goods—where 
they are in close competitive relation. Thus, a competitive relationship 
test for likeness will often result in a finding that goods that differ by 
the parameter addressed by regulation are indeed alike, and should be 
treated the same. 
Interestingly, on its face, the structure of Article XVII seems to in-
dicate that a national regulation imposed on a foreign service provider 
must meet two tests: it must provide treatment no less favorable than 
that accorded domestic like services and domestic like service provid-
ers. Therefore, even if the service providers are not alike, and thus there 
is no possible basis for finding illegal discrimination between them, it 
is still possible that the services they provide may be alike, giving rise 
to a claim of violation of the requirement of national treatment. So, if a 
nurse and a doctor perform the same service, but their performance is 
regulated differently, there is a concern that such differential regulation 
would violate the national treatment obligation. This may lead to absurd 
outcomes. 
Thus, a better reading would read the two requirements above in the 
disjunctive, i.e., to separate the evaluation of treatment of services from 
the evaluation of treatment of service providers.8 It would simply evalu-
ate regulation of services by determining whether the regulation treats 
like services alike, full stop. If this were the case, regulation of service 
providers would be evaluated to determine only whether like service 
providers are treated alike. Using this interpretation, there would be no 
violation of national treatment if like services were treated differently 
where the reason for the difference in treatment is the regulation of the 
service provider. This is likely to be the interpretation that a WTO panel 
or the appellate body would apply.
Service regulations, as such, would only be evaluated to determine 
whether like services are treated alike, while service provider regula-
tions, as such, would only be evaluated to determine whether like service 
providers are treated alike. The WTO dispute settlement body would be 
required to distinguish between regulation of services and regulation of 
service providers. In addition, the analogy to products might be taken 
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one step further, suggesting stronger constraints on host state regulation 
of the service provider than on the service. 
Thus far, GATT/WTO dispute resolution has been unable to pro-
vide a predictable, consistent approach to determining when products 
are alike. We cannot expect GATS dispute resolution to do better as to 
services. Thus, for example, we might ask whether two accountants, 
each with advanced university degrees from different states, are like 
service providers. Under GATT jurisprudence, these questions cannot 
be answered predictably, or in the abstract, but must be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. While this jurisprudence results in a degree of 
unpredictability, the appellate body has now addressed several cases, 
providing experience in how these multiple factors are likely to be 
viewed and applied. The question for us is whether this situation of 
case-by-case analysis by the dispute settlement mechanism is superior 
to a more discrete, ex ante/specification that could be provided by treaty 
making or other quasi-legislative process?
Once services or service providers are determined to be alike, 
it is necessary to determine that the measure imposes less favorable 
treatment on the foreign service or service provider compared to the 
domestic ones. In its Asbestos decision, the appellate body emphasized 
that this is a distinct analysis, and that not every national measure that 
treats foreign goods differently from domestic goods would result in 
less favorable treatment. 
Qu Ali FiCATiON Re Qui Re Me NTS, l iCe NSiNG 
Re Qui Re Me NTS AND PROCe Du Re S, Te Ch NiCAl  
Re Gul ATiONS, AND TRANSPARe NCy
For professional labor, subject to qualification or licensing require-
ments, states may have a nonprotectionist, or prudential, reason for 
imposing qualification or licensing requirements. However, it is also 
clear that these requirements and related technical regulations pose bar-
riers to labor movement. 
Article VI (domestic regulation) spells out general obligations for 
service sectors that have been included by contracting parties in their 
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national schedules, except for measures that are covered by reserva-
tions in these schedules under Article XVII (national treatment) and 
XVI (market access). 
In vague terms, Article VI:1 provides that domestic regulations, ap-
plied in a sector that a member has agreed to include under specific
liberalization commitments, must be administered in a “reasonable, 
objective, and impartial manner.” This commitment will be very impor-
tant to ensure the utility of Mode 4. Furthermore, it is possible that this 
requirement—especially its reasonableness prong—may be employed 
and developed in WTO dispute settlement to impose substantive obli-
gations of proportionality in connection with domestic regulation (but 
see WTO [2005]). Interestingly, and provocatively, the relevant por-
tions of the dictionary definit on of “reasonable” include “in accordance 
with reason; not irrational or absurd,” “proportionate,” and “within the 
limits of reason; not greatly less or more than might be thought likely 
or appropriate” (Brown 1993). The limitation of this discipline to the 
“manner of administration” may be important, although it will be dif-
ficult to separate the manner of administration from the substance of 
rules.
Article VI also includes procedural guidelines requiring that deci-
sions in cases where the supply of a service requires authorization in 
the host country must be issued within a reasonable period of time, and 
that signatories establish tribunals and procedures to process potential 
complaints by foreign service suppliers.
Article VI:4 of GATS calls on the Council for Trade in Services 
(CTS) to develop any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures re-
lating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, 
and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services. We will discuss the Article VI:4 work program and 
its fruits below.
Prior to the agreement and entry into force of more specific rules 
under Article VI:4, disciplines on national measures are available under 
Article VI:5 in sectors in which the importing member has undertaken 
specific commitments. In order for these disciplines to apply, two sets 
of criteria must be satisfied
the licensing or qualification requirements or technical standards 1) 
must nullify or impair specific commitments in a manner that 
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could not reasonably have been expected at the time the specific
commitments were made; and
the measure must not be based on objective and transparent cri-2) 
teria, or be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the qual-
ity of the service, or in the case of licensing procedures, in itself 
be a restriction on the supply of the service.
  I examine these two criteria in turn.
Nullification o  Impairment
Nullification or impairment (N/I) has served as a central feature 
in GATT and WTO dispute resolution. Under Article XXIII of GATT, 
redress pursuant to the dispute resolution system of GATT is only avail-
able in the event of N/I. Where a provision of WTO law is violated, 
N/I is presumed. On the other hand, it is possible, although infrequent, 
for N/I to serve as the basis for a successful complaint in the absence 
of an actual violation of GATT: so-called nonviolation nullification or 
impairment. Article VI:5 of GATS incorporates this concept of nonvio-
lation nullification or impairment
In the leading nonviolation nullification or impairment case, Film, 
the panel reviewed in detail the basis for certain U.S. expectations, in 
order to decide whether the U.S. had “legitimate expectations” of ben-
efits after successive tariff negotiation rounds (see WTO [1998a]). As 
the complaining party, the U.S. was allocated the burden of proof as to 
its legitimate expectations. In order for the U.S. to meet this burden, 
it was required to show that the Japanese measures at issue were not 
reasonably anticipated at the time the concessions were granted. Where 
the measure at issue was adopted after the relevant tariff concession, 
the panel established a presumption, rebuttable by Japan, that the U.S. 
could not have reasonably anticipated the measure. 
The import of this approach in the services context is clear. The 
complaining party must show that the measures attacked were not 
reasonably anticipated. Thus, long-standing regulatory practices or 
circumstances are protected. This provides a certain advantage to de-
veloped countries, as compared to developing countries that may be 
establishing new regulatory regimes. Furthermore, this understanding 
means that the domestic circumstances as they are form a background 
Job Name: -- /309724t
Mode 4 of GATS   261
for all concessions; as a matter of negotiation strategy, members of 
GATS must recognize this and bear the burden of negotiating an end to 
existing measures that reduce the benefits for which they negotiate. It is 
also clear, as described in more detail below, that Article VI:5 will not 
impose substantial discipline on existing domestic regulation, placing a 
greater burden on Article VI:4 as a source of discipline.
It is worthwhile to compare this structure with that applicable to 
goods under the GATT and under the two WTO agreements applicable 
to regulatory standards: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures. Neither GATT nor these agreements include the N/I require-
ment in the prohibition itself. Therefore, in connection with trade in 
goods, determination of a violation of a provision of a covered agree-
ment results in prima facie N/I under Article 3:8 of the D.S.U., placing 
the burden of rebutting the existence of N/I on the respondent. In the 
context of Article VI:5 of GATS, without N/I, there is no violation. 
Without a violation, there is no prima facie N/I. Consequently, it will be 
for the complaining party to show nullification or impairment. This will 
make it more difficult for national services regulation to be addressed 
under Article VI:5.
We may speculate as to why GATS relies on the N/I concept so 
heavily in this context. N/I is an extremely vague standard, but one 
which by itself has been difficult to meet. Thus, in the absence of an 
ability to negotiate more specific disciplines on national regulation, N/I 
provides a modicum of more general discipline. It might be viewed as 
a “least common denominator,” insofar as the parties could agree not 
to nullify or impair concessions earnestly made, but could not agree 
on more pervasive, blanket restrictions on their national regulatory 
sovereignty. Thus, Article VI:5 is first and foremost merely a standstill 
obligation.
The Necessity Test
Under this additional component of the GATS Article VI:5 test, we 
focus on the requirement (incorporated from Article VI:4(b)) that the 
national measure not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the 
quality of the service. Even if it is possible to show that a national mea-
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sure nullifies or impairs service commitments, a complainant would 
still be required to show that the national measure does not comply 
with the criteria listed in Article VI:4, the most likely of which is the 
necessity test examined here. 
Until the E.C.—Asbestos and Korea—Various Measures on Beef 
decisions of the Appellate Body, “necessity” was generally interpret-
ed as requiring the domestic regulation to be the least trade restrictive 
method of achieving the desired goal. In Korea—Various Measures on 
Beef, the Appellate Body interpreted the necessity test of Article XX(d) 
to imply a requirement for balancing among at least three variables:
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indis-
pensable’, may nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contempla-
tion of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing 
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the 
contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement 
of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the ac-
companying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports. 
(See WTO [2000].)
In the context of Article VI:4(b), the reference is to measures “not 
more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.” 
The last clause could be very interventionist. It could restrict not just 
the means to attain a given regulatory goal but even the types of regula-
tory goals that might be achieved, as when the regulatory goal is not to 
maintain the quality of the service but to avoid some other externaliza-
tion or regulatory harm by the service provider. For example, if a bank 
is required to maintain a particular reserve in relation to a loan, is that 
necessary to ensure the quality of the service? Many types of service 
regulation might be subject to similar, inappropriate, attack. This provi-
sion should be revised.
Furthermore, in a placement comparable to the inclusion of the N/I 
criterion in the substantive prohibition, here the necessity criterion is 
included as a parameter of the substantive prohibition, in addition to 
being included in the exceptional provisions of Article XIV(c), relat-
ing to health, morality, and other regulatory goals. Therefore, in order 
to make out a violation of Article VI:5 under this clause, the national 
measure will be required to be shown to be unnecessary in the sense 
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described above. Then, in order for the respondent to claim an excep-
tion under XIV(c), it will be required to show that it is necessary in the 
broader sense defined there. One interesting question involves the bur-
den of proof. Under the products jurisprudence of the Appellate Body, 
it appears that the complainant will be required to show the lack of ne-
cessity under Article VI:5, while the responding state would ordinarily 
be required to prove the affirmative defense of necessity under Article 
XIV(c). This is at least an odd legal circumstance, where each side is 
allocated the burden of proof on the same issue at different phases. The 
complaining state, say for example the EC in an attack on U.S. sepa-
ration of commercial from investment banking, would be required to 
show that the U.S. regulatory approach is “unnecessary” under Article 
VI:5, while the U.S. would be required to demonstrate its necessity un-
der Article XIV(c). 
In 1998, the Committee on Trade in Services adopted the Disciplines 
on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (the Accountancy 
Disciplines), developed by the GATS Working Party on Professional 
Services (now the Working Party on Domestic Regulation) (see WTO 
[1998b]). These disciplines apply to all member states that have made 
specific commitments in accountancy (positive list) but do not apply 
to national measures listed as exceptions under Articles XVI and XVII 
(negative list). They generally articulate further and tighten the prin-
ciple of necessity: that measures should be the least trade restrictive 
method to effect a legitimate objective. In fact, these provisions rep-
licate requirements that have been imposed in the EC pursuant to the 
ECJ’s single market jurisprudence. They also replicate the approach of 
the EC’s General System Directives on professions, codifying princi-
ples of proportionality, or necessity. They have the following features 
relevant to this chapter:
Necessity•	 . Member states are required to ensure that measures 
relating to licensing requirements and procedures, technical 
standards, and qualification requirements and procedures are not 
prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary barriers to trade in accountancy services. 
Such measures may not be more trade restrictive than necessary 
to fulfill a legitimate objective, including protection of consum-
ers, the quality of the service, professional competence, and the 
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integrity of the profession. As will be clear from the discussion 
above, this necessity requirement is substantially stronger than 
that contained in Article VI:5 of GATS.
Qualificatio 	requirements•	 . Member states must take account of 
qualifications acquired in the territory of another member state, 
on the basis of equivalency of education, experience, and/or ex-
amination requirements. Examinations or other qualification re-
quirements must be limited to subjects relevant to the activities 
for which authorization is sought.
Technical standards•	 . Technical standards must be prepared, ad-
opted, and applied only to fulfill legitimate objectives. In deter-
mining conformity, member states must take account of inter-
nationally recognized standards (of international organizations) 
applied by that member.
It is worth noting that the EC has stated that the following should 
be considered in defining necessity under Article VI:4: “A measure that 
is not the least trade restrictive to trade will not be considered more 
burdensome/more trade restrictive than necessary so long as it is not 
disproportionate to the objective stated and pursued.”9 This is substan-
tially more lenient in respect of domestic regulation than the definition
of “necessity” developed in GATT/WTO jurisprudence. Furthermore, 
it is not clear precisely what “disproportionate” means in this context. 
Proportionality stricto sensu (Emiliou 1996, p. 6) inquires whether the 
means are “proportionate” to the ends: whether the costs are excessive 
in relation to the benefits. It might be viewed as cost-benefit analysis 
with a margin of appreciation, as it does not require that the costs be 
less than the benefits. At the same time that it prefers proportionality 
and necessity to a least trade restrictive alternative test, the EC seems 
to suggest that “the validity, or rationale, of the policy objective[s] must 
not be assessed.” (See WTO [2001c, para. 17].)
Necessity has a complex relationship with recognition. That is, a 
necessity test, interpreted as a requirement that the national measure 
be the least trade restrictive alternative reasonably available to ad-
dress the regulatory concern, can either be an absolute requirement or 
a relative requirement. Thus, a less restrictive option might make sense 
irrespective of the home regime or conversely might only be justified in 
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reference to the home country regulatory regime, as a complementary 
measure. Judgments based on the former assessment reflect a high de-
gree of judicial activism and are unlikely to be found legitimate. 
In the latter case, where the home country regulatory regime satis-
fies the host country concerns, necessity may require recognition. This 
would be an extreme interpretation of necessity as least trade restrictive 
alternative analysis, stating in effect that no regulatory intervention on 
the part of the importing country is necessary at all. The least restrictive 
alternative is to do nothing. We have seen this in the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence, and there are also treaty provisions reflecting this concept in 
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement. 
Under this interpretation, recognition may be mandated, or equivalence 
may be determined, by judicial	fiat 	
Note that Article VII of GATS and paragraph 3 of the Annex on 
Financial Services, in contrast, do not require recognition, but merely 
authorize it. Although a strong GATS standard of necessity might even-
tually lead to such judicially required recognition, this is unlikely to 
be the case under current treaty language for reasons we will come to 
in the last section. But the necessity test might nevertheless mandate 
partial recognition of some regulations and not others, whereby partial 
recognition becomes the operational consequence of the principle of 
proportionality. It is important to note that the Accountancy Disciplines 
require recognition of professional qualifications in accountanc . 
As noted above, the Accountancy Disciplines include a greatly en-
hanced necessity test, applicable within that sector.
GATS, like GATT, does not specifically require the use of inter-
national standards, and provides weaker incentives for the use of 
international standards than the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agree-
ment. As noted above, Article VI:5(b) requires that account be taken of 
compliance with international standards where a member state’s com-
pliance with Article VI:5(a) is being evaluated. This is a nod toward a 
safe harbor for states that comply with international standards, although 
it should provide only very modest incentive effects, because of the 
weakness of Article VI:5(a). It does not provide a presumption of com-
pliance, as do Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement and Article 3.2 of the 
SPS Agreement.
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The Accountancy Disciplines require that member states take 
account of internationally recognized standards of international organi-
zations in determining conformity with technical standards (see WTO 
[1998b, para. 26]). This is a different and additional requirement. Under 
Article VI:5(b), compliance with international standards is taken into 
account in determining the compliance of a member’s regulation with 
WTO law.10 Under the Accountancy Disciplines, a member state must 
take compliance with international standards into account in determin-
ing the acceptability of foreign service providers. This is a gentle shove 
toward recognition based on essential harmonization. 
The Article VI:4 Work Program was intended to deal over time with 
certain regulatory barriers to trade in services, through decisions made 
by the C.T.S. under its authority. The WTO Secretariat, with the as-
sistance of member states, has prepared a list of examples of measures 
to be addressed by disciplines under GATS Article VI:4 (WTO 1999a, 
2001d). These examples included, inter alia, residency requirements, 
failure to recognize foreign qualifications, and national standards that 
diverge from international standards. By focusing on examples of regu-
latory barriers that service suppliers actually face, it is possible to target 
additional disciplines more precisely. Developing countries should par-
ticipate actively in this process in order to focus attention on the barriers 
that their service providers face. 
So far, the Article VI:4 Work Program has operated sectorally, and 
only in the single sector of accountancy. However, it may be that other 
professional service sectors, and even other service sectors, may be 
amenable to similar types of disciplines. Thus, it would be possible to 
evaluate application of similar necessity, equivalence, and other disci-
plines on a horizontal basis. 
The proposed draft annex on domestic regulation prepared by Japan 
suggests adoption of the core disciplines contained in the Accountancy 
Disciplines, with some modifications, on a horizontal basis (see WTO 
[2003b]). This would retain the possibility for separate, additional, or 
alternative disciplines on a sectoral basis. 
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 Notes
The other modes are cross-border supply (Mode 1) and service consumer travel 1. 
(Mode 2). 
The scope of activities that may be included in the word “service” may be deter-2. 
mined, in part, by reference to the Services Sectoral Classification List, W/120. 
GATS, Art. XXVIII(g).3. 
For a list of MFN exemptions affecting Mode 4, see Nielson and Taglioni (2003). 4. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the NAFTA, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-Chile, and U.S.- 5. 
Singapore free trade agreements allow for employment-based movement, facili-
tated by a streamlined visa. 
For a useful discussion, see Self and Zutshi (6. 2003). 
See WTO (2001a, para. 99). Note the different opinion with regard to the very 7. 
specific aspects mentioned in para. 154
But see WTO (1997, para.7.322), considering that like service suppliers are pro-8. 
ducers of like services.
See WTO (2001a, para. 22). Note that the appellate body may be understood to 9. 
have adopted a similar position in Asbestos and Korean Beef.
10. Article VI(5)(b) refers to standards “of relevant international organizations,” 
which are defined as “international bodies whose membership is open to the rel-
evant bodies of at least all Members of the WTO.” This definition might exclude, 
for example, the Basle Committee.
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9  
Negotiating Global  
Disciplines on Migration
This chapter examines some of the main dynamics of international 
agreements on migration. The present chapter builds on the welfare 
economics, the ethical, and especially the international political econ-
omy perspectives developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It 
also utilizes as data the legal rules described in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
This chapter develops the broad contours of the possible negotiation 
dynamics that may develop in the field of migration, based in part on 
the schematics advanced in Chapter 4. Based on these contours, Chap-
ter 10 discusses a number of more specific disciplines in this field, and 
Appendix A provides a conjectural outline of a possible multilateral 
agreement on migration. 
Bila teral, r e Gio Nal, Plurila teral, a ND 
Mul tila teral  Ne Gotia tio Ns
As we begin to consider the possibility of international legal rules 
of labor migration, we must first consider the alternatives. There are 
three main types of alternative forms of institutionalization in this field:
1) bilateralism, 2) regionalism (or other plurilateralism), and 3) multi-
lateralism. These can be either formal or informal. Of course, another 
alternative is unilateralism. In Chapter 11, I will discuss possible organi-
zational features of a multilateral organization dealing with migration. 
The first question is that raised in Chapters 2 and 4: what benefit
do legal commitments produce—to what extent is formalism desirable? 
Thus, states may choose to engage in no legal institutionalization at 
all: they may continue to determine their immigration policy unilat-
erally, without legal restriction. This is similar to Coase’s postulated 
choice between the market and the firm, with the informal structure of 
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relationships theoretically equivalent to the market (Trachtman 1997). 
This is the system that broadly applies today: aside from the regional 
efforts already described, we generally have a regime of rough give 
and take, with states exercising power constrained by a degree of in-
formal reciprocity. This does not mean that there is no cooperation—it 
merely means that there is no longer-term legalized and institutional-
ized cooperation. 
However, outside of the EU and forced migration contexts, in-
ternational law and organizations have so far had little influence over 
migration policy. According to Meyers (2000, p. 1266), “The limited 
influence of international organizations and regimes is caused by the 
high political costs of immigration, the difficulty of distributing the 
benefits of immigration, and the almost unlimited supply of labor that 
has exempted the receiving countries from the need to cooperate with 
the countries of origin or with other receiving countries.” 
We must ask whether this type of reservation of complete national 
autonomy, perhaps with some degree of informal reciprocity, is efficient,
or whether some legal restrictions would be useful to states in order to 
achieve a more efficient strategic equilibrium. Recall that Chapter 2 sug-
gests that there is a substantial welfare gain to be won by liberalization 
of migration. The demand for immigrants may be more complex than 
Meyers describes, especially with respect to skilled workers, but also in 
some contexts with respect to unskilled workers. Chapter 3 describes a 
rights-based approach to migration that may support legal confirmation
and delineation of this right. Chapter 4 describes a domestic political 
equilibrium that might fail to support liberalization of migration unless 
some reciprocal arrangements are made, either within the migration 
field or in cross-sectoral linkage. Chapter 4 models states’ immigration 
policies in some contexts as a coordination game along the lines of a 
stag hunt, in other contexts along the lines of a prisoner’s dilemma, and 
in still other contexts as a game in which the efficient equilibrium is 
noncooperation. 
Chapter 4 suggests the possibility that states might benefit from the 
ability to bind one another to liberalization. It is likely that the utility 
of reciprocal commitments will only be fully known once a framework 
agreement is developed and states begin earnest negotiations to deter-
mine the scope of acceptable commitments. 
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Recall that some of the ideas developed in Chapter 4 suggest the 
possible utility of reciprocity, but do not require formal legal commit-
ments for reciprocity. However, the more specific the arrangements, 
and the more carefully balanced the reciprocity, the more likely it will 
be that states will determine to act more self-consciously through for-
mal legal regimes. Note that even a regime of informal reciprocity is an 
institution in the institutional economics sense, and is a regime in the 
international politics regime theory sense. As a matter of fact, in many 
circumstances, including some relating to the global environment, states 
are able to reach implicit (customary) or explicit (treaty) agreements to 
cooperate, and to enforce these agreements (Norman and Trachtman 
2005; Scott and Stephan 2004). They are able to do so among relatively 
patient states, under circumstances of frequently repeated, or linked, in-
teraction, over a long duration, where information about the compliance 
or failure of compliance of others is readily available.1 This problem is 
analogous to other global public goods problems. 
Formal law and formal organization are thus not necessarily re-
quired to achieve a different strategic equilibrium, but they are an 
important means by which states may self-consciously revise institu-
tional dynamics. Formal law and organization provide a set of additional 
tools, accepted default rules, and additional linkages that may be quite 
valuable. 
It is understood that states with certain political affinities, and 
with greater ethnic or socioeconomic homogeneity, are more likely to 
liberalize immigration vis-à-vis one another (Neumayer 2005, p. 18). 
Regionalism is likely to be a good proxy for cultural affinit , but there 
are certainly counterexamples—contexts in which there is great cultural 
or ethnic affinity despite geographic distance. In addition, regionalism 
may be a proxy for symmetry in terms of labor market structure. While 
asymmetry may provide greater welfare gains, it may also provide 
greater political obstacles. 
States may choose to enter into bilateral agreements in order to lib-
eralize their immigration policies. As described in Chapter 7, a number 
of states have entered into bilateral migration agreements, but these 
generally do not involve formal commitments to liberalize. Rather, they 
ordinarily involve management of such topics as recruitment, remit-
tances, and return. 
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Importantly, states have developed webs of bilateral treaty arrange-
ments in connection with foreign investment and international taxation. 
There have been efforts to multilateralize foreign investment treaty re-
gimes, without success to date. Bilateral arrangements of course raise 
important issues of discrimination: of MFN nondiscriminatory treat-
ment (Ugur 2007). However, it is even possible to establish MFN rules 
that link treatment under separate bilateral or plurilateral agreements. 
Bilateral foreign investment treaties often contain MFN obligations that 
effectively link treatment under one treaty to obligations under another, 
multilateralizing the best treatment a particular state has conceded. 
Again, would entry into a broader form of agreement confer greater 
benefits?
Bilateral arrangements may be unsatisfactory for several reasons. 
First, as the number of bilateral labor market agreements increases, it 
is likely that states will grow increasingly concerned about their rela-
tive position, suggesting the utility of MFN-type obligations, or at least 
multilateral negotiations. Why will states be concerned about their rela-
tive position? To the extent that the negotiation is over a discrete quota, 
the relative position—the share of the quota allocated to the sending 
state—will determine market access. To the extent that the negotiation 
is over discriminatory taxes imposed by the destination state, which 
may be assimilated to a tariff, relative position will determine degree 
of market access, and the extent to which migration flows conform to 
actual comparative advantage in producing appropriate migrants, as op-
posed to the relative burden of discriminatory taxes. 
Second, and along similar lines, with increasing competition for 
migrant access to wealthy markets, developing countries may find
themselves competing with one another for access. They may wish to 
negotiate together in a multilateral setting in order to avoid a collective 
action problem in bargaining. For example, the Philippines and Indone-
sia have entered into an agreement for a modest level of coordination 
of their emigration activities (Go 2007). Asian countries have already 
sought to coordinate their activities to protect their emigrants and maxi-
mize the beneficial effects for home countries through the Colombo 
Process.2 
Third, with increasing competition to attract skilled workers, states 
may find themselves racing to the bottom in terms of their taxation or 
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other aspects of their treatment of skilled workers. (See the discussion 
of regulatory competition in Chapter 2.) “The similarities in labour de-
mand across receiving countries, as well as the emerging competition 
for labour from sending countries, may support a multilateral approach 
or at least co-ordinated policies among receiving countries” (OECD 
2004, p. 27). In effect, with increasing competition for skilled migrants, 
competing destination states may wish to negotiate together to establish 
a cartel in order to retain their market power. 
Fourth, while, as noted above, MFN does not require a multilateral 
agreement, if an MFN rule is desirable, it may be easier to negotiate and 
to seek reciprocal commitments within a multilateral negotiation that 
leads to a multilateral agreement. This was one of the benefits that led 
the United States and the UK to seek a multilateral trade agreement in 
the 1940s, resulting in the GATT. Even a multilateral agreement may be 
structured in such a way that it should be understood as a series of bilat-
eral agreements. Much depends on the structure of the relationships and 
whether MFN treatment multilateralizes all concessions. 
Fifth, there are economies of scale that may make a multilateral 
agreement less costly in terms of diplomatic and administrative re-
sources than a series of bilateral agreements. Bilateral arrangements will 
be more costly to implement than multilateral arrangements, and may 
be less transparent. It is also possible that there would be economies 
of scale in connection with international institutional arrangements, 
such as secretariat operations or dispute settlement. Of course, it is pos-
sible to have a hybrid multilateral-bilateral agreement: a multilateral 
framework agreement under which states agree to specific bilateral 
arrangements. 
Finally, it may be that a multilateral agreement would facilitate 
multilateral surveillance and enforcement action that would result in 
greater possibilities for compliance.
A third and intermediate option is regional or other plurilateral ar-
rangements. I have discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 the fact that some 
groups of states have already entered into regional or other plurilateral 
arrangements for immigration. So, of course, one important question is 
why some states have chosen bilateral or regional agreements, and why 
they have considered bilateral or regional arrangements to be more de-
sirable than multilateral arrangements. The emergence of regional and 
Job Name: -- /309724t
276   Trachtman
bilateral arrangements for migration might indeed be taken as evidence 
that migration is not, or at least is not yet, a global problem that requires 
global institutionalization. Another way of saying this is that the extent 
to which it is a global problem may be small compared to the costs of 
global institutionalization. It is possible that, due to greater economic 
homogeneity and lower travel costs, migration is more likely to be the 
subject of regional agreement first (Nielson 2003, pp. 93, 94), but it 
is entirely possible that multilateral arrangements for migration would 
also be desirable or would subsequently be desirable. That is, it may be 
that the experience of regional liberalization may break down resistance 
to further liberalization, thereby facilitating multilateral liberalization. 
Thus, where and when it is valuable to engage in multilateral insti-
tutionalization, as in the WTO, states may determine to do so. Bilateral 
and regional agreements may serve as pathfinders for multilateral agree-
ments, or they can serve as substitutes for multilateral agreements. In 
trade, this set of alternatives has been dubbed the “building blocks” 
versus “stumbling blocks” question, assuming that global welfare is 
maximized by, and global society is heading toward, multilateral agree-
ment. Multilateral institutionalization can serve as a response to the 
question of MFN treatment raised above. It also provides a broader fo-
rum for engaging in negotiations, and perhaps for complex multiparty 
barter that increases the scope of possible agreement. 
So, to the extent that liberalization of migration is understood as 
a deeper form of integration than trade in goods or services, it may 
be that submultilateral integration would be appropriate according to a 
variable geometry perspective. Some states may be more interested or 
more prepared for this type of integration than others, and the variable 
geometry perspective would suggest that the faster states need not wait 
for the slower ones, and that the slower ones need not be required to 
accelerate. It is certainly plausible that some states would refrain from 
entering into a global migration agreement, and so it is reasonable to 
expect some type of plurilateral framework to emerge.
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t he Nee D for Glo Bal  r ules 
There seem to be two main legitimate goals for international law. 
First, international law may be designed to increase welfare by over-
coming bargaining problems in order to allow efficient cooperation, as 
suggested in Chapter 4 (Trachtman 1996). I focus on the welfare impact 
here. 
Second, international law may serve an expressive function: an in-
ternational legal commitment may help to legitimate or popularize a 
certain principle. While I do not dwell on this expressive function here, 
it may be that one of the important functions of an international legal re-
gime for migration would be to begin an educational process that would 
help voters and governments to realize the legitimacy and benefits of 
a permissive regime for migration. This would also serve perhaps as a 
bulwark against demagoguery.
In this chapter, I seek to speculate regarding the design of a system 
that would improve the welfare of each member state: that would be 
Pareto-improving from at least a state-level aggregate standpoint. 
So, what might an agreement among states to achieve an efficient
equilibrium in migration look like? One possibility, among many, 
would be simply to allow free migration. However, simple permission 
for free migration might result in losses to states that invest in human 
capital, and to states that provide high levels of social welfare transfers, 
assuming that immigrants have access to these programs. A move to 
free migration might result in public goods problems and congestion 
problems, and ultimately cause these states to move to otherwise inef-
ficient levels of investment in human capital and social welfare. A move 
to global free migration would also be politically unthinkable in most 
wealthy states. 
Furthermore, a simple move to free migration would lose the 
benefits of both gradualism and customization to particular national 
circumstances. It appears more likely that states would select a more 
nuanced arrangement. Therefore, any new system would by necessity 
include different rules for different states, allowing customization or 
scheduling of commitments. These customized commitments would be 
produced through negotiation, which would include a process of eval-
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uation by each state of its position, presumably based on a welfarist 
analysis. 
As shown in Chapters 2 and 4, states are likely to have divergent 
domestic politics in relation to migration. Therefore, it is highly un-
likely that a one-size-fits-all approach to migration liberalization would 
fit all states—or would even be consistent with maximizing global wel-
fare. Furthermore, different states will find it appropriate to liberalize 
at different rates. Therefore, request-offer-type negotiations, in which 
states make a request of another state to liberalize in a specific sector 
in a specific way, and the requested state makes an offer conditional on 
appropriate reciprocity, would seem attractive. This is the method used 
in services negotiations at the WTO in the Doha Round, and it has been 
used in goods negotiations as well. 
I show in Chapter 4 that there are circumstances where a wealthy 
state’s best option, considering migration alone, may be simply to pro-
tect its labor markets. This may be the case even where liberalization 
would enhance global welfare. Perhaps under these circumstances, 
wealthy destination states would find it useful to exchange liberaliza-
tion commitments in migration for liberalization commitments in other 
sectors by home states. These might include liberalization by poor home 
states in services, investment, or goods sectors, or it could involve other 
concessions. 
To the extent that anti-immigrant demagoguery in destination states 
combines with anti-import mercantilism in sending states, these erro-
neous economic perspectives may be harnessed, by international legal 
agreement, to counteract one another. 
Economists and developing countries have criticized the cross- 
sectoral “grand bargain” that concluded the Uruguay Round, on the 
ground that developing states took on obligations, especially in con-
nection with intellectual property rights, that were costly to them. 
Economists have grown nostalgic for the original GATT years, when 
negotiations were largely concerned with tariff reduction. This is be-
cause from the trade economics perspective, both the importing and the 
exporting state were on the whole made better off by tariff reduction, so 
policymakers could not err. Where all of the possible concessions are 
welfare-improving (at the level of the state), bargaining may be expect-
ed to result in benign outcomes (at least at the level of the state). While 
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the field of migration does not offer the same kind of “error-proof” ne-
gotiations, Chapter 2 shows that worldwide welfare is only likely to be 
diminished by migration that is either in error or excessively motivated 
by public welfare programs. 
Governments might welcome assistance, in the form of internation-
al legal restrictions, in resisting the temptation to restrict immigration, 
where restriction is not consistent with public welfare. As shown in 
Chapter 4, rational governments may seek to maximize their support 
through such international legal restrictions providing for reciproc-
ity. International legal commitments play a similar role in the trade 
context. 
There may be circumstances in which surges of migration cause 
excessive adjustment costs. Therefore, commitments would ideally 
contain economically nuanced safeguards that would allow states to 
revise their commitments to the extent that the commitments actually 
seem to be causing recession, accentuating the adverse effects of reces-
sion, or causing other economic disruption. 
As described in Chapter 4, whether the international migration 
setting is appropriately described in various real world contexts as a 
coordination game, a prisoner’s dilemma, or another strategic model, it 
may be useful for states to cooperate through international law in order 
to communicate regarding selection of an equilibrium strategy in the 
case of a coordination game, and in order to change the payoffs in the 
case of a prisoner’s dilemma and therefore support welfare-improving 
behavior. 
iNter Na tio Nal  Pu Blic Goo Ds a ND 
iNter Na tio Nal  r e GiMes
Hollifield (2000, p. 90) states that until recently there was little de-
mand for international regimes in the area of migration policy. Low 
demand for institutionalization is synonymous with a transaction costs–
transaction benefits structure in which unilateral action and reaction, 
without institutional modific tion, results in a stable (but not necessarily 
efficient) strategic equilibrium. Where, for example, the value to states 
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of migration is small, we would expect them to expend no resources to 
establish institutions to regulate migration.3 
Often the rise of international law has been associated with 
technological or social change that has resulted in the emergence of 
international public goods that can be achieved through cooperation. 
Is liberalization of migration a public good? It is if one state’s use of it 
does not diminish its availability to other states (consumption is nonri-
valrous) and if it is not possible to exclude states from its benefits (it is 
non-excludible). 
There is at least some argument that liberalized migration would 
benefit all states due to direct and indirect effects on the general en-
hancement of global welfare, as well as growth effects. This is similar 
to the argument that free trade constitutes a global public good (Kaul 
et al. 2003). The indirect effects of this enhancement would seem to be 
non-excludible, so in this sense we may view liberalized migration as 
a global public good. The implications of this understanding are that 
we would expect this public good to be undersupplied—its supply is 
a collective action problem. Therefore, some institutional mechanism 
for cooperation may be indicated (not all collective action problems are 
worth solving—it depends on a comparison of the costs and the benefits
of doing so). 
In addition, if we understand human capital as a global public good, 
it also will be undersupplied (Straubhaar 2000, p. 128). As outlined 
above, another way to describe this problem is to generalize that each 
state wishes to attract or retain skilled workers, while many states wish 
to exclude or expel unskilled workers. This conflict coexists with the 
collective goods problems relating to free migration. This collective ac-
tion problem could be addressed by allowing states to appropriate the 
benefits of their investments in human capital through a Bhagwati tax, 
or through other mechanisms. 
Migration can be understood as a global problem, and as a col-
lective action problem, in another way. In order to regulate the flows
of workers effectively, with low costs in economic terms and in ethi-
cal, human rights, and communitarian terms, destination states need 
the cooperation of sending states. This is why many bilateral migration 
agreements include provisions for home state cooperation in restraining 
illegal immigration to destination states. 
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The development dimension of migration may add yet a further 
public goods aspect. To the extent that migration is seen as a means 
to reduce poverty, these results may have some characteristics of pub-
lic goods. The willingness of destination states to accept migrants in 
order to promote welfare of people in sending states may be under-
stood as a collective action problem that may be resolved through 
institutionalization. 
Thus, both free migration and human capital enhancements may 
be understood as global public goods, with possibly somewhat incon-
sistent solutions. In order to resolve this set of problems, it may be 
appropriate to seek a solution in which each state agrees to allow a 
measure of free migration with respect to both unskilled and skilled 
workers, while reaping the benefits of its human capital enhancement 
programs. Of course, to the extent that states have comparative or ab-
solute advantages, it would seem appropriate to allow them to utilize 
these advantages. 
So, for example, if the Philippines has an absolute advantage in 
semiskilled nursing care while the United States has an absolute disad-
vantage, it may be appropriate to ensure that semiskilled nurses from 
the Philippines may migrate to the United States. In order to induce the 
Philippines to make appropriate human capital investments, this regime 
should ensure that remittances, Bhagwati taxes, or compensatory pay-
ments reimburse the Philippines for its investment. 
By allowing states to capture the value of these types of created ad-
vantage in the production of human capital, human capital is converted 
from a public good to a private good from the perspective of the home 
state. This is not an endorsement of limitations on emigration. Rather, 
the point is that states will invest efficiently in human capital—and will 
invest more—if this public goods problem is resolved. 
Mf N a ND Ne Gotia tio N Dy Na Mics r evisite D
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, states would wish to 
consider the utility of an unconditional MFN principle in international 
migration law. In the migration context, the comparative advantage 
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principle suggests that individuals willing to work at the lowest price 
(all other things being equal) should migrate. Comparative advantage 
would be diminished if, in the EU context for example, a Greek worker 
were to move to France to accept a job where an otherwise equivalent 
Nigerian worker would have taken the job at a lower wage rate. The 
MFN principle is broadly consistent with comparative advantage. Thus, 
an MFN principle contributes to the global gains from migration. 
One of the main reasons for a global trade organization (i.e., the 
WTO) is the economic and political need in the trade context for non-
discrimination in the MFN sense: each state requires a promise that 
it will be accorded trade concessions equal to those accorded to each 
other state. As more bilateral and regional arrangements are entered into, 
states may seek a rule of MFN in order to protect the relative value of 
concessions achieved. An MFN rule also ensures negotiators against hav-
ing their work “undercut” by subsequent superior concessions to other 
states, allowing them to avoid adverse political consequences. Both 
of these motivations appear to be applicable in the migration context, 
although there are cultural, regional, or other reasons why departures 
from MFN might be more acceptable in connection with migration than 
in connection with trade in goods or services. 
Of course, there are important distinctions. In the goods context, 
assuming fungible goods, MFN in the application of tariffs would be 
expected to have a significant effect on market penetration, and on terms 
of trade. In the migration context, we often think in terms of quotas, 
rather than tariffs, although it is possible to impose measures equivalent 
to a tariff through discriminatory fees or taxes. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the home state may not have the 
same mercantilist perspective, wishing to increase outbound migration, 
as in connection with trade in goods. Thus, it may be less concerned 
about departures from MFN in connection with migration than it is in 
connection with trade in goods. On the other hand, citizens hoping to 
migrate may criticize their governments for failing to obtain equal treat-
ment with other home states. 
An MFN rule of negotiations would raise the possibility that some 
states would attempt to “free ride” on negotiations by other states, de-
clining to make concessions themselves. However, at least within the 
GATT/WTO system, this problem has generally been addressed through 
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concerted negotiations, with careful examination of each state’s conces-
sions. In connection with GATS, at least for a period in the original 
1994 agreement, states preserved a right to decline MFN treatment to 
certain other states in order to retain a means to deter free-riding. 
As described in Chapters 6 and 7, there already exist regional and 
bilateral migration arrangements that may conflict with MFN and with 
comparative advantage. 
States that find it valuable for their citizens to migrate will desire 
at least MFN treatment. The possible negotiation of treatment supe-
rior to other comparable states may be modeled in strategic terms as a 
prisoner’s dilemma among sending states, in which sending states un-
dermine their collective interest. If they are able to join together, using 
an agreement containing an MFN obligation, to form a cartel they may 
be able to extract superior liberalization commitments from destination 
states (Guzman 1998). In particular, they may be able to countervail 
the market power of destination states by forming a kind of “cartel” of 
home states—they may thus be able to reduce the use of market power 
by destination states. 
One way to evaluate the choice between submultilateral liber-
alization of migration and multilateral liberalization is under the 
global cost-benefit analysis approach described by Jacob Viner (1950) 
in connection with goods as trade creation versus trade diversion. This 
analysis asks to what extent establishment of submultilateral liberaliza-
tion increases global welfare through liberalization of submultilateral 
migration, while diminishing global welfare by diverting migration 
from its most efficient destinations. In the years since 1950, economists 
have critiqued and extended the static Vinerian analysis in a number of 
ways. 
Economists have also importantly added to Viner’s “static” analysis 
by consideration of what Bhagwati (1993) has called the “dynamic” 
time-path issue. This dynamic question includes the question of the 
relationship between the growth of regional trade integration and the 
growth of multilateral trade integration: whether regional integration 
agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks on the path to 
global economic integration (1991). 
It would be possible to establish a multilateral agreement that 
would regulate submultilateral integration in order to prevent welfare- 
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reducing arrangements. This type of agreement would mimic the pur-
pose of Article XXIV of GATT.
Thus, as in the case of goods and services trade, there may be some 
need to allow submultilateral integration as a departure from MFN 
requirements. The EU is an example of such integration. Of course, 
the EU is also inconsistent with the MFN requirements of GATT and 
GATS, and is thought to qualify for relevant exceptions. So, it would 
be consistent to provide similar exceptions in a multilateral agreement 
on migration. There would be similar normative arguments regarding 
the utility of an exception from the MFN principle, in terms of trade 
creation and trade diversion, and in terms of building blocks versus 
stumbling blocks. 
l iNka Ge Politics a ND iNstitutio Nal  l iNka Ge
It is not appropriate to consider migration negotiations as stand-
alone negotiations, isolated from other international issues. As suggested 
in Chapters 2 and 4, there may be circumstances in which beneficial
cross-sectoral reciprocal arrangements may improve aggregate welfare 
as well as state welfare. 
Linkage, as a political fact, is pervasive. States bargaining with one 
another in the international relations market use whatever tools are at 
hand: security matters are linked to trade, finance is linked to environ-
mental protection, membership in regional organizations is linked to 
human rights. This is a natural and a presumably efficient phenomenon. 
In these contexts, states find themselves in a barter economy, trying to 
make deals by seeking to identify “bilateral coincidences of wants.” 
Until the days of greater use of techniques, such as internationally trade-
able pollution permits, or more direct monetary payments in exchange 
for substantive concessions, barter will continue. In barter economies, 
the greater the breadth of subject matters available, the greater the pos-
sibilities for making a deal. 
As an example of linkage as a political fact, consider the linkage 
between trade and intellectual property rights. This political linkage 
evolved into an institutional linkage. The United States sought enhanced 
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protection under domestic intellectual property laws of other states for 
its intellectual property–dependent industries. It achieved this goal at 
the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations with the signing of 
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). This agreement was the product of political linkage: in the 
famous so-called Grand Bargain, the United States, the EC, and others 
exchanged concessions in agriculture and textiles for concessions in 
intellectual property protection and services trade. Political linkage was 
transformed into institutional linkage in the form of the TRIPS, within 
the broader context of the WTO. 
TRIPS is an archetypical, and advanced, case history of linkage. 
We may view TRIPS as a possible precedent for migration. In fact, 
Mode 4 of GATS already demonstrates the degree of natural linkage be-
tween migration and trade in services, and even more narrowly between 
mode 3 commercial presence and mode 4 movement of natural persons. 
The question is whether political, legal, and/or institutional linkage 
would allow states to make and enforce broader welfare-improving 
agreements. 
Of course, it is by no means clear that the WTO should be accorded 
responsibility to address international migration law issues (see Chap-
ter 11). However, broader organizations may offer economies of scale 
and scope. On the other hand, broader organizations could reduce the 
domain of possibly beneficial interorganizational competition (Tracht-
man 2002b). Moreover, it does not necessarily matter whether functions 
are separated in function-specific international organizations, or are in-
tegrated within a single organization, such as the UN, or perhaps the 
WTO. Linkage can be established either between organizations or with-
in an organization. We live in a world of path dependence: given that 
the WTO exists, with a highly articulated set of institutional and legal 
capacities and tools, there may be actions, such as adding functional 
responsibility to the WTO, that make sense that would not make sense 
were the starting point different.  
It is possible that negotiations in the WTO context may provide an 
advantage over negotiations in a separate multilateral migration agree-
ment, IOM, ILO, or another functional context: the greater possibility 
of linked package deals. While institutional linkages may be made 
between discrete functional organizations, under some circumstances 
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doing so within a single organization may enhance administration and 
legitimacy (Guzman 2003; Ryan 1998). The WTO already contains 
much scope for package deals: for side payments. “With all side pay-
ments prohibited, there is no assurance that collective action will be 
taken in the most productive way” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p. 
153). However, it is worth noting that the WTO system, with its ef-
fective requirements of unanimity for amendment, results in greater 
requirements for “package deals” than a system that relies on majority 
voting for new “legislative” rules. 
Martin, Lowell, and Taylor (2000, p. 156) suggest that because host 
countries require the cooperation of home countries in ensuring that 
temporary migrants return home, some means of enforcing commit-
ments (on the part of the home country) are needed. They suggest that 
the host country provide “special trade rights, investment and other pre-
ferred treatments” as a device to secure compliance through threats of 
withdrawal. Depending on the structure of such incentives, they may 
require amendments to existing WTO law, and so some formal linkage 
may be necessary. 
Similarly, these types of benefits could be linked to efforts to as-
sist in preventing unauthorized immigration (see Chapter 4). Martin, 
Lowell, and Taylor argue that “the emigration countries that benefit
from freer trade and investment should be expected to help immigration 
countries manage migration, especially the unwanted or unauthorized 
migration that freer trade is expected eventually to reduce. Given the 
resistance to free trade in many aging industrial democracies worried 
about unwanted immigration, it seems naive to suggest that migration 
can continue to be excluded from trade negotiations” (pp. 157–158). 
Furthermore, restriction on imports of goods produced in developing 
countries, such as agricultural products and textiles, “reduces employ-
ment in emigration countries and increases employment for migrant 
workers in industrial countries” (p. 158). For more on the relationship 
between trade and investment, see Chapter 2. 
Of course, other linkages and compliance mechanisms could be 
considered, and linkages and compliance mechanisms could be formal 
or informal. 
Job Name: -- /309724t
Negotiating Global Disciplines on Migration   287
Brai N Drai N versus l ow -s kill  a cce Pt a Nce
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, states may have two different 
stances with respect to skills. First, from a Heckscher-Ohlin perspec-
tive, states in which unskilled workers are scarce would generally be 
expected to welcome unskilled workers, despite the opposition of com-
peting workers. Where states vary and develop preferences as predicted 
under Heckscher-Ohlin, there is room for welfare-improving agree-
ments. This would provide a motivation for negotiations. 
However, it may appear that many skill-abundant countries are un-
interested in encouraging migration from unskilled-abundant countries. 
Under some circumstances, both skilled and unskilled workers may 
flow toward the high-skilled country—the wealthy country. Thus, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, there may be little to bargain over: the game 
type that may describe the migration game in this context is a “bully” 
game. However, it is possible, through linkage, to identify a broader set 
of feasible bargaining solutions. 
t axa tio N a ND f or Mula  aPP or tio NMe Nt
It is surprising that states do not engage in more frequent disputes 
regarding jurisdiction to tax. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, a Bhag-
wati tax may be useful to redress certain distributive problems that may 
arise in connection with immigration, to the extent that the brain drain 
may confer harm on the home state. It may also redress certain alloca-
tive problems in connection with the ability of a state to capture the 
returns from its investment in human capital. This seems especially 
valuable where the home state is a developing country. 
It seems that increased migration would put increasing pressure on 
states to coordinate in setting tax rates and collecting taxes. Otherwise, 
they may find themselves in an uncooperative competition in which 
they lose the ability to tax mobile resources. It is increased mobility, as 
may result from liberalization of migration, that provides relative mar-
ket power to the mobile factor. 
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Bucovetsky (2003) evaluates the strategic characteristics of a setting 
in which high-skilled workers initially resident in a low-productivity 
home state wish to migrate to a particular high-productivity destina-
tion state. The voters in that destination state would be motivated to 
improve their own positions by capturing rents from the immigrants. 
Bucovetsky assumes that immigrants have above-average incomes in 
the destination state. Therefore, in order to capture rents from the im-
migrants without discriminating explicitly, the destination state will 
increase the progressivity of its income tax system. This outcome as-
sumes that the home state and destination state are unable to cooperate 
with one another. Moreover, it assumes an inability to discriminate in 
taxation between migrants and native-born workers. 
If countries were to seek to cooperate, one equilibrium solution 
might involve an agreement to share the tax base, with or without dis-
crimination to the disadvantage of migrants. While there are many ways 
in which to share the tax base, countries might find some guidance in 
the literature on formula apportionment in connection with corporate 
income tax. Formula apportionment ordinarily divides the tax base 
among tax jurisdictions by reference to a formula referring to the pro-
portion of sales, payroll, and assets within each jurisdiction. These 
components would not be relevant in apportioning the tax base relating 
to a migrant, but other components might be relevant. One is years of 
education. Another might be years of experience. A third might be rela-
tive productivity in the two taxing states. 
aD just Me Nt
As suggested in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, adjustment will be a critical 
part of any regime for liberalized migration. A core question is whether 
the adjustment mechanism is internal to states or is international. 
Adjustment costs in the migration context arise in connection with 
a political or altruistic response to shocks to labor markets. And indeed, 
if the unskilled or semiskilled jobs in developed countries immediately 
became open to workers from poor countries, the incumbent workers 
might find themselves under severe wage pressure, at least in the short 
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term. This would be both cruel and politically infeasible. So an adjust-
ment mechanism must accompany substantial liberalization. 
Experience in the United States and elsewhere seems to indicate that 
destination countries with more flexible labor markets will experience 
reduced adjustment costs. Furthermore, countries with sophisticated fi-
nancial markets will also experience reduced adjustment costs. 
As suggested in Chapter 2, migration is similar in adjustment terms 
to importation of labor-intensive goods. Both raise global welfare, but 
may threaten home country workers who compete with the imported 
goods or the imported workers. 
The simplest adjustment mechanism is gradualism. In connection 
with trade in goods, GATT and now the WTO have served to phase in 
liberalization, and have been complemented by various national and 
perhaps international schemes for adjustment. GATT, which should be 
understood at its inception in 1947 as a framework agreement, has been 
successful in allowing states to negotiate liberalization selectively and 
gradually. GATS is similarly a framework agreement awaiting the ne-
gotiation of more stringent commitments. As discussed above, it seems 
likely that any new international agreement relating to migration would 
be in the form of a framework agreement, and would entail a degree of 
experimentation and adjustment over successive “rounds” of negotia-
tion and commitment. Further, it should be recalled that the experience 
in Europe of migration after removal of formal barriers has been un-
derwhelming in the sense that citizens of less wealthy member states 
of the EU have not migrated in great numbers to wealthier states (Ugur 
2007, p. 83). 
In addition to negotiation over time, another form of gradualism 
entails the use of prenegotiated transition periods. These have the ad-
vantage of being locked in legally, and therefore being somewhat more 
predictable than relying on future negotiations. These have recently been 
used in connection with the accession of new countries to the EU. 
A second alternative, often combined with a degree of gradualism, 
is adjustment assistance in the form of transfer payments, outplace-
ment, or training. The U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program is 
one example. That program currently only extends to workers who lose 
their jobs due to imports of goods, and not due to offshoring of services 
or immigration. 
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Assuming that the relevant liberalization was indeed global wel-
fare improving, there is by definition sufficient surplus to compensate 
the displaced workers, subject to certain limitations. The first limitation 
is that compensation is often only pecuniary, and does not restore the 
nonpecuniary losses occasioned by displacement. Second, significant
transaction costs may be associated with compensation. Third, for a 
variety of political and social reasons, compensation may not occur or 
may be insufficient to address losses.
Although a true international “embedded liberalism” approach 
would provide for cross-national compensation payments, it is difficult
to justify these types of payments in formal political settings. However, 
in informal and less transparent ways, such payments do take place. 
Polanyi (1944) and Ruggie (1982) believe that states must regulate 
the distribution of gains from trade in order to avoid political discon-
tent, and, ultimately, a “backlash” that would destroy the liberal system. 
While Polanyi and Ruggie address distributive issues arising from trade, 
those arising from migration are comparable. 
In Ruggie’s interpretation, individual states must cushion the do-
mestic “losers” from the loss of wages, livelihoods, and investments 
that results from liberalization—Ruggie extends Polanyi’s approach to 
relate free international trade to a domestic welfare state. The embed-
ded liberalism “bargain,” in short, is one in which the state takes care of 
its own through regulatory intervention in order to maintain its politi-
cal ability to liberalize. But, importantly, embedded liberalism calls for 
national regulatory intervention, not global regulatory intervention. Its 
call for redistribution is state-centered, and limited by domestic politics 
and budgetary capacity.
Further, it is important to recognize that global liberalism embed-
ded within a domestic welfare state is not quite analogous to the system 
described by Polanyi (Ruggie 2002). Polanyi saw the need for society-
wide regulatory intervention to make adjustments in connection with a 
society-wide market. The true analog in connection with global markets 
is global regulatory intervention—a global welfare state. Thus, if the 
scope of the market is to some degree global, then it would seem ap-
propriate that the scope of regulatory intervention in the market would 
need to be roughly commensurately global (Trubek 2002). After all, 
what would be the purpose of artificially constraining the possible 
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funding for adjustment, or of other redistributive regulation, to sources 
within a particular geographic segment of the market?
It is important to recognize, with Polanyi’s original work and Rug-
gie’s extension, that the regulation that they are concerned with is best 
understood as implicitly redistributive. The point is not necessarily to 
provide a certain quality of regulation, but to provide a certain quality 
of life. It may be that labor regulation, health regulation, environmental 
regulation, and others are the best means to do this under particular 
circumstances. 
But, as Kaplow and Shavell (2000, 1994) have pointed out, if re-
distribution is the goal, then taxation and explicit redistribution are the 
most efficient means, subject to what we might call political transac-
tion costs. That is, there may be circumstances in which regulation is 
used to redistribute because direct redistribution will be too difficult in 
political terms. This technique, of course, has its ethical and practical 
problems. But it has even greater problems in the global setting, where 
these regulatory policies are dependent on different national economic, 
legal, and political systems and cultures. Suppression of differences 
in order to embed liberalism may be too costly in terms of legitimate 
regulatory diversity. Moreover, the scope for transnational externaliza-
tion—for transnational redistribution—may be too greatly constrained 
by a requirement to act through regulatory means.
So, a true global embedded liberalism would extend to poor coun-
tries and would allow them, as well as wealthier countries, to attenuate 
the risks and costs of liberalism to which their citizens are exposed. 
The transfers could occur on a global basis, and would seem to require 
global institutions to overcome collective action problems in order to 
make them effectively.
Once extended in this way—in terms of both geographic reach 
and redistributive scope—the embedded liberalism idea seems to have 
more in common with the cosmopolitan ethical perspective described 
in Chapter 3. Of course, its motivations are not based on ethics but on 
prudent self-interest: the embedded liberalism concept suggests that in 
order to protect liberalism from destruction by those who lose, it is nec-
essary to compensate them through regulatory intervention. One way 
in which the Rawlsian difference principle and Polanyi’s embedded 
liberalism can be merged is through recognition that, to some extent, 
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each of us lives in a “real” veil of ignorance. That is, over time, we are 
uncertain to which group we will belong—whether we will be among 
the lucky few who hold wealth, or among the poorest wraiths. Under 
these circumstances, the difference principle is simply a hypothetical 
constitutional arrangement that we might actually enter into under un-
certainty (Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; 
Mueller 1996).
The embedded liberalism concept calls for redistribution in order 
to forestall a backlash. The backlash may be a simple move toward 
demagoguery and nativism in destination states, with ugly or inefficient
effects. With respect to sending states, on a very speculative and per-
haps even a counterfactual level, we can at least imagine a relationship 
between poverty and terrorism along these lines. Does global apart-
heid result in frustration, anger, and violence, either domestically or 
internationally? Is the rise of terrorism a kind of backlash against an 
insufficiently embedded global liberalism? Is the correct response to 
embed liberalism in a regulatory regime?
Finally, let us emphasize the connection between liberalization and 
redistribution based on the cosmopolitan nature of poverty. In many 
instances, liberalization gives rise to substantial political costs. These 
costs may be paid through selective protectionism: dissenting interests 
may be paid off through protection against competition. This despite 
the fact that it might enhance global social welfare to simply pay direct 
compensation. However, direct compensation is more readily criticized, 
and allows costs to fall fully on local taxpayers. On the other hand, pro-
tection often raises costs only to presumably less politically powerful 
consumers, and also diminishes the welfare of foreign persons, whose 
interests are not directly taken into account in the domestic political 
system. The point is that domestic redistribution is critical to efficient
liberalization, just as international redistribution is necessary to poverty 
relief more generally.
While some wealthier states have domestic institutions capable of 
facilitating redistribution, others do not, and we lack global institutions 
capable of facilitating international redistribution. That is, redistribu-
tion may be impeded, or at least rendered inefficient, by the lack of 
appropriate institutions to allow individuals or states to engage in re-
distribution with confidence and efficienc . Institutional development 
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can assist in overcoming collective action problems in connection with 
individual decisions to engage in redistribution. 
Arrangements to share the tax base with respect to migrants, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 10, allowing home developing countries 
to at least avoid conferring uncompensated benefits on wealthier states, 
would be a step toward this type of redistribution. 
s afe Guar Ds
As discussed in Chapter 4, recession is a leading cause of scape-
goating, and rejection, of immigration. Yet there are other circumstances 
that may make decisions to admit immigrants, or decisions to accept 
commitments to admit immigrants, regrettable. 
While states have liberalized trade in goods significantly since the 
establishment of GATT in 1947, states have determined that it is desir-
able to maintain the right to impose “contingent protection” in order to 
reverse their liberalization under certain circumstances. Obviously, if 
the right to engage in contingent protection is not constrained enough—
if it is too easy to rightfully apply safeguards—then the concessions 
made by states in international trade negotiations would have little 
value. So the international trade law system is finely balanced between 
enforcement of liberalization commitments and permission to derogate 
from liberalization commitments. 
It might be argued that the permission to derogate from liberaliza-
tion commitments under appropriate circumstances may play a role in 
inducing greater liberalization commitments. That is, trade negotiators 
may be willing to make greater liberalization commitments under con-
ditions of uncertainty regarding the effects of liberalization, where they 
know that they can derogate from these commitments in the event that 
they turn out to be unexpectedly burdensome. It might further be argued 
that at least the safeguards mechanism represents a kind of international 
law facility for “efficient breach.” That is, it allows states to determine 
to back away from their commitments if they are willing to provide 
compensation (under certain circumstances). 
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The main argument for safeguards is that a domestic industry needs 
a period of protection to shield it from a surge in imports, and that 
after a period of protection the domestic industry will be able to com-
pete globally. Horn and Mavroidis have argued in the trade in goods 
context that safeguards measures may serve an efficient temporizing 
function by allowing more gradual and therefore (under specific and 
limited circumstances) less costly reallocation of resources, especially 
labor (Horn and Mavroidis 2003). However, economists are broadly 
distrustful of the ability of governments to sort between valid claims 
along these lines, and invalid claims that will result in a chronic need 
for protection. 
One quasi-economic explanation of safeguards law is Corden’s 
“conservative social welfare function” (1974, p. 107). “The [conser-
vative social welfare function] embodies Corden’s notion that ‘any 
significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section 
of the community should be avoided’” (Deardorff 1987). This early con-
cept is consistent with modern behavioral economics insights regarding 
individual preferences to avoid risks of loss in favor of obtaining risks 
of gain. It is also consistent with a pragmatic political approach to sig-
nificant disruptions in incomes.
Deardorff extends Corden’s analysis, suggesting that safeguards 
may serve as a technique by which to compensate persons injured by 
trade liberalization. In this sense, safeguards may be consistent with 
embedded liberalism. However, Sykes (2005, p. 18) suggests that pro-
tection arising from safeguards is an “extremely costly and clumsy 
device for compensating the ‘losers’ from trade liberalization.” 
The best way to understand safeguards measures is as a facility 
for politically efficient breach. The leading work in this area is Sykes 
(1991). Under this explanation, liberalization commitments are under-
stood as “contractual” commitments made by governments at particular 
points in time. At those points in time, governments are not able to 
predict accurately the competitive effects of their liberalization commit-
ments. However, governments recognize that, for political reasons (as 
suggested by Corden), “any significant absolute reductions in real in-
comes of any significant section of the community should be avoided.” 
Under uncertainty, governments include the escape clause in order to 
provide the possibility for derogation from commitments, with com-
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pensation to harmed states. This type of facility is known in domestic 
legal analysis as a facility for efficient breach. Interestingly, the effi-
ciency is measured, according to this analysis, in political welfare of 
governments rather than in public interest welfare of citizens. 
Sykes’s argument is predicated on the assumption that declining 
domestic industries have made sunk investments, and that these sunk 
investments serve to deter domestic entry. At the same time, foreign ex-
porters have less at stake, especially as they are assumed to be efficient
and therefore profitable. Sykes does not assume that domestic persons 
have greater political influence than foreign exporters, but this may also 
affect political decisions. 
Bagwell and Staiger (2005) suggest that politically efficient breach 
may be permitted, but that it must be constrained in order to induce 
member states to exercise restraint in their use of the facility for breach. 
And so, for Bagwell and Staiger, it is critical that the Safeguards Agree-
ment, applicable to goods, restricts the repeated use of safeguards 
measures. 
l e Gal  l iMits a ND Na tural  l iMits
As discussed in Chapter 2, migration is a function of supply and de-
mand, which in turn depends on relative conditions in the home country 
and in the destination country. As also discussed in Chapter 2, migration 
may result in convergence of incomes and standards of living. Thus, 
migration, if it is not artifi ially constrained, is a self-equilibrating 
process, tending toward an equilibrium. The earlier equilibrium is dis-
rupted by natural, technological, or demographic shocks, as well as 
institutional shocks such as a change in law. 
Migration is thus a self-limiting process, although social transfers 
and other factors may affect the point of limitation (O’Rourke 2004, pp. 
12–13). Given these natural limits, it is worth considering the question 
of the utility and scope of formal limits. In the late nineteenth century, 
emigration from poor countries followed an inverted U-shaped life cy-
cle, rising sharply and then declining (Hatton and Williamson 1998). 
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As home country incomes tended to converge with destination country 
incomes, emigration rates declined. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that legal limits are counterpro-
ductive and unnecessary, at least according to a welfare economics 
perspective. On the other hand, to the extent that emigration may over-
shoot an efficient equilibrium due to information problems, collective 
action problems, or other market failures, legal limits may be useful 
from a welfare economics perspective in order to dampen the swings 
toward emigration. As is well understood, legal limits may also become 
necessary from a political perspective. 
Notes
For an extended analysis, see Norman and Trachtman (2005). 1. 
See http://2. www.colomboprocess.org. 
Forced migration and refugee management has a somewhat different structure 3. 
(Hollifield 2000)
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Toward Specific Global  
Disciplines to Promote Migration
Of course, it is not possible in this academic work to elaborate a 
complete and acceptable set of rules for international migration. How-
ever, in order for negotiators representing states to build a set of rules, it 
is necessary first to establish a taxonomy of rules, and to understand the 
function and benefits or detriments of each rule. Such a taxonomy will 
promote negotiations by states based on their individual circumstances. 
So, the main function of this work is as an exercise in institutional 
imagination, to help focus policy planning and negotiations. Indeed, my 
main argument is that a framework agreement is appropriate in order to 
facilitate negotiations, through which states may discover appropriate 
commitments and rules. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the core political economy functions 
of an international agreement on migration will differ for individual 
states, and even for individual sectors or occupations. But that chap-
ter argues that there would likely be circumstances where states would 
find it useful to reach agreements on liberalization of migration. The 
core functions described would include the type of framework agree-
ment structure described in Chapter 4, including the ability for states to 
make commitments in particular fields, arrangements for cooperation 
on any Bhagwati-type taxes and immigration fees, and safeguards ar-
rangements, would be appropriate. However, certain other provisions 
are also important in a subsidiary sense. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, it is not clear that a multilateral agreement 
is necessary or optimal in this area. However, there are a number of ar-
guments in favor of a multilateral agreement, which, if flexible enough, 
can encompass bilateral, regional, and plurilateral subagreements. 
So the description here, and in Appendix A, of a possible basis 
for a multilateral agreement is not intended to preempt the question of 
the form of agreement or agreements that will arise in the future—it is 
merely intended to posit a checklist of considerations and an illustrative 
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sample of the types of provisions that might be considered for inclusion 
in an international agreement on migration. 
 While the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 
76) is of course correct to emphasize, as others do, that individuals are 
not goods, and that the types of disciplines developed in the area of 
trade in goods are not necessarily appropriate for application to move-
ment of persons, this argument proves too much. No one would suggest 
simply adding “nurses” to the GATT tariff schedules, or even to the 
GATS Mode 4 schedules of commitments, and consider the problem of 
liberalization of migration resolved. Yet this does not mean that greater 
international legal commitments, and more nuanced institutional ca-
pacities and commitments dealing with the complexities of migration, 
are not desirable or feasible. The purpose of this work is to examine the 
desirability and feasibility of these types of commitments. 
Prohibi Tion of  r e STric Tion S on eM iGra Tion
A national welfarist (as opposed to a global welfarist) analysis 
might support some restrictions on emigration to avoid the possibility 
of reduction of origin state welfare by emigration of high-skilled work-
ers. The only significant threat to developing countries from liberalized 
migration would seem to arise from the possibility of brain drain. 
However, the possibility and magnitude of reduction of welfare de-
pends on a number of factors, and it may be difficult for governments 
to determine in advance which types and amounts of emigration will be 
welfare reducing. After all, to determine the welfare impacts of emigra-
tion, governments would be required ex ante to ascertain the needs of 
their own labor markets, the possibility for return, the possibility for 
remittances, and so on. 
On the other hand, human rights considerations argue in favor of full 
rights to emigrate. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, full rights 
to emigrate may promote beneficial regulatory or fiscal competition. 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, the right to emigrate may already be 
protected by international human rights law. 
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Finally, we must recognize that emigration fees along the lines 
discussed below are associated with abuses by Nazi Germany and the 
former Soviet Bloc. So, any proposal of emigration fees must be struc-
tured in a way that is sensitive to the human rights ramifications of 
these fees. Perhaps states should not have unconstrained discretion to 
set these fees. Rather, some independent means of evaluating the state’s 
contribution to the earning power of the emigrant, along with broadly 
available financing arrangements, might allow emigration fees to sat-
isfy both human rights concerns and concerns for the public finances of 
the home state. 
So, while it appears appropriate to ensure that an agreement on mi-
gration protect a broad right to emigrate, it is also important to consider 
the concerns that developing countries may have as to possible welfare 
losses. As we saw in Chapter 4, under the common skilled labor–scarce 
home country and skilled labor–abundant destination country pattern, 
the home country may lose from emigration of skilled workers, while 
the host country per se (i.e., excluding the migrants themselves) does 
not capture much of the gain. Rather, the gain stays in the migrants’ 
pockets. As suggested in Chapter 4, one possible solution is to require 
compensation to those who lose—in this case, those remaining be-
hind—from those who gain: the migrants.
In order to prevent welfare losses to home states, it may be ap-
propriate, as discussed in Chapter 2, to allow home states to impose an 
education fee in order to enable them to recapture the value of public 
education in connection with emigrants. Such fees must be calculated 
in a reasonable amount and should not be charged as a condition for 
emigration, but they should be paid over time after emigration. Al-
ternatively, if the fees were charged in full upon emigration, it would 
be appropriate to ensure that reasonable financing arrangements were 
available to emigrants. 
One way to ensure the reasonableness of financing arrangements 
is to ensure that the obligation is enforceable in destination states. The 
more secure the arrangements for collection, the cheaper and more 
available the financing. Destination states might accept a commitment 
to assist in the enforcement of payment of this charge. This type of issue 
might be addressed as a matter of private international law, relating to 
enforcement of obligations and, eventually, judgments. 
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An alternative structure might involve a taxation structure that 
would have a substantively similar effect: “Young persons who could 
gain greatly from immigration may have limited capital and be unable 
to fund themselves; they would be better served by an arrangement in 
which they pay an extra amount in future income taxes, in the same 
manner that young Australians may borrow for higher education and 
then repay with additions to future income taxes” (Freeman 2006, p. 
165).
Ideally, from the standpoint of the migrant, the tax charge would 
be eligible for a credit, or at least a deduction, under the host country 
tax system. If it were eligible for a credit, the host country would in ef-
fect be ceding tax jurisdiction, or tax base, to the home country, to the 
extent of the tax charge. It is also possible to establish a credit even if 
the home country charge is not structured or characterized as a tax. This 
type of credit could be allocated or depreciated over a number of years. 
Of course, a credit or deduction for education charges is just one way 
to “apportion” the tax base relating to migrants. See the discussion of 
possible formula apportionment in Chapter 9. 
A hybrid structure, such as the following, could be devised: 
an • ex post facto schools charge, based on quantity and quality of 
schooling,
arising upon emigration, and held in abeyance upon and during • 
return, 
to be paid in installments over an extended period of time,• 
enforceable by the authorities in the host state, and• 
eligible for a deduction (or credit) in the tax system of the host • 
state, allocated over a period of time.1 
A different structure, perhaps more attractive from an economic 
standpoint, would involve an auction of immigration rights, as dis-
cussed in the following section. 
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Quo Ta S ver Su S Tariff S ver Su S a uc Tione D a cce SS
Above, I have discussed home state taxation. However, destination 
states may determine that the efficient means to regulate entry is through 
an immigration fee or a discriminatory tax structure. The purpose may 
be, as discussed in Chapter 4, to exercise market power in order to share 
the surplus that would otherwise fall largely to the migrants, or it may 
be to compensate the destination state for negative externalities that it 
may experience. An immigration fee might be especially appropriate in 
relation to unskilled labor. 
One way to analyze the difference between a quota or quality re-
quirement on the one hand and a fee on the other is by analogy to the 
difference between a quota and a tariff on trade in goods. Under an im-
migration fee, immigration would be permitted, but the host state would 
charge fees, or taxes, that would establish a barrier to entry. 
States may view it as useful to replace the current system of quotas 
with a system of tariff-like immigration taxes, emulating the transfor-
mation that took place in the Uruguay Round to “tariffy” quotas on 
agricultural products. Tariffication would have some welfare benefits in 
the sense that, under uncertainty as to the efficient quantity of migration, 
a tariff-type charge would allow market mechanisms to adjust, while a 
quota would not automatically adjust. Tariffication also provides some 
benefits in terms of transparency, predictability, and tractability in ne-
gotiations. Finally, tariffication allows the state to capture a portion of 
the surplus, and perhaps apply it to fund adjustment. 
This structure could be combined with a home state exit fee struc-
ture as discussed above, with joint enforcement between the host state 
and the home state. Under this combined mechanism, both states would 
calculate and negotiate an aggregate charge to migrants, and then nego-
tiate, presumably on the basis of some set of apportionment principles, 
a division of this charge. While these fees would deter some migration, 
the home state and host state would presumably have a joint incentive 
to set the fee at a level that allows efficient migration.
Thus, the same system of charges would permit the home state to 
internalize a portion of the benefits from allowing their high-skilled 
workers to migrate, and allow the host state to impose a charge on un-
Job Name: -- /309724t
302   Trachtman
skilled immigrants that would either compensate the host state for the 
adjustment, fiscal, or administrative costs it incurs in relation to their 
entry, or deter their entry (Hatton and Williamson 2005). The magnitude 
of these fees, and their apportionment between home and destination 
states, could be subject to negotiation. One role for international law or 
organization in this setting would be to establish principles for appor-
tionment, and perhaps an independent mechanism for apportionment. 
These fees could be paid as lump sums, or could be charged over 
time through domestic tax systems or other collection mechanisms.2 As 
suggested above, it would be very important to efficienc  to establish 
a mechanism to facilitate financing of these fees over time in order to 
allow payment from future earnings. There would be no need to har-
monize fees among destination states, as some destination states might 
be more interested in attracting unskilled workers, while others may be 
less interested in attracting or retaining skilled workers. Uniformity of 
fees would tend to suppress the operation of regulatory competition, 
although it may promote the operation of comparative advantage. 
Destination states may wish to distinguish between entrants to their 
labor markets who arrive without a job and those who are recruited or 
already employed. They may also wish to distinguish between service 
workers and manufacturing workers, and between different types of 
skills. Different fees might apply to different types of workers. 
Another way to set the migration fee, which would be even more 
sensitive to market conditions, may be to hold an auction (Simon 1987). 
From time to time, different commentators have suggested auction 
structures for entry visas: “Since immigration quotas are often subject 
to excess demand, there are strong reasons for supposing that, from the 
viewpoint of existing residents, the right to migrate is a valuable scarce 
resource which should, optimally, be sold” (Clarke 1994). Collie finds
that “when immigration occurs with auctioned immigration visas, it is a 
Pareto-improvement” when the wage difference between the two coun-
tries is substantial (Collie 2007, p. 11). This is based on the assumption 
that the auction and redistribution system is structured such that the na-
tive workers in the destination country gain, the migrant workers gain, 
and the workers that remain in the home country gain. “At the optimal 
level of immigration, the wage in the host country is at least twice the 
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wage in the source country, and the cost of the immigration visa is equal 
to more than half the earnings of the immigrant workers” (p. 11). 
Under the mechanism described above, the auction would in effect 
be conducted by the home and host states jointly, or at least it would al-
low the migrant to pay a single charge. One complicating factor would 
be the fact that potential migrants from multiple countries should be 
allowed to bid in the same auction, in order to allocate the right to im-
migrate efficientl .
On the other hand, destination states may be concerned about their 
ability to absorb migrants, and may desire to have a “safeguard” capac-
ity to bar immigrants in case of unexpected labor market disruption or 
other economic or political problems. I deal with this “safeguard” issue 
in policy terms in Chapter 9, and in more technical terms below. 
Taxa Tion
I have already discussed home state taxation in connection with 
migration fees. In order to remove disincentives to emigrate, origin 
states would ordinarily be required to defer to destination states in 
connection with income taxation on destination state–source income. 
States generally do this already through their national tax systems and 
through bilateral income tax treaties, either through an exclusion of for-
eign source income or through a credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign 
source income. A credit system provided by the home state maintains 
a disincentive to migration where the destination state tax rate is lower 
than the origin state tax rate, as the emigrant will be required to pay the 
difference. Furthermore, this type of credit system might suppress fi -
cal competition, insofar as migrants would be subject to a minimum tax 
equal to their home state’s tax, regardless of their residence. Therefore, 
subject to the discussion above of migration fees in order to address 
brain drain, it would seem appropriate to provide an exclusion from 
home state taxation for migrants, with respect to income sourced in 
their host state. 
Furthermore, subject to the above discussion of migration fees, 
host states should not otherwise be permitted to discriminate against or 
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among immigrants in connection with income taxation. Income taxation 
should otherwise be subject to a rule of national treatment and MFN. 
This approach would direct all protection and externality internaliza-
tion into the migration fee. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible that states would engage in 
a competition to attract highly skilled or other desirable workers, and 
it is also possible that they would seek to induce migration by workers 
whose training has been heavily subsidized by their home states. In 
order to avoid the kinds of public goods problems described in Chapter 
9, and in order to avoid an inefficient regulatory competition, it may be 
appropriate to coordinate with respect to taxation. 
c o MMiTMen TS To iMMiGra Tion Libera Liza Tion 
un Der a  Po SiTive Li ST aPP roach
Despite the demonstrated difficulty in determining the welfare 
consequences of immigration on both the host and home state sides, 
states will continue to make policy in this area on the basis of the ana-
lytical resources available to them. Not to decide is to decide, and it is 
just as ignorant to assume that no immigration is beneficial as it is to 
assume that an open door policy is beneficial. It is also equally as ig-
norant to assume that no international legal commitments in this field
are feasible or desirable as it is to assume that a comprehensive set of 
multilateral obligations is feasible and desirable. Moreover, even under 
uncertainty, given the context of the generally beneficial effects of lib-
eralization, the principle of conservatism would counsel not against but 
for liberalization. 
At least as a starting point, it appears that a positive list approach 
provides sufficient flexibilit  and transparency for states to use it as a 
basis on which to commence negotiations. The negotiations that led 
to GATS in 1994 were conducted on a “positive list” basis. That is, 
each member state prepared a positive list of sectors in which it would 
liberalize. The alternative, a negative list approach, entails preliminary 
acceptance of a comprehensive commitment to liberalize, and then ne-
gotiation to establish exceptions (a negative list approach). While the 
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distinction may not seem significant—it may seem akin to the question 
of whether a glass is half full or half empty—there is wide agreement 
among negotiators and commentators that the bureaucratic dynamic of a 
positive list approach has less of a bias toward liberalization. However, 
the positive list approach has been used so far in services negotiations 
at the WTO (with some criticism), and at least up until the 1979 To-
kyo Round, in effect was the dominant approach to reduction of tariffs. 
Since the 1940s, states in the GATT and WTO have debated whether to 
have across-the-board tariff reductions, with exceptions, or to simply 
negotiate on a product-by-product basis. Those states have most often 
used product-by-product negotiations. 
A positive list approach seems to provide more power and possibil-
ity for lobbying either for or against liberalization in particular sectors: 
stronger sectoral lobbies may achieve their goals more readily with a 
positive list approach. A positive list approach may help to overcome 
a collective action problem among industries that might otherwise lack 
sufficient motivation to lobby for liberalization. Therefore, a positive 
list may be more politically feasible and may facilitate beneficial gradu-
alism. It also may provide an opportunity to increase liberalization after 
experience and information are gained. The positive list approach could 
be combined with the migration fee discussed above. 
In order to facilitate negotiations and differentiation of commit-
ments based on particular sectors or skills, it will be important to have 
some degree of harmonization, or at least understanding, regarding 
classification of different types of skills. The International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO), maintained by the ILO, is al-
ready available and serves both as a model for national classifications
as well as to facilitate communications among countries and analysts. 
The ILO describes the ISCO as follows: 
The International Standard Classification of Occupations is a tool 
for organising jobs into a clearly defined set of groups according 
to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job. It is intended both for 
statistical users and for client oriented users. The main client ori-
ented applications are in the recruitment of workers through em-
ployment offices, in the management of short or long term migra-
tion of workers between countries as well as in the development of 
vocational training programmes and guidance. (ILO 2007a)
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ISCO operates at several levels of specificit , as reflected in Ap-
pendix A. It will be up to states to determine at what level of specificity
to allow and make commitments. In the WTO legal system, there have 
already been a number of disputes regarding classification  including in 
connection with the distinction between data processing machines and 
telecommunications equipment, the question of whether an exclusion 
of “sporting” also excluded gambling services, and the question of what 
constitutes salted chicken. We would expect similar types of issues to 
arise in connection with migration, under a positive list approach that 
results in differential liberalization. 
Te MPorarine SS an D Per Manence
Individual migrants may wish to remain in a destination state tem-
porarily, indefinitel , or permanently. Most of them would prefer to have 
a choice. From an economic standpoint, despite arguments that home 
states may avoid the harmful effects of brain drain through regimes of 
temporary migration, individual choice would seem to be most congru-
ent with efficiency in this context. Another way of saying this is that, if 
there is an externality produced by migration, the best way to address it, 
if it is worthwhile to do so, is likely to be with an instrument that mea-
sures and redresses the externality, rather than by imposing arbitrary 
constraints on a type of activity that sometimes gives rise to the exter-
nality. As discussed in Chapter 2, artificial limitations might reduce the 
possibility of efficient migration. So, restriction of migration to allow 
only temporary migration seems like a second-best technique for pro-
tecting home states from brain drain, compared to the type of migration 
fee discussed above. A migration fee is the less migration-restrictive 
alternative, and is likely to be the less welfare-reducing alternative, as a 
means to remedy brain drain. 
While the better approach would seem to be to allow migrants to 
remain permanently, for host state political purposes, it may be useful 
to provide the possibility in any international migration agreement for 
term limits applicable to migration. Any limits would be taken into ac-
count in discounting the amount of a migration fee. 
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iLLe Ga L iMMiGra Tion
Some states might propose that as a quid pro quo in exchange for 
formal liberalization, sending states would be required to take appropri-
ate measures to reduce illegal immigration. As illegal immigration is 
otherwise less desirable than legal immigration, all else equal, formal 
liberalization along the lines proposed here should naturally reduce the 
incentive to engage in illegal immigration. On the other hand, migration 
fees would provide a financial incentive to evade the formal system. 
It may even be that migration fees, collected through the tax system, 
would increase incentives for illegal immigrants to remain in the un-
derground economy. More research may be required, and particular 
situations may require special treatment, for example, where costs of 
illegal migration are relatively low, and benefits of increased wages are 
relatively high, such as at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The WTO legal system, particularly in connection with the TRIPS 
agreement, has some experience in mandating domestic regulation on 
behalf of trading partners. 
DiScri Mina Tion (M fn )
As suggested in Chapter 9, a general MFN requirement should be 
evaluated for inclusion in any international migration agreement in or-
der to reduce state discretion to discriminate among origin states. 
Most-favored-nation treatment compares the treatment of different 
foreigners. In the past, states have used origin state–specific quotas and 
rules as proxies for ethnicity, likely skills, wealth, and perhaps other 
criteria. However it is possible to address these criteria directly, to 
the extent that they are acceptable as criteria, and then apply restric-
tions and rules on an MFN basis. So, while ethnicity would often be an 
illegitimate factor, and may raise human rights issues if applied as a cri-
terion for admission (see Chapter 5), other factors may be acceptable.3 
Destination states would be permitted to establish qualitative and/or 
quantitative restrictions. 
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Hatton (2007, p. 364) argues that most countries already unilaterally 
operate in a nondiscriminatory fashion regarding migration. However, 
there are a number of counterexamples, including recent FTAs between 
the United States and Mexico, Canada, Australia, Chile, and Singapore 
(see Chapter 7). There are many bilateral labor agreements and other 
regional agreements that are structurally inconsistent with a principle 
of multilateral MFN (see Panizzon 2008). 
As noted in Chapter 9, a strict MFN rule could provide incentives to 
“free ride” in liberalization negotiations. Especially given the possibility 
that states would negotiate arrangements to share migration fees be-
tween home and destination states bilaterally, it may be that uniformity 
of migration fees under a strict MFN principle would be inconsistent 
with welfare maximization. Some kind of conditional MFN, or system 
of bilateral relations, could be superior to a rule of unconditional MFN. 
In this connection, under a rule of conditional MFN, migrants might be 
eligible to migrate on an equal basis, except that pairs of states would 
establish different migration fees, and different allocations, depending 
on each state’s particular circumstances. 
So, for example, if the Philippines determined that its welfare would 
be improved by emigration of its nurses to Japan, due to remittances or 
otherwise, while Japan also determined that its welfare would be im-
proved by the same activity, they might determine not to charge any 
migration fees. On the other hand, assume for a moment that South Af-
rica has a shortage of nurses and spent great amounts to train its nurses. 
Under these circumstances, South Africa and Japan might determine to 
charge a migration fee. No other discrimination would be permitted. 
e xce PTion S To M fn
It is likely that states would wish to negotiate some exceptions to 
an MFN obligation. One type of exception might relate to arrangements 
for mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Another type of 
exception might permit entry into free trade areas or customs unions 
that include labor mobility components. If, for example, Australia and 
New Zealand, in pursuit of a broad program of economic integration, 
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agree to free movement of labor between them, this should not require 
them to accept free movement of labor with every other country of the 
world. Such an exception would be similar to those already existing in 
WTO law with respect to regional integration. 
DiScri Mina Tion ( n a Tiona L Trea TMen T)
National treatment compares the treatment of foreigners to the 
treatment of host country nationals, and is intended in the trade in goods 
context to protect the value of liberalization commitments from defec-
tion through discrimination. In the migration context, human rights 
values would also be served by a rule against discrimination. 
In this section, I am discussing national treatment after admission: 
inside the border. If a right of national treatment prior to admission 
were established, it would simply effect a broad liberalization of im-
migration. National treatment is intended in trade agreements to protect 
the value of trade concessions by ensuring that the playing field be-
tween national and domestic is otherwise level: to ensure that states 
do not defect from their liberalization commitments by discriminatory 
treatment “inside the border.” 
The important thing to keep in mind with respect to national treat-
ment in migration, as in trade in goods, is that ordinarily domestic 
persons are entitled to extensive access to their home labor markets, 
while foreign persons start off with only constrained access. So, na-
tional treatment obligations in trade agreements, and in migration 
agreements, begin by assuming important and enduring barriers. These 
barriers are addressed in tariff negotiations in connection with goods, 
and could be addressed in positive list–based negotiations in connection 
with migration. 
As the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 74) 
points out, minimum wage laws and social insurance schemes set a 
floor on the price of labor. But there may still be scope for competition 
above the floo , or utility in establishing rules of nondiscrimination. 
Nondiscrimination by virtue of governmental measures would be an ap-
propriate rule; it is uncertain whether private discrimination needs to be 
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addressed in connection with an economic migration treaty, as opposed 
to national law or a human rights treaty. 
Although Hatton (2007) argues that permanent immigrants are gen-
erally accorded national treatment, this leaves out many ways in which 
immigrants are at least temporarily denied the same rights as nation-
als, including rights to vote and access to certain transfer programs. 
Furthermore, Hatton envisions a regime in which states do not make 
commitments to accept immigrants; experience with trade agreements 
demonstrates that under a regime where states made such commitments, 
but later wished to renege, denial of national treatment would be a pri-
mary avenue for defection (p. 364). National treatment obligations in 
an international migration agreement would have the effect of ensuring 
that protectionist measures are confined to those actually negotiated.
National treatment obligations would require careful structuring 
and exceptions. For example, immigrants may be excluded from certain 
national security–oriented jobs, or may only be permitted to vote after 
an extensive transition period. But the basic idea of a national treatment 
provision, as in the trade context, would be to limit protectionism—to 
limit defection from liberalization commitments through differential 
treatment that makes migration less attractive but does not have a bona 
fide prudential or other justifiable purpose
r e Gu La Tion an D Licen Sin G
It is well understood, both in the EU context (Chapter 6) and in the 
GATS context (Chapter 8), that both discriminatory and even nondis-
criminatory regulation and licensing of professions or trades may serve 
as a barrier to trade in services and movement of workers. Yet these 
regulatory and licensing regimes may serve important prudential pur-
poses, so they can neither be disregarded nor dismantled. Requirements 
of proportionality can serve to ensure that these regulatory rules are 
not used to establish barriers to migration. Regimes of harmonization 
and recognition can serve to ensure the achievement of prudential pur-
poses while minimizing the concomitant impediment to free movement 
(Trachtman 2003c, 2007). 
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As described in Chapters 6 and 8, EU and GATS contain instru-
ments to discipline domestic regulation, through tests of discrimination 
and proportionality, through requirements or facilitation of recognition, 
or through harmonization. These types of instruments may be adapted 
to use in the migration context, with varying degrees of discipline. Of 
course, in an initial multilateral agreement on migration, something 
more along the lines of the GATS facility for future agreements might 
be appropriate, rather than a detailed work program toward harmoniza-
tion and mutual recognition, as in the EU. 
It is important in this context to erect structures that will cause do-
mestic regulators to take into account the effects that their regulations 
have on foreign persons, and to seek to ameliorate those effects without 
losing the prudential benefits expected from the regulation.
a cco MPanyin G f a MiLy  Me Mber S
Denial of entry for members of a migrant’s close family may serve 
as a substantial deterrent to migration—as an additional barrier to 
migration. There does not appear to be a specific customary or conven-
tional international law right to family unity, or family reunification, in 
this context. However, a number of human rights instruments contain 
component rights that may form the basis for an argument of unity or 
reunification under particular circumstances. While, for example, Ar-
ticle 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that state’s 
parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her 
parents against their will, it does not specifically require states to admit 
the children of immigrants. For economic migrants, who presumably 
have a choice to emigrate or not, a host country policy of adult workers 
only would not appear to violate the obligation of Article 9. But condi-
tioning migration on a parent’s willingness to separate from his or her 
children may be an effective barrier to migration. And so, it would seem 
appropriate for any agreement on international migration to address this 
issue. 
In order to make effective the right to bring family members, ac-
companying family members should be provided access to appropriate 
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public services, including educational services. Furthermore, it may be 
appropriate to provide relevant language or other destination state cul-
tural training to migrants and their families. While these are costly, they 
may be covered through a migration fee (Clarke 1994). 
a cce SS of  iMMiGran TS To Pub Lic Ser vice S
One of the possible sources of inefficienc , and potential injury to 
the destination state, is excess utilization by immigrants of public ser-
vices. And of course, this type of utilization raises political concerns 
as well. Qualitative restrictions may address these concerns by estab-
lishing criteria for admission associated with nonuse or modest use of 
relevant public services. Migration fees can be structured to respond to 
the same concerns. On the other hand, broad denial of access to public 
services would deter immigration. 
Trebilcock (2003) proposes using an insurance arrangement to pro-
vide for coverage, while providing that the destination state does not 
bear the cost. He proposes that migrants be required to obtain private in-
surance to cover possible drawings on noncontributory social programs 
during a specified period after entry. The programs addressed would 
include welfare payments and public noncontributory pensions. Trebil-
cock would not deny immigrants coverage under public education and 
health care. He is attracted to this structure because it would develop 
a private insurance market that would assess and price the risk to the 
social insurance system posed by particular immigrants. In a sense, this 
insurance-based structure covers some of the same concerns that might 
be addressed through a migration fee, although it is administered by a 
private party and may be structured to be more specific to particular 
immigrants. The assumption is that the private insurance market would 
evaluate and price these potential costs more accurately than govern-
ment planners. 
This private insurance requirement is certainly worthy of consid-
eration as a less restrictive alternative to skill, age, or other criteria 
designed as proxies for an acceptable level of use of social welfare pro-
grams. This type of insurance would also provide some experience that 
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could be used to determine whether the risk to the destination state fisc
is great enough to require a regulatory response. 
As a matter of equal respect for individuals and perhaps human 
rights, it seems desirable to ensure that equally situated persons are 
treated similarly in terms of social welfare programs. Trebilcock’s pri-
vate insurance proposal ensures equality of access to social welfare 
programs, after entry and mandatory arrangement for private cover-
age. It is therefore consistent with these concerns. Long-term denial of 
access to social welfare programs, and short-term denial of access to 
public education and public health programs, seem inconsistent with 
these concerns. 
Socia L Securi Ty  an D h ea LTh  
in Surance c on Tinui Ty
Along similar lines, individual workers will be artificially deterred 
from migration if they lose their home country social security–type 
or health benefits, or if they are ineligible to participate in destination 
country social security or health programs, or if their work in either the 
destination or home country is ineligible to qualify them for benefits.
Again, it would make sense to funnel all protection, or internalization 
of externalities, into a single migration fee, and to provide a continuous 
system of social security and health benefits. The EU has developed ap-
propriate systems for providing continuous coverage and sharing costs 
between home and destination states. These may serve as a model, al-
though they require a high degree of coordination and administrative 
capacity. 
c iTizen Shi P, n a Tiona L Ser vice, an D 
Draf T o bLiGa Tion S 
States have often been reluctant to grant citizenship to immigrants. 
Difficulty in achieving citizenship may be seen by potential immigrants 
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as a disincentive to migration: the longer it takes and the more difficult
it is to become an equal member of society, the less attractive migration 
will be. One potential solution is to negotiate a uniform, or a scheduled 
nonuniform, maximum period of residence prior to eligibility for citi-
zenship. At some point, states must recognize, with Max Frisch, that 
they have imported not just workers, but men and women who deserve 
the same status, rights, and treatment as native-born men and women. 
States may impose criteria, such as civic knowledge, language ability, 
or others, but these criteria should be required to be reasonable, trans-
parent, and fairly applied. On the other hand, a maximum period prior 
to citizenship may have the perverse effect of inducing states to limit 
the stays of immigrants in order to prevent them from attaining the right 
to citizenship, so this type of structure must be evaluated carefully in 
terms of its interaction with other policies. 
With citizenship, and sometimes residence, come responsibilities. 
It would seem unfair to allow immigrants to acquire a full set of rights 
without requiring them also to contribute in terms of national service or 
military service, if native-born citizens are required to make these types 
of contributions. If the immigrant has already performed these types of 
services, the relevant home state sharing in any migration fee should be 
reduced accordingly, and the destination state sharing increased. This 
would provide a rough way to establish a level playing field and avoid 
cumulative requirements for service. 
Tran SParency  an D r e Gu Lar Proce Dure S
As migration is a “retail” individual decision, unlike much of inter-
national trade in goods and services, transparency of rights, obligations, 
and procedures is critical. Efficient migration depends on good informa-
tion. States should undertake to provide effectively useful information 
about conditions and procedures so that potential migrants can make 
accurate decisions. This would include complete, integrated, and un-
derstandable publication of all measures affecting migrants. States 
should also agree to administer their rules in a reasonable and impartial 
manner.
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Loy a LTy , De Ma Go Guer y , an D Pub Lic r e La Tion S
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are significant tendencies in des-
tination states to scapegoat immigrants in order to deflect criticism of 
the host government for economic setbacks. These tendencies should 
be restricted and fought with public relations efforts. Provisions requir-
ing member governments to refrain from themselves engaging in these 
tactics, and to fairly and fully report to their populaces on an annual 
basis the effects of their immigration liberalization on the domestic 
economy as a whole and on particular segments of the economy, may 
serve to restrict demagoguery. The type of immigration fee proposed 
above should be carefully explained to citizens so they understand that 
this fee ensures that immigrants do not burden the domestic public wel-
fare system, and that those domestic workers who are displaced due 
to immigration will receive appropriate adjustment assistance so that 
they are not harmed. Member states should contribute to a global public 
relations effort, especially focused on the destination states, to promote 
understanding of the benefits of liberalized migration.
Safe Guar DS an D c o MPen Sa Tion
Immigration flows may respond to a number of causal factors 
and may be difficult to predict. Alternatively, states may have trouble 
predicting the effects on domestic employment markets, or they may 
have trouble predicting jobs growth. So, to the extent that states make 
meaningful commitments that are not otherwise limited, there may be 
a rationale for a safeguards-type mechanism to allow contingent pro-
tection against inflows, as discussed in Chapter 9. If a compensation 
system were thought useful, requiring the state utilizing the safeguard 
to compensate the states that relied on the liberalization commitment, 
it might take the form of withdrawal by sending states of immigration 
concessions, or it might be cross-sectoral in goods or services. An alter-
native would be financial compensation.
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One of the problems with a safeguards mechanism would be iden-
tifying causation of injury. If the predicate for contingent protection 
is that increased immigration causes economic dislocation, it may be 
necessary to prove both causation and injury. Neither of these legal 
tests has been without problems in the goods sector, and of course there 
has been a running empirical debate in the United States regarding the 
econometric analysis of the impact of increased flows of immigrants on 
the welfare of domestic workers. 
f orced Migration and “r everse Safeguards”
Although the possibility cannot be considered in detail within the 
context of this work, it may be appropriate to include in an internation-
al agreement regarding labor mobility some arrangements to assist in 
dealing with surges in the demand to migrate. States may have difficulty 
predicting the demand to migrate, so a completely different kind of 
safeguard system from the type used in connection with trade in goods 
may be appropriate in connection with migration. 
This “reverse safeguard” would provide for increased commit-
ments to accept immigrants under circumstances such as famine, civil 
war, or economic crisis. These types of events have often caused surges 
of emigration (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 213). This type of safe-
guard would have a completely different function from safeguards now 
in place with respect to trade in goods, and would really be an extension 
of the concept of forced migration or refugee management. In order to 
work well to relieve misery in sending states, these would be required 
to be coordinated contingent commitments, in which many destination 
states agree to “share the pain” of increased immigration. 
n a Tiona L Securi Ty  an D c ri Mina LiTy
Immigration raises critical issues from a national security stand-
point (Fisher, Martin, and Schoenholtz 2003). Each state will reserve 
the right to qualify its commitments by reference to national security 
concerns. Within the WTO agreements, this type of exception qualifies
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virtually all commitments, and is expressed as to goods in Article XXI 
of GATT.4 While there have been circumstances in which states have 
questioned a purported use of this exception, such as the case of the 
U.S. Helms-Burton law, it has generally not been used for substantial 
defection from liberalization commitments. 
In addition, states will generally wish to restrict entry by criminals 
who may pose a threat of criminal conduct. If states did not have the 
power to restrict entry, malevolent sorting processes might occur, and 
criminals might tend to congregate and exercise power in particular 
states. 
h ea LTh e xce PTion S
Obviously, states will wish to exclude individuals who may present 
a threat of epidemic. There would seem to be less risk of protectionist 
use of health exceptions in the context of migration than there is in the 
context of sanitary and phytosanitary measures relating to agricultural 
products. Consequently, there would appear to be less need for strict 
disciplines on national health measures used as a basis to exclude im-
migrants. Reference to World Health Organization standards may be 
appropriate in this area. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures may be a useful reference as states determine how to 
address this issue. 
c u LTura L in Te Gri Ty , irre Den TiSM, an D 
eT hnic c onf Lic T
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is an ethical and political 
argument for allowing groups of individuals to protect a certain po-
litical culture by excluding individuals who do not accept that political 
culture. Arguments of this nature can easily shade into irredentism or 
worse. On the other hand, there may be strong historical and security 
arguments for maintaining an existing ethnic balance. This is the type 
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of “high politics” with which international economic law has in the past 
been loath to interfere. And it is easy to see how an influx of members 
of a minority ethnic group could upset delicate balances (Ghosh 2000, 
p. 17). However, in a world of increased multilateral liberalization of 
migration, ethnic exceptions may seem more and more suspect. 
n otes
Under U.S. law, for example, certain education loan payments by certain taxpay-1. 
ers (subject to a cap on gross income) are eligible for a deduction. However, under 
current law, only loans paid for expenses at a limited number of foreign educa-
tional institutions qualify for deductibility. 
For a suggestion regarding modifications to the international tax principle of 2. 
residence-based taxation, see Straubhaar (2000, pp. 132–133). Straubhaar rec-
ommends “a fixed lump-sum entrance fee to be paid by every person wishing to 
immigrate, collected at the country of residence, and shared in equal proportions 
by sending and destination countries could be a first idea to follo .” 
Some states may view religion (as opposed to ethnicity) as a critical criterion. 3. 
Article XXI of GATT has not been applied in WTO dispute settlement (WTO 4. 
1986). For scholarly commentary, see for example, Schloemann and Ohlhoff 
(1999). See also Article XIV of GATS (providing exceptions for actions that the 
acting state considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, 
where such actions are taken during a state of war or other emergency in interna-
tional relations).




Should the ILO have been the fourth Bretton Woods institution, 
alongside IMF, the World Bank, and GATT? After World War I, France, 
Italy, Japan, and Poland argued unsuccessfully that the ILO should reg-
ulate migration (James 2001). But after the tightening of immigration 
restrictions in the interwar period, migration was not addressed at Bret-
ton Woods. 
In order for an assignment of authority to an international orga-
nization to be justified, states must first wish to regulate the relevant 
subject matter under international law. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 have 
addressed this issue. Once it is decided to regulate a subject matter un-
der international law, an organization may be useful in order to serve 
as a secretariat for—to manage, enforce, and develop—a multilateral 
agreement on migration. An international organization may house ad-
judication or be a forum for decision making. Of course, the type of 
international organization that will be useful, the desirable structure, 
and the type of functions that it would perform, are dependent upon the 
type of international legal rules that are determined to be desirable. 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which describe the role of the EU, other regional 
or bilateral organizations, and the WTO, respectively, provide examples 
of the types of roles that an organization might play in connection with 
migration. The major roles include facilitation of negotiations, research, 
technical assistance, preparation of new treaty rules, making of new 
rules other than by treaty, surveillance, dispute settlement, and punish-
ment. And, of course, at least four important multilateral organizations 
already address economic migration, in at least some dimensions: 1) 
the IOM, 2) the ILO, 3) the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and 4) the WTO. 
This chapter addresses four main questions:
Assuming that international law would be useful in the field of 1) 
international economic migration, would an international orga-
nization be useful, compared to the alternatives?
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What organizational features and governance arrangements 2) 
would be appropriate for an organization dealing with interna-
tional economic migration?
Would the IOM, ILO, UNCTAD, or WTO serve usefully as the 3) 
international organization principally charged with responsibil-
ity for international economic migration?
How should different organizations addressing varying facets 4) of 
international economic migration coordinate their activities? 
WOuld an Interna t IOnal  Organ Iza t IOn 
be uS eful?
Not all international law requires an organization. Much, if not 
most, international law lacks a secretariat, dispute settlement, decision 
making, surveillance, and other organizational functions. While Chap-
ters 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 suggest that some type of international law may 
be useful in the field of economic migration, it is not necessarily clear 
what, if any, organizational components are suitable. Nor is it clear 
what relationship international migration law should have with other 
international law, or with existing international organizations. 
One theoretical justification for international organizations is to 
reduce the transaction costs of international cooperation. This is the 
Coasean story of the market versus the firm, with the international or-
ganization playing the role of firm (Trachtman 1997). In the Coasean 
theory of the firm, the reason for firms (in our case, organizations) is 
dependent on transaction cost reduction. The best way to think about 
this model is in terms of cost-benefit analysis. There are gains to be 
achieved from cooperation. Where the net gains from cooperation ex-
ceed the transaction costs of cooperation, we would expect to observe 
cooperation. States would be expected to seek to maximize their net 
benefits from cooperation by utilizing the institutional structure, from 
case-by-case cooperation to organizationally structured cooperation 
(analogous to the continuum between the market and the firm), that 
maximizes the transaction benefits, net of transaction costs.
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In connection with international cooperation regarding economic 
migration, transaction costs arise from two main sources. First, they are 
occasioned by the cost of establishing mechanisms to promote coopera-
tion and avoid strategic behavior. If an organization can reduce these 
costs by, for example, supplying information, certifying information, or 
changing the structure of retaliation and the payoff from defection, then 
the organization may be justified.A second channel of transaction costs 
is the complexity of identifying, evaluating, and negotiating a Pareto-
improving transaction. 
It is not possible to determine with any certainty whether an in-
ternational organization would have greater net transaction benefits
compared to those resulting from a simple treaty without a specific
organization formed around the treaty. In important dimensions, the 
question of which would have greater net benefits is dependent on the 
question of the structure of the international organization. 
However, given the complexity of a likely migration treaty, with 
many opportunities for uncertainty and defection, it is certainly possible 
that an organization may provide certain useful services. In particular, 
we might examine the possibility of strategic behavior. To the extent 
that the strategic context in which states find themselves maps into a 
prisoner’s dilemma or another strategic model that could be resolved 
efficiently by a change in the payoffs effected through legal rules, an 
international organization might be useful. It would allow states to co-
operate where cooperation is beneficial, and where it otherwise would 
not be possible. 
Let us pursue the example of a prisoner’s dilemma. Recall that the 
dominant strategy for any state in the prisoner’s dilemma is defection. 
The only way to avoid the Nash equilibrium of defection by all parties 
is to change the payoffs. An international legal rule that entails some 
kind of informal or formal punishment, or other negative consequences 
of defection, can change the payoffs so as to change the game from a 
prisoner’s dilemma to a coordination game, with a much greater likeli-
hood of compliance. Organizations can serve to engage in surveillance, 
communication, and adjudication in order to implement rules that 
change payoffs. 
Williamson, extending the Coasean theory of the firm, focuses on 
asset specifici y as a basis for problems of opportunism and, in turn, 
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as a basis for integration within a firm (Williamson 1985). This type 
of problem arises after economic relations are entered, and arises from 
the fact that one party makes an investment in transaction-specific as-
sets. The classic and perhaps apocryphal example of Fisher Body and 
General Motors is used to illustrate the utility of vertical integration to 
safeguard the party required to make the asset specific investment from 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the other party.1 In this example, 
an asset specific investment is one that can only realize its full value in 
the context of continued relations with another party.
Williamson (1985, p. 42) claims that “it is the condition of asset 
specificity that distinguishes the competitive and governance contract-
ing models. Contract as competition works well where asset specificity
is negligible. This being a widespread condition, application of the 
competitive model is correspondingly broad. Not all investments, how-
ever, are highly redeployable.” 
What makes a particular transaction in international migration “as-
set specific”?Any transaction where one state advances consideration at 
a particular point in time—and must rely on one or more other states to 
carry out their end of the bargain at a later point in time—or experiences 
a significant loss in its expected value is asset specific. For example, a 
state might increase its immigration quotas. While it might be argued 
that this is the kind of self-enforcing transaction in which the consider-
ation can be withdrawn, it may be difficult to reestablish restrictions on 
immigration, and doing so involves political and economic costs. The 
domestic political costs of reducing restrictions will be incurred at the 
time they are reduced, and perhaps cannot be fully recouped later by 
reestablishment of the restrictions. 
Furthermore, to the extent that migration barriers are initially re-
duced on a multilateral basis, under conditions of MFN, withdrawal 
may be made more difficult, as a matter of both international law and 
domestic politics, not to mention immigration administration. In addi-
tion, the entry into an international organization itself may have high 
political costs, again at the outset. It may not be fully possible to be 
reimbursed for these costs. It may be attractive for some states to defect, 
knowing that other states are unable to retaliate. 
Williamson (1985) sees transaction costs economizing as the main 
purpose of vertical integration—of formation of organizations. Verti-
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cal integration is seen as a governance response to a particular set of 
transaction dimensions, including high asset specificity as the principal 
factor. With high asset specificit , the value of contracting is increased, 
but the type of contract—and institution—depends on other factors. 
International law is often subject to the problem of incompleteness 
in a way that domestic contracts are not. Domestic contract disputes 
always have an answer: “the common law abhors a vacuum.” In general 
international law, there are fewer institutional and legal structures to 
complete contracts. First, there is not a complete body of law that can 
be applied to supply missing terms to incomplete treaties. Second, there 
is no dispute resolution tribunal with mandatory jurisdiction. Informal 
mechanisms are more likely to apply. Thus, it is often difficult to rely on 
the ability to complete contracts through general international law. 
Assuming asset specificit , it may be useful to establish devices 
to constrain opportunism in order to realize gains from cooperation, 
depending on the costs and benefits of these devices. Institutions may 
be used to constrain opportunism. Institutions entail transaction costs, 
as do market transactions. Institutions may specify discrete rules, but 
are, under positive transaction costs, always incomplete. Even the 
discrete rules are incomplete in their interpretation, application, and 
enforcement. 
In addition, it is necessary to specify bureaucratic, legislative, or 
dispute resolution methods of completing contracts in order to avoid 
opportunism: to complete the contemplated transaction as intended. 
The higher the magnitude of asset specificit , the greater the incentives 
for opportunism and institutional integration: for the transfer of author-
ity to bureaucratic, legislative, or dispute resolution mechanisms. 
So, in determining whether an international organization would be 
useful, it would be important to evaluate the strategic setting, the mag-
nitude of the payoffs, the capacity for informal enforcement, and other 
aspects of the migration agreement circumstances. It is a complex de-
termination, as the types of commitments that would be appropriate are 
interdependent with the types of institutional structures that would be 
appropriate to enforce them, including the design of the international 
organization. 
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HOW SHOuld an Interna t IOnal  Organ Iza t IOn 
a ddre SSIng M Igra t IOn be d e SIgned?
As described earlier in this work, there are many parameters of 
any international agreement regarding economic migration. These pa-
rameters include, among others, certain commitments, exceptions and 
safeguards, calculation of sharing of migration fees between home and 
host states, coordination of health insurance, social security, and other 
benefits. As states enter into agreements, they may find it efficient to 
specify in great detail the treatment of every possible circumstance. 
This would require states not only to anticipate every possible cir-
cumstance, but also to negotiate and specify the treatment of each 
circumstance. However, not only is it difficult to address every known 
circumstance, but it is also extremely difficult to anticipate change.
Thus, complete contracts in international law, as elsewhere, are im-
possible. Rather, states must accept a degree of incompleteness. They 
may use a variety of methods to ex post complete their contracts. One 
method is simply to negotiate regarding new circumstances as they 
come up. This method may give rise to stalemates or strategic behavior. 
A second method is to provide for a legislative system that involves less 
than full unanimity, or that has other expediting characteristics. A third 
method, with a somewhat different domain, is to provide for dispute 
settlement, with all of the varieties of dispute settlement structure that 
may be available. In particular, it is possible to delegate greater or lesser 
discretion to dispute settlement, through lesser or greater specificity of 
treaty text. 
Dispute settlement is not just a method of completing an interna-
tional contract, it is also a method of enforcing rules. These are separate 
functions and should be evaluated and structured separately. In the 
enforcement role, dispute settlement declares who is right and who is 
wrong, removing the subject treaty from the default international legal 
mechanism of autointerpretation. This declarative role can have impor-
tant informal effects, and these may be sufficient to induce the desired 
level of compliance. However, where the declaration alone is deemed 
insufficient to induce the desired level of compliance, dispute settle-
Job Name: -- /309724t
Organizational Structures   325
ment can be the basis for imposition of penalties or authorization of 
retaliation against the miscreant state. 
Responsibility for international economic migration could be as-
signed to an existing organization or to a new organization. In this 
subsection, I will describe the possible features of a new international 
organization addressing migration. For purposes of discussion, let us 
call it the World Migration Organization (WMO) (Bhagwati 2003). By 
describing a WMO, I do not mean to prejudge the determination of 
whether the relevant responsibilities could be assigned to an existing in-
ternational organization, as discussed below. I simply wish to describe 
what functions may be appropriate. A WMO could have a variety of 
features beyond substantive treaty obligations, including perhaps the 
following: 
Purposes. These would include the facilitation of international • 
migration in order to better the welfare of individuals. A focus 
on the welfare of poor individuals might be appropriate. The pur-
poses may be expressed in broad enough terms to include collat-
eral matters such as social security, health care, and other matters 
to the extent that they would bear on economic migration. 
Membership arrangements and termination. Membership could • 
be open to states willing to accept the obligations of the WMO 
treaty, including obligations to liberalize immigration. 
Secretariat• 
Facilitating negotiations. The WMO secretariat could be ac-• 
corded responsibility to manage negotiations regarding lib-
eralization commitments and other matters. Whether these 
negotiations would be continuous or focused in particular 
periods, like GATT/WTO rounds, would be determined by 
the member states. 
Facilitating dispute settlement. The WMO secretariat could • 
include a function similar to that of the Legal Affairs Di-
vision of the WTO, or like the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, in servicing independent 
dispute settlement tribunals. Alternatively, the WMO could 
house a specialized permanent tribunal.
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Surveillance. The secretariat could be tasked with periodic • 
review of member states’ systems to evaluate the degree to 
which they could be improved in order to facilitate migra-
tion. This function could be modeled on the WTO’s trade 
policy review mechanism. 
Technical assistance. Some member states will require tech-• 
nical assistance in support of their negotiation, as well as 
in support of their implementation, compliance, and dispute 
settlement activities. The secretariat, or an independent en-
tity, could provide these services.
Research. Member states will require research to be per-• 
formed about many aspects of migration, including espe-
cially the economic effects of different types of migration 
in different contexts. The secretariat could perform this ser-
vice. One type of assistance that may be extremely useful is 
assistance in providing sophisticated, independent, and reli-
able economic analysis of the likely effects of liberalization 
of immigration. If states were able to develop a mechanism 
for providing this type of information in a way that would be 
separated from ordinary domestic politics, it might be seen 
as providing accurate information that could form a basis 
for political support, and policy. Thus, if analysis showed 
that a particular commitment to liberalize would not have 
adverse effects on competing domestic workers, they might 
be convinced not to oppose the commitment. Conversely, if 
analysis showed adverse effects, this determination might be 
used as a basis to calculate and apply adjustment assistance 
or other compensation. 
Public relations and transparency. As discussed in Chapters • 
4 and 11, immigrants can often be scapegoats for economic 
problems in destination states. If the antiglobalization back-
lash has been significant with respect to goods, it may be-
come even more active, and more dangerous, with respect to 
immigration. Therefore, it may be appropriate to develop an 
effective public relations function for the secretariat. Given 
the criticism that has been experienced by the EU, the OECD, 
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the WTO, and other international economic organizations, it 
will be important to develop sufficient transparency to sup-
port the perception of legitimacy of a migration organiza-
tion. Adopting the ILO’s tripartite governance structure may 
also facilitate transparency and the perception of legitimacy 
between employers as well as workers (Charnovitz 2003a).
Substantive expertise and experience. A WMO might contain • 
experience in economic negotiations, including analytical capa-
bilities that could support negotiations and dispute settlement, 
expertise in the human side of migration, including the capacity 
of societies to absorb migrants, expertise in labor market condi-
tions and dynamics, expertise in tax policy, expertise in human 
rights, and experience in multilateral negotiations. 
Treaty making and secondary law-making. It is possible for • 
an organization to be mandated to promote future treaty mak-
ing in the field of liberalization of migration and related mat-
ters. While the original GATT in 1947 did not contain a specific
mandate along these lines, GATT, and now the WTO, proceeded 
by “rounds” of treaty making. This treaty making was able to 
operate in the same way that all international law treaty-making 
proceeds: by a rule of unanimity in which only signatories are 
bound. It is important to note that even under a rule of unanim-
ity, there can be great pressure on states to join where the cost of 
exclusion is great. 
Committee structure. From a bureaucratic standpoint, it may • 
be useful to divide the work of an organization into commit-
tees to prepare for law making of various types. These types 
of committees may have an important agenda-setting role 
and should be structured in a way that advances the goals of 
the organization. 
Majority voting. It would be highly unlikely that states • 
would agree in the near term to allow significant liberaliza-
tion or public policy decisions to be made against their indi-
vidual will by virtue of majority voting. On the other hand, 
many related issues have been addressed through majority 
voting within the EU, so we know that such majority vot-
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ing is not categorically impossible. After more experience 
of increased liberalization, and greater commitments for 
liberalization, states may determine that some matters could 
be addressed through majority voting. A number of different 
decision-making structures are possible. One would have the 
composition of delegates to the WMO take a tripartite struc-
ture, similar to the ILO, where representatives of states, em-
ployers, and workers are integrated into the decision-making 
process (Charnovitz 2003a).
Dispute settlement. As discussed above, this is an alternative • 
method of completing incomplete contracts as new issues or 
new facts arise. Dispute settlement mechanisms may be under-
stood as a type of agent of a collective principal, for purposes of 
completing the contract along the lines desired by the collective 
principal. Dispute settlement can be more or less limited, with 
more or less “legislative” discretion. Dispute settlement should 
be evaluated in relation to legislative capacity. Under relatively 
strong and expeditious legislative capacity, dispute settlement 
may not require great authority to complete contracts. 
Tribunals or permanent bodies. In many areas of interna-• 
tional law, we see a choice between ad hoc tribunals and 
more permanent bodies. In international investment law and 
international trade law, we see ad hoc tribunals, while in 
international criminal law and in some areas subject to the 
mandatory jurisdiction of the World Court we see permanent 
bodies. Permanent bodies have advantages of continuity and 
expertise. 
Appeal. One possible hybrid arrangement is that used in the • 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, with ad hoc tribunals 
at a first stage, and a permanent body at the appellate stage. 
However, not all international litigation makes provision 
for appeal. Appeal has the advantage of the possibility for 
quality control and correction of errors, assuming that the 
appellate entity has the ability to provide superior decision 
making. 
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Acceptance. Under circumstances where legislative capacity • 
may be limited, there may be some argument for a political 
filter to evaluate and determine whether to accept adjudica-
tive decisions. This would prevent tribunals, as agents of a 
collective principal, from exceeding the wishes of the prin-
cipal. 
Remedies. Remedies should be designed to induce an effi-• 
cient level of compliance with obligations. They may include 
payment of fines, withdrawal of rights, or requirements of 
provision of alternative concessions. 
Private rights of action. One important question, especially • 
in the migration context, is whether individuals would have 
any rights to bring cases under the relevant treaty, and before 
an international tribunal (as opposed to a domestic tribunal). 
Private rights of action may provide important advantages 
in terms of compliance. They motivate individuals to seek 
out and address violations of rules—often in cases where 
individuals, rather than states, are likely to have first-hand
knowledge of violations. On the other hand, private rights of 
action may result in enforcement under circumstances where 
states would prefer to informally allow noncompliance. 
Scope for complex barter. In connection both with negotiations • 
and with dispute settlement to implement negotiated conces-
sions, greater breadth of coverage may ensure that the set of 
Pareto-improving barter transactions among states will not be 
empty, and that states will have continuing incentives to comply 
with their obligations. As noted in Chapter 9, this does not nec-
essarily mean that the organization must have other responsibili-
ties, but under some transaction cost circumstances, a broad set 
of responsibilities will facilitate barter. 
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WHa t  SHOuld be t He rO le Of  t He IOM, I l O, 
and Wt O?
Now that we have defined some of the functions of a WMO, we 
can begin to assess whether a new organization is necessary or appro-
priate, or whether one or more of the existing organizations could best 
take up these responsibilities. However, the list of functions provided in 
the prior section is not definitive, nor is it required to be provided by a 
single organization. So, it is possible that multiple organizations could 
combine to provide these functions. For example, analytical work or 
research could be assigned to the OECD, UNCTAD, and perhaps the 
IOM, while the IOM, ILO, UNCTAD, WTO, or a WMO could perform 
other functions. Or, dispute settlement for individuals, if they are to 
have private rights of action, could be assigned to a specialized organi-
zation such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, which would thereupon require a change in name. Negotia-
tions over liberalization commitments could take place at the WTO, and 
could even be addressed in rounds in order to allow package deals to 
be created that would include all the subjects presently addressed at the 
WTO, plus migration liberalization. 
Indeed, there are no “ideal” answers to these questions, only practi-
cal choices to be made based on multiple criteria. I begin by describing 
the present functions of the IOM, ILO, and WTO. 
t he IOM
The IOM has had an operational role in managing specific flows of 
migrants, but has not served to facilitate the development and operation 
of international law in this field. “Facilitating the migration of the hun-
dreds of thousands of people in Europe displaced or lacking economic 
opportunity in the post war period was one of the principal activities 
of IOM when it was founded in 1951” (United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights 2003).
Article 1(1)(e) of the IOM constitution provides that it shall provide 
a forum for the exchange of views and the “promotion of cooperation 
and coordination” among states. However, Article 1(3) of the IOM 
Constitution stipulates that it “shall recognize the fact that the control 
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of standards of admission and number of immigrants to be admitted are 
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States . . .” Thus, the mandate 
of the IOM does not seem to include the establishment of international 
legal commitments for admission of migrants. Of course, this is by no 
means an insuperable barrier: in the same instrument by which states 
entered into a multilateral agreement to liberalize migration within the 
context of the IOM, they could modify the IOM constitution to permit 
this activity. Furthermore, as a matter of interpretation, the fact that the 
IOM recognizes that admission is within domestic jurisdiction does not 
mean that states cannot make international legal commitments to con-
strain their authority over admission. 
However, the IOM has no particular history or institutional com-
mitment to liberalization of migration. The IOM contains a great deal of 
expertise regarding the dynamics of migration, and the facilitation and 
management of migration, especially under dire circumstances. This 
expertise would no doubt be beneficial in any initiative toward liberal-
ization of migration. 
t he Il O
The ILO was established in 1919 as part of the League of Nations 
system, and became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1946. 
The ILO, with 179 members, engages in analytical work and in facili-
tating negotiations relating to labor. It states its goals as follows:
The ILO is devoted to advancing opportunities for women and men 
to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, 
security, and human dignity. Its main aims are to promote rights at work, 
encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection, 
and strengthen dialogue in handling work-related issues.
While this set of goals does not necessarily include liberalization 
of migration, there are important connections. Moreover, liberalization 
of migration may be a critical means to advance opportunities to obtain 
the kind of decent work described in this statement. “In the view of the 
ILO, the main route out of poverty is work” (International Labour Or-
ganization 2007a). Yet, surprisingly, the ILO does not today seem to see 
facilitation of liberalization of migration in order to make work avail-
able as one of its “fields of action.” Article 10 of the ILO Constitution 
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states that it shall focus on “international adjustment of conditions of 
industrial life and labour.” The Declaration of Philadelphia, concerning 
the aims and purposes of the ILO, calls for the provision . . . of facilities 
for . . . the transfer of labour, including migration for employment and 
settlement . . .” 
In 2004, the ILO adopted a multilateral framework on labor migra-
tion as part of a plan to manage labor migration better. However, none 
of the activities planned under this framework seem aimed at liberal-
izing migration. In 2004, the ILO adopted a plan of action with respect 
to migration, which includes as one component the development of a 
nonbinding multilateral framework for a rights-based approach to labor 
migration.
The ILO has produced a number of treaties, mostly addressing is-
sues relating to the conditions of work. However, the rate of ratification
of ILO treaties which relate to migration for employment as well as the 
suppression of illegal employment and trafficking of labor has been 
low (Charnovitz 2003a). The ILO also provides technical assistance in 
areas such as vocational training and rehabilitation, employment policy, 
labor administration, working conditions, and social security. So it has 
important experience in many critical areas relating to migration. 
The ILO also has some salient governance features. As noted above, 
one of the intriguing and attractive features of the ILO for purposes of 
work on issues of labor migration is its tripartite governance, which 
includes representatives of states, employers, and workers. Each mem-
ber state has four representatives at the International Labor Conference, 
which is held annually: two state delegates, one employers’ delegate, 
and one workers’ delegate. Each delegate has one vote, and there is 
no requirement for the four delegates of each state to vote as a bloc. 
This tripartite structure and its potential to “catalyz(e) new international 
norms on worker mobility” has been noted by Charnovitz (2003a), who 
has also recommended that any WMO should consider adopting this 
structure “to enable the formation of stronger constituencies for lessen-
ing barriers to migration.” 
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t he Wt O
The WTO, formed in 1995, addresses trade in goods, trade in ser-
vices, and intellectual property rights. Unlike the ILO and the IOM, the 
WTO’s main function is to facilitate and service national commitments, 
mostly in the area of liberalization of trade in goods and services. The 
WTO generally makes decisions by consensus, meaning that decisions 
can generally be adopted if no state objects, although its charter pro-
vides for voting on certain issues. But any significant new commitments 
are made by treaty, where a state is only committed if it actually signs. 
The WTO has a very highly articulated system of mandatory dispute 
settlement, which is used often. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the WTO’s GATS Mode 4 already ad-
dresses movement of natural persons to perform services but has an 
ambivalent relationship with immigration law in the host state. The WTO 
has a highly developed and successful system of dispute settlement. 
While states would be able to make “cross-concessions”—exchanging 
liberalization, for example, in goods for liberalization in migration—
even if migration were not assigned to the WTO, as discussed above 
and in Chapter 9, such cross-concessions might be facilitated by inclu-
sion of these subject matters in a single organization. 
COHeren Ce and t He r eg IMe C OMplex f Or 
Interna t IOnal  l ab Or M Igra t IOn
Any analysis of international cooperation in the field of interna-
tional labor migration, or of lack of international cooperation, must 
examine the relationship among the different “regimes,” or in this case, 
organizations, involved in this area. To some extent, examining the 
IOM, ILO, and WTO, it is striking how liberalization of labor migra-
tion seems to have been deemed to fall outside the mandate of each of 
these organizations, even though their formal mandates arguably could 
be understood to include significantly broader activities in this field.
As Ghosh (2007, p. 111) suggests, “the fragmented institutional set-up 
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inhibits a comprehensive and coherent policy approach to the multi- 
dimensional problem of migration management.” 
Yet, as we examine the rationales for international cooperation in 
this field, it appears that as many economists have suggested, the great-
est payoff from cooperation may come from liberalization of migration. 
International law, and these international organizations, have done little 
to address this issue. Presumably, it is the determination of the member 
states of these organizations to avoid addressing commitments regard-
ing migration that has kept these organizations from moving into this 
area. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Global Migration Group was estab-
lished in order to provide coherence in migration policy. Indeed, the 
Global Commission on International Migration report suggested the 
establishment of an interorganizational facility for coherence among 
international organizations dealing with migration issues. 
As Jagdish Bhagwati wrote in 2003, 
We have only a fragmented set of institutions to deal with flows
of humanity. The International Labour Organisation looks af-
ter workers’ rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees deals with forced migrants. The World Trade Organisa-
tion, under its services agreement, manages the temporary access 
of professional and semi-professional workers—from builders to 
doctors—to other countries. The International Organisation for 
Migration is a cross between a consulting body and an altruistic 
group. Besides, its status is not defined by a treaty. Indeed, we do 
not have a treaty-defined “World Migration Organisation” (WMO) 
that could oversee the whole phenomenon, according to interna-
tionally agreed objectives and procedures. 
WHICH Organ Iza t IOn?
As stated above, there would be many parameters to consider in 
order to determine the organizational structure that would be appro-
priate to perform the functions useful in connection with international 
liberalization of migration. But perhaps it would be appropriate here to 
speculate, or brainstorm, a possible structure. 
Job Name: -- /309724t
Organizational Structures   335
One alternative would be the status quo. This would involve utiliz-
ing the existing organizational structure, and assigning new functions 
to particular agencies based on the affinity of those functions to existing 
functions and capacities. These agencies would be required to cooper-
ate with one another in an intensified manner. The cooperation might 
take place under the umbrella of a coordinating agency, such as the 
Global Migration Group. 
Of course, it would be straightforward to simply assign liberaliza-
tion to the WTO, insofar as the WTO is the premier organization for 
negotiations over international liberalization of goods and services. 
Cross-concessions would be facilitated, the WTO’s experience with 
dispute settlement would be made available, and cross-retaliation in the 
event of a violation might support compliance. And if this path were 
followed, the OECD, UNCTAD, IOM, and ILO could keep their cur-
rent functions and engage in cooperative activities. However, while 
cross-concessions seem appropriate, these could be facilitated in other 
ways, as discussed above. 
The ILO has broad experience in a variety of labor and migration 
issues, and its tripartite structure may facilitate negotiations that neces-
sarily will involve the concerns of industry and labor. However, the ILO 
has little experience in the kinds of distributive negotiations that have 
been the subject matter of the WTO.
None of the other existing agencies seem to have special institu-
tional features that would make them a likely candidate for authority 
over economic migration. Perhaps if there were thought to be a suf-
ficient relationship between forced migration and economic migration, 
the expertise of the IOM would be relevant. 
On the other hand, a new agency—a WMO—might be designed 
with an agreement that it would draw specified resources from, and en-
gage in specified joint activities with, the other agencies with relevant 
responsibilities. 
n ote
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) consider asset specificity only one expla-1. 
nation of vertical integration. Coase (2000) has challenged the factual accuracy 
of this example. However, the example is useful as a parable, regardless of its 
veracity.
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In geologic time, the period during which migration has been 
restricted has been quite short. As noted at the outset of this study, 
migration has served throughout time as a mechanism of human better-
ment (Chanda 2007). 
Restrictions on migration are probably the strongest corollary of 
the strict theory of national sovereignty—derived from the idea of a 
sovereign and its subjects. After all, the other core concomitant of sov-
ereignty—exclusive territorial authority—has been eroded along many 
dimensions. So, a proposal to reduce restrictions on migration must be 
understood as subversive of sovereignty. Perhaps the most important 
way in which liberalization of migration is subversive of sovereignty 
is by breaking the sovereign-subject relationship once and for all, mak-
ing it clear that governments exist to serve citizens and not the other 
way around. As discussed in Chapter 2, individual mobility may also 
provide a welcome competitive discipline on governments, although 
there are circumstances under which mobility could induce an ineffi-
cient competition. 
Given advances in understanding of international law and interna-
tional economics, it seems that restrictions on migration can no longer 
be presumed to be beneficial  Indeed, there is consensus among econo-
mists that broad restrictions on migration diminish human welfare. So, 
the next question is, which restrictions might best be dismantled, and 
what are the political conditions for dismantling them? This work has 
reviewed the welfare economics and political economy of migration, 
in order to suggest the answers to these questions. It is clear that the 
answers will vary from state to state, and that a legal structure that ac-
commodates diverse approaches to liberalization is required. 
The role of international law, in this area as in other areas, is to al-
low states to cooperate—to allow them reciprocally to cede autonomy 
in order to achieve superior outcomes. In order to increase human wel-
fare, and in order to achieve poverty-reduction benefits, an appropriate 
structure for liberalization of migration seems desirable. For practi-
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cal reasons, and for ethical reasons, it seems appropriate to establish a 
framework for gradual negotiation of liberalization in this field.
People are not commodities. This work has attempted to give this 
fact due respect, and to suggest how, nevertheless, international legal 
commitments to allow people to migrate are legitimate and appropriate. 
But it is a challenge to avoid commodification of people. Nuanced in-
ternational legal commitments, written with the whole person in mind, 
and with sympathy and humanity, are needed. It is a challenge to in-
ternational law to defragment its thinking enough to merge the more 
defined economic concerns with the no less valid concerns of humanity. 
There really is no choice, as Max Frisch meant when he said, “We im-
ported workers and got men instead” (Borjas 2007). 
There is today no multilateral system for liberalization of economic 
migration. While there are human rights norms that protect the right of 
exit, and regional systems for liberalization of migration such as the 
European Union, there is no general system for commitment to labor 
market access. And yet, the economic welfare that could be unlocked 
by such a system, especially to the extent that it allows poor people 
to move to places where they could be more productive, is enormous. 
The development potential for sending states is also substantial. This 
book examines the political barriers to unlocking welfare, and at the 
same time unlocking the “global apartheid” in which poor people are 
prevented from leaving places that keep them poor. This book proposes 
legal mechanisms that can assist states in consensually diminishing 
these political barriers. 
It is indeed true that people are not commodities, and it will not do 
simply to apply existing trade rules to the movement of people. People 
involve complex needs and social connections, making movement deli-
cate and challenging. And yet, many people wish to move, and there are 
good ethical and economic reasons to promote this movement. 
What are the factors suggesting unmet demand to move? First, wage 
rate disparities are very large. They are much larger than the differences 
in prices of goods that provide the motivation for trade. Second, de-
mographic decline in wealthy countries, combined with demographic 
surge in poor countries, suggests the bilateral need for migration. For 
example, as to the United States, the Pew Research Center has recently 
stated that, based on current trends, “the population of the United States 
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will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and 82 per-
cent of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 
2050 and their U.S.-born descendants . . . .”1 
Empirical studies of factor mobility, and estimates prepared by 
Winters et al. (2002) and by the World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group (2006), seem to confirm that there are very large potential re-
turns from increased liberalization. These potential returns substantially 
exceed the potential returns from further trade liberalization. Barriers 
to both permanent and temporary movement of natural persons are still 
quite large, and many of these barriers lack a non-economic, or pruden-
tial, justification. Thus, there is a strong initial argument from allocative 
efficiency for liberalization of economic migration.
From the standpoint of destination states, immigrants may bring 
many benefits, including skills, knowledge, entrepreneurial spirit, 
and innovation. These benefits may assist in growth. There is little 
doubt that many likely destination states would gain from immigra-
tion of skilled workers. Destination states are benefited by migration 
to the extent that the migration responds to relative scarcity or pro-
ductivity gains, increasing the general productivity of the economy. By 
increasing the supply of labor, immigration increases the productivity 
of factors that are complementary to that labor. The increased income 
for destination country employers is termed the “immigration surplus.” 
Smith and Edmonston (1997) develop a basic economic model using 
what they believe to be plausible assumptions, including constant re-
turns to scale, to show that immigration produces net economic gains 
for domestic residents. Immigration allows existing domestic workers 
to increase their specialization, producing goods more efficientl . On 
the consumption side, immigrants produce new goods and services and 
are paid less than the value of these goods and services, so domestic 
residents are likely to gain. 
Furthermore, to the extent that immigrants contribute more in taxes 
than they receive in government services and transfer payments, immi-
grants may provide another benefit. The excess is a net fiscal transfer to 
nonimmigrant taxpayers. It is easy to see that high-skilled immigrants 
are likely to pay more in taxes, and consume less in government ser-
vices and transfer payments, than low-skilled immigrants. 
Job Name: -- /309724t
340   Trachtman
However, destination countries may be harmed through three mech-
anisms. First, they may be harmed to the extent that certain groups of 
native or earlier immigrant workers are harmed, where the costs of ad-
justment exceed the productivity benefits. Second, they may be harmed 
through the fiscal mechanism, whereby immigrants receive more in 
public services and transfer payments than they contribute through 
taxes. As Hanson concludes, discussing the U.S. market, if “immigrants 
are a net fiscal drain, the total impact of immigration on the United 
States would be positive only if the immigration surplus exceeded 
the fiscal transfer made to immigrants.” “For low-skilled immigration 
 . . . this does not appear to be the case” (Hanson 2007, p. 21). Third, 
the destination state will experience the costs of administering an im-
migration system. 
Economic theory suggests that, for destination states, an “optimal 
immigration policy would admit individuals whose skills are in shortest 
supply and whose tax contributions, net of the cost of public services 
they receive, are as large as possible” (Hanson 2007, p. 4). Yet it may 
not be a simple matter to determine relative scarcity or abundance. “A 
given type of worker may be scarce [in the U.S.] either because the U.S. 
supply of his skill type is low relative to the rest of the world, or because 
the U.S. demand for his skill type is high relative to the rest of the world, 
as with computer scientists and engineers” (Hanson 2007, p. 14). So it 
is not strange, as Hanson (2007) explains, that in the United States, both 
high-skilled software programmers and engineers employed by rapidly 
expanding technology industries, and also low-skilled workers in con-
struction, food preparation, and cleaning services, are scarce. 
One of the critical issues that liberalization of migration will have 
to face is the fact that much of the desire to migrate involves migration 
from poor countries to advanced countries. Richard Freeman (2006, p. 
161) suggests that “one plausible explanation is that countries differ 
in technology (Markusen 1983; Markusen and Svensson 1985). If an 
advanced economy uses more productive technology than a develop-
ing country, then returns to both labor and capital will be higher in the 
advanced economy and both factors will migrate there (Gierking and 
Mutti 1983).” 
It is possible that destination states may under some circumstances 
lose from immigration of unskilled workers, while origin states may 
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gain. Emigration of low-skilled workers can increase wages and reduce 
unemployment and underemployment of poor workers in the home 
country. O’Rourke finds that wages rose in emigration countries dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, converging with 
countries of immigration, and that “emigration was an important source 
of living standard convergence for [emigration countries]” (O’Rourke 
2004, p. 7). Taylor and Williamson (1997, p. 27) find that international 
real wage dispersion declined by 28 percent from 1870 to 1910, but 
that without the mass migrations of this period, wage dispersion would 
have increased by 7 percent. Migration explains about 70 percent of 
living standards convergence during this period. O’Rourke concludes 
that “emigration was thus a major source of poverty relief in these econ-
omies, allowing living standards to grow far more rapidly than they 
would have in its absence” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 9; Williamson 2002).
Emigration of low-skilled workers has usually been beneficial to 
developing countries, contributing to poverty alleviation (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 64). However, recent studies 
of Albania, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka show no discernible wage im-
provements, despite large-scale emigration (Lucas 2004). Much will 
depend on remittances, return migration, and facilitation of investment 
by virtue of emigration. While the effects of brain drain are uncertain, 
it is possible that poor states could be harmed by emigration of skilled 
workers. 
Although it seems fairly clear that there are significant potential 
global gains to be achieved by liberalizing migration, it is also clear that 
these gains are not distributed evenly. Rather, as is the case with trade 
in goods or services, there will be winners and there will be losers. The 
problem for domestic and international politics, and for international 
institutions, is to establish a method of facilitating policy changes that 
are Pareto improvements in the sense that even those who might other-
wise be losers are better off. The problem for international institutions 
is to assist in building domestic coalitions that will enable welfare-
enhancing policy changes. These policy changes may require careful 
structuring of liberalization, or linkage of liberalization of emigration 
to other types of concessions. 
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I focus here on the implications of economically self-interested 
behavior by voters and lobbyists, rather than important issues of irre-
dentism, demagoguery, and security. 
Between wealthy states, there is little need for international agree-
ments regarding migration. First, there is little demand to migrate, 
because wages and productivity are relatively homogeneous. Second, 
wealthy states already autonomously allow immigration of skilled 
workers from other wealthy states, and unskilled workers have little 
reason to move. While there is little need for such an agreement, and the 
welfare payoff would be low, there is little reason not to provide com-
mitments and clarification of market access for labo .
The more interesting case is migration between poor and rich coun-
tries. Here, the potential welfare gains are very large. However, there 
are three substantial political problems:
The welfare gains accrue largely to the migrants themselves. The 1) 
implication of this fact is that neither the home country nor the 
destination country has strong incentives for liberalization.
There is little room for reciprocal agreements within the field of 2) 
migration, because migration between poor and rich countries 
is a “one-way street.” That is, generally speaking, there is little 
demand by rich country citizens to migrate to poor countries. 
This is because the differences in productivity that give rise to 
the incentive to migrate from poor to rich countries also give rise 
to strong disincentives to migrate from rich to poor countries. 
There is concern, although there is no consensus among econo-3) 
mists on the empirics, that migration of low-skilled workers into 
wealthy countries reduces the jobs and employment of native 
low-skilled workers in wealthy countries. 
And yet, the political economy of migration is different from the 
political economy of trade, because producers are generally interested 
in liberalization of immigration by their own state. 
Let us focus on the political problems of liberalizing migration 
between poor and wealthy states. If productivity differences were not 
great, it would be possible that reciprocal international agreements for 
liberalization could assist in forming a proliberalization coalition be-
tween producers and potential emigrants who seek openness in other 
states. If productivity differences are great, it may be more difficult
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to form proliberalization coalitions. However, one way to do so is to 
provide for other concessions by poor states to wealthy states, perhaps 
along the lines of liberalization of investment or high-value services. 
This type of reciprocation would be benevolent, with both parts of the 
bargain improving the welfare of poor states. To the extent that un-
skilled or other classes of workers are hurt in wealthy states, the wealthy 
states may need to provide adjustment mechanisms to procure support. 
Another possible inducement for a proliberalization reciprocal agree-
ment might be the alternative strategy that destination state capital can 
pursue, through use of outsourcing or through employment of illegal 
workers. From the standpoint of destination state labor, it may be that 
legal immigration is a superior outcome compared to outsourcing or 
illegal immigration. 
One of the political problems with migration is that most of the 
benefits accrue to the migrants themselves. Economists often support 
temporary migration in order to guard against potential adverse effects 
of brain drain. However, a more attractive option in order to prevent 
adverse effects of brain drain, and to increase political support of lib-
eralization in the home state, is to support the home state’s efforts to 
recapture its investment in high-skilled emigrants through the ability to 
charge a tax on some portion of the emigrant’s income. Furthermore, to 
the extent that immigration may harm certain classes of workers in the 
destination state, or may impose undue pressures on welfare or transfer 
programs, it may be appropriate to allow some level of discriminatory 
taxation of migrants by the destination state. These tax arrangements 
may assist in inducing the development of proliberalization coalitions. 
In Chapters 9 and 10, this work has suggested the possibility of a 
migration fee levied on migrants, perhaps in the form of a tax, which 
could be split, as determined to be appropriate, between the host state 
and the home state. The calculation of this migration fee, and its al-
location, would depend on two principal components: 1) the value of 
the home state contribution to human capital of the migrant, and 2) the 
value of the increment to productivity, and wages, that the migrant at-
tains simply by moving from the host state to the home state. In a sense 
these components together measure the societal contribution to the 
individual’s productivity. They also are a measure of the “moral luck” 
of the individual in receiving from society a certain measure of produc-
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tive capacity. It would be ethically innovative to charge individuals a 
tax or fee calculated by reference to their moral luck. This structure, 
combined with redistribution designed to provide equality of resources, 
might be understood as a way to implement Dworkinian egalitarianism 
as to resources (Dworkin 1981). Of course, application of this type of 
redistribution only to migrants might be improperly limited, and might 
have the result of distorting migration. 
Of course the form of any agreement, and the structure of any or-
ganization, to address international economic migration will result, if at 
all, from an extensive domestic and international political give-and-take 
that this book cannot reflect. Rather, this book should be understood as 
a suggestion to commence the give-and-take: as an indication that this 
is a path to greater welfare worthy of exploration. And yet, I thought it 
useful to set out as an appendix a speculated form of agreement. This is 
intended not as something that states should enter into, but more as an 
example or checklist of the types of things that may be worthy of con-
sideration. It is by no means complete and does not purport to reflect the 
preferences and concerns that must be reflected: only the political pro-
cess of negotiation can do that. The main concern of this book has been 
to show that a multilateral agreement on migration may be feasible and 
useful. The actual shape of such an agreement will depend on a number 
of parameters that are unknown at this time, and upon the dynamics of 
negotiation. 
This book’s analysis suggests that different states will have different 
strategic positions, that different economic sectors within these states 
will have different strategic positions, and even that different occupa-
tional groups will have different strategic positions. Thus, it is clearly 
impossible to specify a single arrangement for international coopera-
tion, or even to predict whether international cooperation will occur. 
However, we know that in the aggregate, liberalization is expected 
to provide increased surplus, and, assuming that there are mechanisms 
that can be devised to overcome the strategic problems that may exist 
between different domestic constituencies, and between different states, 
and that the increased surplus exceeds the cost of its capture, we would 
expect states to move to do so. This book is an exercise in institutional 
imagination intended first to evaluate whether the surplus may exceed 
the cost of its capture, and how states may move to capture it. That they 
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have not made these moves generally thus far does not mean that such 
moves are not available: it would be difficult to argue that the interna-
tional legal system as we see it is already efficient. Some may argue 
that capital markets, with their clear pricing, narrow profit motives, and 
numerous transactions, are already efficient, and that therefore, new 
transactions cannot result in profits. However, the international legal 
system is far less efficient, so we may expect that new transactions—of 
the nature described above—could make the parties better off. 
In order to move forward, it will be necessary to analyze different 
states, different sectors within states, and different occupations within 
those sectors, in order to understand the strategic position of each. Then, 
once we know what game is being played, we can evaluate which inter-
national legal rules, if any, are useful in order to allow for the maximum 
net payoffs. It is by establishing a framework agreement, and engaging 
in negotiations, that states will be able to evaluate and reveal whether 
there are useful transactions that may be effected. 
A framework agreement that allows for states to agree on the struc-
ture of reciprocity, to allow sending states to share in the benefits of 
liberalization through a Bhagwati tax or other mechanism, to make side 
payments through linkage to other areas of liberalization, and to make 
side payments through immigration fees, would establish an appropriate 
institutional framework—would minimize the transaction costs—for 
states to negotiate optimal arrangements. While such a framework 
agreement might best be legally binding, it is possible that it might 
alternatively be best kept informal. In international law, the distinction 
may have only subtle behavioral implications. 
Assuming that liberalization of migration is potentially Pareto 
efficient, it may be that states are unable to achieve the efficient liberal-
ization unless a move is made toward actual Pareto efficiency: toward 
compensation of states and individuals that are otherwise made worse 
off. 
The national political economy of international migration as de-
veloped in Chapter 4 is complex, and mediates imperfectly the welfare 
considerations developed in Chapter 2, and mediates even more imper-
fectly the ethical considerations developed in Chapter 3. However, even 
an imprecise assessment of the interplay of interest and power yields 
insights into the possibility that international legal rules may play a role 
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in committing other states to act, in order to support domestic coalitions 
that will support liberalization. 
Note
Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Population Projections 2005–2050 (Feb-1. 
ruary 11, 2008), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/703/population 
-projections-united-states.
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Appendix A
Illustrative Draft General 
Agreement on Labor Migration
This illustrative draft agreement is provided merely to indicate the types 
of provisions that might be negotiated by states if they were to determine to 
enter into a multilateral “General Agreement on Labor Migration.” Its provi-
sions should be understood more as a checklist of issues to consider than as a 
recommendation as to how issues should be resolved. Furthermore, there are 
many additional issues that states will wish to consider as they approach such 
an agreement. Finally, this illustrative draft agreement does not contain provi-
sions creating or specifying the design of an organization in which to house 
the agreement. 
1. Preamble 
1.1. Recognizing the growing importance of migration for the growth and 
development of the world economy; 
1.2. Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules 
for migration with a view to the expansion of migration under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the 
economic growth of all home states and destination states and the development 
of developing countries; 
1.3. Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of lib-
eralization of migration through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations 
aimed at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous 
basis and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving 
due respect to national policy objectives;
1.4. Recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new 
regulations, on the health standards applicable to immigrants, the security 
standards applicable to immigrants, and the qualifications of professions and 
skilled work within their territories; 
1.5. Desiring to facilitate the reduction of poverty and the development of 
developing countries;
1.6. Taking particular account of the serious difficulty of the least- 
developed countries in view of their special economic situation and their de-
velopment, trade, and financial needs
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Hereby agree as follows:
PART I
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
2. Scope. This Agreement applies to measures by member states affecting 
labor migration, including without limitation immigration. 
3. Definition
3.1. For the purposes of this Agreement, labor migration is defined as the 
physical departure of a citizen of one Member from that Member, the travel of 
such citizen to a destination Member, and the admission and residence of such 
citizen in the destination Member, for the purpose of seeking or taking up any 
type of labor.
3.2. For the purposes of this Agreement:
3.2.1. “measures by Members” means measures taken by:
3.2.1.1. central, regional, or local governments and authorities; and 
3.2.1.2. nongovernmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by 
central, regional, or local governments or authorities;
3.2.2. In fulfilli g its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, 
each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to 
ensure their observance by regional and local governments and authorities and 
nongovernmental bodies within its territory.
PART II
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINES
4. Transparency
4.1. Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situa-
tions, at the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of 
general application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement. 
International agreements to which a Member is a signatory pertaining to or af-
fecting labor migration shall also be published.
4.2. Where publication as referred to in paragraph 1 is not practicable, 
such information shall be made publicly available otherwise.
4.3. Each Member shall promptly and at least annually inform the Council 
for Migration of the introduction of any new, or any changes to existing, laws, 
regulations, or administrative guidelines which significantly affect migration 
covered by its specific commitments under this Agreement.
4.4. Each Member shall respond promptly to all requests by any other 
Member for specific information on any of its measures of general application 
or international agreements within the meaning of paragraph 1. Each Member 
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shall also establish one or more enquiry points to provide specific information 
to other Members, upon request, on all such matters as well as those subject 
to the notification requirement in paragraph 3. Such enquiry points shall be 
established within one year from the date of entry into force of this Agree-
ment. Appropriate flexibility with respect to the time limit within which such 
enquiry points are to be established may be agreed upon for individual devel-
oping country Members. Enquiry points need not be depositories of laws and 
regulations.
4.5. Any Member may notify to the Council for Migration any measure, 
taken by any other Member, which it considers affects the operation of this 
Agreement. 
4.6. Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Member to provide con-
fidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement, 
or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which would prejudice legiti-
mate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
5. Labor Market Access Commitments
5.1. Each Member shall set out in a schedule appended to this Agreement 
the specific commitments it undertakes under this Agreement. 
5.1.1. Commitments shall be structured in any of the following ways:
5.1.1.1. Horizontal Commitments. Horizontal commitments relate to all 
immigrants.
5.1.1.2. Occupational Title Commitments. Vertical occupational title 
commitments relate to immigrants who are categorized within a particular oc-
cupational title. Wherever possible, each Member shall utilize the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations 2008, as in force on the date hereof 
(“ISCO 2008”), as a basis for its occupational title commitments. Each Mem-
ber shall publish a set of definiti ns of each occupational title, showing how its 
definitions di fer from the relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
5.1.1.3. Occupational Group Commitments. Vertical occupational group 
commitments relate to immigrants who are categorized within a particular 
occupational group. Wherever possible, each Member shall utilize the ISCO 
2008, as a basis for its occupational group commitments. Each Member shall 
publish a set of definitions of each occupational group, showing how its defin -
tions differ from the relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
5.1.1.4. Skill Level Commitments. Skill level commitments relate to im-
migrants who are categorized within a particular skill level group. Wherever 
possible, each Member shall utilize the ISCO 2008 skill level group defin -
tions, as a basis for its skill level commitments. Each Member shall publish a 
set of definitions of each skill level, showing how its definitions differ from the 
relevant ISCO 2008 definitions.
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5.1.1.5. Wealth Level Commitments. Wealth level commitments relate to 
the net worth of the individual immigrant or family of immigrants, and shall be 
specified in the Schedule of Commitments in terms of a monetary amount, as 
well as a statement as to evidentiary requirements required to be met in order 
to qualify under these commitments.
5.1.2. With respect to each commitment undertaken, each Schedule shall 
specify:   
5.1.2.1. distinctions, where desired, between those who already have ac-
cepted a job offer in the destination Member, and those who wish to enter the 
labor market of the destination Member;
5.1.2.2. terms, limitations, and conditions on access;   
5.1.2.3. conditions and limitations on national treatment;   
5.1.2.4. undertakings relating to additional commitments;   
5.1.2.5. where appropriate, the time frame for implementation of such 
commitments; 
5.1.2.6. the date of entry into force of such commitments.  
5.1.3. Schedules of specific commitments shall be annexed to this Agree-
ment and shall form an integral part thereof.
5.2. With respect to labor market access, including the issuance of a visa (if 
necessary) and entry, each Member shall accord citizens of any other Member 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations 
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule
5.3. Quota for entry. A Member may specify within their schedules as to 
a specific classification of immigrant such quotas or other numerical limit on 
entry as such Member shall determine. 
5.4. Immigration fee or discriminatory tax. Members may specify within 
their Schedules as to a specific classification of immigrant, from a specific
home Member, that such immigrants shall be subject to an immigration fee, 
or an income tax that may be greater or less than that ordinarily applicable to 
citizens or residents. To the extent that the tax is greater than that ordinarily 
applicable to citizens, the collecting Member shall, as specified in its Sched-
ule, either (i) apply the proceeds in a manner reasonably designed to provide 
adjustment assistance to citizens or residents who have experienced economic 
dislocation due to immigration, and shall notify the Council for Migration 
annually of the details of such application, or (ii) transfer the proceeds repre-
senting the excess of the applied tax over that ordinarily applicable to citizens 
to the home Member in respect of the subject immigrant. 
5.5. Restrictions on term of residence, if any. A Member may specify 
within its Schedule as to a specific classification of immigrant such temporal or 
other limitations on the term of residence of such immigrant as such Member 
shall determine. 
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5.6. Entry of family members. A Member may specify within its Schedules 
as to a specific classification of immigrant such provisions relating to permis-
sion for entry of family members and national treatment of family members 
as such Member may determine; provided, however, that any immigrant who 
resides or is expected to reside in the territory of a Member for a period great-
er than one year shall be permitted to be accompanied by such immigrant’s 
spouse or domestic partner, children, or parents. 
5.7. Members may negotiate commitments with respect to measures af-
fecting immigration, including those regarding qualifications or licensing 
matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Member’s Schedule.
6.Prohibition of other Quantitative or Economic Restrictions, Including 
Labor Market Certification Arrangements.
6.1. Other than the types of restrictions permitted to be included in Mem-
bers’ Schedules pursuant to Article 5, Members shall apply no quantitative 
restrictions on immigrants. 
6.2. “Quantitative restrictions” include not only quotas but also, without 
limitation, labor market certification requirements, competitive needs tests, 
minimum wages (other than generally applicable minimum wages applied 
without discrimination by nationality), or other similar labor market condi-
tion-based restrictions or conditions on entry. 
7. MFN in Entry
7.1. With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, except as 
specifically provided in this Agreement, each Member shall accord immedi-
ately and unconditionally to citizens of any other Member treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords to like citizens of any other country. 
7.2. Where a Member maintains a quota on immigration, such quota shall 
be allocated among home countries. The Member applying the restrictions 
may seek agreement with all other Members having a substantial interest with 
respect to the allocation of shares in the quota. In cases in which this method 
is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members 
having a substantial interest shares based upon the proportions of immigrants 
supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, due ac-
count being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be 
affecting immigration.
7.3. A Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with paragraph 1 
provided that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the An-
nex on Article 7 Exemptions. 
7.4. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be so construed as to 
prevent any Member from conferring or according advantages to adjacent 
countries in order to facilitate short-term migration limited to contiguous fron-
tier zones.
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8. MFN Exceptions for Existing Arrangements, Including Bilateral Labor 
Agreements
8.1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a 
party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing labor migration between or 
among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement: 
8.1.1. provides for substantial liberalization of immigration restrictions in 
both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations, 
8.1.2. has substantial occupational coverage, and
8.1.3. provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all dis-
crimination, in the sense of Article 11, between or among the parties, in the 
occupations covered under subparagraphs 1 and 2, through: 
8.1.3.1. elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
8.1.3.2. prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the 
entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time frame, 
except for measures permitted under Article 11 and exceptional provisions of 
this Agreement. 
8.2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1 are met, con-
sideration may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process 
of labor integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned. 
8.3. Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided regarding the conditions 
set out in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph 3 thereof, 
in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both 
overall and in individual occupations.
8.4. Any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facili-
tate migration between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect 
of any Member outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to 
migration within the respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level ap-
plicable prior to such an agreement.  
8.5. Members that are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
shall promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any signifi-
cant modification of that agreement to the Council for Migration. They shall 
also make available to the Council such relevant information as may be re-
quested by it. The Council may establish a working party to examine such an 
agreement or enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to 
the Council on its consistency with this Article. 
8.6. Members that are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 
1 which is implemented on the basis of a time frame shall report periodically 
to the Council for Migration on its implementation. The Council may estab-
lish a working party to examine such reports if it deems such a working party 
necessary. 
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8.7. Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in subpara-
graphs 5 and 6, the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it 
deems appropriate. 
9. Prohibition of Restrictions on Emigration. 
9.1. Members shall not take any measures to restrict or hinder emigration 
by their citizens and residents. 
9.2. The obligations of Members under paragraph 1 shall be subject to 
exceptions as appropriate on reasonable grounds of protection of national or 
international public health, national security, and public policy, provided that 
these exceptions comply with international human rights law. 
10. Emigration Tax 
10.1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, and not-
withstanding any provision in any tax treaty or other treaty in force between 
Members, home state Members may continue to tax their citizens after emigra-
tion to any destination state Member. 
10.2. Any tax imposed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be limited to an 
amount calculated as specified in the Schedule of Article 10 Taxes of the rel-
evant Member. The relevant Member may reduce the tax specified on such 
Schedule at any time. 
10.3. Any tax imposed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall give rise to a deduc-
tion or to a credit under the tax regime of the destination state Member as 
and to the extent specified in the Schedule of Commitments of the destination 
Member. 
10.4. The destination state Member shall provide full assistance to the 
home state Member in connection with the collection and enforcement of any 
tax imposed under paragraph 1. 
11. National Treatment
11.1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions 
or qualifications set out therein or elsewhere in this Agreement, each Member 
shall accord to citizens of any other Member, in respect of all measures affect-
ing immigration, the right to work after entry, and the conditions of work after 
entry, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like citizens.1
11.2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the treatment a Member 
accords to citizens of the other Member may be different from the treatment 
the Member accords to its persons, provided that: 
11.2.1. the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary for 
prudential, fiduciar , health and safety, or consumer protection reasons; and 
11.2.2. such different treatment is equivalent in effect to the treatment ac-
corded by the Member to its ordinary residents for such reasons. 
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11.3. The Member proposing or according different treatment under para-
graph 2 shall have the burden of establishing that such treatment is consistent 
with that paragraph. 
11.4. No provision of this Article shall be construed as imposing obli-
gations or conferring rights upon either Member with respect to government 
procurement or subsidies. 
11.5. Labor organization. Where membership in a labor organization is 
available to citizens, Members shall ensure that such labor organization admits 
immigrants under conditions and circumstances that are no less favorable than 
those that the labor organization accords to citizens of the Member. Any clause 
of a collective agreement or individual agreement concerning eligibility for 
employment, remuneration, or other conditions of work shall be null and void 
insofar as it provides for discrimination against nationals of other Members. 
11.6. Military service. No migrant under this Agreement shall be obligated 
to serve in the military service of the destination state, unless and until such 
individual becomes a citizen of such destination state. 
11.7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, no Member 
shall have any obligation under this Agreement to accord to any person the 
right to vote in political elections, to admit any person to elective or appointive 
public office, or to allow any person to enlist in its military, police, or other 
security services. 
12. Public services. In addition to the obligations provided under Article 
11.1, Members shall ensure that immigrants have equal access to public ser-
vices provided to citizens, including public education, public health services, 
public housing, police and fire protection services, social work services, and 
other public services. 
13. Coordination of Social Security. In order to provide freedom of move-
ment for workers and self-employed persons, the Members shall, in the field
of social security, secure, as provided for in Annex 13, for workers and self-
employed persons and their dependants, in particular: 
13.1. aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to 
benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into ac-
count under the laws of the several countries; 
13.2. payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of 
Members. 
14. Professional Qualifications, Licensing, and Recognitio
14.1. In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Mem-
ber shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting immigration 
and authorization to work are administered in a reasonable, objective, and im-
partial manner. 
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14.2. Each Member shall maintain or institute as soon as practicable ju-
dicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the 
request of an affected person, for the prompt review of, and where justified,
appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting migration. Where 
such procedures are not independent of the agency entrusted with the adminis-
trative decision concerned, the Member shall ensure that the procedures in fact 
provide for an objective and impartial review.
14.3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not be construed to require a 
Member to institute such tribunals or procedures where this would be inconsis-
tent with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system.
14.4. Where authorization is required for the practice of an occupation 
on which a specific commitment has been made, the competent authorities of 
a Member shall, within a reasonable period of time after the submission of an 
application considered complete under domestic laws and regulations, inform 
the applicant of the decision concerning the application. At the request of the 
applicant, the competent authorities of the Member shall provide, without un-
due delay, information concerning the status of the application.
14.5. With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification
requirements and procedures and licensing requirements do not constitute un-
necessary barriers to immigration, the Council for Migration shall, through 
appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such 
disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia:
14.5.1. based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence 
and the ability to practice the occupation;
14.5.2. not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 
practice of the occupation and to achieve other relevant public policy goals;
14.5.3. in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction 
on immigration.
14.6. In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments, 
pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant 
to paragraph 5, the Member shall not apply licensing and qualification require-
ments that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a manner which
14.6.1. does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 14.5.1, 
14.5.2, or 14.5.3; and
14.6.2. could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the 
time the specific commitments in those sectors were made
14.7. In determining whether a Member is in conformity with the obliga-
tion under paragraph 6, account shall be taken of international standards of 
relevant international organizations applied by that Member.2
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14.8. In sectors where specific commitments regarding professional oc-
cupations are undertaken, each Member shall provide for adequate procedures 
to verify the competence of professionals of any other Member. 
15. Recognition. 
15.1. For the purposes of the fulfillment, in whole or in part, of its stan-
dards or criteria for the authorization, licensing, or certification of practitioners 
of specific occupations, and subject to the requirements of paragraph 3, a 
Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements 
met, or licenses or certification  granted in a particular country. Such recog-
nition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be 
based upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may 
be accorded autonomously.
15.2. A Member that is a party to an agreement or arrangement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1, whether existing or future, shall afford adequate 
opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such 
an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable ones with it. Where a 
Member accords recognition autonomously, it shall afford adequate opportu-
nity for any other Member to demonstrate that education, experience, licenses, 
or certifications obtained or requirements met in that other Member’s territory 
should be recognized.
15.3. A Member shall not accord recognition in a manner which would 
constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the application of its 
standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing, or certification of practi-
tioners of specific occupations, or a disguised restriction on migration
15.4. Each Member shall:
15.4.1. within 12 months from the date on which this Agreement takes ef-
fect for it, inform the Council for Migration of its existing recognition measures 
and state whether such measures are based on agreements or arrangements of 
the type referred to in paragraph 1; 
15.4.2. promptly inform the Council for Migration as far in advance as 
possible of the opening of negotiations on an agreement or arrangement of 
the type referred to in paragraph 1 in order to provide adequate opportunity to 
any other Member to indicate their interest in participating in the negotiations 
before they enter a substantive phase;
15.4.3. promptly inform the Council for Migration when it adopts new 
recognition measures or significantly modifies existing ones and state whether 
the measures are based on an agreement or arrangement of the type referred to 
in paragraph 1.
16. Permission for Remittances in Host State and Home State. Members 
shall not prohibit or inhibit the freedom of migrants to transfer funds earned by 
their work, subject to the observance of applicable law relating to regulation of 
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money laundering, taxation, or judicial orders, or other reasonable regulatory 
purposes.
17. Economic Safeguards
17.1. In the event of a labor market disturbance that a Member has deter-
mined, pursuant to the provisions below, seriously threatens or causes serious 
injury to that Member’s affected citizens’ standard of living in a particular 
labor market of that Member (the “relevant labor market”), that Member may, 
as a safeguard measure, temporarily derogate from the relevant liberalization 
commitments specified in its Schedule, to the extent and for such time as may 
be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. Under no circumstances shall 
such temporary exception be applied for longer than six months. Any Member 
taking such measure shall communicate the circumstance and the period of the 
exception to the Secretariat, which shall notify the other Members. 
17.2. Safeguard measures shall be applied by restricting entry of new im-
migrants in accordance with the most-favored nation principles of Articles 7 
and 8 of this Agreement. 
17.3. Safeguard measures shall not be applied in any way to affect the 
position of immigrants who arrived prior to the determination specified in 
paragraph 1. Nor shall any form of expulsion be applied in connection with 
immigrants who immigrate pursuant to this Agreement, 
17.4. A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an inves-
tigation by the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures 
previously established and made public in consonance with Article 4. This in-
vestigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and 
public hearings or other appropriate means in which employers, workers, and 
other interested parties may present evidence and their views, including the 
opportunity to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their 
views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure 
would be in the public interest. The competent authorities shall publish a report 
setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent 
issues of fact and law.
17.5. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
17.5.1. “serious injury” shall be understood to mean a significant overall 
impairment in the position of workers in a relevant labor market; 
17.5.2. “threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean serious in-
jury that is clearly imminent. A determination of the existence of a threat of 
serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture, 
or remote possibility; 
17.5.3. in determining injury or threat thereof, a “relevant labor market” 
shall be understood to mean the workers as a whole who are directly competi-
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tive with one another such that the entry into the market of additional workers 
has a direct and significant e fect on the wages of incumbent workers. 
17.6. In the investigation to determine whether a labor market disturbance 
has caused or is threatening to cause serious injury to affected citizens’ stan-
dard of living in a relevant labor market of a Member under the terms of this 
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an 
objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that labor 
market. The determination referred to in subparagraph 1 shall not be made 
unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the 
existence of a causal link between a labor market disturbance in the relevant 
labor market and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than the 
labor market disturbance are causing injury to the relevant labor market at the 
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to the labor market disturbance. 
The competent authorities shall publish promptly a detailed analysis of the 
case under investigation as well as a demonstration of the relevance of the 
factors examined. 
17.7. Any safeguards measure taken under this Article shall be accompa-
nied, within six months, by a program of adjustment assistance undertaken by 
the Member taking the safeguards measure. Such program of adjustment as-
sistance shall be sufficient to ensure that the significant overall impairment in 
the position of workers in the relevant labor market is ameliorated. 
17.8. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent nec-
essary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a 
quantitative restriction is used, such a measure shall not reduce the quantity 
of immigration below the level of a recent period which shall be the average 
of immigration in the last three representative years for which statistics are 
available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary 
to prevent or remedy serious injury. Members should choose measures most 
suitable for the achievement of these objectives.
17.9. In cases in which a quota is allocated among home countries, the 
Member applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the al-
location of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial 
interest. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the Mem-
ber concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial interest shares based 
upon the proportions of immigrants supplied by such Members during a previ-
ous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which 
may have affected or may be affecting immigration.
18. Public Policy and Public Security Exceptions
18.1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, Members may derogate 
from their commitments under this Agreement, on grounds of public policy or 
public security. These grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends.
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18.2. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall 
comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on 
the personal conduct of the individual concerned. 
18.3. The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent 
a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the funda-
mental interests of society. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars 
of the case or that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be 
accepted.
18.4. In order to ascertain whether the person concerned represents a 
danger for public policy or public security, the host Member may, should it 
consider this essential, request the home Member and, if need be, other Mem-
bers, to provide information concerning any previous police record the person 
concerned may have. Such enquiries shall not be made as a matter of routine. 
The Member consulted shall give its reply within two months. 
19. Public Health Exceptions
19.1. Members retain the right to take action in order to protect national 
and international public health, pursuant to the provisions of this Article.
19.2. The only diseases justifying derogations from the commitments 
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement shall be the diseases with epidemic po-
tential as defined by the relevant instruments of the World Health Organization 
and other infectious diseases or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the 
subject of protection provisions applying to nationals of the host Member.
19.3. Diseases occurring after a three-month period from the date of ar-
rival shall not constitute grounds for expulsion from the territory of the host 
Member.
19.4. Where there are serious indications that it is necessary, Members 
may, within three months of the date of arrival, require immigrants to undergo, 
free of charge, a medical examination to certify that they are not suffering from 
any of the conditions referred to in paragraph 2. Such medical examinations 
may not be required as a matter of routine.
20. Right of Return. The home Member of any person who has left any 
destination state for any reason, including without limitation if such person has 
been expelled on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health, 
shall allow that person to return at any time from another Member and to re-
enter its territory without any formality even if the nationality of the holder is 
in dispute. 
21. Protection Against Expulsion
21.1. Before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or 
public security, the host Member shall take account of considerations such as 
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state 
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of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into 
the host Member, and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
21.2. The host Member may not take an expulsion decision against persons 
who have the right of permanent residence on its territory, except on serious 
grounds of public policy or public security.
21.3. An expulsion decision may not be taken except if the decision is 
based on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member, if 
they:
21.3.1. have resided in the host Member for the previous 10 years; or
21.3.2. are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best in-
terests of the child, as provided for in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.
22. Cooperation in Reduction of Unauthorized Migration. Members shall 
exercise their best efforts to cooperate with other Members in discouraging and 
preventing unauthorized migration. 
23. Progressive Liberalization.
23.1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall 
enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years 
from the date of entry into force of this Agreement and periodically thereafter, 
with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization. Such 
negotiations shall be directed to the reduction or elimination of barriers to mi-
gration. This process shall take place with a view to promoting the interests of 
all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and to securing an overall 
balance of rights and obligations.   
23.2. The process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for na-
tional policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members, 
both overall and in individual sectors. There shall be appropriate flexibility for 
individual developing country Members for liberalization in line with their 
development situation and, when making access to their markets available to 
foreign persons, attaching to such access conditions aimed at achieving their 
development objectives. 
23.3. For each round, negotiating guidelines and procedures shall be es-
tablished. For the purposes of establishing such guidelines, the Secretariat shall 
carry out an assessment of migration in overall terms and on a sectoral basis 
with reference to the objectives of this Agreement, including its development 
objectives. 
23.4. The process of progressive liberalization shall be advanced in each 
such round through bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral negotiations directed 
toward increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by 
Members under this Agreement.
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24. Loyalty. Member governments shall refrain from disparaging the 
labor market, cultural, political, or ethnic effects or contributions of immi-
grants. Member governments shall ensure that any official analyses of labor 
market conditions follow sound social scientific methods of establishing causal 
relationships. 
25. Relationship to International Human Rights and Labor Rights 
Treaties. 
25.1. Except as specifically provided in their Schedules, Members shall 
comply with the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (No. 97), 
including Optional Annex 1 thereof, the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Pro-
visions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143), and the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.  
25.2. With respect to migrants, Members shall comply with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
25.3. [other human rights and labor rights instruments to be listed]
26. Relationship to Other Treaties
26.1. Relationship to International Tax Treaties
26.2. Relationship to International Investment Treaties
26.3. Relationship to International Trade Treaties
27. Secretariat and Funding [to be provided]
28. Decision-Making [to be provided]
28.1. The Committee on Migration
29. Dispute Settlement [to be provided]
30. Final Provisions [to be provided]
Notes
Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require 1. 
any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which re-
sult from the foreign character of the individual.
The term “relevant international organizations” refers to international bodies 2. 
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.
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